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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Lüder's Financial Management Reform Process Model (2002) is used to analyse and explain 
the context of the accounting reform process at the central government of Malta, thus 
introducing Malta in the field of Comparative International Governmental Accounting 
Research (CIGAR). Organisational Theory that underlies this model is referred to when 
discussing its limitations. The qualitative research methodology required a set of interviews 
with actors involved in the reform process, supported by documentary research. 
 
The governmental accounting reform process in Malta is described in two phases: the 
environment of the first phase is assessed as conducive to change; in the second phase, 
stronger forces at macro level reduced this conduciveness. The long-winding reforms at 
central government level in Malta may only be illusory because once the statistical reporting 
requirements for Eurostat were achieved, the reform concept changed. The findings confirm 
the centrality of the budget in government accounting. 
 
The decision by the Maltese Government to adopt International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards (IPSAS) does not appear to be well-informed and appears based on the quest for 
credibility. The objective of the European Union (EU)'s interest in IPSAS is also questioned 
since these financial reporting standards do not give budgeting particular importance, and 
reporting to the EU by member states is already harmonised through the ESA95. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1 COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
RESEARCH 
 
The Comparative International Governmental Accounting Research (CIGAR) Network 
started around 1987 from the idea of studying governments through the eyes of accountants 
(Jones, 1991). Governmental accounting in many countries is not mainstream accounting and 
there are various ways of how an accounting and budgetary system can be designed (Jorge et 
al., 2011). This research field developed, therefore, on the concept that governmental 
accounting systems of different countries are worth knowing about for their own sake, and 
that sharing this knowledge enhances comprehension (Jones, 1991). CIGAR stimulated an 
international exchange of ideas and discussion of research methods and results. Public sector 
accounting is firmly embedded in the political, economic, legal and social contexts in which it 
is practiced, even more so than business accounting (Jorge et al., 2011). This resulted in the 
underlying literature to consist mainly in a set of country studies (Jorge et al., 2011). 
 
CIGAR literature reveals that governments have basically used some form of cash-based 
budgetary accounting system. Such systems were not implemented or audited by 
professionally-qualified accountants (Jones, 2011a). The influence of professional accounting 
bodies, which mainly constitute business accountants, has been increasing since the 1970s, 
resulting in a focus on extending the cash-based accounting to some form of accrual-based 
accounting, with more emphasis on financial accounting and reporting that dominates 
business accounting, with the attendant typical codifications (Jones, 2011a). Jones (2011a) 
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refers to the formation of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) in the US 
in 1984, and the attempt to extend international harmonisation in the form of the International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) in 2004. In spite of this, it is normal for 
a national government to make its own accounting policies in the process of carrying out 
some form of changes to its accounting system to accommodate accrual accounting practices 
(Jones, 2011a).  
 
CIGAR also reveals that the traditional cash-based budgetary accounting system has persisted 
amidst attempts by governments to 'modernise' their accounting systems (Jones et al., 2013) 
in order to perhaps meet private sector professional expectations. Accounting reforms are 
undertaken by governments to introduce some form of accrual accounting system as an add-
on to the traditional cash-based budgetary accounting system and not as a replacement 
(Blӧndal; 2003; Montesinos, 2005; Paulsson, 2006; Grossi and Soverchia, 2011; Jones et al., 
2013). This is due to the centrality of the budget in all governments (Jones, 2011a). The term 
accountability for a national government takes on a different meaning than for a business, due 
to the political, economic, legal and social contexts; and thus, perhaps, even the required 
accounting and reporting: 
The budget is the lifeblood of the government, the financial reflection of what the 
Government does or intends to do. (Wildavsky, 1984:128)   
 
National governments are unique institutions even between themselves due to the various 
relations that may exist between their legislatures, executives and judiciaries; resulting in the 
budget within each national government setting to have its own rules and conventions, and 
thus its own consequent accounting (Jones et al., 2013). 
 
3 
 
The uniqueness of national governments and the importance of the budget are considerations 
that are largely absent from the dominant forms of financial reporting as presented by the 
accountancy profession. Jones et al. (2013) also draw attention to certain literature that 
perhaps does not emphasise the importance of the budget when addressing national 
government accounting reforms1. According to Jones et al. (2013), this may be acceptable in 
studies concerning lower-level governments where the role of the budget is not so formal and 
central, but at national level, such literature would need to be used with care. 
 
Lüder and Jones (2003) is an exemplar of a CIGAR study that includes national government 
accounting and budgeting. Referred to as the EuroCIGAR study, it includes nine country 
studies based on the same format that discusses current and proposed budgeting and 
accounting technique, governmental structure, legal framework and the roles of the 
accounting profession and standard-setting bodies. The EuroCIGAR study uses Lüder's 
Financial Management Reform (FMR) Process Model (2002) to analyse and explain the 
context of the reforms from traditional cash-based budgetary accounting systems to accrual-
based systems in each of the nine countries, even though the reforms are incomplete or merely 
proposed. 
 
Lüder's FMR Process Model (2002) is described as a paradigm for CIGAR (Chan et al., 
1996a) and has been applied and studied in various contexts. In spite of its limitations, the 
model instigated a spate of country studies that contribute to the underlying CIGAR literature. 
The model is criticised for not providing an explanation of the content of government 
accounting (Jorge et al., 2011). In view of the uniqueness of the nature of national 
                                                 
1
 For example, Guthrie (1998) and Monsen (2008). 
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governments as institutions, this appears to be a rather far-fetched expectation from any 
model. Twenty five years of CIGAR reveals fundamental differences in traditional cash-based 
budgetary accounting systems due to the various social, legal, political and economic 
contexts. It also reveals that there appears to be no consensus as to what any accounting 
reforms embracing some form of accrual accounting should actually be (Jones et al., 2013).  
 
The divergence of theory and practice within and between countries is also identified by an 
early survey of the literature on accrual-based reform by Caperchione (2000), that also raises 
issues concerning harmonisation within the European Union (EU), and emphasises the 
importance of governance that should be integrated within any technical accounting reform. 
 
2 THE MALTESE CONTEXT 
 
This study concerns the accounting reforms in the central government of Malta. The objective 
of this study is to introduce Malta in the field of CIGAR. The central government of Malta 
uses the traditional budget-oriented cash-based accounting system, and like other countries in 
CIGAR studies, the Maltese central government is in the process of change to a more 
informative accounting system. This process started in 1999 and is still ongoing. 
 
This study is important because, according to the researcher's knowledge, no other research 
exists concerning the accounting system of the central government of Malta and the changes 
that it is experiencing. The governmental accounting system of Malta is worth knowing for its 
own sake, and the dissemination of this knowledge will also enhance the understanding of 
government accounting systems of other countries (Jones, 1991). 
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Malta is an EU member state, and the timing of this study is, therefore, also crucial. 
Following the economic crisis, the EU is considering the implementation of a standardised 
public sector accounting system across all member states. In the context of the diversity of 
government accounting systems and accounting reforms revealed by CIGAR (Jones et al., 
2013), the work being undertaken by the EU appears daunting to say the least.  The task of the 
EU Commission is even more breathtaking since it has included the reliability of government 
finance statistics in the equation, thus connecting government accounting with national 
accounting, and encouraging the study of harmonisation between the standards underlying 
these two fundamentally different reporting systems. The impression is being given that 
accrual accounting and standardisation will lead to better governance. In the process, it 
appears that the centrality of budgets and budgetary accounting for governments is not being 
given due importance. 
 
Lüder and Jones' (2003) EuroCIGAR study is used as a guide for extracting and presenting 
the findings concerning the current and proposed budgeting and accounting techniques, 
governmental structure, legal framework and the roles of the accounting profession and 
standard-setting bodies in the Maltese context. This study also uses Lüder's FMR Process 
Model (2002) to analyse and explain the context of the reforms from traditional cash-based 
budgetary accounting systems to accrual-based systems in Malta, thus enhancing the utility 
and contribution of this study to CIGAR. 
 
Malta has always had strong links with Europe, way back before EU membership. The legal 
structure is Continental European, while the administration of the country and the fiscal 
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legislation of the Central Government have been inherited from colonial times. The 
underlying financial legislation were designed on British Colonial Regulations with emphasis 
on budget preparation, budgetary accounting and control.  
 
The so-called 'development decades' from 1959 to 1989 saw the government venturing into 
various types of legal and organisational structures, with the public sector growing into a 
heterogeneous and economically influential institution. The constitutional crisis of the 1980s, 
and the government's determination to apply for EU membership, led the politicians to require 
extensive reforms in the public service. The reforms started in 1990, with the Public Service 
Reform Commission (PSRC) suggesting decentralisation and delegation of authority for 
better administration, and efficient and effective public services (PSRC, 1989). One of the 
pillars of public administration reform was the improvement in the financial management of 
the government, including the adoption of modern accounting methodologies.  
 
Local Government was set up in 1993, and soon after, this was required to implement an 
accrual accounting methodology as used by the private sector. New government entities were 
also required to implement such accounting methodology from the outset. The central 
government procrastinates. The findings of this study reveal that while accounting reform at 
this level is paid its due lip service, there appears to be a reluctance to actually implement 
such reforms. Government auditing, both internal and external, evolved over time and now 
adheres to international standards, but government accounting and reporting appears to have 
frozen in the colonial era.  
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The Ministry of Finance set up the Accrual Accounting Task Force in 1999 with the remit to 
take all necessary measures to implement an accrual accounting system for the central 
government. The project of this Task Force was big and multi-pronged, including the 
specifications for an appropriate computerised accounting system; the required revisions to 
the financial management legislation; and the formulation of accrual accounting standards for 
government. It was decided from the outset that the cash-based budgetary accounting system 
will be retained, and that any accrual-based reporting will be an add-on.  
 
While accounting standards for the Government of Malta (the Malta Government Accounting 
Standards [MGAS]) were designed, the findings show that work on the legislation lagged 
behind. Since 2002, in the absence of a new computerised accounting system that can handle 
accrual accounting, the Treasury has been compiling trial accrual-based financial statements 
by integrating accrual data collected from the departments with the cash-based data generated 
from the accounting system. These financial statements are neither published nor audited, but 
the Treasury persists in preparing them and refining the data, in anticipation of the 
implementation of accrual accounting in central government, as preparation of the opening 
balances that would be required.  
 
Malta became an EU member state in 2004 and joined the Eurozone in 2008. The accrual data 
collected from the departments is also required for the preparation of statistical reports 
prepared according to National Accounting standards. The findings reveal that once EU 
reporting requirements were achieved, the accounting reforms stalled. Effectively, the reform 
concept appears to have changed from implementing a full accrual accounting system to a 
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hybrid system that satisfies EU reporting requirements; from being managerial-driven to 
being more accountability-driven. 
 
The organisation structure to carry out the reforms is in place but is not functioning. In the 
meantime, a decision was taken in 2011 to adopt International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards (IPSAS). This decision was taken on the eve of the EU's official demonstration of 
its interest in IPSAS for all member states. Albeit the smallest member state, Malta has to 
abide by all the requirements of EU membership. Limited resources of a small administration 
would necessarily lead to prioritisation. It appears that the Maltese authorities have now taken 
the stance to await further directions from the EU before proceeding with any further changes. 
 
3  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The basic research question of this study is the 'how and why' of accounting reforms being 
carried out by the central government of Malta. The circumstances leading to the adoption of 
IPSAS will also be analysed, together with the perception of national accounting versus 
government accounting. 
 
This one-country study contributes towards CIGAR by heeding to the suggestion of Chan et 
al. (1996) for CIGAR to pay more attention to content (that is, the governmental accounting 
system itself), the process of innovating, and the international diffusion of innovations. It will, 
in particular, answer to Lüder’s call for scholars to conduct studies which are analytical 
exploratory, conceptual and explanatory (Chan, 2002). Although not a comparative study, 
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there is global interest in government accounting reforms, and the model used, that is, Lüder’s 
FMR Model (2002), has been derived from explicit comparative research. 
 
Using Lüder’s FMR Model (2002) focuses the research to answer the following questions on 
central government accounting reforms in Malta: 
 
 What are the factors or variables underlying the change process while it takes place? 
 Who are the main actors effecting and/or affecting the change process? 
 How are the reforms being implemented? 
 What is the combined effect of these factors? Do they create the right environment for 
the government to successfully achieve the anticipated reforms? 
 
The decision taken in 2011, by the Ministry of Finance, to adopt IPSAS in full adds another 
dimension to the study. The empirical data also reveals the importance given to statistical 
reports of national accounting by practitioners. The increased interest in IPSAS being shown 
by the EU for government accounting of the member states makes these issues current and 
relevant, thus adding the following objectives to this study: 
 
 What are the underlying factors that have led to the decision to adopt IPSAS? 
 Why IPSAS and not some other accounting standards? 
 How will this decision to adopt IPSAS affect the accounting reform process? 
 Why is the EU considering IPSAS for its member states and what may be the possible 
outcome of this interest? 
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 What are the perceptions regarding the differences between national accounting and 
government accounting, and how are such perceptions affecting the accounting 
reform? 
 
As the literature review in Chapter 3 describes, Lüder's FMR Model (2002) has changed and 
developed over time as it has been applied by various researchers in different contexts. In his 
current research, Lüder is considering revising the model to a more simplified version (Lüder, 
2013). This study applies the more recent published version of the model in a different 
context, namely, the central government of Malta. After describing the factors constituting the 
variables as they exist in the Maltese context, the conduciveness to accounting reforms of the 
environment created are assessed.  
 
The feedback loops designed in the Model prove very useful to explain the slow reforms 
happening in Malta, in particular, the apparent change in trend in 2004. Moreover, by 
referring back to organisational theory that underlies the Model, the research discusses the 
criticism of the Model in that it does not explain the reason why the contents of government 
accounting are what they are, and why the contents become what they become when they 
change (Jorge et al., 2011). Another criticism is that it does not consider the extent of certain 
variables and how the variables interact with each other (Christensen and Yoshimi, 2001; 
Jorge et al., 2011). 
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4 LIMITATIONS 
 
The central purpose of research is understanding. Documentary research and interviews are 
the research methods used to surface the data required to answer the research questions. Some 
of the findings surfaced by this research are facts and thus difficult to misinterpret. Other 
findings are opinions and may be subject to different interpretations. The analysis of such 
findings is, therefore, subjective.  
 
5 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
Change is the underlying theme of this study. History is a record of events that warrant to be 
noted because they imply change. Change in the government organisational structure, together 
with a change in the environment, lead to a change in the meaning of accountability and 
transparency requirements. The reforms undertaken by a government should lead to a change 
in the governmental accounting system. The model that is used to assess this process of 
change, namely, Lüder’s FMR Model (2002), has itself changed over time and it still is.  
 
This study is organised in nine chapters, including this Introduction (Chapter 1), where the 
scope of the study and the research objectives are identified, highlighting the contribution of 
the study towards CIGAR. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the steps taken in conducting the research and the materials used at each 
step. A qualitative approach is taken to answer the research questions, using a mix of 
documentary research and in-depth interviews. The underlying literature is used as a guide to 
12 
 
prepare the main research tool used for the empirical part of the research. The research 
participants are chosen to accommodate the behavioural variable as identified by the model 
used by the study, namely, Lüder's FMR Model (2002). 
 
Chapter 3 is a review of the pertinent literature relating to organisational change and 
government accounting reforms. Organisational theory underlies Lüder's FMR Model (2002) 
that is used for this study, and Institutional Theory is the branch of organisational theory 
which is used to discuss the criticisms of this Model. 
 
The findings from the empirical and documentary research are described over four chapters. 
Chapter 4 starts with the historical background and leads to the current situation of 
government accounting. Chapter 5 presents the opinions and attitudes of the actors involved 
in the accounting process regarding the proposed reform. Prominence is given to the 
Permanent Secretary's position as the main actor. The opinions and attitudes of the other 
actors may or may not coincide with those of the Permanent Secretary, presenting further 
debates and highlighting uncertainties. The identification of accounting standards for the 
Government of Malta is described in Chapter 6, together with the increased interest being 
shown by the EU in the IPSAS, mainly due to the financial crisis. The findings in this chapter 
try to establish the effect of these variables on the governmental accounting reform process. 
The findings in Chapter 7 relate to the importance given to national accounting by the Maltese 
authorities and how this is affecting the governmental accounting reforms.  
 
The findings described in Chapters 4 to 7 provide data related to the research questions of this 
study as identified in this introductory chapter; and these findings are analysed and discussed 
13 
 
in Chapter 8, through the lens of the literature reviewed in Chapter 3. Chapter 8 is divided in 
five main sections: 
1. The historical background is analysed first, where the impact of the traditional paternal 
system of government and British Colonial influence on current accounting reforms 
are analysed; 
2. The contextual, behavioural and instrumental variables as described by Lüder (2002) 
are identified in the Maltese context. Lüder's FMR Model (2002) is applied and it is 
shown that the governmental accounting reform process in Malta can effectively be  
divided into two phases, with the first phase having an environment that is conducive 
to governmental accounting innovations, while the second phase is perhaps not so 
conducive; 
3. The decision to adopt the IPSAS is analysed, which results in highlighting the 
superiority of the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA95) over 
the IPSAS. The availability of the IPSAS and the EU's interest in them appear to 
actually act as a deterrent on the accounting reform in Malta. The reasons why the EU 
is showing this interest and the possible outcome in the form of the European Public 
Sector Accounting Standards (EPSAS) are discussed, together with the expectation 
that IPSAS adoption would bring government accounting closer to ESA95; 
4. The effect of the ESA95 and national accounting requirements over the governmental 
accounting reforms is then analysed, in particular, the consequences of the limited 
reporting entity definition of the ESA95; 
5. Finally, Lüder's FMR Model (2002) is re-visited. The criticisms of the Model are 
analysed through the lens of Institutional Theory. It is suggested that in the context of 
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the accrual accounting reforms in Malta, the Model could be three dimensional, with 
two interconnected planes being the macro and micro environments.  
 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis with a general overview summarising and highlighting the 
main findings and key contributions. The limitations of the study are pointed out, together 
with recommendations and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This one-country study contributes towards CIGAR by heeding to the suggestion of Chan et 
al. (1996a) for CIGAR to pay more attention to content, the process of innovating, and the 
international diffusion of innovations.  
 
According to the researcher's knowledge, no previous research exists on this aspect of 
government accounting in Malta. The empirical work required by this study has not been done 
before. The study is, therefore, both exploratory, in order to describe the context, and 
explanatory, in that it will try to identify the factors that affect the accounting reform.  
 
The empirical work is divided into two parts. The first part studies the developments in 
government accounting in Malta: the background history and legislative developments that 
make government accounting as it is now. The second part involves an analytical exploratory 
study of the current government accounting situation.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the analytical framework used in the study and to 
describe the research tools used. 
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2 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The objectives of this research are identified in Chapter one. The basic research question is 
the 'how and why' of accounting reforms being carried out by the Government of Malta. The 
circumstances leading to the adoption of IPSAS are also analysed, together with the 
perception of national versus government accounting. 
 
The type of questions presented by the study require a qualitative research methodology in 
order to be answered since the purpose is to describe, analyse and compare accounting 
practices, focusing on a particular context and then integrating a broader approach (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Ryan et al., 2002). Qualitative research is grounded in a philosophical 
position which is broadly ‘interpretivist’ in the sense that it is concerned with how the social 
world is interpreted, understood, experienced or produced (Mason, 2002:4). Documentary 
research and interviews are the research methods used to surface the data required to answer 
the research questions. Using a form of thematic analysis, various themes emerged from the 
data and these are related to the research questions. The empirical data is analysed through the 
lens of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3. 
 
The central purpose of research is understanding. While some of the findings surfaced by this 
research are factual, other findings may be subject to different interpretations. The analysis of 
such findings is, therefore, subject to the interpretation of the researcher, with the researcher 
bearing in mind that the responses of the research participants is what they believe or what 
they want the researcher to believe.  Subjectivity is an integral part of the research due to the 
values of the research participants and the researcher (Robson, 2011). 
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3  RESEARCHING THE HISTORICAL ASPECT 
 
Theoretically, historical structures are needed to explain the current actions of agents. 
Historical structures condition how people act today. Qualitative research normally includes a 
historical part. It is important to be aware of what has happened in the past in order to be in a 
position to better understand the present (Fielding, 2005). 
 
Historical data in general can be collected from archives, books, publications and, if possible, 
by interviewing people who were there at the time. Analysing documents is somewhat fraught 
with uncertainty because consideration needs to be taken of who wrote them and the context 
in which they were written. When using documents for research, Prior (2003:26) explains 
how important it is to keep in mind the dynamics involved in the relationships between 
production, consumption, and content. This is why it would be ideal to substantiate or 
otherwise the documentary findings with interviews of people who were present at the time, 
and who were actually aware of the phenomena being investigated. The interviewee may 
reveal something totally different from what is written. 
 
For the historical aspect of this study, however, it is not feasible or practical to carry out 
interviews. After all, even primary sources of data have their weaknesses, and just because 
someone has witnessed something does not make the witness’ account completely accurate. 
The witness might have some particular motive for highlighting certain aspects of his/her 
experience rather than others (Gidley, 2004:250). 
 
The historical research work was carried out during the period May 2010 to January 2011. 
Reference was made to historical literature concerning the governance of Malta. Appropriate 
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authors were chosen, who are well known for their diligence and neutral political opinions. 
This ensured that their literary work is more reliable. Their work (Pirotta, 1996; Pirotta and 
Warrington, 2001) is valid for the study because it covers the same period of interest, that is, 
from 18002 to the present, and provides a basic knowledge of the social, economic and 
political background to the research context. From the information obtained from this literary 
work, it was decided to choose the year 1924 as the starting point for tracing the changes in 
legislation relating to government accounting3. 
 
In order to find the old legislation and subsequent changes, desk research was carried out at 
the archives held at the National Library in Valletta4. Using archives presents its own 
particularities. Bearing in mind that archives are socially produced within particular historical 
and cultural contexts, attention needs to be paid to different features of the archive, which are, 
according to Gidley (2004:260): the technologies which are used to produce files; the way in 
which documents are filed (sterilisation); and the way in which bits of files go missing.  
 
Depending on the year of origin, these documents are available in paper format (typed or hand 
written) and/or on microfiche. The documents on microfiche are not always complete. The 
original 1924 legislation was traced; subsequent amendments; a 'new' 1948 law; the 1962 
legislation, with all the amendments up to 2010. The 1962 legislation is still in force right up 
to this day. These laws lay down the requirements of government accounting reports, 
budgeting and auditing. It is observed that besides minor cosmetic changes, the requirements 
remained basically the same over the years. Even the format of how the law is written and 
                                                 
2
 Malta’s history is a saga of different foreign rulers. The last ones were the British, who ruled Malta from 1800 
right up to 1964, when Malta became an independent state.  
3
 Malta obtained its first form of limited self-government in 1921. In 1924, Malta formulated its first Treasury 
and Audit Act. It was a dyarchical situation, as the British still maintained their power to govern the island. 
4
 Valletta is the capital city of Malta. 
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divided into parts did not change. Over a period of 48 years, only two amendments are 
relevant for this research: the amendment of 1997 concerning the National Audit Office 
(NAO); and that of 2004, which confers a power to the Minister of Finance enabling him/her 
to perform changes in accounting methodology and to issue accounting standards.  
 
According to Pirotta (1996) and Pirotta and Warrington (2001), the financial legislation 
enacted over time is practically based on the British Colonial Regulations. In order to confirm 
this, the Treasurer’s Reports before and after the 1924 legislation were looked up and 
compared. These are published in the Government Gazette and available at the National 
Library. The content was also compared with the current Financial Reports prepared by the 
Treasury. It was confirmed that, besides minor changes, the format and content of the 
government financial reports are practically the same. In spite of the fact that Malta has seen 
so many changes over the years5, the form of the government reports presented in Parliament 
remain unchanged.  
 
4  RESEARCHING THE PRESENT SITUATION 
 
The government website was gleaned to extract information regarding the structure, functions 
and operations of the Ministry of Finance, the Economy and Investment (MFEI)6. The 
Treasury Department's site is very descriptive as to the accounting system of the central 
government, including references to circulars and directives issued by the Treasury to the 
government departments, concerning the accounting reform. 
                                                 
5
 From part of the British Colony, different forms of self-government, an independent state (1964), a republic 
(1974), and now (as from 2004) an EU member state. 
6
 As from March 2013, this Ministry has been divided into two, and the Ministry of Finance is separate from the 
Ministry of Economy and Investment. 
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Two informal preliminary interviews with government officials confirmed that the topic 
chosen is current. Reforms are being carried out and the intention is for government 
accounting to be based on the business model. The research plan is to first carry out 
documentary research to find out what is being done and who are the persons involved. This 
will identify the subjects of future in-depth interviews in order to substantiate the findings 
from the documents. 
 
According to Richards (2009:20), it is common for a qualitative project design to include the 
use of multiple sources of data, with the aim of bringing many perspectives to bear on the 
question. Scapens (2004:269) calls the process of collecting multiple sources of evidence on a 
particular issue as 'data triangulation', whereas collecting evidence using different research 
methods could be described as 'method triangulation'. The aim of such triangulation is to 
gather corroborative evidence, resulting in plausible and credible findings; that is, increasing 
the validity of the findings. Reliability of an account in recent history is enhanced if 
documentary evidence can be triangulated against oral sources (Gidley, 2004:253).  
 
The minutes of two sessions of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) were located after a 
search on the Government of Malta portal. During these sessions, held during 2009 and 2010, 
the accounting reform process was being discussed (PAC, 2009; 2010). The PAC is the 
scrutinising arm of Parliament, and both the proceedings of the meetings and minutes are 
available to the public. The analysis of these documents identified the participants in the 
meetings and their relative importance in the reform process could be assessed. Information 
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concerning the current accounting system and the changes that it is experiencing was also 
gleaned, providing background knowledge for the interview process. 
 
The research for the current situation involves data gathered from documentary research, 
corroborated with empirical evidence from in-depth interviews with the actors involved in the 
reform, in order to explore and explain the factors that are affecting the process. The 
interviews were held during the period October 2011 to September 2012. 
 
4.1   The research instrument 
 
The contents of the questionnaire7 used during the interviews are based on Lüder and Jones' 
(2003) EuroCIGAR study, with additional emphasis on IPSAS adoption. The EuroCIGAR 
study has been cited in various literature as providing a framework for research because it 
clarifies what constitutes governmental accounting, and how it is to be described. It focuses 
on the technical content of the reforms, and addresses the core government (departments) 
because peripheral entities normally adopt business accounting methods, as is the case in 
Malta. The content of the questionnaire also compares well with the interview guide as 
suggested by Chan et al. (1996a:17-18). 
 
The interview was first tested with one government official. Certain questions were amended 
and new ones introduced. With the help of this official, prospective research participants were 
identified, and the parts of the interview that would be relevant for each participant.  
 
                                                 
7
 Appendix A describes the content of the questionnaire. 
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The interviews were held at the offices of the government officials. Interviews with non-
government officials were held at their offices. The interviews varied in length from one to 
two hours, and more than one interview session was necessary with some of the officials. The 
reason for this is because the interviews were semi-structured using the questionnaire as a 
guide. Open-ended questions give the interviewees the opportunity to expound on the subject 
according to their knowledge, while at the same time ensure that they are kept focused on the 
topic. Qualitative interviews refer to in-depth, loosely or semi-structured interviews, and are 
often used to encourage an interviewee to talk, perhaps at some length, about a particular 
issue or range of topics (Byrne, 2004). Burgess (1984) calls these types of interviews as 
‘conversations with a purpose’. All interviews were digitally recorded, and then carefully 
translated and transcribed. 
 
4.2   The research participants 
 
The research participants have been carefully identified and selected from the actors involved 
in the accounting reform process, in order to comprehensively cover the behavioural variable 
as identified by Lüder's FMR model (2002). The research participants chosen are described as 
political reform promoters, stakeholders and reform drivers8. Sometimes it proved difficult to 
identify whether a participant is a stakeholder or reform driver. For example, the National 
Statistics Office (NSO) is classified as a reform driver but the NSO is a stakeholder as well. 
The National Audit Office (NAO) has been classified as a stakeholder, but it may also be 
considered as a reform driver. While Lüder's FMR model (2002) distinctly describes 
stakeholders and reform drivers, such classification may not be straightforward in practice. 
                                                 
8
 Appendix B identifies the research participants and divides them into the three groups. 
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The accessibility of the research participants by the researcher was facilitated by the fact that 
the government official who helped in testing the questionnaire is a university lecturer as well 
and thus a colleague of the researcher. There was, therefore, no problem to make the initial 
contact. This government official then identified other possible research participants. As the 
interviews progressed, some research participants identified other possible participants, and 
thus the sample 'snowballed' (Saunders et al., 2009) to include even retired public service 
employees who were actors in the reform process at some time or another. The small size of 
the public administration results in the top public service employees knowing each other on a 
first name basis, and this contributed to effective use of the snowball technique, but the 
researcher made it a point to contact each research participant herself so as not to compromise 
willing participation.   
 
A total of 36 interviews were subsequently planned. All participants were contacted be e-mail 
and/or by telephone and were sent a participant information sheet. A total of 349 accepted to 
take part in the research, out of which, 28 interviews were actually carried out10.  
 
  
                                                 
9
 Each Ministry has a Director for Corporate Services (DCS) or a Director General Finance, who is responsible 
for the Accounting function at the Ministry, including the submission of accrual data templates to the Treasury. 
In October 2011 there were nine ministries. The nine DCS were contacted. Only one refused to participate - the 
DCS of the MFEI. In July 2012, the number of Ministries were increased to 12. The three new DCS were 
contacted and accepted to participate. 
The Principal Permanent Secretary, who is the head of the Civil Service and Secretary to the Cabinet, claimed 
that he was too busy to participate and directed the researcher to the Permanent Secretary of the MFEI. 
10
 Appendix C contains the interview schedule together with the codes used in the findings and analysis. It also 
provides hierarchical structures to illustrate the position held by each research participant in the government 
structure. 
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4.3 Limitations 
 
The following are the circumstances of the six interviews that did not happen. 
 
Two Directors for Corporate Services (DCS) had accepted to participate but then failed to 
confirm the meeting for the interview. These two directors were new appointees following the 
July 2012 reshuffle. Since nine other Directors had been interviewed, and the responses 
started appearing very similar, it was decided that it was not necessary to pursue these two 
directors because the trend of the responses indicated that further interviews would not 
contribute new information. 
 
The ex-Minister of Finance who held office when the accounting reforms started in 1999, that 
is during the first phase of the reforms, was contacted at his office in Brussels, as EU 
Commissioner for Health. After accepting to participate, however, certain developments11 
resulted in his termination of office and the circumstances excluded the possibility of a 
meeting with him. The ex-Minister of Finance appears to be the main influential actor who 
had started the accounting reforms, and his drive, initiatives and influence were described by 
various other research participants. 
 
                                                 
11
 In September 2012, the EU Commissioner for Health resigned following accusations of bribery by OLAF. 
This led to a police investigation in Malta, and in early 2013, the person was recovering in a hospital in Brussels. 
 The Minister of Finance in the second phase of the accounting reforms (from 2004) is a 
political reform promoter. After accepting to participate in the research, the inte
appointment was cancelled due to political events
Figure 1: The organisation
 
 
 
 
                                                
12
 The presentation of the Financial Estimates for 2013 was
not approved by Parliament and a General Election was called. The Minister of Finance contested the election 
for vice Party Leader and eventually was heavily involved in the ensuing electoral campaign.
Budget  
Office Financial Policy 
Development & 
Analysis
*A Parliamentary Secretary was not appointed in the Ministry of Finance under the new 
administration of March 2013. This strengthens the position of the Permanent Secretary and his 
relationship with the Minister.
25 
12
.  
 
al structure of the Ministry of Finance
 
 delayed. The Financial Estimates were subsequently 
Minister
Parliamentary 
Secretary*
Permanent 
Secretary
The 
Treasury
Accountant 
General
Director Government 
Accounting
Director Debt 
Management
Support 
Services
 
rview 
 
 
 
(Others)
26 
 
However, two interviews (totaling four hours) were held with the Permanent Secretary (PS) of 
the MFEI. The position of PS is not a political appointment, but the civil servant is personally 
chosen by the Minister, on the basis of competence and mutual trust. The PS at the MFEI is 
the Chief Financial Adviser of the Government. He holds the top position in the hierarchical 
structure of civil servants in the Ministry (refer to figure 1);  providing advice to the minister 
and, at the same time, acting in line with the Minister's directions. The interview with the PS 
is, therefore, taken to reflect the position of the Minister of Finance on the subject matter. 
 
The Shadow Minister of Finance had also accepted to participate, but then did not maintain 
contact once the Electoral campaign started. The opinions of the Opposition regarding 
accounting reforms were still obtained from the interviews carried out with two members of 
the PAC. The Shadow Minister of Finance was considered as a reform driver, but it transpired 
that he was not appointed Minister of Finance under the new administration in government as 
from March 2013. 
 
Under the new administration, the new Minister of Finance is the MEP ex-vice Chair of the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. In his MEP post, he 
was considered as an important reform driver who could also best describe the situation that 
was developing in the EU Commission regarding IPSAS adoption. The MEP had accepted to 
participate in the study, but then failed to maintain contact, most probably due to the electoral 
campaign. In view of this lack of feedback, it was endeavoured to keep abreast of EU 
developments regarding the IPSAS by regularly exploring the EU's websites and by 
subscribing to relevant updates through Eurostat's website. 
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The General Election in March 2013 resulted in a change in administration. What this change 
may mean for the accrual accounting reform in Malta is not covered in this study. It could be 
the subject of future research. However, it is being pointed out that the new Minister of 
Finance, who took office in March 2013, retained the same PS. The influence of the political 
reform promoter who features in this study as the main actor, remains. This fact may not 
augur any changes in the current situation, but future research would need to assess the 
influence of the new Finance Minister, as a new behavioural variable, in conjunction with 
changes in contextual and instrumental variables that a new administration may bring and/or 
face in the future. 
 
4.4  Analysis of the Interview data 
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) present thematic analysis as a flexible qualitative approach to 
analysing data. Since thematic analysis is not tied to a particular theory and epistemology, it 
can be applied across a range of approaches (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The term 'themes' 
refers to patterns in the data; the approach entails the identification of these patterns, which 
are then analysed and reported. While Braun and Clarke (2006) argue that thematic analysis 
should be considered as a method in its own right, Boyatzis (1998) considers it more as a tool 
that can be used across different methods. 
 
The interview data in this study is analysed using a form of thematic analysis, which is very 
theoretical-driven. The research objectives of this study and the underlying theoretical 
framework described in Chapter 3 influences and directs the analysis of the data. In particular, 
the theory underlying Lüder's FMR Model (2002) directs the analysis towards the 
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identification of the contextual, behavioural and instrumental variables, and how these 
effectively interact to influence the environment making it conducive or otherwise to 
governmental accounting reforms. The research objectives concerning the IPSAS decision 
and the perspectives towards national accounting are also included in the analysis.  
 
With hindsight, it is realised that the actual analysis starts during the interview process itself, 
as the interviewer notices recurrent arguments and ideas that arise during the interviews. 
Subsequent interviews are then modified intentionally by the interviewer to extract feedback 
about such themes. The role of the researcher is, therefore, very important in that it not only 
directs the flow of the interview but also affects the content of the data.  
 
The transcription of the 28 interviews proved very time consuming but extremely important in 
order to become familiar with the data; note initial ideas; identify similarities and conflicts 
between the responses. It facilitated the generation of initial codes and the next step of going 
through the entire data set (that is, all the transcriptions), systematically coding interesting 
features, and collating the data relevant to each code. This was carried out by using a word 
document for each code, with the result that the entire data set was arranged into the various 
codes.   
 
The codes themselves were then analysed and collated into potential themes. In this way, all 
the data relevant to each theme was gathered accordingly. The relationship of the data with 
the corresponding theme was checked and adjustments carried out accordingly. 
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The next two steps were carried out concurrently. These involved refining the specifics of 
each theme and creating a thematic map to link them to the research questions13. In this way, 
through the themes and codes, the thematic map provides the link between the research 
questions and the interview transcripts. 
 
Some of the data extracted from the interviews is descriptive, for example, the explanation of 
a procedure. While other data may be subject to different interpretations. The analysis of such 
findings is, therefore, subject to the interpretation of the researcher.  The role of the researcher 
in the interpretative analysis is emphasised. 
  
5 SUMMARY 
 
The objectives of this study is to understand the 'how and why' of government accounting 
reforms being carried out by the Central government of Malta. Descriptive and explanatory 
data are required to answer these types of questions, which were collected through a 
combination of documentary research and interviews as described in this chapter. 
 
This research follows a qualitative methodology, since the purpose is to describe, analyse and 
compare accounting practices. The research is grounded in a philosophical position which is 
broadly ‘interpretivist’. While the meaning of factual data may be difficult to misinterpret, the 
meaning of certain data can be rather subjective as the meaning could be constructed by 
human beings as they interact and engage in interpretation (Robson, 2011).  
 
                                                 
13
 Refer to Appendix D for the thematic map and Appendix E for defined contents of each theme. 
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The whole research process is a learning experience. The interviews carried out and the 
empirical data gathered are an unforgettable experience, where it proved imperative for the 
researcher to discard the accountant's 'blinkers' and observe the political and social 
environment in which government accounting is immersed. The extensive literature that is 
related to the topic covers accountancy, economics, politics, sociology and psychology. 
Chapter 3 reviews a selection of the literature pertinent to organisational change and 
government accounting reforms.  
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CHAPTER 3:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Figure 2: The Theoretical Framework 
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Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical framework. The data theory is outlined throughout the 
description of the research methodology in Chapter 2, since it 'gives the justification for the 
relevance and validity of the material' that is going to be used to support the thesis (Francis, 
1976, cited in Phillips and Pugh, 2005). This chapter presents the background theory and the 
focal theory, which are central in the analytical framework for the discussion and analysis of 
the findings in Chapter 8.  
 
The background theory starts by identifying a suitable organisation theory for public 
administration and organisational change, leading to a description of New Public 
Management (NPM) ideology as this is considered influential in changing the structure of the 
public sector, affecting government accounting reforms worldwide. 'What developments, 
controversies, breakthroughs are currently exciting or engaging the leading practitioners and 
thus pushing forward thinking in the subject?' (Francis, 1976, cited in Phillips and Pugh, 
2005). 
 
The purpose of focal theory is to explain in detail the subject being researched in order to 
examine arguments put forward by others and then apply own data and analysis to push 
forward the academic discussion (Francis, 1976, cited in Phillips and Pugh, 2005). This study 
is about the 'how and why' of government accounting reforms, and, therefore, the focal theory 
surrounds reform processes, in particular, Lüder's FMR Model (2002), and refers to 
Institutional Theory for certain aspects. 
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2  A SUITABLE ORGANISATION THEORY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
 
'The systematic development of organisation theory has traditionally been associated with 
studies of private organisations, particularly business firms' (Christensen, 2003b:109). Over 
the past few decades an organisation theory more specifically geared to studies of public 
administration has developed (Scott, 2001). Public administration is an integral part of the 
political-administration system, and therefore, the focus is on the dynamic relationship 
between political and administrative actors in a democratic context (March and Olsen, 1989). 
Public administration is interested in public decision-making behaviour, 'that is, the 
authoritative allocation of responsibility and resources between actors and levels in the 
political and administrative system' (Christensen, 2003b:110). This focus would distinguish 
organisation theory of public administration from theories that have primarily evolved in the 
context of private organisations.  
 
Public administration organisation theory is not a homogeneous field. It embraces a number 
of different theories expounded both separately and in combination. 'Institutional theories 
started from simple ideas about 'economic man', 'administrative man' and 'social or cultural 
man', (but) have grown more complex over time' (Christensen, 2003b:109). Christensen 
(2003b) describes four main types of public administration organisation theory, depending on 
the assumed driving force of the decision-making processes and their effect. 
 
The seminal work of Gulick (1936), Simon (1945) and March and Simon (1958), primarily 
focuses on the importance of formal, normative organizational structures for decision-
making and on the formal organization of units and roles. It also includes elements from 
social psychology.  
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Decision-makers, whether individuals or organizational units, have problems of capacity and 
with coping with large quantities of information and varieties of premises. Public 
organisations, therefore, have to be designed in ways that modify these problems. Actors have 
to select certain decision-making premises and reach 'satisfactory' decisions based on 
'bounded rationality'. A decision-making structure of this kind channels attitudes and attention 
in certain directions, thereby also creating special roles and patterns of contact. This then 
presents the challenge of coordinating the specialised units and roles and to balance their 
varied decision-making behaviour (Gulick, 1936). 
 
A number of different strands arise from this mode of thinking that the 'formal structure 
matters'. Using Dahl and Lindblom's (1953) concepts of political-administrative control and 
'rational calculation', brings forth the hierarchical version which holds that the leaders of a 
public administration are homogeneous and have tight control over decision-making 
processes - they know what to do and exercise full control over the means to do it (March and 
Olsen, 1976). Another version assumes a heterogeneous leadership and actors and different 
kinds of means-end thinking, resulting in negotiations and compromises. This is what March 
and Olsen (1983) labelled 'Realpolitik' and Allison (1971) called 'governmental or 
bureaucratic politics'. 
 
The second perspective on what influences decision-making behaviour is what can broadly be 
labelled 'formal theories', based on the premise of rational individual or group of actors 
seeking to advance their own interests through utility-maximising behaviour. Some 
formalised models in this theoretical tradition try to explain decisions by rational actors who 
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have more complex decision-making strategies, based partly on institutional factors and 
formal constraints. Theorists who come under this label are interested in, for example: how 
formal rules and procedures inside political-administrative bodies shape rational decision-
making behaviour; how markets and hierarchies can be blended; and how the environment 
can be made negotiable to modify insecurity (Hammond, 1996; Williamson, 1975). 
 
The cultural-institutional perspective is closely associated with Selznick's work (1949, 
1957). According to this perspective, public organisations gradually develop into institutions, 
infusing and adding values to the formal framework. This process of institutionalisation and 
adaptation gradually produces certain informal norms and values that go further in explaining 
decision-making behaviour than formal norms. Public administrative bodies develop different 
and unique cultures, characters or 'souls' through this process (Christensen, 2003b:111). This 
theory combines different types of institutional theories (Peters, 1999): theories of historical 
institutionalism (Steinmo et al., 1992), which emphasise historical roots and path dependency; 
sociological theories of institutionalism (Selznick); and theories of normative institutionalism, 
like March and Olsen's (1989) theory of appropriateness, where public institutions are seen in 
a broader normative democratic context as integrating, shaping and developing actors on a 
collective basis. 
 
The fourth type of organisation theory described by Christensen (2003b) revolves around the 
belief that the environment drives decision-making behaviour. The focus is on the 
environment influencing public administration, even though the reverse effect exists. This 
type of theory can be divided into two parts.  
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One part is primarily concerned with the 'technical environment' and how the internal 
organisation of the public administration - its structure, function, roles and resource allocation 
- is dependent on relevant actors in the environment and their demands and organisation. 
Typical theories here are contingency theories and resource-dependency theories (Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
 
The other part focuses on the 'institutional environment' and stresses that a complex political-
administrative system creates a demand for some simple 'rules of thumb' (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). These are defined on a macro level through the creation 
of myths, that is, ideas based on some kind of social-constructivist tradition. It is assumed that 
certain organizational models, budget or planning systems, types of knowledge, etc., are 
'appropriate' for public administrations (March, 1994). A structure of dominance is created for 
these ideas, often supported by public authority centres or professional groups 'certifying' 
them, and public organisations have to adopt them or at least give that impression.  
 
Brunsson (1989) emphasises that a balance is required between the demand of  the technical 
and institutional environments. This strengthens the legitimacy of public administration. 
Public leaders have to act, take decisions and deliver services, but they can also gain from 
'double-talk', that is, talking as if they intend to act, even if they have no intention of doing so 
and have no idea of what to do if they run into problems of implementation (Goffman, 1974). 
 
Christensen (2003b) emphasises that there is no clear-cut categorisation of these four types of 
theories. Theories may combine elements of bounded rationality, culture and myths, like the 
broad institutional theory of March and Olsen (1989, 1995); they may mix elements of 
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structure and culture with internal and environmental factors, like Selznick (1957); or myth 
theories may be combined with structural elements, as Brunsson (1989) does. 
 
But the four types of theories do focus on different levels (refer to Table 1). The theory of 
bounded rationality often focuses on the micro level and on individual decision-makers, while 
the formal framework in which these actors operate is the organisational or sub-organisational 
level. Social choice theories have some of this focus. Cultural theories combine theoretical 
ideas at the organisational level with elements from the task environment. The same focus is 
given by environmental theories of a technical nature. While myth theories often focus on 
phenomena at a macro level but relate these to effects and implications on an organisational 
level (Christensen, 2003b). 
 
Table 1: Four main types of Public Administration Theory 
Theory Driving force of the 
decision-making process 
Level focus How public 
organisations change 
Bounded Rationality 
(for eg. Simon, 1945) 
 
The formal (normative) 
structure 
Individual at micro 
level 
Change is the result of 
intentions of actors. 
Revolutionary 
processes as a result 
of design and strategy 
Formal, eg. social choice 
theories  
(for eg. Williamson, 1975) 
Utility-maximising behaviour 
of actor(s) seeking to advance 
their own interest 
 
Organisational or 
sub-organisational 
level 
Cultural Institutional  eg. 
sociological theories of 
institutionalism (for eg. 
Selznick, 1948, 1949) 
Norms, values and unique 
cultures, developed through a 
process of institutionalisation 
and adaptation 
 
Combination of the 
organisational level 
and task 
environment 
Change is gradual and 
evolutionary 
a) Technical Environment eg. 
contingency and resource-
dependence theories (for eg. 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) 
Relevant actors in the 
environment 
Combination of the 
organisational level 
and task 
environment 
Change is due to 
adjustment to the 
environment - 
emphasises 
uniqueness and 
divergence 
 
b) Institutional Environment 
eg. myth theories (for eg. 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977) 
Simple 'rules of thumb' 
decisions, defined through the 
creation of myths 
Organisation at 
macro level 
Change is due to 
adjustment to the 
environment - stresses 
isomorphism and 
convergence 
 
38 
 
 
 
The theories also vary in how they believe public administrative units become established and 
change (refer to Table 1). Bounded rationality and social choice theories both perceive such 
processes as the result of intentions of certain actors, such as political and administrative 
leaders. They are regarded as 'revolutionary' processes that are the result of design and 
strategy. However, the two theories differ concerning the importance of self-interest and the 
formal structure that shapes intentions and actions. Cultural theories see change processes as 
the gradual and incremental evolution of public units. The theories of both the technical and 
institutional environment have typical elements of determinism, that is, public administrations 
have to adjust to their environment and do not have much leeway. Selznick's type of cultural 
theory mainly emphasises uniqueness, variety and divergence in public administrations. 
While myth theories and certain other environmental theories, often stress isomorphism and 
convergence, in that public administrative units are becoming more similar (Scott, 1998). 
 
'Organisation theories of public administration have grown more complex, both in quantity, 
diversity and even combinations of different theories' (Christensen, 2003b:113). This may 
reflect the increasing complexity of political-administrative systems and decision-making 
processes. 
 
Civil service systems are more specialised than before, both horizontally and vertically 
(Christensen, 2003b:114). New and hybrid structures have developed both within the public 
sector and in its links with the private sector and society. Traditional political-administrative 
cultures have been partly transformed and new norms and values have appeared, blending or 
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melding with the old ones. Public decision-making processes currently involve actors with 
more ambiguous mandates, involve more and different types of actors and there are more 
connections over time between levels and institutions. Decisions are more often changes in 
the implementation phase, either because of changing conditions or because actors would like 
to change the content of the policies. All this may lead to a differentiated set of theories that 
one can combine to understand the workings of public administration (Christensen, 
2003b:114). 
 
Conversely, the development of both theory and practice of public administration can be 
looked at by taking NPM as a point of departure (Christensen, 2003b:114). According to 
Chistensen (2003b), NPM is widely influential and has spread worldwide, albeit more in the 
form of ideas rather than actual practice in certain countries. Boston et al. (1996) stress that 
the reforms in New Zealand are theory-driven to a large extent. The theories behind NPM in 
New Zealand and other Anglo-American countries are primarily different versions of formal 
theories. They stress simplicity much more than complexity, for example, role differentiation 
between politicians and administrative leaders and the unambiguous chain-of-command. 
NPM theories attach important clear goals and means, efficiency and rationality. Christensen 
and Lægreid (2001) question, however, whether the simplification of theory also leads to the 
simplification of practice in the political-administrative system or whether it actually 
generates more complexity. 
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3 NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (NPM) THEORY 
 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) introduce public management theory by attempting to answer 
'why' and 'what is' public management reform.  
 
According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004:6), public management reform can be thought of as 
a means to multiple ends, including: to achieve economies in public expenditure; to improve 
the quality of public services; to make the operations of government more efficient; and to 
increase the chances that policies chosen and implemented will be effective. Moreover, such a 
reform would enhance government accountability. Politicians can strengthen their control 
over the bureaucracy, and even gain from 'symbolic and legitimacy benefits': 
 
Public management reform consists of deliberate changes to the structures and 
processes of public sector organisations with the objective of getting them (in some 
sense) to run better. (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004:8) 
 
Structural changes would include decentralisation and privatisation. Process changes would 
refer to how a service is delivered. 
 
The public sector deals mainly with three functions: regulation; allocation of public resources; 
and income redistribution (Lane, 1997). One would expect that governments have always 
aimed to improve in order to better carry out their functions. So what is 'new' in the NPM 
ideology? 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, OECD countries experienced a process of 
expansion in their public sectors (Lane, 1997). Economies recovered as the public sector 
expenditures (OECD average) grew from below 25% to over 45% of gross domestic product 
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(GDP) in a couple of decades. This growth, however, was not reflected by a corresponding 
successful measure of outcomes, whether economic or social impact results (Caperchione, 
2000), and in the early 1980s, the effectiveness of various public sector programmes was 
being questioned. The public sector performance problem called for reform strategies. Such 
ideas in the 1980s can hardly be called 'new', because numerous ideas about budgetary reform 
and implementation were launched before, for example, towards the end of the 1960s and 
during the 1970s (Wildavsky, 1979, 1988, cited in Lane, 1997). Even with regards to reforms 
in other policy areas, research indicates that these may have evolved incrementally to 
consolidate past practices and experiences, and there was nothing revolutionary about the 
emerging ideology referred to as NPM (Page, 2005). 
 
What appears to be 'new' in the 1980s reforms was the influence being exerted by the 
teachings of Chicago School economics, focusing on deregulation, privatisation and 
marketisation (Lane, 1997); leading to 'Reinventing Government' (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1993) which emphasises goals and achievement of objectives by public management, rather 
than as a system of impartial administration to govern in the name of equity and the rule of 
law (Lane, 1997). Osborne and Gaebler (1993) introduce the idea of internal markets within 
the public sector, calling for competitive, enterprising and market-oriented governments.  
 
The call for improved performance in the public sector has been made in all key public sector 
operations: allocation, redistribution and regulation (Lane, 1997:9). This was also being 
expounded by international organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank. Even the EU warned member states to curtail their government spending, 
introducing strict rules. The search started for new institutions in the public sector which 
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result in improved state performance guided by new institutional economies (Alchain, 1977, 
cited in Lane, 1997). This lead to a change in the traditional structure and operations of the 
public sector. 
 
According to Broadbent and Guthrie (1992), the public sector was traditionally seen as 
comprising two areas of activity: one being funded by taxation; the other incorporating those 
monopolies which supply services and utilities seen as part of the infrastructure of society. 
The public sector could be defined as that part of a nation's economic activity which is owned 
and controlled by government (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992). The traditional view of the 
public sector included organisations providing services to the public that were publicly 
funded, owned and operated. Ownership and operation were crucial to the concept of the 
public sector (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008:22). The government was involved in all aspects 
of the economy. Accounting and auditing focused on honesty of employees, compliance with 
legislation, and control of expenditure. 
 
The NPM ideology, or 'managerialism', required a new outlook on public administration style 
promoting: efficiency; effectiveness; cost savings; outputs and performance accountability. 
More emphasis being on governance and internal control systems. Privatisation and 
corporatisation of 'marketable' services, particularly utilities, telecommunication and 
infrastructure, reduced the size of the public sector. And the public sector was re-defined as 
'public services', referring to:  
… those activities which are enshrined within the notion of public good or service 
based on universality of access for the citizenry rather than the private provision 
through a market. (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008:22) 
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These changes invalidated some assumptions about state ownership and operation (Guthrie, 
1993). The definition and boundaries of the public sector became blurred as direct 
government ownership and public funding were no longer required for the operation of a 
service (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). What effectively happened was that the private sector 
started getting involved in the provision of these public services as well.  
Globally, it is now taken for granted that it is the provision of services that matters, 
rather than who provides them, and that what is in question is accountability and 
regulation for the nature of that provision. (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008:29)  
 
As a result, the public sector is undergoing structural changes, while it is being urged to be 
more 'commercial' by introducing private sector approaches to service provision (Broadbent 
and Guthrie, 2008:24). The functions have not changed, but there has been considerable 
change in funding, governance and accountability for control and operation of these public 
services, as well as the accounting and auditing of them (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008:24).  
 
Different structures require different accounting systems, and accounting reforms have been 
central in the context of NPM philosophies (Guthrie, 1998; Ryan, 1998; Lapsley and Pallot, 
2000; Christensen, 2002, 2007; Christensen and Parker, 2010). The accounting information 
system is one of the most frequently used tools to renew public administration and make it 
more efficient (Caperchione, 2000). The changes currently underway in the accounting 
systems of various countries are intended to bring accounting information systems more in-
line with the new role taken on by governments in modern societies (Borgonovi, 1994, cited 
in Caperchione, 2000). This phenomenon is also referred to as 'New Public Financial 
Management' (NPFM) (Guthrie et al., 1999). 
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'Traditional' government accounting systems are basically cash-based and budget-oriented. 
The actual 'traditional' accounting system may vary between countries, but they have served 
their purposes for many years, giving the politicians the required control on budget allocations 
and spending. However, Caperchione (2000) highlights some common problems that include 
their short-sightedness; poor readability of financial statements; lack of usefulness for 
decision-making purposes; and the difficulty in assessing intergenerational equity (Anthony, 
1983, cited in Caperchione, 2000:32). 
 
The shift of accounting systems from a cash basis to an accrual basis is considered as an 
innovation but is not deemed as absolutely positive for government accounting (Monsen and 
Näsi, 1998). Accrual-based accounting is perceived as superior because it is used by the 
private sector (Lande, 2006). The proponents of NPM-based practices in the public sector 
believe that the adoption of accrual accounting would improve the financial accountability 
and asset management of government organisations.  
 
However, the adoption of NPM-based practices in the public sector have not automatically 
resulted in improved efficiency and performance. Therefore, even accrual-based accounting 
systems have met with some criticism both from a conceptual perspective and also as to their 
practical benefits within public sector organisations (Carlin, 2005; Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 
2009). Lack of technical understanding by potential users has also made accrual information 
underused for managerial purposes (Bogt ter and van Helden, 2000). Therefore, the transfer of 
business accounting concepts and techniques to non-business settings require critical 
consideration (Carlin, 2005; Connolly and Hyndman, 2006; Christensen, 2007). And 
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Christiaens and Rommel (2008) suggest that accrual accounting reforms are more suitable for 
'business-like' parts of government. 
 
According to Caperchione (2000:43):  
The flaws of traditional governmental accounting systems are not enough to justify 
the behaviour of those who seek an answer to every need for information and fair 
management in accrual basis.  
 
Accounting is only 'a means to an end', and therefore, there is no one accounting system that 
can be expected to suit all purposes. Moreover, according to Caperchione (2000), accounting 
cannot be reduced to a mere technicality and a reform in the accounting system needs to be 
considered in the context of the overall reform in the public administration, otherwise it will 
not produce the required results.  
The potential usefulness of new information cannot be taken for granted, nor can its 
actual implementation in evaluation and decision-making processes. On the 
contrary, the reform of the accounting system is a process of change that should be 
managed carefully for the reform to become a governance tool. (Caperchione, 
2000:44) 
 
4 THEORY ON REFORM PROCESS 
 
Argento and van Helden (2010) refer to theoretical frameworks that can be used to explain 
reforms and reform processes, namely, those of Hood (1995), Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996), Lüder (2002), and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004). This does not mean that they are the 
only models available. Other frameworks have been suggested.  
 
For example, Ouda (2011) proposes a prescriptive model for the accounting reforms in central 
government. Ouda's (2011) framework aims to create a clear transition framework identifying 
the requirements of a reform that not only initiates but also successfully completes an 
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accounting reform process: 'how to enter the tunnel and reach the end of it' (Ouda, 2011:67). 
He considers previous models as merely explanatory models of the context of reforms. While 
this may be true, explanatory models are more applicable for this research that is trying to 
identify the how and why of governmental accounting reforms. Accounting reforms are 
initiated but this does not mean that the end of the tunnel is always reached. Perhaps a process 
is started just to appear to have started, and it may not be the intention of the actors 
themselves to actually reach the end of the tunnel.  
 
This research, therefore, refers to explanatory models, but even the content of the reform is 
examined in order to avoid being like 'marine biologists who know more about the oceans 
than the creatures living in them' (Chan et al., 1996a, cited in Ouda, 2011:67). However, the 
content of the reform itself does not guarantee its success. This depends on the external 
environment, including political will. 
 
4.1 Why Lüder's FMR Model? 
 
Various models have been developed in an attempt to describe and understand government 
reforms. Lüder's FMR Model (2002) is preferred because it addresses financial management 
reform in particular, rather than public management in general. Lüder's FMR Model aims to 
assess the conduciveness of environmental factors for governmental accounting innovations. 
It has been widely used to identify the factors that explain the how and why of government 
accounting reforms, and thus fits neatly with the research questions of this study.  
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Lüder's Model has been extensively researched by CIGAR scholars14. Based on empirical 
evidence from country studies and cross-country comparisons, Lüder's original Contingency 
Model has been revised twice, in 1994 and 2001, by Lüder himself15. The last revision of 
2001 has led to the development of the FMR Model that is being used in this research. 
 
Lüder's model has been described as 'extremely rich and informative. It explains through the 
filter of contingency theory the reform implementation process and evolution' (Lande, 
2006:19). Regardless of future important contributions for CIGAR, Jorge (2003) states that 
Professor Lüder's work will always be considered as a major part of the basic CIGAR 
theoretical framework. According to Chan et al. (1996a), the model has been effectively 
serving the role of a paradigm for CIGAR: 
… the contingency model has shown remarkable robustness and adaptability. Not 
only has it guided CIGAR, the model itself has been the subject of research. (Chan et 
al, 1996a:9) 
 
The availability of a comparative framework with such potentialities promoted a certain 
enthusiasm for CIGAR in different countries from all over the world and at various levels of 
government. Lüder's Model has been applied to a variety of countries with diverse political, 
economic and cultural environments, and, after nearly 25 years, it remains a guiding force for 
this area of research. This study adds to the repertoire of country studies by applying Lüder's 
FMR Model (2002) to central government accounting reforms in Malta - a valuable 
contribution as it is based on empirical research in the smallest EU member state. 
 
                                                 
14
 See, for example: Chan, 1994; Chan et al., 1996a; Godfrey et al., 1996, 2001;  Jaruga and Nowak, 1996; 
Monsen and Näsi, 1998. 
15
 In his address at the Plenary Session of the 14th Biennial CIGAR Conference, held in Birmingham on 2nd and 
3rd September 2013, Lüder described his current research on the Hessian New Administrative Management 
Project, and explained how he is using a simplified version of the 2002 Model, which basically re-introduces 
implementation barriers as a specific variable (as in his earlier models) (Lüder, 2013). 
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4.2 Lüder's Financial Management Reform (FMR) Process Model 
 
Lüder's FMR Model (2002) is aimed to assess the conduciveness of environmental factors to 
governmental accounting innovations (Lüder, 2002:6). For the purposes of the model, 
innovations are defined as: 
... conceptual[ly] not merely procedural changes of the accounting system to ensure 
the supply of comprehensive, reliable and meaningful financial information needed 
for accountability and sound financial management.  (Lüder, 1994:1) 
 
Such an innovation can also be called a 'reform'. The adoption of the accrual basis of 
accounting is often taken as a measure of reform (Chan et al., 1996a:14). This has been 
challenged by Monsen and Näsi (1998) on the basis that the underlying concepts of accrual 
accounting cannot be properly applied in governmental organisations. Lüder (2002) argues 
that whether accrual accounting in government means a change for the better or not depends 
on a set of other factors, including: the information needs; the features of the existing 
accounting system; the features of the accrual accounting system to be implemented; and the 
availability of resources to properly run the accrual system. 
 
The first version of Lüder's Model was called Lüder's Contingency Model because in seeking 
to explain the occurrence of government accounting innovations, it was based on contingency 
theory. Lüder theorised that government accounting innovations are the result of complex 
interactions of contextual and behavioural variables. For example, the general public may be 
influenced by the accounting profession and the capital markets; the way that political leaders 
view financial accountability may be affected by financial crisis or scandals, and even 
according to the degree of existing political competition and the normal culture towards 
accountability. Lüder hypothesised that social, political and administrative structural variables 
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have significant effects on the expectations and behaviours of both those who demand 
government financial information, and even those who supply it. Innovations are likely to 
occur when a particular configuration of these variables creates a favourable environment that 
overcomes implementation barriers (Chan, 2002). 
 
Lüder's Model is fundamentally an economic model, embodying a supply and demand 
framework for government financial information (Chan et al., 1996a:3). The attitudes and 
behaviours of users and producers of governmental financial information are shaped by their 
respective environments (Chan et al., 1996a:3). Given the right environment, the interactions 
between demand and supply could stimulate governmental accounting innovations. 
 
The original model developed by Lüder in 1989 has been expanded and refined over time to 
take into consideration empirical evidence arising from its application by various researchers 
undertaking CIGAR. Jorge (2003) provides a very detailed description of how the model 
evolved over time. Some of the major contributions to the model include Pallot's (1995) 
consideration of size of the jurisdiction; Godfrey et al.'s (1996) aid distortion; Jaruga and 
Nowak's (1996) feedback loops and consideration of sociological theories to complement 
contingency theory; Laughlin and Pallot's (1998) epistemic communities; and Godfrey et al.'s 
(2001) consideration of other theories of diffusion of innovations. 
 
The revised model is illustrated in Figure 3, which displays the FMR Model as it is 
summarised by Lüder (2002:18):  
The financial management reform process model (…) consists of two clusters of 
contextual variables (‘stimuli’ and ‘institutional arrangements’), three clusters of 
behavioural variables (‘reform drivers’, ‘political reform promoters’ and 
‘stakeholders’) and two clusters of instrumental variables (‘reform concept’ and 
‘implementation strategy’). 
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In Figure 3, ‘feedback loops’ are distinguished from ‘lines of influence’ and ‘lines of impact’. 
The feedback loops represent the ‘consequences of the real world’, which allow the behaviour 
and attitudes of key actors in the innovation process to be tied with the results, taking into 
consideration the possibility of a multi-stage reform process:  
 
Depending on the size of a still existing gap between the outcome of the reform and 
the reform concept, the feedback either brings the process to an end or induces a 
subsequent reform loop with or without prior modification of the reform concept. 
(Lüder, 2002:10) 
 
Figures 4, 5 and 6 describe in some detail the contextual, behavioural and instrumental 
variables, respectively. 
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Figure 3: Financial Management Reform Process Model (Lüder, 2002) 
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Figure 4: Contextual Variables 
 
 
Contextual Variables 
 
 
Stimuli 
 
The stimuli are considered to 
have a direct impact on the 
politicians responsible for 
starting the reform. 
 
Fiscal or economic crisis 
(usually underlying fiscal 
stress), financial scandal, 
dominating doctrine, and the 
requirements of public sector 
reform, are identified as 
possible triggers of a 
governmental accounting 
reform. In the case of 
developing countries, 
'endeavours to improve 
international reputation' are 
also supposed to be a relevant 
stimulus for accounting reform 
(Lüder, 2002). Governmental 
accounting reform can be 
embedded in a larger reform of 
the Public Sector, for example, 
as part of an administrative 
reform. 
 
  
Institutional arrangements 
 
This refers to societal, political and administrative structural variables of the model, 
including implementation barriers. The institutional arrangements are directly 
influenced by the behaviour of the political reform promoters, while they are 
indirectly influenced by the behaviour of the reform drivers and stakeholders. On the 
other hand, the institutional arrangements have a direct impact on the reform concept 
and on the implementation strategy. This reinforces the direct impact that the 
institutional arrangements have on the outcome of the reform. 
 
Different legal systems would be linked to different types of governance and some 
are more conducive to change than others. Models that apply the rule of law as the 
guiding principle for administrative action are less flexible than public interest 
models. In the latter models, the state 'is regarded as something of a necessary evil' 
and 'officials must constantly be held to public account' (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2004:53). Other features of the legal system that affect government accounting 
reform comprise the electoral system and the flexibility of the budget law (Lüder, 
2002:9). 
 
Lüder (2002) explains that state structure refers to such categories as 
'unitary/federal', 'co-operative federalism/competitive federalism', 'one chamber/two 
chamber parliament'. It also refers to the division of power between the electorate, 
the executive branch of government and the directly elected bodies and officials. 
According to Lüder (1992), a state structure combining 'unitary/one chamber' with 
an unbalanced division of power favouring the executive may be conducive to 
government-induced reforms.  But in order for reforms to be induced by parliament 
or other state organ, a more balanced division of power would probably be required, 
as elements of direct democracy play a significant role in the system (Lüder, 
1992:116). 
 
The administrative structure refers to organisational characteristics of the 
administration and the division of power between organisational units, such as 
'centralised and decentralised', 'concentration and fragmentation of financial 
management functions', 'existence of central organisational units at the different 
administrative levels' (that are able to promote the reform in their area), and 'formal 
power position of the heads of central units and the head of line units'. A 
decentralised structure with financial management functions concentrated in 
powerful central units should be supportive to government accounting reform 
(Lüder, 1992:117). 
 
The qualifications of the Civil Service in general, and accounting knowledge, are 
crucial factors for the mode, duration and cost of implementation. Lack of 
accounting skills may not only delay the implementation, but would also increase 
resistance to the change, thus endangering successful implementation. 
 
The culture variable incorporates social, political and administrative tendencies. 
This variable refers to certain characteristics like 'risk-taking vs risk-averse', 
'individualism vs collectivism', 'level of transparency in political and administrative 
processes', and the 'responsiveness' to the needs and demands of the general public. 
The most favourable reform climate is created under risk-taking, individualistic, 
open and responsive combination (Lüder, 2002:10). 
 
53 
 
Figure 5: Behavioural Variables 
 
Behavioural Variables 
Behavioural variables specify the actors in the process. In the FMR Model, reform drivers, political reform promoters, and stakeholders have a distinctive role; thus separating the dynamic and 
static variables (Lüder, 2002; Lüder and Jones, 2003). 
Reform drivers 
 
Political reform promoters 
 
Stakeholders 
These actors include government commissions, consulting 
firms, standard setting bodies, professional associations, 
audit institutions, and academic networks: 
 
"(They) are recognised institutions and professionals in the 
reform field that promote the reform through advice, talks 
and publications aimed at making governmental 
accounting reform a political issue and influence political 
decision-makers in a specific way" (Lüder, 2002:8).  
 
Reform drivers provide conceptual ideas for solutions to 
problems, be they actual problems or perceived ones. They 
provide motives for the political actors to engage in the 
reform. Also referred to as 'epistemic communities', 
including experts who share the same views on the main 
features of the reform, and thus their influence on the 
reform process is strengthened (Laughlin and Pallot, 1998). 
 
The behaviour of Reform drivers influences the Political 
reform promoters, and thus all the reform process. 
 All administrative reforms require a 'champion', that 
is, a politician, normally a member of the government, 
who initiates a reform and has the power to enforce it. 
In the case of governmental accounting reform, this 
key role is normally played by the minister of finance 
or the prime minister, but it could also be any chief 
financial officer. The role is not entirely political, as 
the actor needs to be a professional to shape the 
reform concept seeking the advice of reform drivers. 
Usually, the views of the reform drivers and the 
political reform promoters regarding the reform 
process would be the same (Lüder, 2002).  
 
In order for members of parliament to be political 
reform promoters, a strong parliament is required, 
with the ability to enforce reforms even against the 
resistance of the executive (Lüder, 2002). 
 
The political reform promoters are affected by three 
clusters of variables: stimuli, reform drivers and 
stakeholders. The behaviour of political reform 
promoters directly influences the reform concept, the 
implementation strategy, the institutional 
arrangements and the stakeholders. 
 This group includes line departments/agencies, 
statistical offices, parliament and the general public. It 
is referring to institutions or positions that are affected 
by the reform, either in a positive or a negative way, 
but are neither reform drivers nor political reform 
promoters. The audit institutions may be either reform 
promoters or stakeholders.  
 
The stakeholders' views may differ from that of the 
reform drivers and the political reform promoters, but 
may be influenced by the latter. The effect that 
stakeholders may have on the reform process depends 
on their formal position and their discretionary 
powers. The behaviour of the stakeholders may 
influence the political reform promoters. Lüder (2002) 
assumes that the stakeholders' attitudes towards the 
reform depends on the reform concept and the 
implementation strategy, and on their chances to 
affect both. Some of the stakeholders may welcome 
the reform, expecting it to be in their interests, while 
others may oppose it if they expect negative effects. 
 
Successful reform would require the political reform 
promoters to lead the key stakeholders to at least a 
neutral position (Lüder, 2002). 
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Figure 6: Instrumental Variables 
 
Instrumental variables 
Reform concept  Implementation strategy 
The reform concept is the target that is being planned: 
innovations that allow the governmental accounting system 
to provide information useful for ensuring financial 
accountability and sound financial management. Lüder 
(2002) specifies that the reform concept does not refer to a 
simple change in procedure; the reform concept refers to 
more fundamental changes involving accounting concepts. 
 
The reform concept itself needs to be understandable and 
practically achievable. It also needs to be flexible in the 
sense that it reacts to feedback. The reform concept has a 
direct impact on the implementation strategy. 
 
 Types of strategies include authoritarian/participative, 
centrally guided or not, one/multi-step, with or without 
pilot testing, considerable/minimal discretion, with or 
without systematic staff training. Here, even the length 
of the implementation period is a factor. The 
implementation strategy chosen will directly affect the 
probability of success or failure of the reform and can 
also cause deviations between the original reform 
concept and the outcome of the reform. 
 
 
 
4.3 Limitations of Lüder’s FMR Model 
 
Previous CIGAR works have used Lüder’s Model to identify the factors that explain the how 
and why of government accounting reforms. The cumulative effect of all the variables 
included in the model should gauge the inclination of the country to successfully carry out the 
reform or otherwise.  
 
However, according to Christensen and Yoshimi (2001), the ability of the model to make such 
predictions is limited because the extent to which the modules interact is not known. The 
empirical validity of the model is risky as it contains many speculative features (Jorge et al., 
2011). Lüder himself criticises the methodological approach applied as 'informed speculation' 
(Lüder, 1994:3) because, for example, the empirical relevance of the environmental 
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conditions and their relationships with the accounting system are not definitely settled. Vela 
Bargues (1996:48) explains that: 
... the model has a probabilistic nature that does not permit to establish definite and 
immutable causal relationships between its variables. 
 
But as long as this limitation is recognised, it does not preclude the use of the model, bearing 
in mind that the objective is to gauge the extent of conduciveness of the variables for the 
governmental accounting reforms to achieve some kind of innovation. 
 
Lüder also pointed out that the model might be incomplete since it may not contain all 
conceivable and relevant independent variables (Lüder, 1992:110). This limitation is being 
overcome over time as the model is applied in various contexts, and different researchers have 
identified possible relevant variables. Since the model is considered as the basic theoretical 
framework for CIGAR, the model is kept alive by the researchers themselves, and further 
research will identify more variables.  
 
The model itself does not try to differentiate the weights of the various factors. Once again, 
this limitation is overcome as the model is applied over time and space. The variables 
themselves and the extent of their effect on the reform process change as the social and 
political context of governments and governmental accounting changes over time. This point 
was also identified by Chan (1994:20). 
 
Another problem with the FMR Model identified by Jorge et al. (2011), is that it addresses the 
context and not the contents, of the reform process – focusing on the ‘why’ governmental 
accounting has changed or changes, rather than on the ‘why’ of the new accounting model 
(refer to Figure 7).  
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Figure 7: The FMR Model and the reform process 
 
 
 
 
 
This aspect could be addressed using a suitable organization theory. But it should be 
recognised that this is going beyond Lüder's Model, because the model itself does not attempt 
to establish a link between the political, social, legal and cultural features of a country and the 
peculiarities of its governmental accounting system. In fact, Lüder (1994:1) assumes that the 
contents of the governmental accounting system are determined by the information needed, 
and not the environmental context. This assumption alludes that all countries having the same 
information needs would have conceptually similar governmental accounting systems. But 
later evidence seems to dispute this assertion. Referring to Godfrey et al.'s (1995) research 
that described how developing countries tend to distort innovations leading to hybrid systems 
in order to meet the requirements of donor agencies and international organisations, the 
authors had concluded by stating that: 
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This perhaps reinforces much of the political economy of development literature 
which would dispute the assertion that one accounting system suits all countries. It 
would appear from our analysis that the accounting system cannot be effectively 
imposed by international organisations and donor agencies by ignoring key 
variables like the administrative culture, staff formation systems and the 
implementation barriers of staff qualifications and aid distortion. (Godfrey et al., 
1995:29) 
 
Lüder's Model addresses the effects of the governmental accounting context on the 
conduciveness to reform processes. It does not address the contents of the accounting system 
itself. Nevertheless, the Model is an important comparative governmental accounting theory, 
providing some explanations for the 'why' of governmental accounting changes towards more 
informative accounting systems. What makes an accounting system more informative is a 
debatable issue. Is it the accrual basis? 
 
5 LOOKING THROUGH THE LENS OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 
Lüder's Model appears to be based on the premise that the accrual basis is superior to the cash 
basis. The CIGAR Network does not hold an official position, but most CIGAR scholars have 
had a normative tendency in believing, for example, in 'a more informative public sector 
accounting' (Lüder, 1992). According to Chan (2002), positive research seeks to answer the 
question 'what is' and not 'what ought to be'. For example, positive research would seek to 
understand why a government uses the cash basis of accounting. Government accounting is a 
social and institutional practice, like other types of accounting, and is therefore a product of 
rational calculations of costs and benefits by self-interested stakeholders (Hopwood and 
Miller, 1994). The choice of accounting policies by government can be studied as the result of 
political and market processes, as in private sector accounting (Watts, 1992). If it is accepted 
that public officials are motivated by self-interest, then their behaviour for holding short-term 
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planning horizons due to frequent competition in elections should not be condemned. In doing 
so, they are responding to the incentives provided by the rules of the game in the political 
system (Chan, 2002:27). Chan (2002) calls for a robust positive theory that could explain or 
predict the survival of new ideas in a particular environment, especially in view of the strong 
recommendations for a wider adoption of IPSAS; this in order to create more harmonised 
government accounting systems. 
 
The sociological branch of institutional theory tends to explain why modern organizations are 
homogeneous and which institutional factors are likely to influence and diffuse this evolution 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest the concept of 
isomorphism (similarity) to explain administrative change within an organization. 
Isomorphism is defined by institutionalists as a constraining process that forces one 
organization to resemble other organizations that face the same set of institutional pressures. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) distinguish three important mechanisms - coercive, normative 
and mimetic - by which institutional effects are diffused through a field of organisations. They 
emphasise structural isomorphism as an important consequence of both competitive and 
institutional processes (Scott, 2001:43). 
 
The institutional theories first identify the position of the organisation in its social 
environment, and how it interacts. As organisations strive for competitiveness and legitimacy, 
these theories analyse the evolution of the organisation through the filter of multiple 
interactions that are exerted on it, in a similar manner as is done by contingency models 
(Lande, 2006). 
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These interactions of the organisation with its social environment lay down boundaries on 
organisational practices. These practices are then recognised by the institution: they become 
institutionalised, and become the standard. These institutional standards are then adopted by 
the organisation. In this way, it would be possible for the organisation to acquire legitimacy 
by adopting a position that conforms to institutional practices (Lande, 2006). This process of 
how organisations change in their search for competitiveness and legitimacy is illustrated in 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Interaction between the organisation and its social environment 
 
(Source: Lande, 2006:20) 
 
Social theorists have identified three vital elements of institutions: regulative systems, 
normative systems and cultural-cognitive systems (Scott, 2001:51). These three elements 
form a continuum moving 'from the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to 
the taken for granted' (Hoffman, 1997:36). Scott (2001:51) calls them the 'three pillars of 
institutions'. Table 2 outlines the principal dimensions for each element that have been 
brought forward by various theoretical arguments and assumptions.  
 
 
 
 
Pressures
Modification of 
formal or informal 
rules
Institutionalisation 
of rules
Legitimacy by 
conformity to rules
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Table 2: Three Pillars of Institutions 
 Pillar 
Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken-for- grantedness; 
shared understanding 
Basis of order Regulative rules Binding expectations Constitutive schema 
 
Mechanisms 
 
 
Coercive 
 
Normative 
 
Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules; laws; sanctions Certification; 
accreditation 
Common beliefs; 
Shared logics of action 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed 
 
 
Comprehensible; 
Recognisable; culturally 
supported 
(Source: Scott, 2001:52) 
 
 
The Regulative Pillar gives prominence to regulatory processes: rule-setting; monitoring; and 
sanctioning activities. Regulatory processes involve the capacity to establish rules, inspect 
others' conformity, and manipulate sanctions - rewards or punishments - in an attempt to 
influence future behaviour. The primary mechanism of control, employing DiMaggio and 
Powell's (1983) typology, is coercion: 'force, fear and expedience are central ingredients of 
the regulatory pillar' (Scott, 2001:53). The harsh effects of these elements are often 
moderated by the existence of rules, whether in the guise of informal mores or formal rules 
and laws (Scott, 2001). 
 
The regulative and normative pillars can be mutually reinforcing. For example, when 
authority is used to legitimate coercive power by a normative framework that both supports 
and constrains the exercise of power (Scott, 1987). Normative systems include both values 
and norms, so they define goals and systems, 'but also designate appropriate ways to pursue 
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them' (Scott, 2001:55). Normative systems restrict social behaviour, but at the same time, they 
empower and enable social action, by conferring rights and responsibilities; privileges and 
duties; licenses and mandates. They also give rise to roles - both formal and informal - where 
the values and norms of particular individuals would become normative expectations of how 
specified actors are supposed to behave: 
The expectations are held by other salient actors in the situation and so are 
experienced by the focal actor as external pressures. (Scott, 2001:55) 
 
 
Neo-institutionalists take seriously the cognitive dimensions of human existence:  
In the cognitive paradigm, what a creature does is, in large part, a function of the 
creature's internal representation of its environment. (D'Andrade, 1984:88, cited in 
Scott, 2001:57)  
 
Therefore, in order 'to understand or explain any action, the analyst must take into account 
not only the objective conditions but also the actor's subjective interpretation of them' (Scott, 
2001:57). The mechanism involved is described as 'mimetic' because things are 'said' without 
words. In many circumstances, compliance occurs automatically, simply because 'this is the 
way we do things here' and other types of behaviour are inconceivable. Repetitive patterns of 
action gradually become habitualised and objectified, and this can be recognised in the 
operations of institutional frameworks that provide prefabricated organising models and 
scripts (Goffman, 1974, 1983, cited in Scott, 2001). Meyer and Rowan (1977, 1991) and 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) emphasise the extent to which wider belief systems and cultural 
frames are imposed on or adopted by individual actors and organisations. 
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5.1 The three pillars of institutions and the adoption of accrual accounting 
 
Organisations require more than material resources and technical information if 
they are to survive and thrive in their social environments. They also need social 
acceptability and credibility. (Scott et al, 2000: 237)  
 
According to Lande (2006:20),  
the adoption of accrual accounting ... can be analysed as a conscious or 
unconscious wish on behalf of the organisation (State or local governments) of 
being in conformity with the institutionalised standards and, in this way, attaining 
legitimacy. 
 
The three pillars of institutions described by Institutional Theory elicit three related but 
distinguishable bases of legitimacy, as shown in Table 2 (Scott, 2001:60). The basis of 
legitimacy moves from legal sanction under the Regulative Pillar, to being morally governed 
under the Normative Pillar. While the legitimacy of actions under the Cultural-cognitive Pillar 
is based on the actions being understandable, recognisable and culturally supported. 
 
5.1.1 Coercive Isomorphism (the power of the law) 
 
The legislative framework that is required for a government to reform its accounting and 
introduce accrual accounting would be a determining force of coercive isomorphism. But 
Lande (2006:21) asks:  
What sanctions are incurred by public governments in the event of non-compliance 
with the law and accounting practices? 
 
Would a qualified audit report submitted to Parliament pose a credible threat? There may be 
some political damage as a consequence, but the sanctions are only symbolic and would not 
result in formal coercive pressure (Lande, 2006).  
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International organisations, like the World Bank and the IMF, can acquire the power of 
coercion through their control over governments that need resources from them in order to 
survive. This power can be used to reform economic and financial policies, and also to initiate 
accounting reform to implement accrual accounting (Lande, 2006). As Lande (2006:22) 
points out, the mechanisms of coercive isomorphism can thus be analysed through the 
resource dependence theory (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992, 2001, cited in Lande 2006). 
 
5.1.2 Normative Isomorphism (peer legitimacy) 
 
Normative isomorphism is seen when practices are standardized through a body of issued 
rules, admitted and recognized by professionals. Normative isomorphism plays a determining 
role when a government enacts a legislation which results in the adoption of a conceptual 
framework and a set of standards issued by an independent standard-setter. Especially if the 
accounting framework would include concepts largely shared with the private sector, like the 
principles of true and fair view and prudence, which concepts have been ignored by the public 
sector, as the latter is more accustomed to refer to budgetary principles (Lande, 2006). 
 
The role of international accountancy organisations like the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and the 
IPSASB, is also significant, especially through the terminology used that is directly inspired 
by that used for the private sector, and which is used by each country to establish their own 
accounting standards. Lande (2006) maintains that the adoption of a conceptual framework is 
a means of peer recognition by the use of a common language admitted and recognized by all. 
64 
 
The official position of the country is made 'easily readable by its partners because it adopts 
conventions currently in force at the international level' (Lande, 2006:24). 
 
The mere availability of the IPSAS does not exert any coercive pressure, but they can gain 
peer legitimacy, for example, on their adoption by international and supranational 
organisations. Normative isomorphism also results when these international bodies link the 
availability of grants and loans with the adoption of these accounting standards by the 
government concerned. The fact that the feasibility of IPSAS adoption is now also being 
considered by the EU for its member states is increasing their legitimacy in the eyes of 
sovereign governments.  
 
5.1.3 Mimetic Isomorphism (doing what is deemed as ideal) 
 
The accrual-basis of accounting is often perceived as an essential means to be assured of 
greater financial transparency and carries a pledge of more effective and more efficient 
management. This assumption is an idea largely shared in the public sector. Mimetic 
isomorphism is observed in the perception that the adoption of the same set of standards is a 
way for public organisations to be as powerful as private ones, while the numerous financial 
disasters that have happened in the private sector are disregarded (Lande, 2006). 
 
Mimetic isomorphism makes the role of the epistemic community rather ambiguous. Because 
of its composition (researchers, auditors, consultants, associations of accountants, etc.), the 
epistemic community influences the process of standardization while being a force in 
proposing the choice of the standards to be adopted or developed. According to Lande (2006), 
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however, when proposals that are not in conformity with the 'code' or with the standards in 
force are carried out (Lande and Scheid, 2003) they are not considered very credible by the 
remainder of the epistemic community because they deviate from 'generally accepted 
positions'. Lande (2006) persists that the suggestion of accounting principles or policies 
distinct from those of the private sector is regarded as a way of thinking against the dominant 
current and as a lack of realism or pragmatism. Lande (2006:26) concludes, therefore, that the 
principle is to adopt the dominant position and not to innovate. In the end, the adopted 
position must be in conformity with the generally accepted position in order for it to be 
'credible' and considered as legitimate. The fact that advice is sought from external experts 
will ensure such legitimacy. 
 
 
Figure 9: Isomorphism impact on the reform's steps 
 
(Source: Lande, 2006:27) (adapted) 
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Accrual accounting is considered as the norm for the reform concept in Lüder's FMR Model 
(2002) (Lüder and Jones, 2003:54). The whole accounting reform, including the reform 
concept, is subject to the pressures of contextual, instrumental and behavioural variables. 
Other mechanisms or pressures are present in association with these contingent variables – 
coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism. As illustrated in Figure 9, these three 
isomorphisms interact among themselves and modify the actors’ expectations, the accounting 
system and the organization itself. According to Lande (2006), an interacting system is 
observed, with each organization or institution or corporation interacting according to the 
perceived social environment and contributing to modify this social environment.  
 
Lande (2006:26) observes that if the forces or pressures that are exerted explain these 
movements of reform in favour of accrual-basis accounting, then this isomorphism is not 
perfect, because, there are different definitions of accrual-basis of accounting in various 
countries. However, 'will we see new accounting standards or even new accounting systems 
deviating from the generally accepted models?' (Lande 2006:27 ) 
 
From an institutional perspective, accounting is part of the institutionalised and rationalised 
structure of a society (Miller, 1994:11). In order to be able 'to understand fully how particular 
ways of accounting have emerged, and why such significance is accorded to them', Miller 
(1994:20) emphasises the importance of moving beyond the boundaries of the organisation 
and 'examine the social and institutional practice of accounting'. 
 
The urge for legitimacy is an underlying theme in institutional development. As innovation 
spreads, a threshold is reached where the adoption of particular practices provides legitimacy 
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rather than necessarily improves efficiency or performance (Meyer and Rowan, [1977] 1991). 
Legitimacy is defined by Suchman (1995:574) as:  
a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions. 
 
Scott (1987) argues that legitimacy can be achieved by conforming to current conventional 
practice and external pressures. According to Selznick (1957:17), new practices become 
'infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand'. Technical 
explanations are sometimes used to hide political and cultural factors (Meyer and Rowan, 
1991:44). 
 
Although the implementation of new accounting and reporting practices in the public sector 
have often been viewed as a means of improving productivity and efficiency of public sector 
organisations, the emphasis has been directed to the symbolic power and legitimation roles of 
accounting information (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992:613-615). However, it is in the pursuit of 
enhanced public sector efficiency and accountability, as intended outcomes, that efforts have 
been made to import private sector management practices in the public sector, such as the use 
of generally accepted accounting principles (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992:613).  
 
6 SUMMARY 
 
Four main types of public administration theory are identified by Christensen (2003b), 
depending on the assumed driving force (influences) of the decision-making processes and 
their effect (refer to Table 1). These four theories can overlap but focus on different levels. 
They also vary as to how public organisations become established and change.  
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The development of both theory and practice can be looked at through NPM. The ideas of 
NPM have spread, but not actual practice. Regulation, allocation of public resources and 
income redistribution are the three functions of the public sector. Public sector activity grew 
but its effectiveness has been questioned.   
 
The increased involvement of the private sector, and more business-like provision of public 
services, could have been the underlying pressure leading to private sector approaches being 
adopted in government financial reporting. Proponents of NPM-based practices believe that 
the adoption of accrual accounting would improve financial accountability and asset 
management of government organisations. Advantages are not automatic, however, and 
accrual-based accounting systems have faced both conceptual and practical criticism.  
 
6.1 Lüder's FMR Model and Organisation Theory 
 
The four broad categories of organisation theory (as summarised in Table 1) are not clear-cut; 
the elements may be combined, and this is what Lüder's Model appears to be doing. The 
distinction of the behavioural variables into reform promoters, stakeholders and reform 
drivers, sprouts from bounded rationality theory. Even the importance given to institutional 
arrangements considered as contextual variables is based on this theory where 'the formal 
structure matters', and even on formal theories that are based on the premise of 'utility-
maximising behaviour'. The cultural-institutional perspective underlies both the institutional 
arrangements and the stimuli as identified in Lüder's Model. The fourth type of organisation 
theory revolves around the belief that the environment drives decision-making behaviour; the 
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feedback loops in Lüder's Model illustrate the effect of the environment on the reform 
process. Brunsson (1989) emphasises that a balance is required between the demand of the 
technical and institutional environments; Lüder's Model takes both types of environments into 
consideration.  
 
While each type of broad category of organisation theory tries to relate to a rate of change in a 
public organisation, Lüder's Model takes elements from all categories, and therefore, a 
predicted propensity to change will depend on the effect of all the variables. As already stated, 
the predictability of Lüder's Model has been criticised because the extent to which the 
modules interact is not known. 
 
Lüder's Model identifies the variables affecting a financial management reform process, and 
attempts to predict whether favourable factors will overcome implementation barriers so that 
innovations occur. The Model has, therefore, been designed as a consequence of accounting 
reforms that are suggested by promoters of NPM ideology. The reform concept itself is taken 
to be accrual accounting methodology. Why is this accounting methodology deemed 
'appropriate' for public administrations? A structure of dominance is created, supported by 
professional groups, and public organisations have to adapt them, or appear to do so. This 
'myth' is in line with organisation theory that focuses on the institutional environment (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Powell and Di Maggio, 1991). For this reason, institutional theory is 
referred to, bringing the analysis full circle. The analysis of the findings in Chapter 8 attempt 
to establish how the three pillars of institutions - regulative; normative; cultural-cognitive - 
play a role in Lüder's Model.  
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6.2 Concluding Note 
 
Change is the underlying theme of this study. Organisation theory has developed over time to 
reflect changes and complexities in public administration. Reforms in public administration 
and government accounting systems are said to be inspired by NPM ideology. On the other 
hand, NPM ideology appears to be driven by institutional theory (Boston et al., 1996). 
Organisational theory forms the backdrop of the government reform models that have been 
developed to study changes in administration. One such model is Lüder's FMR Process Model 
(2002). 
 
Lüder's FMR Process Model (2002) is used to assess the conduciveness of an environment 
towards a financial management reform process. The model is holistic in that it combines 
elements from the four broad categories of organisation theory. After the findings from this 
research are described in the next four chapters, Lüder's model is applied in the Maltese 
context. Institutional theory is used when discussing the limitations of the Model. Lüder's 
model is re-visited in chapter 8 and linked with institutional theory to better describe the 
government accounting reforms in the Maltese context. 
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CHAPTER 4:  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE CURRENT 
SITUATION  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this study is to describe and analyse the 'how and why' of government accounting 
reforms in Malta. The purpose of this chapter and the next is to describe the current 
accounting system used by the Government of Malta, and to present findings that answer the 
first set of research questions presented by this study, being: 
 
 What are the factors or variables underlying the change process while it takes place? 
 Who are the main actors effecting and/or affecting the change process? 
 How are the reforms being implemented? 
 
This chapter starts with the historical background and leads to the current situation of 
governmental accounting in Malta. The relatively small size of the country of Malta is 
highlighted through the map in Figure 10 and the demographic and economic indicators in 
Table 3.  
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Figure 10: Map of Malta in the Mediterranean Sea (Source: worldatlas.com) 
 
Table 3: Key demographic and economic indicators (as at December, 2012) (Source: NSO, 2013) 
Official Name:  Republic of Malta  
Area:  316 km2 
Shoreline Malta:  200.0 km 
Shoreline Gozo and Comino:  71.2 km 
Capital City:  Valletta 
Official Languages:  Maltese and English 
Monetary Unit:  euro (€) 
Population  421,364 
Population density (persons per km2)  1,333 
Employed population  172,701 
Number of employees in:  
Government Departments  31,181 
Companies with Public Sector majority shareholding  1,842 
Independent Statutory Bodies  8,735 
Whole Public Sector  41,758 
Public Sector employees as a % of employed population 24.2% 
Unemployment rate  6.4% 
Retail Price Index Inflation Rate  2.42% 
GDP (at market prices)  €6,829.5 million 
Balance of Payments current account  €109.4 million 
Imports of goods  €6,178.3 million 
Exports of goods  €4,431.1 million 
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2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 A British Colony (1800 - 1964) 
 
Foreign rule is one of the factors that have affected the history, politics, social life and 
economic activity of Malta. Under British rule, Malta served as the main British naval 
servicing base in the Mediterranean Sea (Pirotta, 1996). During times of war, commercial 
activity around Malta’s harbours expanded, increasing wages and the standard of living. In 
times of peace, the Maltese had to look at their own industry and were expected to shoulder 
not only the burden of their institutions but also that arising from the defence of their Island16. 
The British invested heavily in the Island, and thus issues on public funds were the centre of 
attraction. Government accounts were audited in Malta by the Services Commissariat 
Auditing Board, which also audited the accounts of Britain’s fighting services. The audited 
accounts were then forwarded for inspection to His Majesty’s Treasury Commissioners for 
Auditing Public Accounts in London. 
 
The Public Service and the departmental system of government administration were founded 
by the first British Governor of Malta in 181317, who was also the first Accountant General 
(Pirotta, 1996). The NAO was established in 1814. The government's budgeting system was 
introduced in 1827, when the British Parliament decided that the financial requirements of a 
colony was to be regulated ‘in anticipation’ and financial assistance would only be provided 
on the basis of acceptable financial estimates18 (Bartolo, 1975).  
                                                 
16
 From 1812 onwards, any surpluses accruing to the Maltese government in any given year were to be 
transferred to the Military Chest (Pirotta, 1996).  
17
 Retaining the centralised administration system established by the Knights (1530-1798). 
18
 The budget for next year had to be presented to the Colonial Office at the end of each year. 
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A form of Representative Government was granted to the Maltese for the first time in 1849. 
Governors and public officers were to remain accountable to the Colonial Office in London, 
but now they would be subject to greater scrutiny in Malta itself. In 1885, the first Maltese 
official was appointed as Auditor-General, and he was trained at the Colonial Audit 
Department in London. British policy pressed forward the anglicization of Maltese education 
and administration. Conflict over this issue eventually crystallized into what became known 
as the 'language question'; and in 1903, Britain revoked the Constitution and Malta reverted to 
the status of a Crown Colony. 
 
Due to heavy expenditure in public works, Malta’s financial position deteriorated seriously in 
the first decade of the twentieth century, culminating in the riots of June 1919. It was decided 
that Malta should be given a modified form of responsible government led by an elected 
Ministry. Under the 1921 Constitution, control of the Island was divided between the Maltese 
Imperial Government and the Maltese Government (Cremona, 1963, in Pirotta, 1996). The 
aim was to give the Maltese as “great a control over their purely domestic affairs” (Mason, 
1985 in Pirotta, 1996) as was consistent with the interests of the fortress and the colonial 
authorities19.  
 
In November 1924, a Bill “to regulate the receipt, custody and payment of public moneys and 
to provide for the audit of accounts” was read in Parliament, resulting in the Treasury and 
Audit Act, 1926. Until then, Colonial Regulations regulated government accounting and 
                                                 
19
 As Mason (1985, in Pirotta, 1996) puts it, diarchy was intended to hand over the steering-wheel while 
retaining in colonial hands control over the accelerator and the brake. 
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auditing. The Bill embodied and gave legal force to those sanctions of the Colonial 
Regulations which dealt with the audit function and the workings of the Treasury20. 
 
The language question and a continuous power struggle instigated by political patronage were 
the highlights of local elections. But Britain was increasingly nervous about Italian influence 
in Malta. In November 1933, the British Government suspended the Constitution and 
reinstated Crown Colony government. In 1934, the use of Italian was completely abolished 
from the Courts and was substituted by Maltese (Cassar, 1991, in Pirotta, 1996). By 1935, 
Malta had drifted into an undeclared state of emergency due to the impending war. 
 
Malta always tended to prosper whenever there was a threat of war in the Mediterranean. 
British defence spending in Malta increased and unemployment was drastically reduced. By 
1939, the standard of living was higher than ever before (Austin, 1971, in Pirotta, 1996). The 
second world war brought the British and Maltese communities closer, and in 1943, the 
British Government gave an undertaking to restore self-government at the end of the war.  
 
Under the new dyarchical constitution which came into effect at the end of 1947, the Auditor 
was appointed by Ministers and he was answerable to them. He was required to carry out a 
detailed audit by both the Colonial Regulations and the re-enacted Treasury and Audit Act, 
1948.  
 
Self-government generated an expansion of administrative activity and organization, initially 
on account of the post-war reconstruction scheme and, from 1955, in preparation for Malta’s 
                                                 
20
 The first financial legislation of 1926 was based on British Colonial Regulations. This law was re-enacted two 
times over the years - in 1948 and in 1962. The government's financial legislation, however, did not change to 
reflect the change of status of the country over time. 
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Constitutional Integration with Britain (Pirotta and Warrington, 2001). Disputes between the 
Maltese and British governments, as well as among Maltese political parties, created political 
instability which may have discouraged sound policy making and administration. Malta 
experienced both an expansion of public finance, as well as chronic fiscal insecurity. This 
awkward combination encouraged extraordinary heavy expenditure, but discouraged financial 
planning (Pirotta and Warrington, 2001). 
 
Periodic breakdowns in the Anglo-Maltese relations very often centred around the fortress 
which continued to exert its influence. However, as the extent of the British Empire receded, 
the importance of Malta as a fortress declined, and British defence cutbacks fuelled one crisis 
after another (Pirotta, 1996). The crisis in 1958 arose as a result of the British decision to 
privatise the naval dockyard in Malta and to lay off thousands of Maltese workers from its 
naval establishments. This led the Maltese Government to resign in April 1958, and Britain 
was once again forced to withdraw the Constitution and to govern the Island directly.  
 
The period between April 1958 and September 1964, was a time of intense debate mainly 
concerning Malta’s constitutional status vis-à-vis Britain and the nature of the Islands’ 
political system. In 1959, the post of Accountant General (AG) was created and he inherited 
all powers and duties of the Treasurer – a public servant, head of the accounting function of 
Government. The Auditor was re-styled ‘Director of Audit’ under the 1959 Constitution, but 
he remained a public officer, subject to appointment and control by the Governor. 
 
A ‘State of Malta’ came into being under the Constitution of 1962. It signified a significant 
improvement in constitutional terms, however, Malta was not yet a sovereign state or a 
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dominion, but not quite a colony. The Financial Administration and Audit (FAA) Act, 1962, 
imposed extensive reporting obligations on the auditor. The Minister of Finance did not make 
General Financial Regulations (GFR) until 1966, so that Colonial Regulations remained the 
principal procedural guide – and they were not altogether relevant to certain new classes of 
financial transactions.  
 
2.2 The Period of Development (1959 – 1989) 
 
A period of development surrounded Malta’s independence in 1964, led by the government's 
role as an investor, entrepreneur, trader and producer, as well as policy-maker and pace-setter. 
The historical paternalism of Maltese government reached its peak during the so-called 
‘development decades’ from 1959 to 1989 (Pirotta, 1996). As a result, public administration 
grew more complex, the powers wielded by ministers and officials multiplied, and 
government became more centralized in an effort to maintain the pace and coherence of 
administration. The centralised administration devised by the Knights21 and the British to 
govern their fortress provided a ready foundation for the ambitions of Malta’s sovereign 
governments (Pirotta & Warrington, 2001). 
 
In legal and organisational terms, the public sector became heterogeneous. In principle, 
various forms of government entities were set up to distance regulatory and adjudicatory 
functions from ministerial control, or to enable public enterprise to operate flexibly under 
market conditions. In practice, there was little consistency in the arrangements. Some 
                                                 
21
 The Order of the Knights of St. John, a military and religious Order, ruled Malta between 1530 and 1798. Like 
the British who succeeded it, the Order regarded Malta as a fortress state, but it also used Malta as a base from 
which it could manage its vast estates spread around Europe. The Order enhanced the Island's administrative 
structure for this purpose. 
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enterprises, both successful and not, remained departments of the public service22. Some 
public corporations developed subsidiaries to run one element of their operations23. Public 
officers provided administrative support to certain bodies, while others were authorised to 
employ staff directly (Pirotta and Warrington, 2001). 
 
Since 1980, annual audit reports consistently refer to international developments and 
standards. In the Maltese context of paternalist government, the auditor also recognised the 
importance of control over employment levels in the public sector and the efficient utilisation 
of manpower24. The scale of operations, the authority vested in officials, the range of goods 
and services in the public domain, the variety of legal, political and managerial regimes – 
these factors created difficulties.  
 
Signs of cumulative administrative distress were highlighted by a constitutional crisis (1981-
1986)25, and the politicians agreed that a comprehensive reform of Malta’s governing 
institutions and public administration was necessary. The decision to join Europe also 
contributed to the need to adapt internal structures with European standards.  
 
2.3 Governmental Reform (1989 - ) 
 
A newly-elected government in 1987, appointed the PSRC in May 1988 to examine the 
organization of the public services and to make recommendations as to how the Public 
                                                 
22
 For example, the Government Lotteries and the Milk Marketing Undertaking. 
23
 For example, Water Services. 
24
 Audit Report, 1983: par. 15 
25
 The General Elections of 1981 had elected a Labour Government because it had the larger number of 
representatives, however, it did not hold the majority of the first-preference votes. In protest, the representatives 
of Nationalist Party boycotted the parliament and the Opposition did not attend Parliamentary sessions. The 
Constitution was later amended to remove the re-occurrence of such an anomaly. 
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Service can efficiently respond to the changing needs for effective government (PSRC, 1989: 
Appendix 1). The Commission's report triggered governmental reform extending from the 
delivery of public services to the working of the Constitution and the independence of the 
NAO (Pirotta and Warrington, 2001). 
 
Steps were taken to improve the relationship of the public sector with the citizens, including 
the use of ICT throughout the system of public service provision to encourage citizen 
participation in public life and for the services to reach greater efficiency levels. 
Decentralisation was undertaken to change a traditionally highly centralized administrative 
structure. This resulted in the setting up of various statutorily-independent entities, some of 
which managed to decrease their reliance on central budgetary funds, while others were not so 
successful. The increased involvement of the private sector in the provision of public services 
was also sought through public-private partnerships (PPPs). The objective was to improve 
public services through best use of human and technical resources. 
 
The implementation of these measures revealed the inadequacy of the 1960's financial 
legislation on public finance. A new legislative framework was required to consolidate 
existing reforms and to cater for the modernisation of management of public finances, 
especially by reducing inefficiencies and wasteful use of public funds. In 1988, the NAO 
agreed with the Commission’s recommendation that:  
Public Service reform should also encompass a full-scale revision of the financial 
management legislation so as to bring it into line with modern accounting methods, 
including automated accounting and other financial management systems. (Audit 
Report, 1988, par.23)  
 
The first step was to computerise the cash-based government accounting system. The change 
to accrual started later, in 1999. 
80 
 
3 THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING SYSTEM 
 
3.1 The Departmental Accounting System (DAS) 
 
The DAS is the first computerised government accounting system used by the Government of 
Malta. Its implementation took eight years.  
 
The government issued the tender for the implementation of a cash-based computerised 
accounting system in 1992. The tender was awarded to a private audit firm, namely, Grant 
Thornton. The firm used the Sage Sovereign26, and converted the accrual accounting package 
into a cash-based one. The principles of double entry were still maintained, but other add-ons 
were required to bring it in line with government requirements, commitment tracking in 
particular. A Unix based programme was purchased to cater for multi-usage.  The MITA27, as 
the government agency responsible for the system's operations, purchased the customised 
package from the audit firm. 
 
The DAS implementation process started in 1993. After development and testing, the system 
was introduced in 20 government departments (out of 60) in 1996. At departmental level, the 
new system was run in parallel with the manual system, while the Treasury continued using 
the old system. The consolidated Treasury function was introduced one year later. In late 
1999, MITA started planning for the implementation throughout the Central Government, and 
                                                 
26
 Sage Sovereign is an off-the-shelf accounting package, produced and distributed by Sage plc, a software 
company based in the UK. 
27
 The Malta Information Technology Agency (MITA) is the central driver of Malta Government’s Information 
and Communications Technology (ICT) policy, programmes and initiatives. 
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this was complete in 2000. According to a MITA Manager (Interview 11), "we were a group 
of 12 people on the go, non-stop".  
 
3.2 The double entry in the current accounting system 
 
The backbone, which is used as a repository, is the Sage Sovereign with a multi-user function. 
Due to the overlaying development, the user only sees the DAS functions, but the ledgers can 
be accessed. Apart from some journals, double entry is done automatically. The functionality 
starts at the front end through the processes that the users have as part of their work. The 
functions available through the overlaying are explained in Table 4. 
 
Every department has the Sage Sovereign and the DAS, meaning that every department has its 
own individual books of account. The user does not have the actual system but the software to 
connect his/her PC with a server. All transactions are done on the server. 
 
At the end of the day, each department sends its electronic data to the Treasury. The Treasury 
is referred to as 'the consolidated' because it consolidates the departmental information to 
issue the government report. The consolidated data is a replica of the departmental sets.  
 
The coding structure facilitates the amalgamation of the datasets. At departmental level, the 
code of each line item consists of the account number, the cost centre and the responsibility 
centre. The code moves up one level in the consolidated because the responsibility centre is 
dropped, while the department code becomes the cost centre, and the cost centre of the 
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department becomes the responsibility centre. From the consolidated dataset, the financial 
report can be issued monthly, quarterly or annually. 
 
 
Table 4 : The DAS Functions 
DAS Function Description 
Commitments This is used for purchasing. A purchase order is raised and the system checks with the 
budget amount and controls. The funds are blocked, and will remain so until either the 
commitment is cancelled or the invoice is received, posted and moves for payment. If a 
commitment is not acted upon, the funds will not be carried forward at the end of the 
year. When the invoice is posted, the purchase ledger is updated. When the invoice is 
paid, the cash book and the purchase ledger are updated. So the system is not purely 
cash-based, but at front end it is. The departments have details of their creditors, but the 
reporting is done cash-based. 
 
Income routine When income is received and a receipt is issued, the user has to decide which account is 
going to be credited. The sales ledger in the backbone is practically not used, because 
the major revenue-generating departments have their own accounting systems. These 
systems are not replicated in the DAS. 
 
Transfer and 
adjustment 
 
Used for journal entries. 
Multi payments This is another means of payment for expenses not supported by an invoice. In this 
case, the backbone is not updated immediately because the department has to await 
authorisation for payment from the Treasury before it updates the DAS from its end. 
The same time gap exists for recording income receipts. 
 
CBM payments Used for payments done by bank transfer. 
 
Petty cash Petty cash. 
 
Schedules This is a means of accounting for payments from the public account but through other 
systems, for example, the Treasury Pension System and the Government Payroll 
System. This function is also used to record transactions between departments. 
 
Funds These are the budgetary controls. The budget amounts are entered towards the end of 
the year, after the Financial Estimates are approved by Parliament. The budget amounts 
are not part of the double entry but only a set control of values.  
In the case of expenditure, the estimate becomes a budget amount. In the case of 
revenue, it remains an estimate. A budget is a limit that cannot be exceeded according 
to the law and regulations. Since a budget expense line item cannot be exceeded, a 
transfer may be required from one line item to the other. A virement is simply a budget 
transfer and is not recorded as a transaction. Authorisation from the MFEI is required to 
effect a virement exceeding €50,000. 
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Part of the consolidated dataset is the bank reconciliation statement. The electronic procedure 
consists of issuing the cash book from the DAS by exporting the data from the consolidated 
dataset; importing data from the other systems and updating the cash book; and matching 
cheque numbers and amounts with the bank statement details imported from the Central 
Bank. The reconciliation is a function of the Treasury. 
 
The accounting system is menu driven and has inbuilt funds controls. Each account will 
include the amount allocated by the original budget, the revised estimate, warrants and 
virements. The revised estimate is used in the case of amendments to the original budget. The 
warrant is the routine used when the MFEI issues additional funds, known as supplementary 
estimates. Each account includes commitment tracking28. The bottom line will always show 
the amount of funds available for that line item. 
 
3.2.1 Budgetary Controls 
 
The budget is not part of the double entry in the current cash accounting system but is treated 
as a control. When the Appropriation Act is issued, the budgeted amounts are entered in the 
budgetary control system within the DAS, but this is not part of the double entry. Each 
account is split into two: budgetary controls and transactions. They are segregated because the 
                                                 
28
 A 'soft' commitment becomes 'hard' when the purchase order is issued; when the invoice is posted, the hard 
commitment moves to 'approval for payment'; 'post' means that the transaction has been sent to the Treasury; and 
it becomes a 'paid transaction' once the Treasury issues the cheque. 
A commitment is described as soft when the tender is issued. At this point, both the supplier and the actual 
amount would still be not known. Soft commitments are not taken as an accrual because the process of receiving 
bids and awarding the tender is still pending. Once the contract is entered into and the payments are being called 
upon, then the contract can be taken as an 'expenditure payable' - it becomes a 'hard' commitment. According to 
the ex-Budget Office Director, this distinction between a soft and hard commitment makes the system "refined" 
(XBO, Interview 25) 
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budget is not actual funds. The system calculates variances and a report can be issued 
comparing the budgeted amount with the actual.  
 
3.2.2 Year-end procedure 
 
Basically, there is no year-end procedure ... First of all, no balances are carried 
forward. And secondly, they (the Treasury) continue working on them for some three 
months, while they already have transactions for the current year ... we create new 
datasets for them (the Departments) at the end of the year. Each year, they start 
afresh. (MITA2, Interview 11) 
 
Payments are recorded up to December. The Treasury issues the first summary Financial 
Report in March, and in the meantime, it continues working on the old dataset adjusting for 
transactions between departments and checking certain transactions with the Central Bank. 
The final transaction entered is the State Contribution concerning the government's part of 
national insurance contributions collected during the year. Certain departments generate a net 
surplus, for example, the Inland Revenue, Customs, VAT, and the Government Property 
Division. Other departments have more expenditure and produce a deficit, for example, 
Education. At the end of the year, these surpluses and deficits are transferred to the 
Consolidated Fund. The balance on the Consolidated Fund is then transferred to the new year. 
The full Financial Report is issued in June. 
 
The Departments start each year with a blank page because they are given a new dataset. A 
manual process needs to be followed to create a new account for each below-the-line item and 
enter the balances on these accounts29.  
                                                 
29
 Below-the-line accounts are used to record items that do not pass through the consolidated fund, for example, 
advances. Sometimes, until the year-end balance on the below-the-line account is confirmed, half of the balance 
is temporarily transferred to the new year so that the department can continue working on the item. 
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3.3 Criticism of the current accounting system 
 
The end users in the departments perceive the year-end cut-off as the major disadvantage of 
the DAS: 
 ... at year end, the system fails, because it is as if no commitments have been done. 
The DAS records commitments within the year, from January to December. You can 
print these out using the report generator, but you have to input them again in the 
system, come January. (DCS4, Interview17) 
 
The fact that a new dataset is provided at the beginning of the year also limits the search 
facilities and "its reporting facilities are not very flexible, especially when you request certain 
data for a number of years" (DCS7, Interview 23). Another disadvantage is that the 
purchasing system is not integrated with the stock system (DCS9, Interview 28). The DAS 
uses the MSDos mode, which is quite outdated and not very user-friendly (DCS8, Interview 
26), however, the users appreciate that it has been developed over time, with new controls on 
procurement introduced gradually into the system (DCS4, Interview 17). 
 
In fact, it appears that only the internal auditors appreciate the reporting possibilities in the 
DAS: 
The DAS has weak spots but it has many good things. No one knows how to use it: 
its functions and reporting functions ... They say it is obsolete, but in reality, it 
serves us well ... But we are the only department interested in extracting 
information. Management only feels the obligation to input the information, and 
does not regard it as an available tool. (IAID, Interview 21) 
 
The users have now "got used to it, and ... find it very reliable" (DCS4, Interview 17), but it is 
unanimously criticised for the way that the year-end cut-off clears away any allocated funds 
that are not used. The users feel that this hinders proper management because they cannot 
plan ahead for more than one year. The users have the expectation that this 'cruel' cut-off will 
end with an accrual-based accounting system: 
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With an accrual basis, for sure there will not be this problem because you would 
know what funds you have for three years and you may carry forward your funds. 
But we cannot do this under the current system. We are at the mercy of the MFEI. 
(DCS4, Interview 17) 
 
The users are overlooking the possibility that this is an application of the annuality rule in 
budgeting, which may still be applied even if an accrual-based accounting system is used. For 
example, even though accrual-based budgets are prepared in the UK, the government still 
adopts a strict interpretation of the rule of annuality because money that is unspent at the end 
of the year must be paid back to the Consolidated Fund (Jones, 2012).  As shall be shown 
later on, this issue is one of the main contentions of the Budget Office and the PS for 
opposing the introduction of an accrual-based budget. It may also be one of the reasons why 
the draft financial management legislation was not finalised but sent back to the drawing 
board. 
 
4 AN OUTLINE OF THE ACCOUNTING REFORMS 
 
4.1 The beginning of the reforms 
 
As already described in section 2.3, accrual accounting for the Government of Malta has been 
under discussion from at least the 1980s (IAID, Interview 21). Modern accounting 
methodologies were suggested as a management tool during the public service reforms 
(PSRC, 1989),  while the Audit Report of 199430 specifically recommends the adoption of an 
accrual accounting system by the public sector. 
 
                                                 
30
 Audit Report, 1994: par.1.10.6-10 
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In 1993, the Local Councils were formed and these were required to start using accrual 
accounting systems from 1995. Government entities were also required to adopt this 
"modern" accounting system. It was only the Central government that procrastinated. 
 
It appears that the Minister of Finance during the 1990s held the vision to implement accrual 
accounting at central government level. In 1999, he set up the Accrual Accounting Task Force 
just for this purpose and appointed the Director General Special Projects as Chairman. The 
Task Force was the main steering committee, from which three committees emerged to deal 
with each important aspect of the reform, being the accounting standards, the legislation, and 
the accounting software specifications.  
 
The members of the Task Force were the MFEI represented by the Director General Special 
Projects (as chairman); the Treasury represented by the Accountant General (AG), the 
Director Government Accounting (DGA) and an official from the Accrual Accounting 
Working Group (AAWG); the Internal Audit and Investigations Directorate (IAID); the 
Financial Management Monitoring Unit (FMMU); the MITA; the NAO (as observers); and a 
representative from the Malta Institute of Accountants (MIA) (NAO2, Interview 4). The work 
of the Task Force was based on the premise that: 
The Government is committed to a policy of instituting modern financial methods in 
its management of public finance ... to provide a basis for constructive long-term 
financial projections and planning. The Government's commitment to better 
financial management has resulted in the decision to implement accrual accounting 
throughout all the departments. (Camilleri, 2005) 
 
The Task Force emphasised that accrual accounting is a management tool that helps and 
facilitates the financial management function, and was not a methodology that would solve 
Government problems (Camilleri, 2005). The Task Force believed that the success of accrual 
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accounting implementation will be assessed by the extent that the defined strategic and 
tactical objectives of Government are achieved (Camilleri, 2005).  
 
4.2 The initial reform work  
 
The Minister for Finance showed a personal interest in the project and the chairman of the 
Task Force was an energetic "driver": "it was like a big explosion ... there was a huge drive" 
(MITA1, Interview 27) and the reforms progressed at a steady rate. 
 
During the first six years, the Task Force managed to introduce various accounting disciplines 
that provided a basis for the implementation of the accrual accounting methodology 
(Camilleri, 2005), including training; formulation of policies and circulars; preparation of 
guidelines and various studies; reviews of the IT system; and the re-organisation of the 
Treasury Department. The Task Force had also worked on the required underlying financial 
legislation and had prepared a draft law in this respect. The Lands Department started a 
project to compile a complete record of the lands that the government owns (GT, Interview 
14). This project is still in progress (DGA, Interview 2). 
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4.3 The trial financial statements 
 
The preparatory work of the Task Force included the compilation of financial statements 
under partial accrual accounting rules for all Departments commencing financial year ended 
31st December 2002. These financial statements are for internal evaluation and have the 
objective of gradually developing the opening balances that would be required for the full 
implementation of accrual accounting in Government (Camilleri, 2005). 
 
The trial financial statements have continued to be prepared. Towards the end of 2011, the 
Treasury was finalising the trial financial statements for the year ended 31st December 2010 
(DGA, Interview 2). "These reports have improved over time" and are now "more accurate" 
(XDGS, Interview 8). The Treasury has a dedicated AAWG to continually chase the 
departments for their returns; highlighting omissions and helping them to improve the quality 
of the accrual data being submitted (DGA, Interview 2). However, the Director General 
Strategy and Operations (Interview 19) described the accrual data being collected through the 
Treasury circulars as "sporadic", and stated that there is no system that ensures that the 
information required is being supplied across the board. 
 
4.3.1 The AAWG and the Departments 
 
The DCS refer to the compilation of the quarterly accrual data templates as "the accrual 
accounting project". It is perceived as a project owned by the MFEI and the Treasury, and the 
DCS' point of reference is the AAWG within the Treasury. 
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The compilation of the templates is seen as a theoretical exercise, and is not a system that the 
DCS work with (DCS8, Interview 26). Only one DCS (Interview 28) claims that he finds the 
accrual data collected on the templates very useful for managing the department's creditors. 
 
Some problems were encountered when the system of templates started but the departments 
found required support and guidance from the AAWG, and now find that the process has 
become smoother (DCS6, Interview 22).  
 
According to the DGA (Interview 2), the AAWG holds discussions with the DCS to show 
them the impact of their recording on the financial statements. The Director (Interview 2) 
stated that the DCS "enjoy and benefit from these discussions, and they are also made aware 
of the importance of keeping proper records". But the AG (Interview 13) said that these 
discussions are only held with the accounting officers actually compiling the templates and 
not with the DCS. 
 
Following a Treasury training session held in June 2012, the DCS are now more aware of the 
objective of the templates exercise, that is, the role it has in the compilation of EU statistical 
reporting (DCS9, Interview 28). One DCS (Interview 26) expressed concern that this would 
be the ultimate aim of the whole exercise and wished for more communication between the 
ministries and the central level: 
My fear is that it stops there ... They have to say something because we wouldn't 
know what the central has in mind. We are always waiting for accrual accounting. 
We have this uncertainty in that we are working with this system - granted, the DAS 
can be a bit more user friendly, but it is what it is. And we are always waiting for 
something that perhaps would not materialise. We need some clarity.  
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The DCS mutually feel that they require guidance and training, and that there should be more 
dialogue with the MFEI at central level. While recognising that reporting is the prerogative of 
the Treasury, the departments have never received a set of the trial accrual-based financial 
statements: 
No feedback is received re-accrual accounting reform from the Treasury. The only 
feedback is how we are doing on the returns. A pity, when you consider the number 
of man hours involved! (DCS4, Interview 17) 
 
4.3.2 The process of compiling the Trial Financial Statements 
 
The trial accrual-based financial statements are not official, not audited, and used only for 
internal consumption (MITA2, Interview 11). The cash-based data is issued from the DAS 
and amalgamated with the accrual data collected from the templates. A Treasury Accountant 
(Interview 3) calls it a "hybrid system" because there is no double entry of accrual accounting 
but involves "taking a cash-based system, and patching it up to accommodate accrual".  
 
In this process, each department is treated as a reporting entity and the budgeted amounts are 
posted in the accounts (MITA2, Interview 11). The budget is considered as expenditure for 
the Consolidated (government) and revenue for the Department. Unused funds are shown and 
called ‘forfeited budget funds’, because at the end of the day, a department is only spending 
its budget funds and has no profits. The ‘profit’ can only be calculated at government level 
when the revenue earning departments are consolidated with the spending ones.  
 
The trial financial statements use reserves to record movements that do not affect the 
surplus/deficit. Besides loan repayments, borrowings, creditors and accruals for below-the-
line items, reserves reflect the movement in fixed assets. The total amount spent is debited to 
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the expenditure account. From the cash flow template, the amount referring to capital 
expenditure is then credited in the expenditure account and debited to a reserve. The 
department then prepares the template for fixed assets, and the movement for the year is 
debited in the fixed asset account and credited in the reserve (refer to Figure 11). Technically, 
therefore, the balance on the reserve should be nil, but it is not, due to two problems identified 
by a Treasury Accountant (Interview 3), being the incomplete property register31 and the lack 
of a defined leasing policy32. 
 
Figure 11: Recording Non Current Assets in the Hybrid System 
Total Expenditure Account 
Total expenditure for year Capital Expenditure from cash flow 
templates  
  
Reserve (Non current assets) 
Capital Expenditure from cash flow 
templates  
Capital Expenditure movement for the year 
from templates  
  
Non Current Assets Account 
Balance b/f  
Capital Expenditure movement for the year 
from templates  
 
 
  
                                                 
31
 The Government Property Department is in the process of preparing a dataset showing the value of all the 
property owned by the government. This work has not been finalised, and therefore, the departments have 
incomplete information about the assets they hold. In the meantime, a department may incur expenditure to 
improve its property. This is shown as a fixed asset by that department. When the Government Property 
Department eventually gets around to valuing this particular property, it would need to take into consideration 
the improvements that have been carried out by the department using that particular asset. Eventually, these 
reserves should be netted off at consolidation level, but a lot will depend on the valuation used by the 
Government Property Department (TA, Interview 3). 
32
 Leasing is the other problem (TA, Interview 3). It is vital for a leasing policy to be laid down to distinguish 
between a finance lease and an operating lease. The department heads should be informed as to what to flag as 
capital expenditure (TA, Interview 3). 
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The accrual data is collected according to the requirements of the MGAS (now IPSAS). Some 
responsibilities have been delegated to the departments, for example, the requirement to 
identify whether expenditure is capital and to specify the category (TA, Interview 3; MITA2, 
Interview 11). 
 
According to a Treasury Accountant (Interview 3), the preparatory work being done on the 
preparation of these trial statements serves two important purposes: it should facilitate the 
change over whenever the new system is acquired because the Treasury is "building up the 
opening balances that would be required and refining them"; and in the meantime, the 
Treasury is teaching the accrual methodology to the departments: 
 
It would be useless to have a new system and the users do not know what to input, 
and are not aware of the effects of incorrect inputting. This is not simply a change of 
a system, but a change in the methodology - the way that you are working. (TA, 
Interview 3) 
 
 
The MITA was responsible for preparing a compliance report on the trial financial statements, 
but as from 2009, this report is being prepared by the Treasury itself (MITA2, Interview 11). 
The report explains how the financial statements are being compiled and describes how 
compliant the financial reports are with accrual accounting standards (MITA2, Interview 11). 
The compliance report stipulates that the financial statements are prepared subject to the 
information that is given by the departments on the accrual data templates (MITA2, Interview 
11). 
 
The Assistant Auditor General (NAO2) (Interview 4) thinks that the trial financial statements 
previously had many gaps regarding stocks, creditors and fixed assets, that would have 
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resulted in a qualified audit report had they been audited. But he has observed an 
improvement over the years and "the figures are now making more sense" (NAO2, Interview 
4). 
 
The DGA (Interview 2) persists in pursuing the project and considers the work as part of her 
duties because she does not want to be caught on one foot should some higher official 
suddenly decide to really implement the new system. As at November 2011, the DGA 
(Interview 2) was considering the introduction of private audit firms to scrutinise the process 
and to strengthen it by making it more transparent.  
 
A PAC member (Interview 6) criticised the Treasury for not being transparent in the work that 
it is doing. The Treasury had explained its work to the PAC, but he considers it high time for 
these statements to be audited, published, and discussed in Parliament. 
 
4.4 The rate of the reform process 
 
According to Camilleri (2005), the level of success in the implementation of accrual 
accounting would depend upon the commitment of both the Government and the employees 
within the Departments towards the project. The ex-Director General Special Projects 
(Interview 8) pointed out that as at 2005, the foundations required for the introduction of 
accrual accounting were ready, and the next step was the issue of the tender for the IT system, 
but "it appears that the government does not want to invest in the system".  
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When the process had started, the partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 14) had felt 
that there was a clear commitment from the top that accrual accounting is to be implemented. 
He does not think that the original plan was for the project "to exceed 12 years and still be 
shaky" (GT, Interview 14) 
 
The MITA (Interview 27) described how with the change in the Minister of Finance in 2004, 
"the motor got stuck a little". The "steering people" changed, and everything went back under 
review again. According to the MITA (Interview 27), the Minister's successor "wanted to 
start a new chapter" and "even the role of the Task Force became questionable." 
 
In fact, according to the Treasury (Interviews 2, 13) the Task Force did not meet again after 
the chairman's retirement in June 2009. The successor is the Director General Strategy and 
Operations within the MFEI, but the Task Force has never met with him.  
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) thinks that perhaps the terms of reference of the Task Force have 
been concluded and so this is no longer relevant. He has the impression that all the process is 
stationary. According to his records, the last meeting of the Task Force was held on 17th June 
2009, while that for the MGAS Committee was in November of the same year (NAO2, 
Interview 4). 
 
According to the AG (Interview 13), "unfortunately, the Task Force is not functioning at all", 
and it has not issued any more directives. In the meantime, the Treasury has carried out a lot 
of work to consolidate the function of the AAWG, which has now become even more 
demanding with pressures from the EU Commission regarding the IPSAS: "What we are 
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pushing for now especially are the IPSAS" (AG, Interview 13). In fact, the IPSAS Committee 
was set up on 31st August 2011 to take care of technical matters and pass on its opinions to 
the Task Force, which would then inform the PS to issue a circular so that implementation 
starts in the departments: 
The idea was to have the two boards  working in sync ... but it appears that none of 
the committees are functioning at present [November 2011]. None of them have 
delivered. (DGA, Interview 2) 
 
The Director Financial Policy appears to be in charge of the IPSAS project and he declared 
that his unit "should be able to start focusing more on purely financial reporting" but "there 
are immediate priorities" (DFPDA, Interview 12). He hopes that the "MGAS Committee" will 
start meeting more often, and referred to a meeting held towards the end of 2011 where the 
IPSAS issue was discussed (DFPDA, Interview 12). According to this Director, the NAO 
were present at the meeting, but the NAO (Interview 4) does not have a record of attending. 
Perhaps the Director Financial Policy had referred to an informal meeting. 
 
The work on the legislation appears to have come to a halt. The AG had set up a committee to 
go over each clause of the draft legislation. According to the NAO's records, the last meeting 
of this committee was held in February 2009. The AG (Interview 13) confirmed that he had 
passed on the Treasury's suggestions to the MFEI, but he was not sure which directorate was 
now responsible for the legislation. 
 
The Corporate Financial Management Project Board had "managed to do a very good 
business requirements document after over 60 meetings", according to the AG (Interview 13). 
But once again, the AG pointed out that all the work and effort appears to have somehow 
found a "bottleneck" at ministry level: 
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The tender has not been issued. Whether it's expensive or not, whether for other 
motives, I don't know. What I know is that I completed the project. I delivered. 
Somehow the system is not here yet.  
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) confirmed that this particular committee had completed the system 
specifications in May 2010 and stopped meeting. According to the auditor, it was estimated 
that the new software would cost tens of millions. But besides the system being expensive at a 
time when the government is endeavouring to reduce the deficit, he identified other possible 
reasons why the reform may have stalled. In particular, he referred to Malta's accession in the 
EU in 2004 and euro adoption in 2008 as two events that required the concentration of MFEI 
personnel and the focus on the accounting reform was temporarily lost. The fact that a key 
person or committee was not appointed to take charge of the reform may be another reason 
why the process appears to be "happening in spurts" (NAO2, Interview 4). After a couple of 
years concentrating on something else, the process would need to be kick-started again, and 
perhaps the Task Force lost the energy that it previously had due to the passage of time 
(NAO2, Interview 4).  
 
The PAC Chairman (Interview 5) is concerned that the effort on accrual accounting is 
decreasing instead of increasing, and according to him, "there is a lot of stage work that could 
be on paper but in reality is not there". He also referred to the half-hearted way that the Task 
Force was treated, which never developed due to minimal financing: "if you don't invest, it 
would die a natural death, as in fact happened" (PAC1, Interview 5). While a PAC member 
(Interview 6) commented that during PAC meetings when the work on accrual accounting 
was discussed, he had felt a heavy complacency from certain top officials involved in the 
reform: "there is no real agenda; there is no will; they just can't be bothered". 
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The partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 14) describes the project as an "orphan" 
but does not think that it will be aborted; the question is rather 'when'? 
In appearance, it seems that the project will be executed - and in fact this 
'appearance' can be delayed forever.  
 
He also referred to the generic lack of knowledge regarding accrual accounting and the 
confusion that may be caused when having to deal with the ESA95. He emphasised that 
unless a champion/driver/owner is appointed to take care of the project, it will take a very 
long time to be implemented, if ever (GT, Interview 14). Similar to the NAO2, he thinks that 
it is a matter of priorities when the MFEI is extremely overstretched, "with various initiatives, 
and they are grossly under staffed": 
I think that the last thing they want on their plate is to do this accrual accounting. 
Even the meetings that were held lately, it's like they are done very quickly, just to 
record that a meeting has been held, and it appears that there is no drive.  
 
The heir to the accrual accounting project describes his responsibilities at the MFEI as "you 
name it all and there is no limit ... and amongst many things, there is this accrual accounting" 
(DGSOS, Interview 19). The Director General Strategy and Operations (Interview 19) 
confessed that his work on the project was limited to monitoring the stage reached by the 
Treasury rather than actually seeing what still needs to be done. He confirmed that there 
definitely was no intention for the new financial legislation to be approved in 2012 as it is still 
being discussed. With regards to the IT system required to replace the DAS, he said that even 
though the appointed committee had drawn up the specifications, it was still work in progress 
which "has stopped at the stage where we are seeing how the tender should be issued" 
(DGSOS, Interview 19). The result is that the accrual accounting reform is not considered as 
"top urgent", at least as at May 2012, as confirmed by the Director General Strategy and 
Operations: "there are no deadlines at this stage".  
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4.5 The new Public Finance Management Act 
 
4.5.1 Work done on the new legislation 
 
One of the primary objectives of the Task Force was to address the legal aspect of the reform. 
The legislation needed to be brought up to date since it only referred to a cash-based 
accounting system. 
 
The ex-Director General Special Projects (Interview 8) confirmed that the first version of the 
Act had been drafted in 2002 by a director at the MFEI, who had integrated various Maltese 
laws and regulations. His own task was "to spread some accessories over it", for example, to 
make provisions that allow the carry forward of unspent votes; to introduce the concept of the 
three-year rolling budget; and to make timely reporting a legal requirement. Procedures were 
replaced with concepts, but certain details were still required in the legislation otherwise they 
would be ignored by the civil servant (XDGS, Interview 8).   
 
The draft of the new legislation was handed over to the AG, who appointed a new committee 
to review each clause (XDGS, Interview 8). The Treasury, the NAO, and the IAID were 
amongst the members of this committee. While acknowledging that the draft legislation had 
been prepared by very competent persons, the DGA (Interview 2) confirmed that it was 
scrapped, and only its "skeleton" was used during discussions. The AG (Interview 13) 
described how the Treasury had started chairing the committee since no one else was 
available at the MFEI. The Treasury made its suggestions and then passed the work on to the 
MFEI when new directors were appointed (AG, Interview 13). 
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According to the PS, the new legislation was not nearly ready in 2002. "It was a patched up 
piece of work" and did not consider certain issues like a fiscal framework. It is important to 
"avoid gold-plating" and not to go from one extreme to another: "the problem is that you 
cannot give shocks to the system" (PS, Interview 9). 
 
4.5.2 The new legislation and the NAO 
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) thinks that the draft financial management act was never enacted 
because it drastically changes the current legislation. 
 
One of the NAO's concerns regards the issue of who should audit. The draft had provided that 
the government departments appoint private audit firms to audit their accounts while the NAO 
would only audit whole of government accounts. The NAO had objected to this provision, 
because it felt that it should be the decision of the NAO whether to appoint private audit firms 
and the audit of government departments should remain the responsibility of the NAO: 
The most important thing is for the NAO to maintain absolute control of the audit 
process.... The external auditor is responsible for whole of government accounts. 
(NAO2, Interview 4) 
 
This wholesome responsibility could either mean that the NAO would require more human 
resources to carry out continuous auditing of the departments and ministries, or it could 
contract out (NAO2, Interview 4). According to the NAO2 (Interview 4), contracting out 
would be more feasible, just as long as the NAO maintains absolute control and even appoint 
the private audit firms itself. This is the system applied for the audit of local councils. 
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Another issue concerned timing. One of the recommendations was that if a Ministry had an 
accrual accounting system in place and was on the right track, then the NAO would audit that 
particular Ministry, while the other ministries would be audited on a cash basis. The NAO did 
not agree, insisting that all ministries should start applying accrual basis simultaneously and 
officially issue accrual-based reports at the same time: "we have to audit everything. There 
are no half measures" (NAO2, Interview 4) 
 
The NAO2 agrees that the present law needs to be changed, in particular the requirement that 
the NAO audits the government accounts and reports before the expiry of 12 months after the 
end of the financial year. This can remain applicable for whole of government, but for 
departments and ministries the requirement could be similar to local councils, that is, to 
present audited accounts by March/April (NAO2, Interview 4). 
 
4.5.3 Gradual changes vs major overhaul 
 
According to the PS (Interview 9), "a fiscal framework gives you a certain rigour; a certain 
discipline of how to do things". He confirmed that modern financial management concepts 
need to be considered, but he does not think that this requires "drastic changes" to be made to 
the current legislative framework. The NAO2 (Interview 4) agrees that "tinkering with the 
law" is the best way in order to avoid confusion. 
 
Other officials believe that the current legislation is too old and needs a total overhaul to make 
the departments more efficient using modern approaches (PAC1, Interview 5); to introduce 
modern principles (DFPDA, Interview 12); and to reflect the current situation of the country 
102 
 
with its international commitments (NAO1, Interview 15). Even the AG (Interview 13) thinks 
that "the current legislation requires a very big overhaul", and the biggest challenge is that 
the FAA Act tackles budgeting and appropriations besides accounting. 
 
4.5.4 Defects in the current legislation 
 
When the FAA Act was written in 1962, there was no idea of accrual accounting for 
government, therefore, "there is no legislative backing for the accounting reforms" (DGA, 
Interview 2). According to the DGA (Interview 2), its main defect is that it does not refer to 
internal controls. Two major complaints of the PS (Interview 9) concern the "dreaded 
supplementary estimates" and the "infamous direct orders". 
 
The PS (Interview 9) intends to remove the facility of supplementary estimates33 and replace 
it with a predetermined contingency that is factored in the budget estimates. It does not make 
sense to him that after the budget is prepared, a "safety valve" is provided to everyone so that 
they can spend as much as they like and then the excess is "rubber-stamped" by Parliament at 
the end of the year. This cannot be achieved by simply amending the law to remove the 
supplementary estimates. The PS believes in introducing directives and standards gradually 
over a period of a few years in order to strengthen the underlying framework before taking the 
final drastic step: 
Why? Because at the end of the day, if you want something sustainable, unless this is 
built on discipline, it will not work. This is where we want to go. Then once we have 
built substantially, and we are approaching - stop the supplementary.  
 
                                                 
33
 Article 25 of the FAA Act permits supplementary estimates. It gives the Minister of Finance the power to 
authorise expenditure from the Consolidated Fund for any purpose, if no amount has been appropriated for that 
purpose, or if the amount authorised is insufficient. Subsequently, the Ministry of Finance "asks" for 
Parliamentary approval for this additional expenditure. 
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Direct orders are used when a department or ministry first spends money and then seeks 
MFEI approval retrospectively. Direct orders have no legal basis because approval is required 
before and not after incurring expenditure. The PS (Interview 9) claims that the use of direct 
orders has decreased since they have started being published in the annual audit report. He 
wants to instil the mentality that the MFEI will not approve such law breaking, and that 
eventually the law will be changed to introduce personal liability for these actions: 
"transparency and accountability will definitely stop all playing around and nobody will do 
it". 
 
The PS (Interview 9) claims that the MFEI is introducing more discipline on both reporting 
and planning. The departments, ministries and government entities are required to submit 
their reports by a deadline, and if this is not adhered to, their funds are delayed. Adherence to 
business plans and budgets is being strictly applied, and if a project is not included in the 
estimates, it is not allowed to start. The PS believes that certain financial management 
principles that are presently upheld are "good and still valid", but can be strengthened by 
introducing a framework that enhances accountability. 
 
4.5.5 Update the budgetary process 
 
The carry forward of unspent allocations was one of the provisions in the draft legislation, but 
as described further in the next chapter, the PS is the main objector of this provision. This 
could be one of the reasons why the draft legislation was scrapped. 
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The AG (Interview 13) thinks that the biggest obstacle in implementing a new financial 
management act is the change required in approaching the budget cycle. While insisting that 
the presentation of the financial estimates to Parliament should remain cash-based, he deems 
it important to adopt accrual-based budgeting as well. At present, the whole budget cycle 
concentrates on the consolidated fund, that is, the revenues and expenditures in the estimates, 
while the accrual element is considered only at year-end. The AG considers it important to 
entrench the accrual element within the budget cycle as "it has to be something continuous". 
 
The AG (Interview 13) thinks that the MFEI lacks the necessary expertise in drafting a 
financial legislation, and the mind set of certain high officials needs to be changed. 
 
4.5.6 The reporting entity definition 
 
While the legislation does not specify the definition of the reporting entity, according to a 
Treasury Accountant (Interview 3), the definition can be inferred from the definition given for 
'accounting officer' and the various provisions that describe the responsibilities of the 
department heads and the AG34. The NAO2 (Interview 4) confirmed that the reporting entity 
is not defined in the legislation: 
 
                                                 
34Article 2 of FAA defines ‘accounting officer’; Article 12 of FAA mentions the duties of the accounting 
officers; Article 49 of the FAA mentions the measures against fraud and irregularities and the duties the Heads 
of Departments, the Auditor General in accordance with NAO Act and the IAID in accordance with the IAID 
Act; Article 4 of the GFR includes the duties of the AG; Article 5 of the GFR includes the duties of the AG with 
regards to material irregularity; Article 6 of the GFR includes the responsibilities of accounting officers; Article 
91 of the GFR states that the Heads of Departments are responsible for providing the list of accounting officers 
to the AG and the Auditor General; Article 92 of the GFR states that the Heads of Departments are responsible 
for certifying the accuracy of collections of revenue or other public moneys; Article 102 of the GFR states the 
responsibility of the Heads of Departments to report cash losses; and Article 105 and 106 of the GFR lists the 
responsibilities of the Heads of Departments in relation to stores. 
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Each vote is a reporting entity and should produce financial statements. …this does 
not emanate from the legislation. The FAA Act and the GFR mention that the 
department head should maintain proper records, but then point to the Treasury as 
the reporter and the preparer of financial statements.  
 
The various circulars and directives always put the onus of reporting on the department head. 
The DGA (Interview 2) is concerned that a head of department may challenge the Treasury 
regarding the process of collecting accrual data since the law does not identify the department 
as a reporting entity. She acknowledged the importance of such a definition that should be 
included in the new legislation. 
 
The ex-Director General Special Projects (Interview 8) explained that this problem was 
anticipated in the draft legislation which defined "Department, Agency and Units of 
Government" as "an administrative unit of Government", and had also defined "what 
government is" (quoting from Part 1 Section 2 of the proposed Act): 
"Government" as used in this Act, includes all ministries and departments, local 
authorities, bodies corporate and other entities whose powers, functions and duties 
are conferred and assigned under the Constitution or any law, or whose funding is 
wholly or partly financed from public funds.  
 
4.5.7 Is a new legislation required to introduce accounting reforms? 
 
According to the DGA (Interview 2), the Minister's ability to enforce the accounting reforms 
would be strengthened if he has appropriate legal back up. A minimal framework is required, 
which can be fleshed out with subsidiary legislation to clarify problems and issues 
encountered as the reform progresses. According to this Director, if a comprehensive 
legislation is attempted, the work of the drafting committee may stall due to the complexity. 
This coincides with the PS's views on "gold-plating". 
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The AG (Interview 13) is not going to wait for a new legislation in order to implement the 
IPSAS because these can be introduced by a regulation. He questions the importance of legal 
requirements, since even the transmission of accrual data from the departments to the 
Treasury is a process that is only supported by a circular, and the departments are not legally 
bound to the process: 
We are going to ride the wagon of the Public Administration Act. In this act, the 
Principal PS has the power to issue directives which to a certain extent become law. 
So what we can do is to issue a directive under this Act, with the reporting 
requirements that we need from the departments. In this sense, we will have more 
power. 
 
Even the Deputy Auditor General (NAO1) (Interview 15) believes that an amendment would 
be sufficient to introduce accrual accounting, but a complete overhaul of the current 
legislation is required "if we want to have something wholesome ... and enhance fiscal 
discipline". 
   
4.6 The planned accrual accounting system 
 
From the outset, the planned accrual accounting system was one that would be able to 
concurrently generate the current cash management accounting reports (Camilleri, 2005). The 
system would generate financial statements for each Department under both cash accounting 
and accrual accounting rules. Initially, the accrual accounting information would be used for 
internal financial purposes only, while the cash accounting data and reports would continue to 
be utilised in the traditional sense. 
 
As at 2005, the vision held by the Task Force was very wide and planned for the introduction 
of accrual-based multi-year budgets, with increased departmental responsibility and 
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accountability (Camilleri, 2005). The Task Force envisaged the new IT system as a business 
intelligence engine that incorporates information resource management principles and 
enhances analysis of information to support better decision-making (Camilleri, 2005). 
 
4.6.1 MITA and the new IT system 
 
The MITA35 is heavily involved in the accounting reform as a consultant and is represented 
on both the Standards Committee and the committee responsible for designing the IT 
specifications (MITA2, Interview 11). 
 
The MITA is not a small organisation. It has solid expertise on government systems but it is 
not its policy to write software. MITA's human resources are absorbed in other work in line 
with its macro objectives and "it pays to outsource everything ... so that the work can be 
executed in the required timeframe" (MITA1, Interview 27). It would not be worthwhile to 
write an accounting software programme for the government because accrual accounting 
methodology is standard and software packages are available off-the-shelf (PS, Interview 9; 
MITA2, Interview 11; MITA1, Interview 27). So "why re-invent the wheel?" when the 
supplier can change the parameters of the package to suit the buyer's requirements (MITA2, 
Interview 11).  
 
                                                 
35
 The Public Service Reform in the early 1990s split the Management Systems Unit into two: MITTS, a limited 
liability company, focusing on the IT requirements of the public sector; and the Management Efficiency Unit, 
concentrating on business process reforms within government. The latter has now been downsized and its remit 
is limited to the OPM, while the MITTS was reverted back to a government agency, the MITA, in 2008. The 
MITTS had focused on development of systems and technologies at micro level. MITA's objectives are now at a 
higher level, looking at national strategy and its implementation at a macro level. Both the MITTS and the 
Management Efficiency Unit were represented on the Task Force (MITA1, Interview 27). 
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According to the NAO2 (Interview 4), it would also be unethical for MITA to undertake the 
project itself since it was involved in the preparation of the specifications of the required IT 
system. The tender will be issued as a public tender according to the government's 
procurement regulations. 
 
4.6.2 The tender story 
 
The Director of Contracts has recommended an open tender with a transparent scoring 
system36. The Committee responsible for the IT specifications also prepared the tender 
documentation. The tender was ready on two occasions: in 2004 and in 2010 (MITA1, 
Interview 27). 
 
The tender was complete in 2004 when the previous Minister of Finance resigned. "Then 
everything stopped due to change of players", and subsequently, the new Minister of Finance 
required the tender to be updated (MITA1, Interview 27). 
 
A project board was set up on purpose for the procurement of the solution which was called 
the 'Corporate Financial Management System'. The tender was reviewed from scratch for a 
period of two years, during which departments and heads of sections were consulted. The 
tender was ready in May 2010 and the board presented the document to the PS and the 
                                                 
36
 Originally it was intended to issue a negotiated procedure, which is still a public tender, but negotiations are 
done with the shortlisted applicants before the tender is actually awarded. "This procedure can be very effective, 
but for public scrutiny, it can be less transparent and therefore risky" (MITA1, Interview 27). The open tender 
would still be subject to a review and a qualitative assessment, but this will be done after the contract has been 
awarded (MITA1, Interview 27). 
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Minister of Finance. The Minister agreed in principle and the PS wrote officially to the Board 
that it could move on  (MITA1, Interview 27). 
 
However, the Minister of Finance then decided that the specifications were "extravagant" and 
he asked the Board to remove some parts that were considered as extra. The AG (Interview 
13) thinks that the Minister of Finance has always held the wrong impression that things 
should be kept simple and that an off-the-shelf package would suffice. The DGA (Interview 
2) mentioned as one example that the board was being asked to limit the tender to applicants 
that had the required government experience, but the board did not agree with this limitation 
and wanted the opportunity to be available to everyone. The IAID (Interview 21) referred to 
innuendoes surrounding the procurement, and the board members felt that they did not want 
to cater for a system that "one or the other supplier had to offer".  
 
Apparently, internal conflicts arose within the MFEI, and some members of the Board 
resigned (AG, Interview 13; DGA, Interview 2; IAID, Interview 21). But the MITA 
(Interview 27) felt obliged to follow the MFEI's directions and "downsized the specifications". 
 
On a quarterly basis, the Procurement Outlook on the MITA's website indicates to suppliers 
the tenders that are going to be issued. The prospective tender for the government's financial 
management system, as amended by the MITA, featured on the Procurement Outlook for the 
second quarter of 2011, but the actual tender was never issued and was subsequently removed 
from the website. According to the MITA (Interview 27), up to June 2011, there was a drive 
from the top to move ahead, but then the priorities of the government changed due to the 
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financial squeeze being experienced following the crisis. During 2011 and 2012, the tender 
got stuck due to other priorities of the government.  
 
During the interview (January 2012), the PS (Interview 9) confirmed that the specifications 
were ready and it was a question of when the tender can be issued. While the MITA 
(Interview 27) stated that (as at September 2012) it appears that "the spirit has risen again" 
due to EU pressure. 
 
According to the AG (Interview 13), however, "the IT system is only the tip of the iceberg", 
and in his opinion, the IT system is not really needed to implement accrual accounting. As 
already described, the AG thinks that the IPSAS can still be implemented without changing 
anything in the system. Even the DGA (Interview 2) holds the same view because the ultimate 
objective of reporting to the EU is being achieved.  
 
4.6.3 Interested suppliers 
 
According to the DGA (Interview 2), the interest of the private sector in government 
operations will be re-ignited once it becomes aware that the government is considering a new 
IT accounting system. Private audit firms will team up with their IT partners and will be 
interested in the tender (DGA, Interview 2). The partner of the audit firm (Interview 14) that 
was involved in the DAS implementation stated that they have been waiting for the tender for 
the past two years. 
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The DGA (Interview 2) confirmed that large IT software companies used to "pester" members 
of the board. The Treasury informed its superiors that it was being approached in this way, 
and it was instructed to stop communications with external parties. When the tender was 
being designed, the board did not refer to any one particular system and was not biased 
towards a particular IT company. The DGA stated that the board never watched any 
demonstrations. 
 
But according to the Director General Strategy and Operations (Interview 19), it would be 
normal for a review to be carried out of what is available on the market, and confirmed that 
the bulk of this work was done by the MITA. 
 
4.6.4 The Cost of the new IT system 
 
As from 2010, reform expenditure is being capitalised in the Financial Estimates (refer to 
table 5). Previously, it was being considered as recurrent expenditure. The AG (Interview 13) 
confirmed that the reason is because previously the expenses had related to training, while 
now "we are talking about procurement and implementation of the system". A Treasury 
Accountant (Interview 3) confirmed that the capitalised amounts are mainly MITA 
consultancy fees. The AG pointed out that the acquisition cost of the new IT system would 
run into millions and not as indicated in the Financial Estimates. According to the NAO 
(Interviews 4, 15), the estimated cost of the new IT system and its implementation ranged 
from 20 to 40 million euro. The NAO1 (Interview 15) stated that this large quotation was for 
the basic requirements and not for some "extravagant" specifications. 
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The government had considered applying for EU funds to finance this project but apparently 
funds are not available for this purpose (NAO2, Interview 4; PS, Interview 9; AG, Interview 
13). The PS (Interview 9) acknowledges that funding is a problem, but this can be carefully 
planned because since the system will be introduced in modules, it is not required to purchase 
the whole system outright. According to the AG (Interview 13), cost is not a problem and "if 
you want funds, you will find them".  
 
Table 5: Extracts from Financial Estimates, 2007 to 2013 
Year Approved Estimate Actual Expenditure 
 € € 
Programmes & Initiatives MFEI  - (5011) Accrual Accounting 
2005  10,780 
2006 93,174 35,972 
2007 46,588 51,504 
2008 47,000 48,908 
2009 55,000 6,301 
Capital Vote MFEI  - (7273) Public Finance Management System 
2010 100,000 84,803 
2011 500,000 44,524 
2012 100,000 1,545 
2013 50,000  
 
(Source: Ministry of Finance, Annual Financial Estimates, 2007 to 2013) 
 
The ex-Budget Office Director (Interview 25) considers such an expense a waste of financial 
resources. Since the EU, the IMF and credit agencies, are satisfied with the current patched-up 
system, "do we need to incur an expense of millions so that we can say that we are holier than 
the pope?" The government would only be giving money to the private sector, and the cost 
should also factor in the need to maintain the system. He acknowledges that the DAS is old, 
but according to him, the government should consider simply acquiring a new version, which 
perhaps would have the adjustments that the NSO carries out integrated within the system. 
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According to the ex-Budget Office Director, this would mean that only the current supplier 
needs to be approached to carry out such work, and a public tender need not be issued. 
 
4.6.5 The users of the new IT System 
 
According to MITA (Interview 27), consolidation of the whole IT system is required for the 
accounting reform to be successful. The system will import the data from the independent 
systems on a daily basis, and it will be up to the central level to decide the frequency of 
financial reports: "the central level will not depend on the manual inputting of data from the 
large departments like the Inland Revenue and VAT" (MITA1, Interview 27). The system will 
provide a certain autonomy and flexibility, and the information will be provided online: 
For the first time the government will be in a position to access information that has 
been updated within the last 24 hours by everyone. (MITA1, Interview 27) 
 
According to the MITA (Interview 27), over a period of four years, the improved technology 
will increase the number of users of the IT system across whole of government from 2,000 to 
5,000. Accounting, procurement, managers and directors, will all have a role in the 
technology. The reporting functionality will be personalised for the director, senior and 
executive management, thus including the decision-maker as a participant in the technology. 
 
But the PS (Interview 9) thinks that the problem goes beyond systems and there is no point in 
having a sophisticated system that produces reports which are not read and used. According to 
him, the problem is the user and not the system: 
We should not reduce the problem to one of systems. This would be a very big 
mistake. Given that systems are not as sophisticated as we wish them to be, but they 
are there. The quantity of data in the DAS is tremendous, but it was never used 
because there was no one who could use it.  
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The views of the PS are, therefore, in line with Caperchione (2000) in that the change from 
cash to accrual accounting is not a simple technical exercise, and that "the potential usefulness 
of new information cannot be taken for granted" (Caperchione, 2000). In order to be useful, 
there has to be the expertise to properly use the output from the system. To date, this expertise 
appears to have been lacking. 
 
5 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter starts with the historical background of the administration of Malta, and leads to 
the reform in public administration in the late 1980s. The cash-based government accounting 
system is described, together with the government accounting reforms effected to date. 
 
Since 1999, the MFEI has undertaken a project to replace the cash-based accounting system 
with an accrual-based accounting system. The Task Force was set up to oversee the 
introduction and implementation of the accrual-based accounting system according to a 
defined implementation project plan.  
 
It was envisaged that an accrual-based accounting system was to be in place in all government 
departments by the end of 2005, because the new financial legislation was in its final phases; 
the MGAS were compiled and training was being provided; and the necessary amendments to 
the DAS were being tackled37.  The situation after thirteen years is that the introduction of a 
full accrual accounting system in Government Departments has not happened; work is still 
being done on the finalisation of the new legislation; the MGAS have been abandoned for 
                                                 
37
 According to the “National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis” of 2002, prepared by the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs for the EU pre-Accession Agreement. 
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IPSAS; training is still being continuously provided; and a tender for the required 
computerised accounting system has not been issued. In the meantime, the Treasury is 
preparing trial financial statements based on a modified-accrual basis, but only for internal 
use. 
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CHAPTER 5:  PROPOSED GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
REFORM  AND THE UNDERLYING ISSUES 
 
1 REFORMING GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
 
The findings described in this chapter are derived from the questionnaire used as a basis for 
interviews with government officials. The questionnaire is based on Lüder and Jones' (2003) 
EuroCIGAR study.  
 
1.1 An overview of the accrual accounting system 
 
A clear political decision has been taken on the implementation of accrual accounting in 
central government when the Accrual Accounting Task Force was set up in 1999 (MF 
Circular No. 14/99; DOI, 2001; PS, Interview 9; AG, Interview 13). According to the NAO2 
(Interview 4), this was a policy decision, not based on a legislation or a particular 
requirement. 
 
The decision has been re-iterated in recent years as the reform was mentioned in the Budget 
Speeches of 201038 and 201339. According to the DGA (Interview 2), reference in the Budget 
Speech constitutes "an official declaration." 
 
                                                 
38
 Delivered by the Minister for Finance to Parliament on 9th November 2009, where the Minister stated that a 
call for tenders was going to be issued for the procurement of an accounting system for Government. 
39
 Delivered to Parliament on 10th December 2012, where the Minister referred to the new fiscal framework. 
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As is the trend in most countries (Lüder and Jones, 2003), reforms in accounting systems of 
local government started earlier. The Local Councils were set up in 1993 and were required to 
adopt an accrual accounting system as from 1995. Both the PS (Interview 9) and the AG 
(Interview 13) confirmed that the decision for reforming the national government accounting 
system had nothing to do with Local Councils. The regulations for Local Councils require 
their financial statements to be audited by private firms. This may have contributed towards 
the requirement for them to adopt an accrual accounting system, "but this is not the primary 
factor" (DGA, Interview 2): 
It is now a policy that when a new agency or entity is created, accrual accounting is 
adopted immediately … in order to reduce problems … since we have decided to 
adopt accrual accounting in the public sector … we entrench it in their legislation. 
(PS, Interview 9) 
 
The Ex-Director General Special Projects (Interview 8) thinks that the new Minister of 
Finance in 2004, even though an accountant, may have been disillusioned with the use of 
accrual accounting in Local Councils during his previous experience as mayor. According to 
this ex-Director, this may have negatively affected the reforms at central level, which did not 
stop, but were "successfully suffocated and placed on the back burner." 
 
According to the DGA (Interview 2), the process to change the national governmental 
accounting system started following the report of the PSRC in 1989. The Public Service 
reform was spread over four pillars: human resources; IT; finance; and embedded culture 
(PSRC, 1989).  
 
It is the opinion of the AG (Interview 13), however, that the thrust to start compiling accrual-
based data for central government occurred when Malta applied for EU membership, and the 
requirement to report accrual-based data to the Commission loomed in the very near future.  
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The accrual-based trial financial statements are prepared by the Treasury for internal use. 
These financial statements are not presented to Parliament and are not audited. Revenue 
arrears data is audited because it is required as part of the annual Financial Report by the FAA 
Act. While the data for inventory is only checked for compliance with the circulars, and only 
a sample is audited (NAO2, Interview 4). 
 
The Government's annual Financial Report has not changed since 1999, except for some 
"cosmetic changes" like the inclusion of bank accounts and the distinction between quoted 
and unquoted investments (DGA, Interview 2; NAO2, Interview 4).  
 
The state of each reform phase for the national government40 are identified in Table 6 and 
described in the following paragraphs in this section. 
 
Table 6: Phases of accrual accounting reform at national government level 
Phases of reform process Started Completed 
Idea X  
Development of concept  ?  
Experimentation  (Pilot projects) X  
Norm Setting  X  
Implementation  X  
 
 
It is generally accepted by all the interviewees that the idea exists to carry out accounting 
reforms at national government level. But there appears to be no consensus about the state of 
the development of the concept. For the NAO2 (Interview 4), the concept has been 
                                                 
40
 At Local Government Level, there were no development of concept or experimentation phases. Commercial 
accounting was entrenched in the legislation and implemented. 
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developed, while for the DGA (Interview 2), the concept is still undergoing development. The 
AG (Interview 13) stated that the Treasury does have a clear target but he is not sure whether 
this coincides with the target of the PS. It appears, therefore, that the Treasury Officials are 
more aware of the uncertainties surrounding the expected outcome of the reforms, while the 
NAO may have distanced itself from the actual decisions and arguments. 
 
According to Lüder and Jones (2003), the development of concept phase is not necessary if no 
special concept for governmental financial accounting has been developed, and if the idea is 
to adopt commercial accounting with some modifications. The findings described in Chapter 
4 reveal that dual reporting is intended, but accrual-based budgeting is still a controversial 
subject. Uncertainty appears to surround budgetary accounting and not financial accounting. 
 
 
"Experimentation has started with the preparation of the trial financial statements", stated 
the NAO2 (Interview 4), referring to experimentation prior to the introduction of the new 
system41. The DGA (Interview 2) described the work being done by the AAWG as "pilot 
projects" since this monitors the quality of the financial statements. This piloting can only be 
complete when the new IT system is in place, and the figures in the trial financial statements 
are used for the opening balances in the new accrual accounting system. 
 
As to norm setting, the ongoing work on the new financial legislation is described in Chapter 
4.   
 
                                                 
41
 Lüder and Jones (2003) distinguish between experimentation carried out prior to the decision on the 
introduction of the new system, to improve the information basis for the pending decision, and that carried out 
after that decision, as part of the implementation phase, to test the design details and/or to give the staff the 
chance to get accustomed to the new system before it is put into operation. 
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Both the NAO2 (Interview 4) and the DGA (Interview 2) perceive the completion of the 
specifications for the required new IT system as the first step taken towards implementation. 
But the issue of the tender is still pending, and therefore, the Treasury cannot proceed with the 
implementation. 
 
1.2 The Statement of Financial Position: measurement focuses and valuation bases 
 
Same as Chan (2003) and Lande (2006), Lüder and Jones (2003) point out that in government 
accounting practice, it is rare to observe a purely cash-based system of accounting and 
budgeting, and various extents of accrual can be observed depending on the extent of 
recognition of assets and liabilities, as shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7:  Various levels of recognition of assets and liabilities 
Accounting System Assets Liabilities 
Modified cash accounting Monetary assets: cash and 
equivalents, loans and investments 
of the year 
 
Monetary Liabilities: Borrowings 
of the year 
Modified accrual accounting Financial assets =  monetary assets 
+ receivables  
 
Financial liabilities = Borrowings 
+ payables 
Accrual accounting (for 
governments/public sector) 
 
Financial assets + most physical 
assets (+ some intangible assets) 
Financial Liabilities + most 
provisions 
Full accrual accounting (for 
firms) 
Financial assets + all physical assets 
+ all intangible assets 
 
Financial liabilities + all 
provisions 
(Source: Lande, 2006, in Jones (Ed.), 2011, Public Sector Accounting, London: SAGE. Vol. 4 , Page 17) 
 
In order to deal with this variety of accounting systems, the EuroCIGAR study limited the 
term 'accounting basis' to define when an item is measured in the accounting system, and the 
term 'measurement focus' was coined to include also what is measured within the accounting 
system. As a result, measurement focus is described using four different classes of assets and 
121 
 
four different classes of liabilities, thus distinguishing 16 possible measurement focuses42 (as 
illustrated in Table 8). Table 8 includes the classification of the Financial Report as currently 
prepared, and the expected target(s) of the government officials. 
 
Table 8: Measurement focuses 
LIABILITIES 
ASSETS 
 
Monetary 
assets  
(cash and 
equivalents 
+loans 
+investments) 
Monetary assets 
+ Receivables 
Monetary assets + 
Receivables + most 
physical/intangible 
assets 
Monetary assets + 
Receivables +  
all physical/intangible 
assets 
Monetary 
liabilities 
(Borrowings) 
 
Current 
Financial 
Report 
   
Borrowings + 
Payables 
 
    
Borrowings + 
Payables + most 
provisions 
 
  
AG, NAO2 DGA 
Borrowings + 
Payables + all 
provisions 
 
  
 PS (MFEI) 
 
 
The Financial Report of the central government laid down in Parliament uses modified cash 
accounting, since monetary assets and monetary liabilities are disclosed (Financial Report, 
2011). 
 
                                                 
42
 Lüder and Jones (2003) point out that the distinctions are not always precise, but:- 
• “Financial assets + all physical assets + some intangible assets” requires recognition of all substantial 
assets belonging to IPSAS 1, par. 88, (a), (b), and (e). 
• “Borrowings + Payables + all provisions” requires recognition of all substantial provisions defined in 
IPSAS 19, par. 22. 
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According to the DGA (Interview 2), the target reform is for accrual accounting (for 
governments/public sector), but disclosing 'all' physical assets and not 'most', since "we have 
never discussed what assets to exclude." More daringly, the PS (Interview 9) claimed that 
once the system is fully working, the target is to have "a full accrual accounting system". The 
AG (Interview 13), however, does not see a full accrual accounting system as realistically 
achievable, mainly due to asset valuation problems and the lack of standards and policies. 
Even the NAO2 (Interview 4) described a full accrual accounting system as a "theoretical 
(debatable) target." 
 
The DAS does not provide for all the data required to compile the current Financial Report. 
The borrowings and the balance on the main public account are extracted from DAS, but then 
the departments that hold other bank accounts have to submit relevant bank details to the 
Treasury. 
 
The DGA (Interview 2) pointed out that receivables and payables data is not produced from 
the DAS but is gathered from the departments using templates as required by the circulars.  
 
The data for fixed assets is still missing … and these require a lot more work. (PS, 
Interview 9) 
 
The data for fixed assets is being compiled by each department according to the circulars. 
Historical cost is used where this information is available. As to heritage assets, these will 
either be valued at a nominal cost (PS, Interview 9) or simply disclosed (DGA, Interview 2). 
According to the NAO2 (Interview 4), it would be pointless and misleading to actually value 
heritage assets since the government has no intention of disposing of them. 
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According to the PS (Interview 9), all liabilities including contingent liabilities are known. 
Contingent liabilities for future pensions have been estimated and will be disclosed, even 
though not required by IPSAS 19, because according to the PS, the crystallisation of such 
issues need to be taken into consideration when assessing the sustainability of public finances. 
The main problem he anticipates concerns the valuation of expropriated assets that have never 
been settled, since the actual liability will only crystallise once a settlement is reached. 
 
When the new system is in place, all the data will be extracted from the system (DGA, 
Interview 2). The specifications that have been designed refer to an integrated system with 
different modules for financial assets and liabilities management, cost management, 
receivables and payables, fixed asset management, cash management, stock control, purchase 
orders, service orders and budgetary control.  
 
The historical cost basis is used for the valuation of monetary assets and monetary liabilities 
in the current modified cash-based system. Impairments on financial assets are also accounted 
for (DGA, Interview 2). 
 
The historical cost basis is also used for the accrual data and capital expenditure collected 
using the templates, but in cases where the original cost cannot be traced, the head of the 
department is required to get a "management valuation" from a professional (internal or 
external) (DGA, Interview 2). 
 
The DGA (Interview 2) anticipates that the valuation methods that are being employed now 
during the reform process, will continue to be used when the system is fully implemented. 
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However, she thinks that it is still too early to discuss the depreciation policy that will be in 
place because "we are still at the stage of capturing and measuring our assets". A 
depreciation policy paper has been prepared based on the revaluation model, but the paper has 
not been issued as a circular. 
 
The DGA (Interview 2) expects that an asset and liability recognition policy will be specified, 
which will be the same across the board to ensure harmonisation of departmental reports. The 
PS (Interview 9) pointed out that asset valuation problems will still arise and it is not just a 
question of issuing a policy.  
 
1.3 The Statement of Financial performance: disclosure issues 
 
According to the DGA (Interview 2), it is intended to follow the structure for the Statement of 
Financial Performance as given in IPSAS 143, and that expenses will be disclosed both by 
function and by nature. This is already being done in the current Financial Report because it is 
required by the legislation. 
 
  
                                                 
43
 At the time of the EuroCIGAR study (2003), the Operating Statement in IPSAS 1 was required to show three 
balances for surplus/deficit, being: 
• Surplus/deficit from operating activities 
• Surplus/deficit from ordinary activities 
• Total surplus/deficit. 
IPSAS 1 was subsequently amended and this anomaly removed. The Statement of Financial Performance is 
required to show one total, being “the total surplus/deficit”. 
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1.4 The Statement of Cash Flows: disclosure issues 
 
The trial financial statements are presenting both formats of the Statement of Cash Flows, as 
allowed by IPSAS 2, using the direct and indirect methods. The DGA (Interview 2) is of the 
opinion to choose the format that is more popular on the international scene, while the NAO2 
(Interview 4) feels that it would be better to choose the direct method since it is more simple 
and more understandable by politicians.  
 
Both the NAO2 (Interview 4) and the DGA (Interview 2) believe that there are no problems to 
classify activities into operating, investing and financing activities, because this classification 
exercise is already being done during the experimentation phase, and is being checked by the 
AAWG at the Treasury.  
 
They then disagree as to linking the Statement of Cash Flows with the annual budget. While 
the Director (Interview 2) thinks that they should be kept separate, the auditor (Interview 4) 
stated that the change in cash and cash equivalents would provide the link with the cash 
budget.  
 
  
 1.5 Consolidated Financial S
 
Lüder and Jones (2003) describe f
12. 
 
 
As already explained in Chapter 4, the reporting entity is not defined in the current financial 
legislation. According to the AG (Interview 13), "
that is, a cost centre in the DAS. The trial financi
December 2009 contained 60 different sets of financial statements:
A reporting entity is one that in the budgetary estimates has a vote. There are about 
49 line departments in the trial financial statements; nine 
President's Office and the House of Representatives. These two are like line 
departments, but are consolidated at Ministry Level. This is then consolidated for 
central government. 
 
government’s budget, thereby excluding those government 
organizations that are not financed through the budget but are 
The ‘
organizations that are not financed through the budget but are not legally 
The ‘economic entity’
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tatements and the Reporting Entity 
our categories of reporting entities, as illustrated in Figure 
Figure 12: Categories of reporting entities 
a reporting entity is a department as such
al statements prepared for year ended 31st 
 
ministries; and the 
(DGA, Interview 2) 
‘Governmental sub-entities’, referring only to the 
government’s departments and agencies
The ‘budget entity’, which includes all entities in the 
not legally separate from the government
legal entity’, which is the budget entity plus government 
separate from the government
, which is the legal entity plus all organizations controlled by it
 
", 
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The Treasury (Interviews 2, 13) intends to produce a full set of individual financial statements 
for each level of reporting entity, but the DGA (Interview 2) is not sure about the publication 
of financial statements at the various levels of consolidations. The NAO2 (Interview 4) 
perceives audit implications with regards to increase in work load for the NAO, because 
ideally, the financial statements should be audited by vote and by ministry. There could also 
be timing problems requiring the contracting out of some audits, as described in Chapter 4. 
 
Lüder and Jones (2003) point out that IPSAS 6 and 7 require line-by-line consolidation of 
controlled entities and application of the equity method for investments in associates. IPSAS 
6 defines control by highlighting power and benefit conditions. The critical issue is to define 
what “controlled entities” are.  
 
The AG (Interview 13) was not willing to define control and controlled entities, stating that 
this would be a decision of the MFEI and not the Treasury. This stand was supported by the 
DGA (Interview 2) who insisted that the remit of the Treasury is limited to the government 
departments and the ministries, and excludes the entities controlled by the Ministries as "these 
prepare their own accounting statements and will remain separate".  
 
The DGA (Interview 2) confirmed that IPSAS 6 will not be adhered to completely. Even at 
Ministry level, it is not the intention to consolidate all institutions that are legally separate 
from the government, like, for example, the Central Bank, even though they fall within the 
definition of a controlled entity according to IPSAS 6. But it is too early to specify a policy of 
exclusion, as this would be the responsibility of the IPSAS Committee once it starts 
functioning properly (DGA, Interview 2). 
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While acknowledging his lack of awareness of detailed IPSAS requirements, the NAO2 
(Interview 4) reiterated the importance of adhering to IPSAS unless it proves to be 
impossible. Another exception that he highlighted concerns consolidation, where he stressed 
the overriding importance of the ESA95 rules even if this would mean a qualification in the 
audit report. This concurs with the attitude of the AG (Interview 13), who, while recognising 
that there are differences between government accounting and ESA95 reporting, he will 
endeavour to minimise these differences by keeping to the same consolidation rules and only 
consolidate the entities that form part of the General Government as defined in the ESA95: 
When it comes to consolidation, I would do this in the same way that the NSO do it. 
So I would only consolidate those entities that form part of general government. 
 
The AG considers the general government concept as ultimately the most important in the 
short and medium term. Eventually, the whole of government picture would be considered, 
but he anticipates this to be "extremely difficult" (AG, Interview 13).  
 
The economic entity is the vision of the PS (Interview 9). He described the central database 
(the Financial Data Repository System [FDRS]) held at the MFEI, where all the financial 
information about departments, ministries, local councils, entities and corporations is input. A 
monthly consolidated report for the whole of government is extracted and analysed. But the 
PS recognises the FDRS as a temporary solution and sees the scope of developing the 
financial accounting system to produce whole of government consolidations. According to the 
AG (Interview 13), "as a country, we can go for the economic entity", but only as to 
collection of data. According to him, the FDRS is only issuing aggregated data and not 
consolidated reports.  
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The ex-Director General Special Projects (Interview 8) doubted whether the Task Force had 
drafted a policy paper on consolidation, but he confirmed that the aim was to consolidate up 
to the legal entity excluding the Central Bank and Airmalta44. He referred to the process of 
changing the various financial year end dates of corporations and local councils to 31st 
December, which was done throughout the years to facilitate eventual consolidation. But the 
Task Force never tackled the consultant's proposal to apply common accounting standards 
across the board (GT, Interview 14). The PS (Interview 9) does not anticipate any problems in 
consolidation when entities use different standards, referring to the existence of "bridge 
tables". The issue of different standards for various government entities is re-visited in 
chapter 6. 
 
The consolidated trial financial statements only include the government departments and the 
ministries, that is, the "governmental sub-entities" category but excluding the agencies. The 
Treasury will only consolidate up to this level for the annual Financial Statements because 
this is its remit and this is the only information that is currently available on the DAS (AG, 
Interview 13; DGA, Interview 2). 
 
The corporate financial management system that is being planned could eventually include 
the Local Councils and the Extra Budgetary Units (EBUs) and this would bring reporting 
closer to the General Government Sector as defined in the ESA95 (the budget entity) (AG, 
Interview 13). Without referring to the ESA95 definition of general government, the PAC 
Chairman (Interview 5) expects consolidation up to the budget entity, because even though 
EBUs and Local Councils have their individual sets of accounts, he would need a more 
                                                 
44
 Airmalta plc is a quoted limited liability company  and 98% of its shares are held by the Government of Malta. 
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"holistic picture of how each euro of public funds is being spent". While according to a PAC 
member (Interview 6), the most important thing is to identify the reporting entity in order to 
exercise better control. 
 
Some of the DCS (Interviews 17, 22, 23) interviewed are convinced that the MFEI is already 
performing some sort of consolidation to get an overall picture of the country's performance 
and financial position. In their opinion, a set of consolidated financial statements would make 
the government more accountable to Parliament, but they "do not think that ordinary citizens 
would be interested in these financial statements". One DCS (Interview 7) could not 
understand the scope for consolidating because this would be like going back to when all 
operations were centralised. In his opinion, a consolidated report would hide the fact whether 
an entity is producing a surplus or a deficit, when this information is of utmost importance for 
the government and even the public: 
I don't see why we would need to consolidate because the scope is to increase 
management efficiency and target problem areas, rather than to get a balance sheet 
for the whole of government. (DCS1, Interview 7) 
 
The interviewees unanimously agreed that increasing management efficiency is more 
important than the consolidation issue for the accounting and reporting reform. Management 
information for planning is more important, especially if long-term budgeting is improved. 
 
  
131 
 
2 REFORMING BUDGETARY ACCOUNTING AND BUDGETING 
 
2.1 Budgetary Accounting 
 
A fundamental use of government accounting is for budgeting and budgetary control. One 
DCS (Interview 17) stated that the departments are not a business and do not require a profit 
and loss account: what they need is a planning tool to check their performance with the 
budget and to know exactly the funds needed in order to get by.  
 
As explained in chapter 4, budgeting in government is controlled directly by the technology: 
the system does not allow the user to raise invoices if the budget limit is exceeded. Any 
overruns should be justified and approved beforehand. 
 
The budget remains an important control tool, and the budgeting module was considered as 
crucial during discussions about the specifications of the new IT system (DGA, Interview 2). 
In the opinion of the DGA (Interview 2), the financial and budget systems need to mirror each 
other. But the Budget Office (Interview 18) affirms that spending against the budget remains a 
dominant measure of performance and tool of control, and that the cash balance on the 
consolidated fund is monitored on a monthly basis.  
 
It is the opinion of the NAO2 (Interview 4) that a government would be tempted to consider 
only the cash effect: 
… and in reality it has to do this because at the end of the day, it can only do what is 
permitted by the amount it has available to spend, regardless of outputs and 
outcomes.  
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Due to the limited time frame of the politicians' mind-set, "the temptation is to look only at 
cash in and out in a year", but the auditor stressed the importance of multi-year budgeting, 
which would provide more control over the structured deficit by ensuring that the expenditure 
on capital projects is sustainable. 
 
2.1.1 The budget horizon 
 
The annual budget is prepared by the Budget Office and not by the departments or ministries.  
 
Ministries used to prepare three-year business and financial plans, but this system was 
stopped in 2008. The three-year business plans was an idea introduced by the government 
consultants in the nineties (BO, Interview 18). The departments were preparing very attractive 
three-year plans, but at the end of the day, these had to fit in the overall framework of the 
Central Government (BO, Interview 18). Some of them spent a lot of money to prepare these 
plans, even using outside contractors, but according to the ex-Budget Office Director 
(Interview 25), this was a pointless exercise and a waste of resources. 
 
The three-year business plans were replaced with one-year financial plans at departmental 
level in the case of revenue expenditure.  The Budget Office (Interview 18) feels that these are 
easier and sufficient because they eliminate certain speculations. But a DCS (Interview 17) 
commented that he cannot understand why the three-year plans were removed because they 
had provided useful management information, even at central level.  
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An annual circular is issued to each Ministry requiring next year's plan for all the departments 
and a consolidated plan. An incremental approach is used since departments are encouraged 
to start by assuming that next year's requirements will be the same as for the current year and 
then indicate any possible changes - both savings and more expenses (BO, Interview 18). 
After taking into consideration the increase in wages and salaries, the Budget Office 
endeavours to maintain the funds allocated to each expense line item at the same level each 
year. In this way it will be effectively requiring the departments to curtail their operations due 
to decreasing purchasing power (XBO, Interview 25). 
 
At central level, the Budget Office has detailed three-year projections. The three-year 
financial plans published in the Financial Estimates are based on such projections (BO, 
Interview 18). The MFEI presents its detailed three-year projections to the EU and the IMF, 
and are also available to the NSO (XBO, Interview 25). According to the ex-Budget Office 
Director, the ministries do not ask for these three-year projections, and if they did, he does not 
think that the MFEI would give them these details. He believes that the MFEI cannot afford to 
lose its flexibility, and it would if it gives out such details which may be considered as 
"promises" by some officials. 
 
It would also prove not practical to give the departments three-year projections because 
sometimes even the one-year budget is not guaranteed albeit authorised by Parliament. If the 
MFEI needs to revise the estimates at some time during the year, the departments would then 
query how future projections would be affected, and this would "create a Babylon" (XBO, 
Interview 25). 
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The argument is different for capital projects. Three-year forecasts are prepared by the 
departments for projects. Funds promised on capital projects are not withdrawn as this may 
also cause political harm, according to the ex-Budget Office Director (Interview 25). The 
Ministries may have many projects in the pipeline, but they try to prioritise before they 
prepare the capital expenditure forecast for the MFEI, otherwise "you ask for a cake, but they 
give you a small doughnut" (DCS8, Interview 26).  
 
2.1.2 Accruals in the budget 
 
According to the Budget Office (Interview 18), the annual budget is purely cash-based and no 
adjustments are done for changes in accounts payable and other financial assets and liabilities.  
 
However, the DGA (Interview 2) stated that payments to creditors and commitments are taken 
into account when the budget is prepared, but these are not recorded separately in the budget. 
This point was also emphasised by the ex-Budget Office Director (Interview 25), and even by 
the AG (Interview 13), who stated that the Budget Office started recognising the effect of 
accruals ever since the country started sending Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) 
notifications to the EU. 
 
The MITA (Interview 27) confirmed that "today, accrual budgeting is done but it is not 
formalised". The government enters into long-term commitments and each year then it has to 
record, carry forward, and honour the balance on its commitment: 
The budgeting process cannot not be accrual-based because it already is … You 
can't say that the principle will not be introduced because the principle is already 
there.   
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The current budget system does contain an element of accruals but only for long-term capital 
commitments. As described in Chapter 4 (section 3.3), the DCS would appreciate something 
similar for revenue expenditure. But this appears to be an issue with the Budget Office and the 
PS. Perhaps this is why the Budget Office was so adamant in describing the annual budget as 
purely cash-based. 
 
The current budget system does not always make a distinction between current and capital 
expenditure. For example, "Programmes and Initiatives" may include an element to be spent 
on fixed assets, and "Improvement to property and equipment" is classified under recurrent 
expenditure.  The distinction between capital and revenue expenditure appears to be an 
inherent problem and there are no hard and fast rules being followed, in spite of a Treasury 
Circular on the subject. The distinction is fundamental if an accrual-based budget is being 
considered (Jones, 2012).  
 
2.1.3 Accrual Budgeting and control 
 
According to the DGA (Interview 2), accrual accounting and budgetary accounting will be 
integrated in the new system, and the budgetary accounts will be part of the double entry 
system. She also confirmed that the balance sheet will be extracted from the accounting 
system in order to reduce errors. 
 
The Budget Office (Interview 18) stated that it is possible that accrual accounting affects 
budgeting, but it is still under discussion. The Budget Office accepts that the accounting 
system and the budgetary system should be complementary in order for there to be 
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comparability, but it is not really convinced about the utility of accrual budgeting at 
departmental level.  
 
The AG (Interview 13) thinks that the adoption of accrual-based budgeting is the biggest 
obstacle in the implementation of the new financial legislation. The PS (Interview 9) sees a 
contentious discussion surrounding unspent allocations. He thinks that in order to use accrual 
basis for financial estimates, "one would have to accept the rule that whatever is not spent in 
one year is left there"; he prefers the present rule that unused allocations are removed as in 
this way one could exercise total control, and in his opinion: 
There is no way that you can manage a national financial system without having 
absolute control at central level. (PS, Interview 9) 
 
According to the PS (Interview 9), the current budget system already contains an appropriate 
element of accruals for capital expenditure because commitments are taken into consideration 
for projects in progress, but similar concepts cannot be introduced for recurrent expenditure 
otherwise "you would lose control on your financial situation". The PS, therefore, upholds a 
dual system of accrual financial accounting and a cash-based budget: 
I don't think that we should go for accrual budgeting, but this is a discussion that 
still needs to be made. And a dual system exists in many countries. What we are 
doing is not any different from everyone else.  
 
According to the NAO2 (Interview 4), it would be necessary to prepare both a cash-based and 
an accrual-based budget. He thinks that it is important not to deduct anything from the present 
system and accrual accounting will be an "add-on". He has "no doubt that politicians would 
prefer a cash budget", due to understandability and clarity about financing (NAO2, Interview 
4).  
 
137 
 
According to the Budget Office (Interview 18), the cash-based budget is essential for 
parliament to base its resource allocation decisions: 
I cannot see how you can operate without the cash budget. Even in the private 
sector, cash forecasts are extremely important. If the accrual-based budget is 
prepared, parliament can then decide whether to refer to it or not. 
 
According to the Budget Office (Interview 18), "it would be difficult to conceptualise what 
control is being exercised" if only an accrual-based budget is presented, and politicians would 
retain control if the cash budget is still presented to them.  
 
A PAC member (Interview 6) asked whether politicians may fear losing control "in terms of 
ways and means of how to hide things", but according to the PAC Chairman (Interview 5), it 
is not a question of losing control, but rather a question of whether one is ready to take the 
plunge to be more responsible, expose oneself to more criticism, and risk one's political 
objective to be re-elected. 
 
Various debacles have taught politicians that being totally honest may have disastrous 
consequences. Perhaps this is the underlying reason why the effort not to be so transparent is 
more urgent than any fear they may have in losing control over the purse strings. After all, as 
the ex-Director General Special Projects (Interview 8) pointed out, the control of politicians is 
already limited since they can only spend up to the limits approved by Parliament. If accrual 
accounting is introduced, it has always been planned that the traditional cash-based budget 
will remain for parliament, and accrual-based reports would be made available for those 
politicians who are interested. So in this case, it is not a matter of losing control over the 
budget and government finances as suggested by Jones and Lüder (2011), but rather the fear 
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to be too transparent. However, transparency can also indirectly lead to loss of control (XBO, 
Interview 25).  
 
It appears that no one considers that Parliament should be concerned with authorisation of 
changes in accounts payable and receivable. It is the opinion of a PAC member (Interview 6) 
that it is irrelevant who authorises such changes; what is important is that the process is 
transparent. While the NAO2 (Interview 4) thinks that the level of receivables should be a 
decision of the department head because they would hold appropriate knowledge of the 
situation. In the case of payables, the Treasury and the MFEI could issue circulars as 
guidance, but the final responsibility should also lie with the department head. The Treasury 
and the MFEI cannot decide everything and should act only as "regulators", but of course, 
this would depend on the level of system centralisation that is desired (NAO2, Interview 4). 
The Budget Office (Interview 18) agreed that direction should come from the Treasury, but 
both Treasury Officials (Interviews 2, 13) confirmed that the Budget Office is already 
exercising control on the level of creditors: "it is not engrained in their procedure, but the 
thinking is already there". 
 
According to the PAC Chairman (Interview 5), the budgetary reforms that he expects is in the 
set up of who actually prepares the budget. The budget is prepared by the MFEI and not by an 
independent body. Current practice accommodates the government in that it can manipulate 
the estimates to suit its party's motto: 
The estimates as presented now have a political aim fitting neatly in a political 
cycle. This needs to stop … More emphasis should be made on projections … Year 
in year out, these projections are missed completely. (PAC1, Interview 5) 
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The PAC Chairman (Interview 5) is therefore also admitting that politicians are more 
interested in the budget itself rather than its realisation. As a member of the opposition, one 
would expect that he would be more interested in the latter: 
The government side is interested in the budget itself, whereas the opposition is 
interested in budget realisation. (NAO2, Interview 4) 
 
The Budget Office (Interview 18) thinks that politicians should be interested in the both the 
budget itself and its realisation:  
The budget itself needs to be attainable and credible and it is in the interest of all 
politicians that the budget does not create any problems. There would be 
repercussions on the sustainability of the financial framework of the country if the 
budget is not achieved. 
 
The DGA (Interview 2) described the budget as "a short-term succession plan for the 
individuals in parliament". According to her, all politicians have more interest in the budget 
because they are there for sensationalism and they use the budget as a tool for marketing: 
"What can I give to my voters?" 
 
2.2 Budgeting Principles 
 
Lüder and Jones (2003) highlight and explain the budgeting principles shown in Table 9. 
According to the Budget Office (Interview 18), these principles are all being upheld, with 
some modifications. The modifications were not made in anticipation of the introduction of 
accrual accounting, but were needed due to the development of certain structures and policies 
(DGA, Interview 2; BO, Interview 18). 
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Table 9: Budgeting Principles 
Budgeting Principle 
 
Unity This means comprehensiveness – the government brings together all of its 
financial transactions into one document, known as its budget. 
 
Universality Also known as the gross budget principle. Revenues must not be allocated to 
particular items of spending in advance; and revenues cannot be set-off against 
spending. 
 
Annuality The budget is to cover a single and complete year. 
 
Specification Detailed specification of what can be spent. 
 
Balanced 
Budget 
This can mean revenue equals spending; or revenue plus borrowings equals 
spending; or ordinary revenue equals ordinary expenditure and borrowings 
equal investments. 
 
 
(Source: Lüder and Jones, 2003) 
 
Unity and universality are two principles that have been modified due to the growth of 
government entities (BO, Interview 18). Corporations are excluded from the central budget 
because they prepare their own budget. The overall effect of other government entities is 
reflected in the central budget, but only line items are shown for each entity, with the amount 
of funds allocated to them. The detail is then shown in the budget of the particular entity.  
 
The gross budget principle is also being maintained in that there is no setting off; any grants 
received are reported as revenue; and even "programmes and initiatives" are reported gross. 
There is one exception to this principle because revenue can be allocated in advance to 
particular items of spending through the use of the Treasury Clearance Fund45 (BO, Interview 
18).  
                                                 
45
 Article 32 refers to the Treasury Clearance Fund, which is held to account for the receipts and payments of 
court and other deposits. The moneys from this fund can be used to pay certain refundable expenses. The 
Minister does not need parliamentary approval to use these funds. These moneys can be invested, and interest 
received, changes in value of investments, and gains/losses on disposal of investments, are then transferred to the 
Consolidated Fund (except in the case of deposits on account of foundations or trusts). 
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Even annuality is not strictly upheld, according to the DGA (Interview 2), because a legal 
notice exists that permits the carry forward of unspent balances through the use of a below-
the-line account. But in recent years, the MFEI has been restricting the use of such accounts 
in practice (DCS8, Interview 26). 
 
With regards to specification, one DCS (Interview 28) finds the fact that departments are 
allocated funds for each line item instead of one lump sum as in the case of entities, as a 
limitation on their operations. While he understands that the present method enables the MFEI 
to exercise more central control, he thinks that "there are issues that need to be centralised, 
but there are other issues that can be decentralised" (DCS9, Interview 28). 
 
According to the Budget Office (Interview 18), the balanced budget means revenue equals 
spending. But specifying ordinary revenue to equal ordinary expenditure, and borrowings to 
equal investments, makes sense as well, "and this should result in a surplus". 
 
According to the DGA (Interview 2), it has always been the practice to start from the target 
deficit and work backwards to determine the tax revenues, therefore, accounting would 
determine the tax. But the ex-Budget Office Director (Interview 25) claims that the emphasis 
is always on control of expenditure. It is never desirable to introduce new taxes as this would 
have a negative effect on the economy (XBO, Interview 25).  
 
In February 2012, a change in the Constitution was proposed in Parliament to introduce the 
balanced budget requirement at national level. According to the PS (Interview 9), this 
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relatively new concept has advantages and disadvantages. He explained that the fiscal 
framework used in the past three years has "strengthened the rules of the game". The EU's 
Fiscal Treaty gives latitude for a deficit, but this rule in the Constitution would essentially 
mean that the level of expenditure is capped, leaving no sector as "untouchable". According 
to the PS, the balanced rule in the Constitution would leave only two alternatives: increase 
taxes, in order to maintain the high costs of health, education and pensions that are provided 
free to all at the point of delivery; or reform the core costs of these 'free' services. 
 
His opinion is that, in technical terms, the balanced budget would be "the best thing that ever 
happened", but political games and promises would need to stop "because you cannot expect 
to continue operating in the same way as before" (PS, Interview 9). While acknowledging 
that a balanced budget would be a big challenge, the Budget Office (Interview 18) considers it 
as achievable if expenditure is controlled with the input of everyone: "by being more efficient 
and doing more with less; and by decreasing tax evasion". 
 
2.3 Output Measurement 
 
According to Lüder and Jones (2003), output measurement, in practice, has tended to focus on 
actual results, but its foremost place is naturally in budgeting, in which case accrual budgeting 
would be required to fully realise the benefits. 
 
The Budget Office (Interview 18) does not exclude the possibility of output measurement in 
budgeting, with the results being published by the departments themselves and not as part of 
the budget document, so that the departments are more responsible and accountable. 
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A member of the PAC (Interview 6) expects to see more control on outputs and outcomes, 
and the NAO2 (Interview 4) considers it ideal to have performance measures and performance 
indicators to monitor outputs and outcomes. Some departments actually do have some 
measures in place but these are only used internally and are not done in a systematic way. 
There is much room for improvement as these measures can be included in the financial 
statements and audited46 (NAO2, Interview 4). 
 
The Budget Office (Interview 18) is not excluding the possibility of control of outputs and 
outcomes, but not as a substitute for detailed control of revenues and spending. The Budget 
Office, however, ponders on the dilemma it will face as to what action it can take if such 
targets are not achieved: 
Would this warrant a decrease in the allocated funds? What is the effect on the 
quality of the service? Who will suffer from such sanctions in the end?  
 
The Budget Office (Interview 18) feels that the only thing that it can do is investigate the 
reasons why a target is not achieved, but the public service is very complex and there may be 
many uncontrollable factors: "would external users care about this?"  
  
                                                 
46
 The indicators need not be financial, but should be quantifiable, and these could even be audited. The use of 
non-financial performance indicators bridge the gap between non-profit and profit oriented entities. Indicators 
can be used by the government as a guide for health, education, etc., and also for accountability. You see the key 
objectives of a department or ministry and extract the key performance indicator. This information could 
substitute the objective of the Income Statement. The compliance auditors check that the ratio is correct while 
the performance auditors would assess improvements ... The most important aspect of accrual accounting is that 
it provides more data on which decisions can be based. But to supplement this you have KPIs that can assist in 
decision-making, so that the government will see the areas where it needs to concentrate. (NAO2, Interview 4) 
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3 CONTEXT OF THE REFORMS 
 
3.1 The process of setting new accounting norms and rules 
 
Table 10 shows the different types of legal instruments which may affect government 
accounting in Malta. The degree of detail increases as one moves down the hierarchy of 
instruments. EU Directives are transposed into national legislation, and then circulars and 
instructions are issued to departments.  
 
Table 10: Hierarchy of government accounting law in Malta 
Binding 
nature 
Instruments Institutions 
 
Mandatory 
 
Statute law 
Ordinances 
Regulations 
Directives and circulars 
Guidelines and instructions 
 
Parliament 
Cabinet/Minister 
MFEI 
Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), MFEI, Treasury 
Treasury 
 
Voluntary 
 
Recommendations 
 
The NAO 
 
 
There is no Government External Body that issues guidelines on government accounting law 
in Malta.  The accounting of the government is the responsibility of the Treasury. The FAA 
Act and all the directives/circulars/guidelines are compulsory. "We do not issue anything that 
is voluntary", stated the AG (Interview 13). The GFR require all accounting officers to abide 
by circulars/notices issued by the MFEI and by the Treasury.  
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) referred to the MGAS which were guidelines issued by the MFEI 
that were not compulsory, and in fact were only used by the Treasury when preparing trial 
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financial statements. The only recommendations that exist are those that the NAO includes in 
its reports, and such recommendations are not mandatory. 
 
Both the NAO1 (Interview 15) and the AG (Interview 13) confirmed that "as wide a 
consultation as possible" is required whenever a new law or legal notice is being drawn up. 
For example, should a legal notice concerning the adoption of IPSAS be issued, external 
bodies, like the MIA, would be consulted more as a formality and not much feedback would 
be expected "because they are more geared for the private sector rather than for government" 
(AG, Interview 13).  
 
3.2 Central Guidance 
 
The MFEI provides central guidance for the accounting reform through the Task Force. As 
described in Chapter 4, progress was made during the period when the Task Force was 
chaired by the ex-Director General Special Projects (NAO2, Interview 4). This MFEI official 
"owned" the project and had the support of the Minister of Finance of that time. But when he 
retired in June 2009, the project lost its direction.  
 
According to the AG (Interview 13), the Task Force is not operating anymore and "it only 
exists on paper". The NAO (Interviews 4, 15) confirmed that the Task Force is no longer 
holding meetings, and that it appears that it has exhausted its assignment even though accrual 
accounting has not actually been implemented.  The Treasury (Interviews 2, 13) is now giving 
more importance to the IPSAS Committee, which needs to start meeting more often and 
provide "central guidance".  
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The Ministries perceive the Treasury as the owner of the reform. The NAO1 (Interview 15) 
sees the accounting reforms "spearheaded" by the Treasury, as the accountant of the 
government. In the opinion of the ex-Director General Special Projects (Interview 8), "the 
Treasury needs to be more enthusiastic" and a responsible person with a financial background 
should be placed "in charge of the project on a full-time basis". 
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) expects central guidance on items of a technical and administrative 
nature to be provided by the MFEI, and then implementation is activated by the Treasury 
since it is responsible for the accounting system (NAO2, Interview 4). The NAO1 (Interview 
15) does not like this distinction between the MFEI as policy maker and the Treasury as 
implementer (NAO1, Interview 15). He fears that this distinction is becoming more 
pronounced when the Treasury should take on a more proactive role even in policy making. It 
is the opinion of the NAO1 (Interview 15) that any committee taking policy decisions should 
be driven by the Treasury due to its experience and expertise, and it would not need to refer to 
external sources. 
 
This distinction between the MFEI and the Treasury as decision-maker and implementer, 
respectively, was constantly emphasised by the AG. He was adamant that "policy should be 
divorced from execution" and that the Treasury cannot be expected to be "two arms at the 
same time" (AG, Interview 13). The AG understands that the expertise of the MFEI is not 
being focused on what happens in the departments, while the Treasury is regarded as the 
expert in this field. He feels that the Treasury is being expected to take policy decisions 
because the MFEI lacks knowledge in accounting areas. The AG believes, however, that the 
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reform project does not involve solely accounting but the whole system of budgeting and 
financing matters.  
 
On the other hand, the PS (Interview 9) regards the Treasury as part of the MFEI, and stated 
that the Government Accounting Directorate within the Treasury has the structural capacity to 
be responsible for the accounting standards:  
The accounting systems of the public sector, the accounting structure and the chart 
of accounts are maintained by the Treasury. The standards are a Treasury remit. 
 
3.2.1 The participation of the private sector 
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) referred to the constituency of the Task Force which had included 
one member who was external to the government, namely, a representative of the MIA. But 
apparently, this person never attended the meetings (NAO2, Interview 4). However, certain 
studies had been carried out by private audit firms, which had issued guidance papers for the 
government, for example, regarding valuation of fixed assets (NAO2, Interview 4; XDGS, 
Interview 8; MITA1, Interview 27). 
 
According to the MIA's technical officer (Interview 1), the private sector is interested in 
government accounting because it is financing the public sector through taxes. According to 
the partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 14), there was a lot of discourse about the 
project at one time, and it raised a lot of interest even at Institute level. The MIA had a public 
sector sub-committee that was chaired by an accountant working in the civil service who also 
represented the IAID on the Task Force (GT, Interview 14). 
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The inclusion of non-government members on such an advisory board that is guiding the 
accounting reforms is considered "healthy" but to a certain extent. According to the PAC 
Chairman (Interview 5), persons who are external to the system can identify shortfalls more 
easily, while people who are internal to the system tend to get accustomed to it. However, 
while the outsider can highlight what needs to be done, the insider will be aware of the 
limitations, for example, due to the regulations. Both an external view and the opinion of 
someone who knows the system very well are, therefore, required. 
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) highlighted that while the internal civil servants may not have such a 
wide experience on accounting, there is the danger that private sector people may only see the 
commercial side of things and would not take into account the government aspect. This view 
was confirmed by the NAO1 (Interview 15): 
The private sector can give important input to the government, as long as we bear in 
mind that the focus is different. 
 
The AG (Interview 13) is in fact disillusioned by the input of the non-governmental member 
on the Task Force and he did not find their input really practical especially when it comes to 
deciding the policy that the government will adopt: 
Lack of expertise was on their part. They did not understand the system of how the 
government works. Their input was more of a technical nature - academic-technical 
input, I would call it, rather than practical. (AG, Interview 13) 
 
The DGA (Interview 2) agreed and would only include the private sector "to be able to make 
use of their expertise", because at the end of the day, "we have to apply it for our sector, and 
in this sense we are more knowledgeable".  
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The NAO2 (Interview 4) thinks that the participation of at least one person from the private 
sector is important for technicalities rather than to make the reform process more accountable 
and transparent. Accountability and transparency of the reform process can be achieved by a 
wholly internal group made up of adequate and responsible individuals (NAO2, Interview 4). 
 
A PAC member (Interview 6) commented that the input of the private sector is obviously 
required because of their knowhow in the working of accrual accounting, given that "for the 
public service on its own, accrual accounting is not a salient point". But what is more 
important than the issue of private sector involvement is to have a structure that delivers 
results, and not a confusion of committees "that get mixed up and end up producing nothing, 
even with the input of the private sector" (PAC2, Interview 6). 
 
3.2.2 The involvement of the NAO 
 
The NAO (Interviews 4, 15) supports the accounting reform and has regularly mentioned the 
change to accrual accounting in its annual audit reports. According to the NAO1 (Interview 
15), enhanced accountability is the reason for the accounting reforms, and it would be 
pointless to change the accounting system without improving fiscal discipline and accounting 
competence.  
 
The NAO officials (Interviews 4, 15) like to use the term "active observers" to describe the 
position they take when participating on government committees. According to the NAO1 
(Interview 15), it is important that the NAO is involved in the government accounting reform 
process, first of all so that the Office is aware of what has happened when it comes to audit, 
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and secondly, due to the useful contribution it is in a position to give from its experience in 
the functioning of the departments.  As "active observers", the auditors feel that they distance 
themselves from any conflict of interest in the future. This is achieved by reviewing all 
circulars and guidelines issued by the Task Force; and by giving their opinions without 
endorsing decisions and by not instigating changes/studies.  
 
The Treasury officials (Interview 2, 13) appreciate the position of the NAO in that "it cannot 
suggest or dictate policy". The participation of the NAO is considered as important and the 
representatives on the committee participate in the discussions, and offer their advice in their 
personal capacity as accountants (AG, Interview 13). According to the DGA (Interview 2), 
the NAO officials hold a very high level of commitment and always give their advice freely.  
 
On the other hand, the PAC does not hold such a high opinion of the NAO. The PAC 
Chairman (Interview 5) describes the NAO as "more reactive rather than proactive", due to 
its constitution. A PAC member (Interview 6) feels that the NAO is "straight-jacketed within 
convention that it has inherited … they are more concerned with compliance". According to a 
PAC member, the NAO waits for the government to act and does not anticipate and carry out 
certain things in advance. 
 
For example, while the NAO has seen the trial financial statements, it has never audited them. 
The NAO (Interviews 4, 15) appreciates that if ever there is a change to accrual basis, the first 
thing that would require its attention is the data used for opening balances. While the NAO2 
(Interview 4) thinks that in theory it makes sense for the NAO to carry out unofficial audits at 
this stage to pinpoint any shortcomings, "in practice, there may be other pressures like the use 
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of human resources for work that is not apparent". The NAO1 (Interview 15) confirmed that 
this would be a problem for the NAO, and all the staff in the Financial and Compliance Unit 
would have been absorbed on doing this work since 2002, when the actual date of changeover 
is still unknown. 
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) is sure that should these trial financial statements be audited, the 
audit report would definitely be qualified since gaps of information exist regarding 
inventories, creditors and non-current assets. Arrears of revenue are the only accrual data 
reported and audited as required by the FAA Act.  
 
The PS (Interview 9) finds it "insulting" should the auditor issue a qualified report, and it 
would be an incentive not to do any changes. He does not consider it proper for the auditor to 
create problems with Parliament and the Press when the government is trying to improve its 
operations (PS, Interview 9). 
 
On the other hand, the AG (Interview 13) is not bothered with the possibility of a qualified 
audit report, and sees it as a positive thing especially should the auditor put forward 
suggestions for improvement. He does realise, however, the political consequences of a 
qualification. The partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 14) stated that a qualified 
audit report for government is "no big deal" when one considers that, in the US, the auditor 
disclaims the report on the US Defence Budget due to inaccessible information.  
 
Another audit issue arises if authorities and entities are included in the whole of government 
accounts. Some of these authorities and entities already prepare audited financial statements, 
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but if they are consolidated, then the NAO would be responsible for their audits as well. If 
this happens "the NAO would need to increase by at least five times" (NAO2, Interview 4). 
The NAO has issues regarding the new legislation and the question as to who should audit, as 
outlined in Chapter 4. 
 
The NAO's involvement in the reform process will increase due to the EU's requirement that 
the NAO will accompany the Eurostat delegation during future missions, and the NAO will 
be required to audit "upstream data" (DGA, Interview 2). This development is described in 
Chapter 7. 
 
3.3 The main stimuli that triggered the reform 
 
According to a PAC member (Interview 6), governmental accounting reform activities is a 
worldwide phenomenon triggered mainly by the change in nature of the role of government 
over the last 50 years, with the government becoming increasingly more of an agent in 
economic development and economic running. Most of the countries attempted to modernise, 
and government action became more project-oriented, creating hybrid organisations with a lot 
of interaction with the private sector and international organisations. In spite of PPPs and 
similar organisations that cropped up, government expenditure expanded and still amounts to 
roughly 50% of the GDP, "so there was a push to control this big beast". As the government 
role became more complex and multi-faceted, the traditional cash-based accounting system 
was proving to be "very clumsy, very unaccountable, and it doesn't give you the right feel of 
what is going on", with the result that an alternative accounting model was sought: 
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Effectively then you look at the alternative model, that is, that used by the private 
sector. The question then was: can we adapt this to our systems? Easier said than 
done. (PAC2, Interview 6) 
 
The PS (Interview 9) agrees that NPM ideology could have been part of the original stimulus 
to undertake accounting reforms but thinks that the changes were not properly planned 
because, in his opinion, it is a question of reforming the whole sector and not simply a matter 
of transposing systems: 
Conceptually, at a high level, the ideas were there, but operationally there wasn't 
the wherewithal to implement them. You don't transpose systems on human 
infrastructures which cannot support them. This would be useless.  
 
This supports the view presented in the literature by Caperchione (2000) in that an accrual 
accounting reform is not a simple technical exercise but must be part of a holistic 
administrative reform. 
  
The PS (Interview 9) identified the criticism of the cash-based accounting system as the main 
stimulus; mainly the fact that invoice payments could be manipulated. But according to him, 
this criticism became unfounded once the government starting adhering with the Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS) requirements, and eventually with the ESA95 when reporting 
statistics to the EU, since these standards require the reporting of creditors and accruals: 
The original raison d'être was to stop the manipulation that is possible with a cash-
based system, and thus have a complete reporting system. With the change in our 
statistics, that raison d'être died. (PS, Interview 9) 
 
On the same line of thought, then, it is not surprising that the AG (Interview 13) thinks that 
the thrust to start compiling accrual-based data occurred when Malta applied for EU 
membership due to the reporting requirements. The DGA (Interview 2) confirmed that the 
primary role of the accrual data being collected by the Treasury is for reporting the EDP to the 
EU, since the NSO uses this data for its reporting. The Treasury is not experiencing any 
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pressure from high officials in public administration to publish the trial accrual-based 
financial statements that it is preparing: 
Now I question whether if we did not have this EU regime and accrual accounting 
reporting requirement, most probably we would not even be doing these internal 
accrual-based accounts. (DGA, Interview 2) 
 
The AG (Interview 13) also considers the desire to secure public sector reputation 
internationally as a major stimulus: "the fact that the government adopts accrual accounting 
and IPSAS is seen as a must". But he links this with the present economic crisis in the EU as 
having "directed the limelight on the issue" (AG, Interview 13). 
 
The AG (Interview 13) confirmed that securing public sector reputation nationally, that is, in 
comparison to the private sector, was never an issue. According to a PAC member (Interview 
6), there was no stimulus for governmental accounting reforms coming from the private sector 
because it has no interest and perhaps it would rather prefer a status quo. 
 
The NAO1 (Interview 15) confirmed that "the private sector is not really concerned with 
government operations", but he also considers securing public sector reputation 
internationally as irrelevant since it is the reputation of the international organisations 
themselves that is currently at its lowest ebb. According to the NAO1, the government is not 
facing any sort of problems for which an accrual accounting system could be perceived as 
somehow leading to a solution. "Enhanced accountability is the reason for the accounting 
reforms", and in his opinion the main stimulus is, or at least should be, "the requirement for 
the government to present a more true and fair view of its finances for the public" (NAO1, 
Interview 15). 
 
155 
 
According to the NAO2 (Interview 4), the EU Commission would definitely perceive a 
country in a more positive light if it is even considering changes in its accounting system, that 
should provide more accurate data. "Obviously, any change is attractive, especially if it is an 
international trend", but the circumstances of the country have to be taken into consideration 
and not change simply for the sake of change. Changes are nearly always for the better, but 
"unless something is mandatory, you don't just copy the rules, but you have to go into them" 
(NAO2, Interview 4). The NAO1 (Interview 15) thinks that, since not all countries support 
accrual accounting, one has to be careful that the country is not actually disadvantaged if it 
adopts accrual accounting before all the other EU member states. 
 
All the interviewees feel that the NPM approach has somehow triggered the accounting 
reform to some extent. According to the NAO1 (Interview 15), the emphasis has now shifted 
from compliance to efficiency, "especially now, with the budget cuts that are being done - we 
are doing more with less". According to Lüder and Jones (2003), the NPM requirements refer 
to financial accounting, cost accounting and output- and accrual-based budgeting, but in the 
case of Malta, it appears that the approach to the ideology was, and still is, not so 
comprehensive. 
 
Even though the country does not have donations from international agencies, the IMF still 
carries out investigative missions and enquires about the government's accounting system. But 
since the country started reporting to Eurostat, the IMF's questions are less since "it is taken 
for granted that we have some sort of accrual-based data" (AG, Interview 13). This tallies 
with how a PAC member (Interview 6) perceives the attitude of donor institutions towards 
accrual accounting. 
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According to the Treasury (Interviews 4, 13), credit rating agencies would be affected by the 
type and quality of financial reporting effected by the government, but a PAC member 
(Interview 6) does not agree since the country is too small to merit any particular attention 
from the capital markets. 
 
The IAID (Interview 21) thinks that there was never any stimulus to carry out accounting 
reforms because otherwise some sort of result would have been achieved after all this time. 
She thinks that "the reform was just a good idea at the back of everyone's mind", but fear of 
change holds back the politicians from actually executing the accounting reforms. 
 
3.3.1 Management orientation vs Accountability orientation 
 
The interviewees recognise that the reforms are being carried out to improve both internal 
management and external (public) accountability, but accountability is paramount.  
 
The Budget Office (Interview 18) recognises that accrual accounting would give a more clear 
and complete picture, "and the public should be given the satisfaction of knowing what the 
government is spending its money on". The NAO1 (Interview 15) is of the opinion that the 
obligations of the government lie first with its citizens, since "the taxpayer is the 
shareholder". He emphasised the importance of the government to be accountable locally; on 
the other hand, the IAID (Interview 21) stated that the country's reporting abroad is extremely 
important since there are many things attached to such reporting that will affect the level of 
funds that the country is entitled to, and may even expose the country to sanctions. 
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At a high level of administration, the PS (Interview 9) does not perceive "reporting the 
deficit" as external, because the information is used for management decision-making. Both 
the PS (Interview 9) and the AG (Interview 13) appreciate the importance of day-to-day 
management at departmental level, but time is required in order to reap the benefits from 
better internal management. According to the AG (Interview 13), it would be pointless 
preparing statements that no one can interpret. 
 
3.3.2 True and fair view 
 
As an auditor, the NAO2 (Interview 4) is convinced that an accrual-based system would 
present a more true and fair view, but then confirms that the law does not require an accrual-
based system and does not refer to a true and view. The requirement of fair presentation is 
implicit in the legislation and the NAO1 (Interview 15) confirms that "mostly, it is an 
auditor's conviction". The AG (Interview 13) stated that an effort is done to produce 
statements that show a true and fair view, even though this is not required by the legislation, 
because "it is an add-on".   
 
3.3.3 Factors holding back the accounting reform activities 
 
The cost of the IT system required may be considered as prohibitive. The PAC members 
(Interviews 5, 6) think that the cost of the required system is only an excuse. The Budget 
Office (Interview 18) considers the cost of the IT system as an investment and "would not 
really hold back the accounting reform".  The AG (Interview 13) said that the acquisition of 
158 
 
the IT system is not the factor holding back the reform because there are still various things 
that require to be done beforehand. 
 
There is a lacuna of qualified accounting staff in the civil service. Experience shows that it 
is very difficult for the government to attract accountants in its employment due to the low 
level of salaries offered (DCS3, Interview 16). Since accountants are very flexible and tend to 
change their employment often, according to the NAO2 (Interview 4), they would not provide 
the continuity required. The lack of suitably qualified staff is an important negative factor as 
previously confirmed by both the AG (Interview 13) and the PS (Interview 9) when they said 
that it would be useless to transpose a system onto a structure that is not able to handle the 
output. 
 
Political ownership and leadership is a difficult issue to assess, according to the NAO1 
(Interview 15). It should not really be a problem since both the government and the opposition 
agree with accrual accounting. But discussions about the topic in the PAC ceased after a 
particularly interested member did not remain on the committee (NAO1, Interview 15). The 
Minister of Finance has always said that he wants accrual accounting and that he is going to 
do it, but things appear at a standstill (NAO1, Interview 15; AG, Interview 13). The accrual 
accounting project was always owned by the MFEI and for ten whole years it was owned by 
one particularly dedicated official, but still nothing transpired (AG, Interview 13). 
 
While the AG (Interview 13) claimed that circumstances and prioritisation have nothing to 
do with the accounting reform, the Budget Office (Interview 18) and the NAO (Interviews 4, 
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15) refer to EU membership and adoption of the euro as events that absorbed limited 
resources. 
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) referred to the possibility of certain disagreements that can arise 
resulting in a process to be stalled. A lot of work is done on a project, and then an official in a 
high position presents some opposition to certain aspects and everything comes to a halt: "You 
agree to disagree and you don't continue … This happens in the civil service" (NAO2, 
Interview 4). 
 
3.4 The key players in the reform process 
 
Lüder and Jones (2003) explain that “key players” does not mean individuals but positions in 
an organisation and whole organisational units, whose attitudes and activities are deemed 
crucial for the success of the reforms. Lüder 2002 identifies three types of players in the 
reform process: political reform promoters; reform drivers; and stakeholders. 
 
3.4.1 Political Reform Promoters 
 
The Parliament is a scrutinising body. The implementation is in the hands of the 
Executive (Cabinet). The Prime Minister can order things to get done. The Leader of 
the Opposition can only criticise. (PAC1, Interview 5) 
 
The political reform promoters are the Ministers, led by the Prime Minister. The other 
members of Parliament are stakeholders, but could also act as reform drivers. 
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According to the NAO officials (Interviews 4, 15), there is political support because all 
members of Parliament agree on the implementation of accrual accounting, but they express 
their concern about whether this support is "active" or just "lip service". On the other hand, 
the DGA (Interview 2) does not think that there is political support because the Treasury is 
never asked about its progress on accrual accounting and there is no insistence for 
deliverables: "there is no political drive to see any result." 
 
The AG (Interview 13) feels that there is tangible political support through the PS who "is not 
skimpy with resources when it comes to the reform". The AG is convinced that the Minister of 
Finance wants the reform, and that nothing would be done if this was not so. The problem that 
he sees is that the Minister of Finance and his advisers tend to "simplify things too much" and 
do not appreciate the complexity of government operations.  
 
Even the NAO2 (Interview 4) believes that the Minister of Finance is supportive for the 
accounting reform. While the NAO1 (Interview 15) is always glad to hear the Minister 
mention the reforms in the Budget Speeches, so the "outside appearance" is that the Minister 
thinks "that something is going to materialise". 
 
The Minister of Finance is able to enforce the accounting reform (AG, Interview 13). The 
NAO2 (Interview 4) pointed out that the Minister would need Cabinet approval to carry out 
the reforms, especially due to the large amount of money involved, but the AG (Interview 13) 
does not think that the Cabinet would hold back its approval, describing the Minister's 
position as "very strong, if he wants". 
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Under the current legislation, the Minister of Finance has the power to set accounting 
standards47. The DGA (Interview 2) perceives the 2004 amendment as a positive provision in 
the law since it provides a fast route by bypassing the Cabinet's approval, thus avoiding 
dissenting members who would require discussions in the Cabinet. 
 
3.4.2 Reform Drivers 
 
Lüder (2002:4) describes an epistemic community as an informal network of recognised 
experts "with shared beliefs and convictions how to resolve a certain political or 
administrative problem." 
We don't have these (epistemic communities) in Malta. (DGA, Interview 2) 
 
According to the NAO1 (Interview 15), the MIA would have a contribution to give but it does 
not really bother. Even as part of the Task Force, the MIA's input was described as 
"insubstantial". The NAO1 (Interview 15) does not know whether this attitude is due to lack 
of resources on the part of the MIA or whether it is its philosophy48. The DGA (Interview 2) 
confirmed that the MIA does not exert pressure, on the contrary, "we have to chase them for 
                                                 
47
 Refer to the 2004 amendment to the FAA Act. 
48
 The MIA does not have resources to provide consultancy to the government, and will leave this service to be 
provided by its members (MIA, Interview 1). The Technical Officer of the MIA (Interview 1) stated that while 
IFAC exerts a lot of pressure on its members concerning ISAs, ethics and education standards, the imposition on 
its members is different in the case of IPSAS, because "IPSAS are not within the jurisdiction of institutes, like 
the other three". The main target of IFAC are international comparability and harmonisation, but the SMO 5 
dealing with IPSAS is very concise: "Each member should make its best endeavours to incorporate the 
requirements of IPSAS into the national public sector accounting standards. Where the institute does not have 
the responsibility for development of public sector accounting standards (as in the case of Malta), but this lies 
with third parties (as is usually the case), the institute should try to persuade those responsible to include these 
requirements (that is, comply with IPSAS)"  (MIA, Interview 1). 
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some sort of feedback or service". And the PAC Chairman (Interview 5) finds the MIA as 
"totally indifferent". 
 
According to the PAC Chairman (Interview 5), private sector accounting firms all agree with 
accrual accounting, "but they do not see it as their role to push for it". In his opinion, the fact 
that the government has a strong role in the economy, private accounting firms would not 
criticise the government of the day because they would be endangering their eligibility to get 
some tender.  
 
According to the NAO2 (Interview 4), the accounting reform process is "all internally 
instigated", and not even the EU exerts any pressure. He identified Eurostat as a possible 
reform driver since it requires member states to submit accrual data, but it only exerts indirect 
pressure: 
To now, it does not require the accounting system to be accrual-based and offers the 
option to have cash basis plus time adjustments - as adopted by Malta. (NAO2, 
Interview 4) 
 
3.4.3 Stakeholders 
 
The NAO officials consider the MFEI as the most powerful stakeholder: 
At the end of the day, regardless of our endless advice, they proceed only if and 
when they want to. (NAO1, Interview 15) 
 
Besides the MFEI, the AG (Interview 13) considers all the other internal stakeholders, like the 
Treasury, the IAID, the NAO, as powerful, but thinks that the other government departments 
are not so powerful. But the NAO officials (Interviews 4, 15) do not feel that their office is 
that powerful; they have mentioned their preference for accrual accounting in the annual audit 
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report and commented upon the missing information in the cash-based financial report - but 
nothing transpires because "the MFEI will still move at its own pace". The involvement of the 
NAO in the reform process has already been outlined. 
 
The DGA (Interview 2) thinks that certain employees in the government departments are 
powerful at their level, "but someone higher up has to champion the reform in order for it to 
be successful". But a PAC member (Interview 6) thinks that the civil service does not have 
persons of substance who really have an interest and drive for the accounting reforms. 
 
According to the DGA (Interview 2), the members of parliament have a role because what 
they say has an impact on the public. But the NAO1 (Interview 15) does not think that 
parliamentary discussions would have a strong impact because the general public feels that 
this issue is something external to them. According to the NAO2 (Interview 4), except for a 
handful of experts who appreciate the benefits of accrual accounting, "such arguments would 
not interest the taxpayer - what interests the taxpayer is whether he will directly benefit". 
 
The Parliament and its scrutinising arm, the PAC, are observers of the reform process. The 
PAC has a role to play in promoting governmental accounting reform, but like the NAO, it 
does not have executive powers (NAO1, Interview 15). According to the Treasury (Interviews 
2, 13), the PAC does play a role in accounting reform and it exerts pressure on the 
government. But the NAO1 (Interview 15) explained that the PAC has no power at all: "the 
PAC can discuss a matter for a whole month - it has no power of implementation".  
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3.5 The implementation strategy 
 
Lüder and Jones (2003) define 'implementation' as the last phase of the reform process. It 
comprises the realisation of a reform project according to a given concept and based on 
corresponding legislation, including the necessary software renewal. The implementation 
strategy affects the probability of success or failure of a reform and may also lead to 
deviations between the reform concept and the outcome of the reform (Lüder and Jones, 
2003) .  
 
The governmental accounting reform in Malta, at central level, has not yet reached the 
implementation phase, but the interviews revealed that many plans and ideas surround this 
final stage. The following findings concern the plans and opinions for each of the six features 
of a prospective implementation strategy. 
 
3.5.1 The extent of central guidance 
 
The implementation will be centrally guided. The government structure lays down that central 
guidance is obtained from the PS, in this case, from the PS of the MFEI (BO, Interview 18). 
The implementation of accrual accounting is done by the MFEI, while the implementation of 
the system will be done by the Treasury (AG, Interview 13). 
 
Government entities already have their own accrual accounting system. The MFEI would 
need to decide whether entities will keep their present system or use the new integrated 
system (AG, Interview 13). The entities will, therefore, have discretion as to the software 
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package that they use, just as long as the output caters to the information requirements at 
central level (AG, Interview 13)49. The ministries and departments will not be allowed such a 
discretion, and would have to use the software package that will be common across central 
government (DGA, Interview 2). 
 
As to the terminology used, the chart of accounts, and the recognition and valuation rules, 
these issues will be decided centrally by the MFEI, and the entities will have to ensure that 
they satisfy these requirements (AG, Interview 13). While "all the ministries and government 
departments have to follow our (the Treasury's) instructions to the letter" (DGA, Interview 2). 
 
3.5.2 The planned length of the implementation period 
 
According to Lüder and Jones (2003), improper short implementation periods of up to five 
years bear the danger of postponing the solution of important problems to the time when the 
new system is in operation. 
 
The MITA (Interview 27) specified a period of four years for full implementation. A period of 
four years is classified as short, but the AG (Interview 13) appreciates the fact that the work 
on the IPSAS should be done before the actual system is acquired and the implementation 
period starts. In fact, a lot of preparatory work has already been done over the years, 
especially regarding the refinement of the data for the opening balances. If this work is taken 
into consideration, then the implementation period can be classified as 'long'. 
 
                                                 
49
 The NAO2 (Interview 4) believes that no discretion should be allowed, and that everything should be centrally 
controlled in order for the reform to succeed. 
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3.5.3 The transition mode 
 
According to Lüder and Jones (2003), normally, the transition mode depends on the size of 
the government. The size of the government in Malta may be relatively small, but it is still 
considered that a single-stage transition is not possible (AG, Interview 13). A single-stage 
transition mode is where all reform elements are implemented at the same time.  
 
The transition mode is planned to be multi-stage, where reform elements are sequentially 
implemented by conceptual components. Once the basic (integrated financial accounting and 
budgetary control) is implemented throughout the departments, then the DAS can be 
eliminated, and the implementation of more complex components, for example, asset 
management, can be carried out (AG, Interview 13).  
 
This method of transition is agreeable with the majority of interviewees50. It is logically 
sensible for the PS (Interview 9) that the new system is introduced across the board in stages, 
"because you need to build a critical mass". Introducing the system in just one department, 
that is where reform elements are sequentially implemented by organisational unit, may cause 
confusion, because this may result in a situation where certain departments will be using the 
new system while others are still using the DAS (AG, Interview 13).  
 
                                                 
50
 There are two exceptions. The NAO2 (Interview 4) thinks that it would be less problematic if the transition is 
done by organisational unit rather than by conceptual components, since he anticipates many problems in the 
beginning "so it would be better to solve them at micro level". Even a PAC member (Interview 6) considers the 
best approach to be organisational, using two ministries as pilot projects and then expanding to other ministries. 
He suggested rewarding the person leading the pilot so that the other ministry officials realise that it would be 
beneficial for them to go along with the system. 
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This method will also facilitate the procurement of the system because not all the modules 
need be acquired at the outset (DGA, Interview 2; PS, Interview 9).  
 
The MITA (Interview 27) pointed out that there are many systems that need to be in place. 
One of the modules will be budgeting, because the solution being sought will cater for all the 
requirements, "but then it is up to the client to decide when to implement them - it will be at 
the discretion of the government" (MITA1, Interview 27). 
 
The DGA (Interview 2) described a possible sequence as Departmental accrual accounting, 
then financial reporting, followed by accrual budgeting, and finally whole of government 
financial reporting;  but she emphasised that the approach could change should any 
difficulties be encountered. Therefore, the sequence of reform implementation has not really 
been decided51. 
 
3.5.4 The extent of experimentation 
 
The actual testing of the system will be done before and not during implementation, with the 
help of the MITA (DGA, Interview 2). Further experimentation will then be carried out 
during implementation to identify technical problems, including various types of testing, for 
example, 'user acceptance testing' (AG, Interview 13). Direct observation of the 
implementation will highlight the need for any changes (DGA, Interview 2). 
                                                 
51
 For example, the NAO2 (Interview 4) thinks that whole of government financial reporting should come before 
departmental accrual budgeting. In his opinion, budgeting and financial reporting are two different processes, 
and budgeting should be left for last due to its complexity. One should also provide for the eventuality that 
accrual budgeting is not used at all (NAO2, Interview 4). 
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The DGA (Interview 2) pointed out that with the production of the trial accrual-based 
financial statements, the Treasury is actually trying out certain elements of the reform concept 
before putting them into operation. This type of testing is important, according to the AG 
(Interview 13), in order to "check that we have the correct perception". 
 
The DGA (Interview 2) considers the work being done by the AAWG within the Treasury, 
with its liaison with departments regarding accrual data, and the preparation of the trial 
accrual-based financial statements, as a way of performing 'dry runs'.  Dry runs test the design 
details and/or give the staff the chance to get accustomed to the new system before it is put 
into operation (Lüder and Jones, 2003). 
 
The MITA (Interview 27) made a distinction between parallel running and parallel reporting. 
Parallel running means that the new and old systems will continue running in sync, which 
should not exceed three months. Parallel reporting refers to dual reporting. While the 
accounting system will be accrual-based, the new technology will produce both accrual-based 
and cash-based reports, and in this way, Parliament can take its time to decide what type of 
reporting is preferred. 
 
3.5.5 The intensity of staff training 
 
Intensive staff training is envisaged at all levels of staff (AG, Interview 13). A system of 
'training the trainer' is being planned (DGA, Interview 2). Staff training will be provided both 
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before and during the parallel run52. The MITA (Interview 27) is anticipating that, at 
Parliamentary level, there would be a need for certain exposure about how the reporting is 
going to be. 
 
3.5.6 The setting up of an advisory board 
 
An advisory board will be set up with the aim of resolving conceptual and practical problems 
emerging during implementation.  According to Lüder and Jones (2003), the advisory board is 
more important if there is no special conceptual basis for the reform (or only a poor one). At 
this stage, more work is required on the development of the reform concept, but perhaps more 
progress may have been done by the time the actual implementation phase starts. 
 
It is generally agreed by the interviewees that the board will be an intergovernmental body, 
but including the supplier of the package to deal with IT related problems.  
 
The AG (Interview 13) is planning for two levels of 'advisory boards': a steering committee 
and an implementation board. The steering committee will include the MFEI, the Treasury, 
the IAID, the NAO, MITA, and the vendor. The presence of the auditor, either the NAO or 
the IAID, is deemed important to ensure that there are sufficient audit trails. Each department 
will then have an implementation board to include the MFEI, the Treasury, a MITA project 
leader, a representative of the vendor, and a representative from the particular department53. 
                                                 
52
 The NAO2 (Interview 4) explained that both types of training are required, but the most important would be 
that provided during the parallel run. According to the auditor, training before is prone to be forgotten, while 
hands-on training is better absorbed. 
53
 The NAO2 (Interview 4) suggests to include one accountant from each ministry on this board. In his opinion, 
this would be a full-time job and the ministry's DCS would, therefore, not be sufficient. 
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3.6 Small country and culture  
 
Malta is the smallest EU member state. One would expect that it would be a relatively easy 
task to implement a new accounting system for such a small administration (Lüder, 1992). Is 
the size of a jurisdiction an important contextual variable that affects the reform process?  
 
3.6.1 Relative size of civil service 
 
The government is often criticised for the large number of employees in the public service 
(XBO, Interview 25). The administration of a country has certain fixed staple requirements, 
whatever its size. Therefore, there is a sort of a 'fixed element' of number of employees that 
would be required in the public service. This fixed element would result in a large percentage 
of a population that is comparatively small.  
 
Due to limited resources, the administration cannot afford to have employees specialising on 
one issue, but each employee would have to be involved in a variety of tasks (DGSOS, 
Interview 19). At the same time, their service is still required "in real time and in a 
professional manner" (XBO, Interview 25).  
 
The advantage of administering a small country is that you can get the top people together 
around one table. But the same small cluster of people are required to take on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
In the first few years, the central advisory board would be inundated with work. It would be important, therefore, 
"to have an expert in each ministry who can hand-hold certain users … who will be the contact person when 
problems arise" (NAO2, Interview 4). This coincides with the idea of the implementation board at departmental 
level. The NAO2 (Interview 4) also thinks that once the system is implemented and running, "a group of gurus 
would be required who would know the system inside out". 
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responsibility of many things. While a large country can afford to have more staff and each 
one could specialise on one aspect (DGSOS, Interview 19). When public service employees 
compare themselves with their foreign counterparts, they may feel that they lack 
specialisation, but at the same time, the opportunities provided through wider exposure is 
rewarding (DGSOS, Interview 19; IAID, Interview 21). 
 
Another problem is that people are very competitive and individualistic. The education system 
does not emphasise team work, and eventually a person may find it very hard to function as 
part of a group (IAID, Interview 21). 
 
3.6.2 Country size as a limiting factor 
 
At face value, it may appear that the small size of the country would facilitate a process. But 
no quick decisions are taken, and it appears that political forces would tend to make careful 
actions to protect the country's reputation. In the case of Malta, its small size appears to be a 
factor that is negatively impacting the accounting reform process. 
 
The actual level of human resources acts as a constraint because it would need to be 
concentrated on issues that are top priority, with other processes being placed temporarily on 
a 'waiting list'. For example, the importance given to euro adoption has already been described 
as a factor that may have negatively affected the accounting reform, because limited resources 
were being absorbed by this issue. 
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4 THE IMMEDIATE PLANS 
 
As at September 2012, the MITA (Interview 27) held “a very clear vision” of the tender for 
the IT System that will replace the DAS to be issued by the end of 2012 or early in 2013. He 
envisaged the supplier to be identified by the end of 2013 and installation to start in 2014. 
 
The MITA explained how the original specifications, prepared by the responsible committee, 
were being “watered down” as required by the Minister of Finance. The MITA was working 
towards the re-activation of the tender (MITA1, Interview 27). The MITA realised that it was 
not an ideal time to introduce a new system with a general election in the horizon, but did not 
think that it will raise any political concerns because there is consensus on the new accounting 
methodology. The MITA considered the implementation of the new IT system as urgent: 
If the process does not start now, the hurt will be bigger because the technology is 
getting older and the expertise is all the time decreasing. 
 
On 10th December 2012, the Financial Estimates for 2013 were presented to Parliament by the 
Minister of Finance. The Financial Estimates were not approved by a majority vote. As a 
result, Parliament was dissolved on 7th January 2013, and a General Election called for 9th 
March 2013. The tender for the new IT System has not been issued. Did the early General 
Election distort the MITA's plans? Or were the MITA's plans just 'wish lists'? 
 
5 SUMMARY 
 
The findings described in these two chapters (chapters 4 and 5) are summarised in Table 11, 
highlighting positive and negative factors that may have affected or may be affecting the 
accounting reform process. 
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Table 11: Factors affecting the government accounting reform 
 
Positive factors 
 
Negative factors 
 
The accounting reform in central government started in 
1999 on the initiative of the Minister for Finance at the 
time. The accounting reform was not pushed onto him, and 
he is described as being "not only involved in the reform, 
but he felt the reform" (MITA1, Interview 27). "It was his 
vision as Minister of Finance", his decision as Minister; 
there was no formal committee or policy taking and no 
external pressure (XDGS, Interview 8). The Minister of 
Finance at the time was a management accountant, 
perceiving accounting from a decision-making point of 
view. According to the ex-Director General Special 
Projects, the main stimulus of the accounting reform was 
the vision of the ex-Minister of Finance "because of the 
type of person that he was" (XDGS, Interview 8). 
According to the partner of the consulting audit firm, the 
ex-Minister's accountancy background in the commercial 
field made him appreciate that one can only know the true 
financial position with accrual-based financial reports (GT, 
Interview 14). The ex-Minister may also have observed the 
trend that other governments were changing to accrual 
accounting (GT, Interview 14). 
 
 
The "motor got stuck a little" when the Minister of Finance 
changed in 2004 (MITA1, Interview 27). The Minister of 
Finance at the time when the reforms started was a 
management accountant, perceiving accounting from a 
decision-making point of view. Whereas the current 
Minister of Finance is an auditor54, and in the opinion of 
the ex-Director General Special Projects, this makes them 
"two different types of people", because an auditor is more 
concerned with compliance, holding a different general 
attitude towards the use and purpose of accounting: the 
two Ministers did not share the same vision (XDGS, 
Interview 8). "They did not complement each other as 
personalities", and it was expected that the new Minister 
of Finance would want "to start a new chapter" (MITA1, 
Interview 27). The ex-Director General Special Projects 
suspects that the new Minister of Finance may have 
somehow been disillusioned with accrual accounting in the 
public sector following his experience as mayor (XDGS, 
Interview 8). 
 
 
The previous Minister of Finance had appointed one 
person to be responsible for the accrual accounting project. 
This person, the now retired Director General Special 
Projects, turned out to be "a driver" himself who used to 
take a lot of initiative and instigate fervour in the people 
that he worked with (MITA1, Interview 27). In his own 
words: 
During my employment, I tried to encourage the 
zeal for accrual accounting. I tried to show them 
that the world was moving in that direction ... It 
was the Minister's idea, but I tend to become 
enthusiastic and I go beyond that.... In fact, the 
Accrual Accounting Project persisted because I 
used to push and push.  (XDGS, Interview 8) 
 
It appears that there was mutual respect between the ex-
Minister and the ex-Director General Special Projects, and 
the latter tried his utmost to prove his "boss" right by, for 
example, meeting the target date of 2003 to issue the first 
set of trial financial statements (XDGS, Interview 8). 
 
 
Now it appears that the project does not have an owner: it 
is described as an "orphan". This does not mean that the 
project will be aborted, but the appearance that it is being 
executed can be delayed forever (GT, Interview 14). "The 
project is suffering from lack of vision" due to lack of 
enthusiasm of the officials in charge (XDGS, Interview 8). 
"Could it be that ownership of the project from the top is 
missing?" (PAC2, Interview, 6). Is the champion missing? 
 
In a project like this, unless you have a champion, 
an owner, who drives the process really hard, the 
chances are that it will fail or drag on for years. 
(GT, Interview 14) 
 
Putting up appearances as if you are installing it 
everywhere, and no one has its leadership, or its 
leadership is not so important compared with other 
things. (PAC2, Interview 6) 
 
  
                                                 
54
 Under the new administration of March 2013, the Minister of Finance is an economist. 
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Positive factors 
 
Negative factors 
 
The change in Minister of Finance coincided with Malta's 
EU membership, and therefore, one cannot really 
distinguish whether in 2004 the reason that the accrual 
accounting project was continued was affected by either 
the new Minister of Finance or EU requirements, or both. 
It appears that under the new Minister of Finance, "there 
was a lot of drive on the initiatives of the EU" (MITA1, 
Interview 27).  Of course, even in 1999, the Government's 
policy was to prepare Malta for EU membership, so this 
may have affected even the previous Minister of Finance 
(XDGS, Interview 8). The ex-Minister of Finance may 
have partly instigated the reforms in anticipation of the 
accrual data that would be required to fulfil the country's 
reporting requirements to the EU. According to the ex-
Director General Special Projects, when the accrual 
accounting project started in Malta, there were only around 
four other EU countries that were using accrual 
accounting, and it was a period when the EU Commission 
itself changed its system to accrual accounting (XDGS, 
Interview 8). 
 
 
Perhaps the new Minister of Finance in 2004 was 
appointed at a not very opportune time to introduce any 
radical reforms. Malta became a member state of the EU in 
2004, and all resources of the MFEI concentrated on the 
Maastricht criteria and the looming adoption of the euro. 
At one of the PAC meetings, the Minister of Finance 
explained that he had stopped the tender for the new IT 
system because it would need to be changed in a few years 
due to euro adoption. Perhaps it was originally planned for 
the new system to be introduced before EU membership, 
but then the Minister was overtaken by events, and the 
accrual accounting project was put on the back burner 
(GT, Interview 14; NAO2, Interview 4; DCS2, Interview 
10). 
 
 
The EU may not have been a factor when the reforms 
started in 1999 (DCS2, Interview 10), but EU's reporting 
requirements are presently perceived as a main stimuli 
(DCS1, Interview 7). It is a common perception that the 
EU is the driving force of any reform, including the 
accounting reform, "because in Malta, everything is done 
when the EU requires it" (DCS6, Interview 22). EU's 
requirements are "satisfied" even if the process may mean 
that there are no proper foundations for what appears to 
have been achieved (XDGS, Interview 8). Target reporting 
dates are met because they are imposed: "as unfortunately 
happens regularly in Malta, perhaps on our own steam we 
were not capable of creating such a mind-set" (GT, 
Interview 14). 
 
 
The EU crisis of 2008 changed the priorities of the 
government (DGSOS, Interview 19). The accounting 
system is a back-office system, and is therefore not given 
priority when resources are limited. Projects are prioritised 
according to social and political objectives, and the accrual 
accounting project does not feature in these objectives 
(MITA1, Interview 27). When decisions are taken at 
Cabinet level to identify the priority projects which would 
fit in the fiscal targets of the government, with the limited 
funds available due to the squeeze following the crisis, the 
accrual accounting project is not amongst them (MITA1, 
Interview 27).  
 
 
According to the MITA, the EU is now making its 
intentions clear with regards accrual accounting for the 
member states, and this "will definitely re-ignite the spirit 
again." 
 
In the circumstances brought on by the crisis, it may have 
been undesirable to introduce unknowns in the operation 
of government: how would the new system affect the 
accounting data gathered and what would be the effect of 
the new legislation on the operations of the government 
and the departments? (DGSOS, Interview 19). 
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Positive factors 
 
Negative factors 
 
Besides the confusion that is caused by the ESA95 
requirements and government accounting, the refinement 
that was required to adhere to ESA95 may have helped to 
change the mentality of government officials by 
introducing the accrual perspective (GT, Interview 14). 
The fact that the departments are required to regularly 
compile accrual data may have helped raise awareness and 
thus increased the push for an accrual accounting system. 
 
 
The fact that Eurostat requires accrual data but then 
accepts time-adjustments and patched-up cash-based 
reports is another negative factor (PAC2, Interview 6). 
Satisfying EU reporting requirements could be perceived 
as the target for using accrual accounting (AG, Interview 
13), and since "the EU is happy this way, and we are not 
infringing our obligations, it would be a waste of 
resources should we be scrupulous" (XBO, Interview 25). 
"Why bend over backwards?" (PAC2, Interview 6) So it 
appears that the government is acting on the advice to wait 
until the EU requests any changes to the accounting system 
and then act accordingly (IAID, Interview 21; DCS8, 
Interview 26). 
 
While the requirements to adhere to ESA95 may have 
introduced the idea of accruals in the mentality of the 
finance officials, it may also act as a negative factor if 
assumed as a replacement to accrual accounting (GT, 
Interview 14; PS, Interview 9). This aspect is further 
explored in Chapter 7. 
 
 
When the accounting reforms started in 1999, the intention 
of the government was to apply for EU membership, and it 
could be that certain decisions were taken to move away 
from old systems, perhaps "the government wished to 
appear more progressive especially in the eyes of the EU" 
(DCS1, Interview 7). 
 
 
The small size of the country, with the accompanying 
problem of limited human resources, appears to be a factor 
that is negatively affecting the accounting reform process. 
According to Lüder (1992), one would expect accounting 
reforms to be more expensive and difficult to implement in 
larger countries. But the findings reveal that a small 
country would encounter other types of difficulties. 
The partner of the consulting audit firm describes the 
MFEI as "extremely overstretched": 
They are grossly understaffed, with various 
initiatives, and I think that the last thing they want 
on their plate is to do this accrual accounting. 
(GT, Interview 14) 
 
According to the Director General Strategy and 
Operations, the small size of the country and the 
corresponding limitation on the size of human capacities in 
the civil service, does not allow an official to specialise on 
just one issue and would need to be involved in a "hundred 
and one things ... you name it all!" (DGSOS, Interview 
19). 
 
 
Once part of the EU, it is felt that an accrual accounting 
system is compulsory for Malta to be comparable with 
other EU countries (XBO, Interview 25). Besides some 
problems it may have found to report its finances abroad, 
perhaps the government realised that the cash basis was 
not in line with the reality in the accountancy field, when it 
could be comparing itself with was happening in other 
governments and in the private sector (DCS2, Interview 
10). The government has expressed its wish to move from 
the archaic cash-based system to a more modern one: "on a 
commercial basis, to be like the private sector" (DCS1, 
Interview 7).  
 
 
The fact that the reform process has taken 13 years and the 
"project is still shaky" is not very encouraging (GT, 
Interview 14; NAO2, Interview 4; IAID, Interview 21). It 
exudes an impression of "lethargy ... at all levels: 
politicians; civil service top; medium ... and even at EU 
level" (DCS8, Interview 26). 
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Positive factors 
 
Negative factors 
 
The main stimuli are the requirements, or the need, for the 
government to move to better accounting practices and 
thus have a better picture of government finances (DCS5, 
Interview 20). The government is criticised for its cash-
based system (DCS7, Interview 23), and the current 
reports are always susceptible to questions of completeness 
and transparency, therefore, indirectly, the private sector 
does influence the government to change its accounting 
system to a more transparent one (DCS1, Interview 7). 
Private audit firms engaged with the Treasury/MFEI may 
express their professional opinion in this respect (DCS1, 
Interview 7). This pressure from the private sector would 
give rise to a corresponding political pressure from the 
opposition (DCS1, Interview 7). 
 
 
Politics is considered as another negative factor. Accrual 
accounting would require future planning and politicians 
would not wish to be bound in this way: 
This year I want to tighten my belt, and before an 
election, I would want to loosen it a little bit. So 
the country would benefit from a three year plan, 
but the politician will lose votes and silly things 
like that. Whoever is in power will act like that. 
(DCS4, Interview 17) 
 
The political aspect is very important and the cash-based 
system provides more control for politicians (DCS6, 
Interview 21). Perhaps accrual accounting reveals too 
much (XDGS, Interview 8) and "transparent and more 
timely reporting may not be so desirable after all" (DCS5, 
Interview 20). There is no real interest from higher levels, 
"and they are considering political issues which would 
work against them" (DCS4, Interview 17). 
 
 
Following the Public Service Reform Report of 1989, 
various improvements have been carried out concerning 
the organisation structure and procedures of government, 
making it better prepared to undertake the accounting 
reform (DCS1, Interview 7). As an organisation, the 
government is "more experienced and mature" and "more 
confident that the reform will work now" (MITA1, 
Interview 27). 
 
 
Another negative factor is the generic lack of knowledge 
as to accrual accounting (GT, Interview 14) and lack of 
professionalism in the departments with the majority of the 
DCS not being accountants (PAC1, Interview 5; XDGS, 
Interview 8). It is seen as useless to have an accrual 
accounting system being operated by staff that lack 
accounting knowledge (PS, Interview 9; AG, Interview 13; 
DCS1, Interview 7; DCS5, Interview 20). Of course, 
training could be provided but they would have no 
particular interest in accounting per se (DCS4, Interview 
17). The level of salaries offered by the government would 
fail to attract professionals, and once trained in accounting, 
the private sector would prove to be more attractive 
(DCS1, Interview 7; DCS4, Interview 17). "There are no 
rewards in pursuing that kind of commitment - politically 
and administratively" (PAC2, Interview 6). The situation 
is aggravated when even top positions of divisions 
concerned with accounting are held by persons lacking a 
financial background: 
If the government does not really want something to 
get done, that's the way to do it, by appointing 
persons who are not qualified to properly do the 
job.... because if you don't have suitable persons 
with enthusiasm towards the project, and they don't 
believe in it, then it's not going to happen.  (XDGS, 
Interview 8) 
 
The most practical positive factor is that the present 
accounting system is outdated and up for replacement 
(DCS6, Interview 22; DCS7, Interview 23). The DAS uses 
technology of the 1990s; a technology that has outlived its 
life span, and as expertise in the old software dwindles, 
even the supplier may find problems to continue 
supporting it in the near future (MITA1, Interview 27). 
This imminent risk provides the government with the 
opportunity to upgrade the technology and simultaneously 
change its accounting system to an accrual basis. 
 
 
The large cost involved to replace the accounting system 
together with the lack of funds, especially due to the 
economic crisis and the increasingly-restrictive deficit 
targets, are perceived by some as the main factor holding 
back the reform (DCS2, Interview 10; NAO1, Interview 
15; NAO2, Interview 4; NSO, Interview 24). The ex-
Director General Special Projects describes a constant 
"fear of introducing accrual accounting because there 
were never enough funds" (XDGS, Interview 8). But 
others see this only as an excuse and funds are never a 
problem when required (AG, Interview 13; PAC1, 
Interview 5; PAC2, Interview 6).  
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Positive factors 
 
Negative factors 
  
Disagreements concerning the cost of the new system 
and/or specifications, resulting in the tender not being 
issued, was another negative factor (DGSOS, Interview 19; 
MITA1, Interview 27). 
 
 Lack of communication, with the Ministries not being 
aware of the objective and scope of the work being done 
(DCS1, Interview 7; DCS8, Interview 26), indicates that 
the project is not being given due importance. 
 
 
  
The implementation is the political responsibility of the 
Minister. There needs to be a political decision. But there 
appears to be no political will to change and no funds are 
allocated for the project55 (PAC1, Interview 5; PAC2, 
Interview 6). An important factor should be political 
leadership because that signals the commitment that there 
will be (PAC2, Interview 6). 
 
  
Fear of change and the resistance that is incumbent in 
human nature is another negative force (XDGS, Interview 
8; PAC1, Interview 5; DGSOS, Interview 19). Combined 
with the "pen pushing approach" engrained in the civil 
service, things will appear to be happening when nothing 
is actually being done (PAC2, Interview 6). 
 
  
When "the steering people changed" in 2004, everything 
went back under review (MITA1, Interview 27). Will the 
same happen again in 2013 should the steering people be 
replaced under the new administration? 
 
 
This chapter and the previous one present the findings from the empirical research carried out 
through interviews with government officials, supported by documentary research, as 
described in Chapter 2, to answer the first set of research questions presented by this study. 
After a short historical background, the accounting system of the Government of Malta is 
described, together with the anticipated accounting reforms and how these are being 
implemented. An attempt is made to identify the factors or variables underlying the change 
process as it takes place, together with the main actors effecting and/or affecting it. 
                                                 
55
 Refer to Table 5 in Chapter 4 (section 4.6.4) showing the funds allocated to the Project. 
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The combined effect of these factors and whether they create the right environment for the 
government to successfully achieve the anticipated reforms are analysed in Chapter 8, using 
Lüder’s FMR Model (2002). But first, the IPSAS decision is investigated in the following 
chapter, as this is another part of the anticipated government accounting reform. 
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CHAPTER 6:  ACCOUNTING STANDARDS FOR THE 
GOVERNMENT OF MALTA 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous two chapters describe the accounting reforms being carried out by the central 
government of Malta. One assignment of the Accrual Accounting Task Force was to design a 
set of accounting standards applicable for the Maltese government.  
 
This chapter describes the findings relating to the design of the MGAS, and how eventually 
the objective changed over time resulting in a decision to adopt IPSAS, which accompanied 
the increased interest being shown by the EU with regards to IPSAS and their suitability for 
member states.  These developments instigate the following questions, which the findings in 
this chapter tackle: 
 
 What are the underlying factors that have led to the decision to adopt IPSAS? 
 Why IPSAS and not some other accounting standards? 
 How will this decision to adopt IPSAS affect the accounting reform process? 
 Why is the EU considering IPSAS for its member states and what may be the possible 
outcome of this interest? 
 
 
 
180 
 
2 THE MALTA GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
 
The formulation of accrual accounting standards for government was considered as one of the 
first priorities for the Task Force, in order to lay down the rules for the desired output (GT, 
Interview 14).  The Task Force set up a sub-committee, namely the MGAS Technical 
Advisory Committee. A public tender was issued, which was taken up by the private audit 
firm, Grant Thornton (GT, Interview 14; MITA1, Interview 27). The tender required the 
standard preparer: to ensure that the government standards were in line with international 
accounting trends; to use language that was understandable by non-accountants; and to make 
the standards applicable to the Maltese scenario. 
 
They were called MGAS. The private audit firm's suggestion that MGAS should be styled on 
IPSAS was accepted by the Task Force, but IPSAS were very limited and did not cover all the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) issued to date (GT, Interview 14). Some IPSAS 
were still at exposure draft stage; various studies were published, but there was a complete 
void on certain issues (GT, Interview 14).  
 
The first set of MGAS were launched by the Minister of Finance in 2001, with a public 
announcement at the MFEI and a press conference (MITA1, Interview 27):  
This is the first time in the history of the Maltese Government that Government 
Accounting Standards have been defined and will be applicable to all Departments 
and other relevant Government entities. The Malta Government Accounting 
Standards define accounting principles, conventions, rules and practices in the 
treatment of various accounting transactions generated by Government 
Departments ... (DOI, 2001) 
 
The first set of MGAS contained 19 standards, which were a "hotch potch" from the 
information available. In the absence of an IPSAS, exposure draft or study, the IAS were 
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referred to directly (GT, Interview 14). Subsequently, Grant Thornton was entrusted to keep 
the MGAS updated, and it did this by following the developments that were made on IPSAS 
(GT, Interview 14). During the execution of its work, the audit firm had three points pending, 
which were subject to the decision of the Task Force: 
a) The choice between benchmark and alternative treatments. The MGAS were not to 
contain any options so that all departments applied uniform rules; 
b) The effective date of commencement; and 
c) The applicability. Initially the MGAS were targeted for the pure public service, that is, 
the ministries and their departments. But the audit firm had suggested to extend their 
applicability to other government entities excluding companies56, because from its 
experience with audits of various government entities, it had encountered some 
problems to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) because 
these are not written for the public sector57.  
 
The audit firm never received a definitive answer about these three issues, and to its 
knowledge, the MGAS are still in draft form, in that they are not yet effective (GT, Interview 
14).  
 
Accrual accounting has not yet been introduced at central government, but the MGAS were 
referred to when collecting accrual data using the templates and for the preparation of the trial 
accrual-based financial statements (GT, Interview 14). The role of the MGAS Technical 
Advisory Committee was "to create a bridge" between the conceptual content of the 
                                                 
56
 Companies are regulated by the Companies Act 1995 and compliance with IFRS is compulsory. 
57
 The audit firm felt that corporations, authorities, local councils and all government entities should consider 
MGAS applicability (GT, Interview 14). The firm recognised that this would depend on the ultimate objective of 
the government as to the level of consolidation because "obviously, you would need to have common rules in 
order to consolidate, otherwise you will  have a problem" (GT, Interview 14). 
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standards and actual application, in the form of more pragmatic directives as to policies and 
procedures58 (MITA1, Interview 27). The Committee relied on recommendations made by 
outside contractors appointed to prepare the underlying studies, for example, Ernst and Young 
were appointed to carry out the study on fixed assets of the government (MITA1, Interview 
27). 
 
The MGAS were an adaptation of IPSAS and IFRS, and there were no radical changes 
(MITA1, Interview 27). The ex-Chairman of the Task Force (Interview 8) described the 
MGAS as a "simplified version" of  IPSAS and IFRS: 
MGAS were created to be more specific for Malta. A sub-set extracted from the 
jungle of standards available. A simpler version which makes people more 
compliant.  
 
The circulars of the MGAS Committee were the procedure manual required for 
implementation of the standards by the government departments, bearing in mind that most of 
the people in the accounting function are not accountants. 
 
The 2004 amendment of the FAA Act was done with the intention to publish the MGAS in 
the Government Gazette so that they become legally binding (XDGS, Interview 8). But the 
MGAS were never published and were not compulsory. They were guidelines that no one was 
obliged to follow, and effectively they were never used except by the Treasury in the 
preparation of the trial financial statements (NAO2, Interview 4). 
 
                                                 
58
 For example, with reference to fixed assets, the Committee issued a circular detailing the procedures, how 
assets are valued, the minimum information required to compile a plant register, and the procedures required to 
update the information. 
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Once the MGAS were established by the MGAS Committee, they were passed on to the 
Financial Policy Directorate within the MFEI, and it was this unit's responsibility to chase the 
consulting audit firm for updates (XDGS, Interview 8). According to the ex-Director General 
Special Projects (Interview 8), the renewal of this contract could have triggered the question 
whether MGAS were needed when IPSAS and IFRS existed. 
 
The PS (Interview 9) considered the work being done by the private audit firm as a cut-and-
paste exercise; choosing elements of the IPSAS and calling them MGAS, which were then not 
recognised. As the IPSAS change, then the MGAS need to be updated. In his opinion, the 
whole process was a waste of money, trying to re-invent the wheel and causing more 
confusion. He decided that it would be better to work within a structure that was 
internationally recognised. 
 
In February 2011, the members of the Task Force received an e-mail from the PS (the 
chairman) to the effect that the accrual accounting reform is to be compliant with IPSAS, 
referring to IFRS in their absence (DGA, Interview 2).  
 
The MGAS Committee was renamed the IPSAS Committee, and started being chaired by the 
PS. The Financial Policy Directorate within the MFEI is the policy arm of the MFEI,  
concerned with information management for the government, and is therefore involved in a 
wide spectrum of areas (DFPDA, Interview 12). According to the Director of this unit 
(Interview 12), the main drive for the adoption of IPSAS is to provide a stronger financial 
reporting framework based on international compatible standards: 
We will adopt standards that already exist and that talk internationally. We do not 
need to invent our own standards if there are no valid reasons. I don't think that a 
small country on the face of the earth need have its own accounting standards.  
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3 THE IPSAS DECISION 
 
It's a question of harmonisation; it's a question of recognition; it's a question of 
credibility. (PS, Interview 9) 
 
The PS (Interview 9) firmly believes that if international acceptable standards exist, these 
should be used because they give you credibility. It does not make sense to him to take such 
standards, change their physiognomy, and call them something else - MGAS. No one knows 
what the MGAS are, even though they are based on IPSAS. It is not necessary for Malta to 
have its own accounting standards simply because it is a separate jurisdiction. Malta does not 
make up its own standards for other areas. As an example, he gave the NSO which uses 
international standards to prepare statistical reports, otherwise they would not be acceptable 
by international organisations like Eurostat, the UN, the OECD and the IMF. The PS insists 
that: "home grown measures are simply not recognised by these organisations, even for 
labour statistics".  
 
According to the PS (Interview 9), Malta needs to be recognised by international 
organisations, and by respectable and developed countries like "the US, the UK, Germany and 
the Nordic countries. And recognition is gained by using international standards". He 
perceives such countries as role models with a sound economy. Whether or not these 
countries use or refer to IPSAS seems irrelevant to him. 
 
The movement in the EU is towards adopting the IPSAS, "but this has nothing to do with my 
decision", insists the PS (Interview 9). He is sure that other countries are migrating towards 
these standards, and, therefore, Malta should do likewise.  
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According to the PS, the MFEI need not bother to write accounting standards because it can 
never be as credible as the IASB and the IFAC. These two bodies are practically authorities; 
they are the experts in accounting standards, and not the MFEI: "Can I be as credible as the 
IASB?" (PS, Interview 9) 
 
On the other hand, the IAID (Interview 21) takes the IFAC and the IPSASB "with a pinch of 
salt" because she recognises that they have a personal interest in promoting their standards: 
The more they complicate things, the more they create work for themselves. The 
IFAC is hijacked by top people of the Big Four. Complicate, so that few people 
understand the new system, and I will reign supreme. This is my gut feeling.  
 
But this "does not mean that whatever they say is rubbish", and the IAID (Interview 21) still 
examines their pronouncements to identify any relevant and applicable information. 
 
The PS (Interview 9) emphasised the importance of credibility, stating that "the economic 
survival of the country is partly dependent on its credibility". In his view, this credibility 
depends on the system of governance, and is part of the government structure; in order for a 
country to be competitive in an international market, its system of governance counts. It needs 
to be recognised by its international counterparts unless it is an autocracy. Without 
specifically referring to accounting, let alone IPSAS (he is not an accountant), he said: "I am 
dependent on someone else, and this person recognises these standards and not something 
that I have invented". He concluded that Malta is aspiring to work and compete, and 
therefore, international recognition is of utmost importance.  
 
According to the IAID (Interview 21), there was no decision to adopt the IPSAS, but the 
move away from MGAS to IPSAS was simply the result of a discussion held at a meeting 
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chaired by the PS. The Director Financial Policy (Interview 12) stated that the issue about 
accounting standards was "discussed internally" and it was "unanimously agreed" that since 
the differences between MGAS and IPSAS were minimal, then "we might as well go for an 
international framework". "The IPSAS decision came naturally", according to this Director 
(Interview 12).  
 
While the MGAS started being done to simplify things, the NAO1 (Interview 15) thinks that 
it was realised that the adoption of internationally accepted standards would provide more 
credibility. "Or it could simply be a question of not re-inventing the wheel", as the MGAS 
were not really required but could simply be replaced by MFEI circulars specifying which 
options will be adopted from those offered by an IPSAS (NAO2, Interview 4). 
 
The Treasury officials (Interviews 2, 13) confirmed that no studies were carried out to check 
the suitability of IPSAS for the country and they have no evidence that the IPSAS would 
produce valid results, but the thrust was felt for IPSAS adoption and "we have succumbed to 
EU pressure" (AG, Interview 13). But the PS (Interview 9) specifically denied that EU 
pressure had affected his decision. 
 
The NAO1 (Interview 15) believes that the decision would not be based solely on "any 
pressure", after all, in his opinion, the EU and the IMF are not exerting enough pressure for 
IPSAS adoption, especially in the current financial crisis. The NAO2 (Interview 4) does not 
think that there has been any pressure to go for IPSAS, but IPSAS were chosen simply 
because they are international standards. When one considers the benefits gained through 
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IFRS in the private sector, "it is much simpler like this than adopting your own standards" 
(NAO2, Interview 4). 
 
The two PAC members (Interviews 5, 6) claimed that they were not aware of the MGAS 
project, let alone about the IPSAS decision. However, they agreed that any standards that are 
adopted should be based on international criteria in order to satisfy international requirements, 
especially as EU members. The PAC members suggest that Malta should look at what other 
countries are doing, and adapt whatever it can. It need not re-invent the wheel, but adapt such 
standards, that apply to all countries, for the situation in Malta: 
Our role is to see how we adapt them … I presume that they are correct since they 
are international standards, prepared by experts, and have been accepted by other 
countries in a general manner. (PAC1, Interview 5) 
 
3.1 The objectives of achieving IPSAS-compatability 
 
For the NAO1 (Interview 15), it is "very clear and obvious" that the adoption of IPSAS will 
add accountability and credibility to the government's financial system. The AG (Interview 
13) acknowledges transparency and accountability as objectives for adopting IPSAS, but he 
considers credibility with international organisations as extremely important, especially now 
with the present drive in favour of IPSAS by the EU Commission: 
Once you say that you are adopting IPSAS, there is already a certain 'relaxation' ... 
just saying it is already a very big step.  
 
Only two DCS (Interviews 7, 10) were aware of the IPSAS adoption, but all nine of them 
applauded the decision taken by the MFEI: 
Credibility is one advantage with adopting international standards. And this is what 
globalisation requires: that we are open and not fenced off on our own. It will be 
advantageous for our business with foreign countries. (DCS4, Interview 16) 
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The NAO1 (Interview 15) and the IAID (Interview 21) feel that credibility at a local level is 
more important, and that transparency and accountability are important tools that would still 
be needed even if the country was not a member of the EU. The NAO2 (Interview 4) agrees 
that transparency and accountability are the reasons why international standards are adopted - 
"both are important and interlinked ... and are the two key objectives of NPM". But he would 
go beyond accounting standards and publish performance indicators with the financial 
statements that disclose the level of output and outcomes. 
 
The IAID (Interview 21) thinks that the benefits of transparency and accountability exceed 
those from comparability, while the Technical officer of the MIA (Interview 1) does not think 
that comparability is important for a government. On the other hand, the DGA (Interview 2) 
emphasised the importance of comparability, especially since the country's performance with 
other EU member states affects its eligibility for EU funds. In her opinion, it is vital for the 
EU to use a common yardstick when comparing economic data of the member states, "and 
this means that all countries need to abide by the same standards".  
 
For the ex-Director General Special Projects (Interview 8), comparability is a management 
tool that supersedes accountability and transparency. He thinks that once countries start 
adopting IPSAS, the next step would be that the EU will start closing on the options that are 
available in order to ensure convergence. 
 
The DGA (Interview 2) firmly believes that the availability of IPSAS facilitates and promotes 
accrual accounting in government, and also facilitates convergence of accounting systems 
between countries. The fact that IPSAS are available should make governments more willing 
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to adopt them and to change to an accrual accounting basis (DGA, Interview 2). But the IAID 
(Interview 21) and the NAO1 (Interview 15) are rather sceptic about this. The latter thinks 
that many governments still prefer the cash-basis, and that IPSAS will not encourage them to 
adopt accrual accounting, even if there is a need to have similar systems. While the IAID 
thinks that even though the EU has bothered to look into the suitability of IPSAS for its 
member states, it will be a long process due to political innuendoes. 
 
Convergence is one of the main objectives of IPSAS, but the NAO2 (Interview 4) does not 
recognise that this has had a big impact to date. While IFRS can and have been imposed on 
private companies through the Companies Acts of the various countries, the NAO2 thinks that 
it would not be easy to impose IPSAS on governments because this would imply interference 
with a government's sovereignty. IPSAS adoption by the EU member states is one way of 
mitigating the differences between the accounting used in the different countries, because in 
the opinion of the MITA (Interview 27), such differences can never be eliminated. But at least 
they will create some consistency amongst government reporting.  
 
3.2 Why IPSAS? 
 
"Why not IPSAS?" The IPSAS are "tailor made" for public administration and thus "it is 
obvious" for the DGA (Interview 2) to refer to such specialised guidance. The AG (Interview 
13) and the NAO1 (Interview 15) agree, with the latter describing it as "the logical choice", 
while the former stating that "after all, the IPSAS are based on IFRS".  
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Even the PS (Interview 9) considers IPSAS as applying specifically for the public sector, 
while IFRS were written for business and are, therefore, "not exactly transposable for the 
public sector". But the fact that IPSAS are linked with IFRS is considered as positive 
(DFPDA, Interview 12). 
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) definitely prefers IPSAS over IFRS, since adjustments would be 
necessary to adapt the latter for the public sector. He thinks that the MGAS would have been 
more flexible and applicable for Malta, with the advantage of being more simple, but they 
"lacked the brand name". The NAO2 (Interview 4) describes IPSAS as "the best standards 
possible" because they are issued by a reputable body and therefore presumes that "they have 
been well-studied and have not been issued ad hoc". He admits to judging the quality of the 
standards by the "brand" and not by looking at experiences of other countries or by actually 
reading the standards. His only reserve is that since the majority of members of the standard-
setting body are from the private sector, there may be areas of the standards that would not be 
so easily applicable for the public sector. 
 
The IAID (Interview 21) also prefers IPSAS over IFRS because even though the accounting 
profession in Malta is IFRS-trained, "we are followers" and thus should follow on the 
recommendations of the EU. According to this Director, given that the bulk of EU member 
states are Continental European, then the EU would not favour the UK model that uses IFRS.  
 
One DCS (Interview 10) thinks that it does not matter whether a government uses standards 
for business or for the public sector, as long as the standards chosen are internationally 
recognised, so that it would not have any issues with international organisations. He pointed 
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out that IPSAS are acceptable because they are internationally recognised and the 
Government should apply them if it thinks that their adoption will not be a problem. In his 
opinion, the Government should examine any issues that have been encountered by other 
countries when applying IPSAS, but it should also bear in mind that the problem may lie in 
the country concerned and not in the standards themselves.  
 
At ministry level, none of the DCS interviewed have read IPSAS and do not see any 
requirement to do so because they are guided by the central MFEI and act on the guidance 
provided by the circulars (DCS8, Interview 26). "The MFEI and Treasury circulars serve as 
our standards" (DCS9, Interview 28). This emphasises the importance of the procedure 
manual that is described later on. 
 
Whenever a new government entity is set up, it appears that neither MGAS nor IPSAS are 
ever considered as an alternative to IFRS. The partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 
14) revealed that from experience of auditing such bodies, their Boards see IFRS adoption as 
"an automatic choice", and are not aware that certain IFRS treatments would not cater for 
non-commercial transactions. 
 
The Technical Officer of the MIA (Interview 1) pointed out that even small companies 
encounter problems to implement IFRS, so he "can foresee certain issues with application of 
IFRS in the Public Sector, for example, tax revenues and pension liabilities - these would 
pose a problem". Being "a firm believer in IFRS", the Technical Officer of the MIA 
(Interview 1) found the question "Why IPSAS?" as rather challenging, and confessed that he 
would need to examine IPSAS in more detail to be able to answer the question. The only 
192 
 
factor that appears to make IPSAS attractive is that they are international standards issued by 
an internationally recognised body.  
 
The partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 14) recognises that some IPSAS and IFRS 
are "practically identical except for certain terminology and examples". He referred to prior 
practice of the IASB when each standard used to have a paragraph at the end noting the 
applicability of the standard for the public sector. He admits that, for the accountant who is 
well-versed in IFRS, such a practice was "less scary" than being faced with a whole new set 
of standards: "but I still think that it makes sense that you have a separate framework on your 
shelf which you can say: this is what applies".  
 
3.3 IPSAS and Sovereignty 
 
According to the PS (Interview 9), sovereignty has nothing to do with the decision to adopt 
IPSAS. In fact, he considers it a sovereign decision to adopt IPSAS. Once a country adopts 
international standards of any kind, it can then influence their content and requirements by 
participating in their development. The IAID (Interview 21) agrees since "many countries are 
represented on IFAC, and then it all depends on their lobbying". 
 
Of course, when a country adopts international standards, it always loses the latitude, that is, 
it loses its freedom from restrictions (PS, Interview 9). The PS distinguishes between 
sovereignty and latitude and concludes that "by accepting international standards, you 
distinguish between a serious country and a banana republic".  
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The fact that IPSAS are set by a private body does not bother the AG (Interview 13), and he 
does not see it as a question of undermining the Minister of Finance's power to set accounting 
standards. According to the AG, the policy decision to adopt IPSAS has already been taken, 
and the Minister has the power to make the choices that are offered by IPSAS. 
 
The IPSAS are issued by IPSASB, under IFAC's umbrella, and IFAC embodies the 
accounting profession. The ex-Director General Special Projects (Interview 8) does not think 
that the government is giving up its sovereignty "just because of this", on the other hand, the 
government would be showing how serious it is by accepting standards set by an independent 
body. However, the NAO2 (Interview 4) thinks that, unlike Malta, the reluctance shown by 
other governments to adopt IPSAS is mainly because their acceptance would encroach on 
their sovereignty, and that it would be difficult to make them mandatory unless enforced by a 
supranational body like the EU. This is in line with the views expressed by Lüder and Jones 
(2003) and Chan (2003). 
 
A  PAC member (Interview 6) perceives such objections "as an excuse not to do anything". 
"Arguments about sovereignty are made so that the countries hold on to what they have", 
according to the IAID (Interview 21): 
We have been giving up a lot of 'sovereignties'! You shouldn't form part of the club 
then, if you find such objections. We have arrived to the point of giving up our 
sovereignty on the European Public Prosecutor when Justice and Home Affairs are 
the sacred cow of each county's jurisdiction ... let alone how you are going to report 
your accounts! 
 
The NAO1 (Interview 15) sees it as a give-and-take situation: governments lose a little bit of 
their sovereignty in exchange for tangible benefits: 
It's like marriage. It was my decision to get married. Granted that you are losing 
some of your sovereignty, but you are gaining a lot of credibility in return by 
adopting acceptable accounting standards. 
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One DCS (Interview 17) thinks that compared with other countries like Germany and the UK, 
Malta is "too small" to think in terms of sovereignty because the country's economy is too 
dependent on other countries. 
 
But perhaps the willingness shown by the Government authorities to accept standards issued 
by an internationally recognised body, albeit from the private sector, is not an issue of 
sovereignty, but rather a question of giving credibility and legitimacy to procedures. The lack 
of accounting expertise in government has already been described. It is common practice for 
certain work and studies to be contracted out to private audit firms in order to make processes 
and reports legitimate (DGA, Interview 2; MITA1, Interview 27). The decision for the 
adoption of  IPSAS by the Maltese government should, therefore, not be surprising. 
 
3.4 Effect of IPSAS on the Reform Process 
 
The AG (Interview 13) thinks that the adoption of IPSAS "will help you to slowly achieve full 
accrual accounting". The NAO1 (Interview 15) agrees that their adoption would give the 
reform process "a push", not in terms of time, but rather in terms of the quality of the 
reporting. 
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) fears, however, that the adoption of IPSAS would only make the 
reform process more complicated. While he acknowledges that certain departments "would 
not need to apply more than 5% of the IPSAS", the system would have to cater for all possible 
situations concerning the concepts in the standards.  
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The DGA (Interview 2) feels that the adoption of IPSAS "was a push forward", but the 
momentum will only "definitely increase with EU enforcement". The PS (Interview 9) does 
not think that the accounting reform process actually needs any impetus from EU pressure 
because the decision to go for "a wholesale adoption" of IPSAS has been taken, and all that 
needs to be done is to check and decide on the alternatives offered by the standards. But the 
condition of the IPSAS Committee shows that the importance for this work to be carried out 
before the actual implementation of accrual accounting is not unanimously recognised. 
 
The IAID (Interview 21) does not think that the decision to go for IPSAS will affect the 
reform process, because the decision was taken lightly to give the impression that the 
government is implementing accrual accounting to counteract local criticism: 
Adopting the IPSAS will imply that you are adopting accrual accounting. But it's all 
pie in the sky. We are saying these things in order to give the impression that we are 
going for accrual accounting. Why? Because there is the impression in this country 
that if you go for accrual accounting there is more transparency and accountability. 
But it's all perception ... I think that we have an inferiority complex because we use 
cash basis. When you talk to certain people who are not knowledgeable, you realise 
that they think that we are the only country that is using the cash basis, and that all 
other countries are accrual-based.  
 
The NSO (Interview 24) is not interested in the government accounting reforms and clarified 
that his office is only "involved in IPSAS because Eurostat is pushing towards them". He 
admits, however, that the current division between the cash-based accounting system and the 
accrual data on the templates may not be attractive, and the latter may be integrated in one 
system thus providing "more inbuilt checks". IPSAS adoption may, therefore, help the 
Treasury to push the government to take the next step in the accounting reform process and 
acquire a new accounting system that would give him "more peace of mind" (NSO, Interview 
24). 
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A PAC member (Interview 6) is "very cynical about these things" and expects the government 
to just pretend that it has adopted IPSAS: "you do not start an accrual system and tell them 
that you are adopting IPSAS". This in fact reflects the AG's plan to make the IPSAS 
applicable for the current patched-up cash accounting system by issuing a legal notice, 
without actually implementing an accrual accounting system (refer to Chapter 4 sections 4.5.7 
and 4.6.2).  
 
3.5 Different Standards and Consolidation 
 
Chapter 5 introduced the problem that could arise when consolidating financial statements 
prepared using different accounting standards. Local Councils and other government entities 
that prepare accrual-based financial statements have adopted IFRS, while the government 
departments and ministries will move towards IPSAS. The AG (Interview 13) does not 
believe that there should be an "enormous problem" because the Treasury is used to dealing 
with different systems and different standards. He does appreciate that standards need to be 
harmonised as much as possible for consolidation, but he does not anticipate any difficulty. 
 
According to the AG (Interview 13), Local Councils should be IPSAS-compliant because 
they are part of government. He pointed out that there are two types of government entities, 
and IPSAS would not appeal to market-oriented entities, which may prove problematic, but 
overall he does "not see the consolidation as something insurmountable".   
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4 THE IPSAS COMMITTEE 
 
According to Lüder and Jones (2003), it would be ideal for a committee to be established 
prior to implementation, with the task of preparing policy papers. The committee's task would 
be ongoing, during and after implementation, so as to keep up to date with developments. 
 
In Malta, the IPSAS Committee has been set up prior to implementation. But the AG 
(Interview 13) is waiting for the roles of the individuals on this committee to be identified: "it 
should be clear who is going to do what". He also pointed out that the committee should start 
meeting regularly and "not ad hoc".  
 
According to the records of the NAO, the last meeting of the MGAS Committee was held in 
November 2009. Following the decision to adopt IPSAS, the NAO2 (Interview 4) was not 
sure whether a change in name for the committee was required or whether the committee no 
longer had a function. It appears that the auditor was not aware that the IPSAS Committee 
was set up on 31st August 2011 and had no record of any meetings. According to the Director 
Financial Policy (Interview 12), the committee is made up of the PS, the Financial Policy 
Unit, the Treasury, the Budget Office, the IAID, the NSO and the NAO. The MITA 
(Interview 27) claims to be a member of this committee, because "normally, we are always 
the same group of people". 
 
The DGA (Interview 2) is expecting central guidance on the accounting reform from the 
IPSAS Committee: "a committee that has been established but is not functioning". The IPSAS 
Committee needs to go through each standard to review and analyse the financial policy 
implications (AG, Interview 13). The DGA (Interview 2) felt frustrated that this work has not 
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started. She considers it important that discussions are held and policy decisions taken 
regarding, for example, valuation and recognition of tangibles and consolidation issues. Such 
studies and decisions should be taken immediately, before actual implementation, but she 
regrets that this urgency is not recognised by higher levels of administration.  
 
The function of the IPSAS Committee would be to continuously adapt the national norms and 
rules to reflect the continuously changing IPSAS (AG, Interview 13). While the PS (Interview 
9) is expecting the Treasury to carry out this function, the AG (Interview 13) thinks that the 
IPSAS Committee may need to refer to external sources. 
 
The IPSAS Committee will decide on government accounting policy when choosing from the 
various options offered by IPSAS. While the Treasury will prepare and issue the circulars 
regarding the implementation of the policy. The circulars will thus explain and highlight the 
chosen accounting policies, using language that is understandable by the departments, and the 
circulars will be the content of the "procedure manual" used across government. The 
Treasury will act as a sort of "go between" between the Committee and the departments (AG, 
Interview 13). The procedure manual will also ensure standardisation so that departments 
apply the same rules (NAO1, Interview 15). 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 5, the AG (Interview 13) is adamant that there is a division 
between policy and execution. He also thinks that the Financial Policy Unit within the MFEI 
should take on the role of preparing the procedure manual, but does not know whether it has 
the required resources. 
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However, as also described in Chapter 5, a more proactive role is expected from the Treasury: 
the procedure manual is considered as a crucial role of the Treasury, and it would also be 
desirable for the Treasury to lead the IPSAS Committee (NAO1, Interview 15). It is the 
opinion of the NAO1 (Interview 15) that, due to its experience and expertise, the Treasury 
would not need external sources.  
 
The NAO2 (Interview 4) thinks that the committee can be inter-governmental, which could 
seek external expert advice when required. However, according to the auditor, if the 
government had an accountant in each ministry, it would have the required expertise. Internet 
facilitates awareness of changes in IPSAS, and the NAO2 recommends the appointment of 
one official who is responsible, and who would meet the Committee at least once a year to 
keep them updated. Implementation of any changes would then require the issue of a directive 
"most probably, from the Treasury" (NAO2, Interview 4). 
 
The problem is that the government does not have an accountant in each Ministry, let alone in 
each department, which is considered by the AG (Interview 13) as "a very serious situation" 
that stretches widely the role of the Treasury to bridge the IPSAS Committee and the 
departments. The situation emphasises the importance of the procedure manual, the 
preparation of which is compared by the AG to the work that was done on the MGAS: 
How can we make them understand that in order to adopt a standard they need to do 
such and such a thing? You would need to water it down in laymen terms: spell it 
out in a-b-c, and hopefully, the department would adopt the necessary methodology. 
One of the objectives of the MGAS was exactly that, and we have to do it for IPSAS.  
 
In spite of the importance of the preparatory work required by the IPSAS Committee, 
everything has been put on hold pending the EU decision concerning the suitability of IPSAS 
for member states: 
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But since the EU decision is still pending, we are waiting for the EU to issue the 
direction first ... Now we have to see what the EU outcome will be. (MITA1, 
Interview 27) 
 
5 IPSAS AND THE EU 
 
On 6th May 2011, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs proposed a directive 
requiring that "Member states shall move to adopt IPSAS within three years of this Directive 
coming into force"59. On 8th November 2011, the Council Directive 2011/85 was issued, with 
Art. 16(3) stating that "the Commission shall assess the suitability of IPSAS for member states 
by 31st December 2012". 
 
According to the NSO (Interview 24), Eurostat will take into consideration the feedback from 
its public consultation and the results from Ernst & Young's survey for its assessment. It will 
also take into consideration the experiences of countries that have already adopted the IPSAS, 
and even refer to the IPSASB's study of 2005 on the convergence of IPSAS with ESA and 
GFS, which study is currently being updated.  
 
But the AG (Interview 13) is convinced that the decision for member states to adopt the 
IPSAS has already been taken by the EU, even though the Directive only mentions a 
feasibility study, because: 
... when something is mentioned, this would normally mean that it will be done. 
Some things are described as 'voluntary', which in practice would mean 
'compulsory'. This is the normal process of things.  
 
The AG (Interview 13) describes the adoption of IPSAS by member states as a "mammoth 
task" because none of the countries are prepared for these standards, which are difficult in 
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themselves: "Easy to say but once you start reading the standards you think, but how am I 
going to get there?!" 
 
It is common knowledge that the EU's "Six-pack legislation" and the attendant November 
2011 Directive are part of the EU's response to the financial crisis and the economic crisis that 
followed it60. The Treasury Officials (Interviews 2, 13) believe that the reason why IPSAS are 
being considered by the EU is to ensure that the government accounting data used for 
statistical reporting is more reliable, and to facilitate the work of the NSO when it prepares its 
statistical reports for Eurostat. According to the AG (Interview 13) and the NAO2 (Interview 
4), given that the ESA95 is also accrual-based, the advantage of having an accrual-based 
accounting system is that less adjustments would need to done by the NSO.  
 
The NAO1 (Interview 15) thinks that IPSAS adoption will only provide a "new impetus" to 
the accounting reform process if adoption becomes mandatory, because anything voluntary 
remains "anno mai". But he fears that the EU will face "a very though opposition" to this 
"cultural shift", and thinks that this may be the reason why the actual EU Directive took a 
softer approach than that proposed. From his international exposure, he feels that "there is 
definitely lack of political will from certain larger countries, like France", which he described 
as the country that most treasures the issue of sovereignty. The NAO1 is also afraid that the 
EU will find opposition with regards to the forthcoming "missions". 
                                                 
60
 Due to what happened in Greece, the financial crisis and because they played around with their accounts, the 
Six-pack legislation was drawn up, and there is this push for the governments to adopt the IPSAS. (NSO, 
Interview 24) 
Due to the Eurozone crisis, the EU has become aware that the countries are not up to it in their reporting - 
everyone hiding things in a rampant way - so now it is making a study to see how it can introduce accounting 
methodologies that are harmonised within government. (MITA1, Interview 27) 
The EU Commission has reprimanded the Eurostat on this issue. Where was Eurostat? And they are going to 
revise their procedures. The Eurostat is a Directorate of the EU Commission, like the OLAF. A very important 
EU agency that has not done its work well. (IAID, Interview 21) 
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The fact that only a handful of countries have actually adopted IPSAS reveals that there is "a 
bit of a political issue" regarding their adoption, which makes the EU's involvement very 
interesting for the Technical Officer of the MIA (Interview 1). His "gut-feeling" is that it 
would be highly unlikely that IPSAS become mandatory unless the major countries, like 
Germany and France, are on board. But the MITA (Interview 27) thinks that "there is a 
serious mandate from the very top by the larger countries to push for IPSAS adoption". He 
believes that a transitional period of three years maximum would be given to governments of 
member states in order to implement IPSAS, which "should not cause an earthquake, since 
many EU countries have already implemented them or their equivalent". The MITA expects 
that normal concessions would be allowed to member states that already have some form of 
accounting standards, but those that do not "would have to pull their socks up". 
 
The partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 14) pointed out that there are big issues to 
fully implement IPSAS, "and not just in Malta", for example, the valuation of heritage assets. 
He regards the decision to go for IPSAS as "ambitious" and still believes that the standards 
need to be adapted for the local scenario: "as to language; and even to clarify on the 
benchmark and alternative".  
 
5.1 IPSAS Adoption-adaption: the ESA effect 
 
The target is for full adoption of the IPSAS (PS, Interview 9; AG, Interview 13; DGA, 
Interview 2), or at least, it should be (NAO2, Interview 4), but the DGA (Interview 2) does 
not exclude the possibility that implementation may necessitate the exclusion of certain 
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provisions. The NAO2 (Interview 4) thinks that either "you are compliant or not" and that 
"you cannot just pick and choose" unless valid reasons are given for non-compliance, 
otherwise the audit report would need to be qualified. The auditor admitted that he does not 
know the precise requirements of IPSAS and whether there are any requirements "that would 
be nearly impossible to apply".  
 
The fact that the EU itself had commissioned a study on the feasibility of IPSAS for the EU 
member states, which standards are supposedly all beneficial to governments, made the IAID 
(Interview 21) re-consider full IPSAS adoption and not "put all the IPSAS in one measure". 
She suggests that IPSAS should be studied and analysed one by one, and that the government 
should only adopt those that add value.  
 
The Treasury had requested the NSO to be represented on the IPSAS Committee so that the 
NSO can provide guidance as to the effect of IPSAS policies on the statistical deficit as 
reported according to ESA95 (DGA, Interview 2). The IAID (Interview 21) confirmed that 
this reported deficit is considered as the "bottom line" and the "fear" of the IPSAS effect on it 
is always felt during meetings. The IAID is disappointed that she "did not manage to sell the 
idea that you can prepare a set of accounts for your benefit". 
 
In spite of the declarations for full adoption, the AG (Interview 13) has already decided not to 
adhere to IPSAS 6 when it comes to consolidation, but to refer to the ESA95 definition of 
'General Government'. The NAO2 (Interview 4) agrees with this idea, in order "to be 
practicable", since Eurostat's requirements are more important than those of IPSAS. This 
issue has already been described in Chapter 5.  
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The NAO2 (Interview 4) pointed out that as the system stands now, more adjustments are 
required to make the cash-based data "Eurostat-compliant": "such adjustments would be 
reduced if the government data is IPSAS-compliant". But the NSO (Interview 24) pointed out 
that if the original deficit (referring to that reported in the government accounts) is reported 
using accrual accounting according to IPSAS or some other standard, adjustments are still 
required to convert it according to ESA95. He highlighted "this drive for everyone to adopt 
IPSAS so that our data will be more in line with business accounts" and the current 
convergence exercise of IPSAS and ESA95. The NSO pointed out that adjustments can be 
done in either IPSAS or ESA95 in order "to move them closer together", and stated that any 
adjustments to IPSAS would only concern public sector accounting and would not affect 
private sector accounting: 
Bear in mind that with IPSAS we are talking about the accounts of the public sector, 
so if we change something in IPSAS, we would not be changing business accounting. 
 
It appears that the NSO is expecting a totally different IPSAS objective and/or a totally 
different type of accrual accounting for government. The fact that one of the objectives of the 
IPSASB is to build IPSAS on IFRS so that government accounting is more in line with 
business accounting appears to be irrelevant for the NSO. The NSO (Interview 24) does not 
require business-type of reporting, because in his opinion, the statistical reports prepared by 
his office are the accounts of the government because they are used by the government and 
the Commission for decision-making: 
I think that 'statistics' is a misnomer. They are statistics, but at the end of the day, 
they are the accounts of the government. These reports are being used by the 
Commission and the government when taking decisions - then these are the accounts 
of the government. At the end of the day, it would not make any difference if the 
government adopts IPSAS - these will still remain, because decisions are taken on 
them.  
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The perception about government versus national accounting is covered in more detail in 
Chapter 7. 
 
Going back to the argument about converging IPSAS with ESA95, as an example, the NSO 
(Interview 24) referred to the treatment of government grants as advocated by IFRS, and 
stated that allocating the income over the lifetime of the asset acquired does not make 
economic sense to him: "We don't do this in ESA!" He stated that Eurostat and the IPSASB 
have to tackle such issues by going through each IPSAS to check whether it is applicable, and 
contradicted his earlier statement about convergence by declaring that changes would only be 
one-sided, that is, in IPSAS. And the sensitive political spot appears to be the definition of the 
reporting entity: 
The definition of General Government in ESA is definitely not going to change. ... If 
an IPSAS is not applicable, the Eurostat will not change the ESA. And even the 
countries will not accept such changes. There was a lot of hassle when Eurostat 
suggested to change the 50% ratio in the EBU classification for the revised ESA. 
But the member countries objected. Obviously, everyone has problems, and not only 
us. It was being suggested to widen the definition to include more entities in General 
Government. We would have had to include Enemalta, Water Services. So the 
present definition will remain. (NSO, Interview 24) 
 
However, the NSO (Interview 24), who is not an accountant, is convinced that some IPSAS 
may actually help his ESA95 exercise because otherwise Eurostat would not be bothering 
with them.  
 
The EU Commission has the power to decide the type of reporting that EU member states 
should submit to Eurostat, and according to the IAID (Interview 21), the Commission should 
shift away from economists "because these do not solve economic problems". She perceives 
Eurostat and its reporting requirements as "hijacked by economists" when government 
reporting cannot be done in an economic way. According to the IAID, the IPSASB have 
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seized this opportune moment "to sell their product", and their marketing worked because the 
EU Commission has gone back to the drawing board to consider the IPSAS. 
 
While acknowledging that IPSAS can be as complicated as the economics aspect, the IAID 
(Interview 21), being an accountant herself, thinks that accounting concepts are not so abstract 
as economic concepts, and that this would make government reporting more understandable: 
Something positive could come out of this. Perhaps once governments start 
preparing financial statements using IPSAS, then the results shown here would be 
used for EU reporting instead of the current statistics, and we could be hitting two 
birds with one stone.  
 
This goes contrary to what the NSO believes and against the line of thought of all the other 
officials interviewed. The IAID (Interview 21) trusts that the EU Commission really believes 
that accrual accounting would provide more control and accountability in the system since it 
had adopted accrual accounting itself in response to its scandals (Grossi and Soverchia, 2011), 
or 
Was it just a decision taken ad hoc to appear to be doing something? Or does the 
EU Commission really believe that accrual accounting would provide more rigour? 
 
According to a PAC member (Interview 6), all this talk about controlling government 
spending is just lip service, because control can be exercised even with a cash-based system, 
and any country with whatever type of accounting system can still "fudge" the figures. 
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5.2 The EU's reaction to the crisis 
 
According to Makaronidis (2012)61, lack of fiscal transparency was one of the key issues 
behind the financial and economic crisis that hit the EU from 2008. Makaronidis identified 
lack of reliability in data provided to policy makers by member states and statistics offices as 
one of the problems leading to lack of fiscal transparency. Lack of reliability resulted in this 
data being subject to significant revisions, especially with regards to the boundary of 
government as defined in the ESA95 that identifies the entities to be included in the statistical 
reports submitted by member states to Eurostat (Hughes, 2012). 
 
The Six-Pack legislation was the EU's response to the crisis in improving economic 
governance, which instigated a series of initiatives. First of all, Eurostat's role62 in providing 
the data to policy makers was reinforced, giving Eurostat new powers to carry out financial 
audits and investigations on statistics offices and government administration in general; and to 
propose to the Council fines on member states.  
 
In view of its new powers, Eurostat decided to implement a robust quality management and 
audit system, starting from the source of the data that is used for the compilation of statistics, 
to the transmission process from the sources to the statistics offices. It also decided to 
promote the harmonisation of public sector accounting across the EU including "the very idea 
of accrual-based public sector accounting" (Makaronidis, 2012).  
 
                                                 
61
 Head of the GFS quality management and government accounting unit within DG Eurostat, speaking at 
ACCA's 4th International Public Sector Conference, 'Rebalancing the economy - boosting growth', held in 
London, on 13th December 2012. 
62
 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the 
excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
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Makaronidis (2012) identified three problems for Eurostat's task: 
a) Fiscal surveillance and budget co-ordination at EU level is based on accruals while 
most budgetary policy at national level is often based on cash data; 
b) Maastricht debt and deficit are GFS based on accrual data, which means that GFS data 
is a result of transforming cash data into "some sort of accruals"; and 
c) The accounting data bases of the member states are not quite comparable because the 
underlying public sector accounting standards are very different across EU member 
states and rather "country-specific". 
 
The Budgetary Framework Directive (2011/85/EU), which was part of the Six-Pack 
Legislation, addressed two requirements from member states: to implement public sector 
accounting systems covering all sectors of General Government as defined in the ESA95, 
which generate the accrual data needed for ESA purposes63; and to subject national public 
sector accounting systems to internal control and external audit. 
 
The same 2011 Directive required Eurostat to assess the suitability of IPSAS for EU member 
states, in order to see whether it could be possible for all member states to apply a single set 
of public sector accounting standards. The objective of such harmonisation is to improve 
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of public sector management; it will indirectly 
also improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector audit; and better fiscal 
transparency is expected to affect the information available to financial markets and their 
functioning (Makaronidis, 2012). 
 
                                                 
63As Makaronidis (2012) pointed out, this regulation does not clarify whether the public sector accounting 
systems themselves need to be accrual-based, or whether the accounting systems are able to generate the accrual 
data needed for ESA purposes.  
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In order to carry out this assessment, Eurostat commissioned a survey, carried out a public 
consultation, and set up a task force. 
 
According to Makaronidis (2012), the results of Ernst and Young's (2013) survey confirm 
what Eurostat witnesses during its visits to member states, in that "it is all very different!" - 
and not just between the (then) 27 member states but even between sub-sectors in the same 
member state, and sometimes even within the same sub-sector of the same member state. 
Differences also exist in the interpretation of the standards between the various entities that 
are classified within a certain sector of general government64 (Makaronidis, 2012).  
 
During the period February to May 2012, Eurostat ran a public consultation through its 
website in order to gather the views of the key players and stakeholders in the area of public 
sector accounting standards regarding the suitability of the IPSAS for member states. The 
result of the consultation was published on Eurostat's website on 18th December 2012.  
 
Eurostat set up a Task Force to examine the technical aspects of the IPSAS, with 18 member 
states participating on a voluntary basis, and with the IPSASB and the IMF as observers. The 
Task Force includes various experts from Ministries of Finance, National standard setters and 
National Statistics Institutions (NSIs). Makaronidis (2012) explained how the Task Force had 
scrutinised all 32 IPSAS and observed that not all the standards are suitable for "direct and 
immediate implementation", due to technical and conceptual issues, and even "government 
issues in general affecting certain standards in particular". The Commission's Staff working 
                                                 
64
 Differences in the interpretation of standards are not a peculiarity of the public sector. Being principles-based, 
the IFRS of the private sector require an element of judgement in their interpretation. The IASB's Conceptual 
Framework is a framework within which judgement to resolve accounting issues can be made, but it is not the 
panacea for all accounting problems. Differences in interpretation exist also in the private sector, necessitating 
the existence of the IFRS Interpretations Committee within the IASB. 
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document has already identified the core set of IPSAS that can be adopted without any 
alterations, while it has highlighted other IPSAS that may need slight amendments and others 
that would require substantial changes (SWD(2013)57).  
 
5.3 EPSAS: the possible outcome of Eurostat's study on IPSAS 
 
On 6th March 2013, the EU Commission presented its formal report (COM(2013)114) to the 
Council and the European Parliament, which report sets out its findings and suggestions 
regarding the suitability of IPSAS for the member states. The final decision and further action 
now rests with the European Parliament and the Council, "which will take the more political 
view on the results" of this work (Makaronidis, 2012).  
 
Given that the main sources of the GFS are the accounting records and reports of the various 
government entities, reliable government financial accounts are essential for the preparation 
of national accounts. According to the Commission's report, incidences of inappropriate 
financial reporting by some member states have shown that the system for fiscal statistics has 
not sufficiently mitigated the risk of substandard quality data being notified to Eurostat. The 
Commission believes that the current system of reconciling the data from the various public 
sector accounting systems at micro level with the data submitted according to ESA95 at 
macro level, may no longer be sustainable. 
 
The reporting framework for fiscal monitoring in the EU, that is the ESA95, is accrual-based, 
because it is believed that accrual accounting is economically sounder than cash accounting: 
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Accruals accounting is the only generally accepted information system that provides 
a complete and reliable picture of the financial and economic position and 
performance of a government ... (COM(2013)114:3) 
 
The Commission is therefore promoting the adoption of accrual accounting systems for the 
public sector to complement the cash accounting systems. Cash accounting systems are still 
considered important, particularly for the purposes of budgeting and budgetary control. The 
Commission persists, however, that: 
The superiority of the accruals principle, whether for macro or micro fiscal 
monitoring, is indisputable. The macro level is already accruals based; harmonised 
accruals accounting is also essential at micro level. (COM(2013)114:6) 
 
The report also states that similar to private listed companies, government entities have an 
obligation towards market participants, that is owners of government debt securities and 
potential investors, to provide quality financial reporting. Therefore, since private sector 
accounting standards are harmonised within the EU, the same thing should apply for the 
public sector  (COM(2013)114:6). 
 
Eurostat is thus promoting a system of harmonised accrual-based accounting standards, 
consistent with ESA95, for all entities of the government sector. IPSAS are the only 
internationally recognised set of public sector accounting standards, and hence, their 
consideration. 
 
Following the feedback from the participants in Eurostat's study, the Commission concluded 
that IPSAS are not suitable for direct implementation by the member states. The reasons 
given include: the alternative accounting treatments that IPSAS offer; the fact that IPSAS are 
still being developed; the question surrounding their governance; and IPSAS do not take 
sufficient account of specific needs, characteristics and interests of public sector reporting. 
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The Commission's report, for example, refers to the problem of the reporting entity definition 
in IPSAS that is not in line with the core concept of general government as defined in ESA95 
(COM(2013)114). This is considered as a major issue. In spite of all this, the Commission's 
report expresses the understanding that IPSAS provide a good basis for the development of 
public sector accounting standards that would cater for the specific needs of the EU member 
states.  
 
Since most member states have an issue with IPSASB's governance and due process, the EU 
Commission's report proposes that the EU sets up its own governance structure, which will 
need to have the necessary powers to legislate its own EPSAS. Makorinidis (2012) pointed 
out that "these new structures and processes should create and maintain very close and 
regular links to the IPSASB". He also emphasised the importance to maintain a minimum 
level of global comparability, "especially as government bonds compete on global financial 
markets", and therefore, unnecessary differences between EPSAS, IPSAS, IFRS and ESA95 
should not be created.   
 
Co-incidentally or not, the idea about the development of EPSAS had already been 
anticipated by two academics hailing from Austria and Germany, who took the initiative to set 
up a dedicated website65 (EPSAS.eu). According to EPSAS.eu, significant improvement to 
the financial management of public entities is required "in order to prevent future crises". The 
adoption of an "accrual, resource based" accounting regime would provide comprehensive 
information on a public entity's financial situation. EPSAS.eu consider harmonised, accrual-
                                                 
65
 The website is neither sponsored nor has it been instigated by Eurostat and/or the European Commission. 
EPSAS.eu is a joint project of the University of Hamburg and the University of Linz which was launched in 
order to inform about Eurostat's public consultation and the idea of introducing a uniform European public sector 
budgeting and accounting system in general. (Burth Andreas, e-mail correspondence dated 12/12/12) 
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based accounting standards as crucial to "improve transparency, allow cross-border 
benchmarking, increase accountability of public decision-makers, and foster 
intergenerational equity in public entities' fiscal policy". It is, therefore, opportune "to 
promote uniform budgeting and accounting standards for public entities in the EU".  
 
The IPSAS framework does not include budgeting and budgetary control, but the IPSAS are 
still considered by EPSAS.eu as a "possible starting point for" an accrual-based "European 
Public Sector Accounting System". An endorsement procedure based on IPSAS, similar to 
what is already carried out regarding IFRS for the private sector, is considered as one 
reasonable approach for developing and implementing EPSAS (EPSAS.eu). However, it does 
not appear that any standards dealing with budgeting in the public sector are being considered 
by the EU, since, according to Makaronidis (2012), budgeting lies outside Eurostat's remit. 
According to Makaronidis (2012), Eurostat is only concerned with "real and actual" 
statistical data, and budgets and forecasts are not Eurostat's responsibility. 
 
It is encouraging to note that the EU Commission does not intend to increase the 
administrative burden on its member states by its proposals. The possibility of referring to  
financial reporting data for the main EDP indicators would also be a positive move, but it is 
not clear whether the intention is to adapt the ESA95 or to adapt financial reporting to suit 
ESA95 concepts (COM(2013)114:5-6). 
 
Finally, the EU Commission Report draws attention to the fact that a set of harmonised 
EPSAS on their own are not the solution to guarantee the quality of accounting data. The 
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underlying governance structure needs to be strengthened and this needs strong political 
support, effective internal control and external financial audit. 
 
6 SUMMARY 
 
The Maltese Government used unmeasured resources to develop the MGAS. Albeit based on 
existing international reporting standards, the MGAS were more user-friendly for the 
government's operations. All this work was swept aside and it was decided to adopt the 
IPSAS directly. This decision was agreed upon by all the officials involved, because it is 
mainly believed that the MGAS do not have the 'brand name' that would give the required 
credibility.  
 
The Treasury Officials are aware that the work that needs to be done in order to implement 
IPSAS is basically the same that was being done on the MGAS, that is, choosing from the 
options available and simplifying the language when translating the technical details of each 
standard into a circular that can be issued to the line departments for actual implementation. 
The IPSAS Committee, however, does not appear to have proper terms of reference and is not 
functioning properly. Progress on the standards has in fact stalled, and due to the 
developments in the EU, the Committee is waiting for further directions to be issued by the 
EU before proceeding. This position then begs the question whether the "push" from the EU 
towards IPSAS did in fact play any part in the PS's decision to go for IPSAS, or not. The PS 
claims that it did not. 
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Arguments in favour of IPSAS were brought forth, but the fact that the IPSAS are based on 
IFRS seems to be a reassuring factor for the Maltese government officials. Sovereignty is not 
an issue, since the government officials consider the adoption of internationally recognised 
standards that are set by international professional bodies as the proper thing to do. 
 
On the other hand, the authority of the IPSASB as a standard setter does not appear to be 
satisfactory for the majority of the other EU member states, leading the EU Commission to 
propose that the EU establishes its own governance structure to issue public standards that are 
particular for EU member states, namely the EPSAS.  Of course, IPSAS will be used as a 
framework, but it appears that the IPSAS cannot simply be 'endorsed' like the IFRS were for 
the private sector, because there are technical, conceptual and, more importantly, government 
issues surrounding some of the standards. 
 
The EPSAS are proposed as the possible outcome of the EU's work in its efforts to strengthen 
the budgetary framework of its member states in response to the crisis, but budgets and 
budgetary control are not within Eurostat's responsibilities as this Directorate is only 
concerned with statistics. The Eurostat does not want to create any unnecessary differences 
between EPSAS, IPSAS and IFRS - is more of the same then to be expected? The only 
possible difference may arise since Eurostat has included ESA95 in the equation. How will 
the ESA95 influence EPSAS development? Perhaps the accountancy profession is hoping for 
a reverse effect, that is for EPSAS to affect ESA95 requirements. 
 
From MGAS to EPSAS - the ground is shifting for the government officials involved in the 
accounting reform at central level in Malta. It appears that the decision to abandon the MGAS 
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and adopt IPSAS will not affect the reform process, and since the key people are waiting for 
decisions at EU level to be taken, this can only prolong any decisions taken at country level. 
While the IPSAS decision was apparently a positive move that would re-ignite the accounting 
reform process, it may now result in even more procrastination. But perhaps this could have 
been the intended outcome from the outset. 
 
Throughout the findings described in Chapters 4 to 6, National Accounting and ESA95 have 
regularly featured as important issues that are considered by government accounts preparers 
and decision-makers. Government and national accounting are two different schools of 
thought that have been described as 'epistemic communities' by Heald and Georgiou (2011), 
in that they can exert pressure and affect the decisions taken by the reform promoters and 
even the stakeholders. Chapter 7 describes the findings particular to this theme. 
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CHAPTER 7:  NATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND THE EU 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The empirical data in Chapters 4 to 6 reveals the importance given to statistical reports by 
practitioners. The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings that answer the research 
question: 
 
 What are the perceptions regarding the differences between national accounting and 
government accounting, and how are such perceptions affecting the accounting 
reform? 
 
2 STATISTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 
 
Three different but related frameworks have been established in order to present country 
comparisons on a standardised basis: the UN's System of National Accounts (SNA)66; the 
IMF's GFS67; and the EU's ESA9568. 
 
Malta applied the SNA since 1993, and adopted the ESA95 in 2003. For EU member states, 
the ESA95 is the standard for submitting national accounts data to all international 
                                                 
66
 The SNA is the internationally agreed standard set of recommendations on how to compile measures of 
economic activity in accordance with strict accounting conventions based on economic principles (SNA 2008, 
2009: par.1.1). The SNA guidelines have been produced under the joint responsibility of the United Nations, the 
IMF, the EU Commission, the OECD and the World Bank. 
67
 The GFSM 2001 describes an integrated statistical system that is harmonised, to the extent possible, with the 
SNA (IMF, 2001). 
68
 The ESA95 is fully consistent with the world-wide guidelines on national accounting, the SNA (ESA95, 
Art.1.24). 
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organisations. Only in the national publications is strict adherence to the ESA not 
obligatory69. 
 
The ESA95 and the SNA differ in presentation. Moreover, the ESA95 concepts are more 
specific and precise than those of the SNA. The ESA95 can afford to be more specific 
because it primarily applies to the EU member states and meets the data needs of the EU. The 
most significant difference is that, formally, the ESA95 is a legal act70, it has more precise 
definitions and it is intended as a reference guide; whereas the SNA includes more 
explanations and background information, and it can be used as a teaching handbook for 
statisticians worldwide. 
 
The ESA95 stipulates that the ESA framework can be used: 
to analyse and evaluate the structure of a total economy; specific parts or aspects of 
a total economy; the development of a total economy over time; and a total economy 
in relation to other total economies. (Art 1.03) 
 
The figures from this framework play a major role in formulating and monitoring the social 
and economic policy of the EU and its member states (ESA95, Art.1.04). The ESA95 
identifies the following important specific uses: 
a) for monitoring and guiding European monetary policy: the criteria of convergence for 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) are defined in terms of national accounts 
figures (government deficit, government debt and GDP); 
                                                 
69
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2223/96, Art.1.3. 
70
 Council Regulation (EC) No.2223/96 of 25th June 1996 on the European System of national and regional 
accounts in the community. Subsequently amended by Council Regulation 448/98, Commission Regulation 
1500/2000, Commission Regulation 995/2001, EP/Council Regulation 2558/2001, and Commission Regulation 
113/2002. The ESA95 is currently being updated to ESA2010, which is applicable from 2014 onwards. 
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b) for granting monetary support to regions in the EU: the expenditure for the Structural 
Funds of the EU is partly based on regionalised national accounts figures; and 
c) for determining the EU's own resources.  
 
These specific uses may have ripple effects on the quality of statistical reporting and 
accounting reform. The  Maastricht Treaty requires all 28 EU member states to calculate the 
deficit/surplus and debt according to ESA95, and if the criteria in the Treaty are exceeded, 
this could trigger the EDP against the member state.  
 
ESA95 reporting is accrual-based. The cash-based deficit reported in the Consolidated Fund is 
adjusted to arrive at an accrual-based deficit according to ESA95, which is called 'General 
Government net borrowing' ('net lending' in the case of a surplus).  
 
The Maltese ESA95 deficit is being reported at Parliamentary Level as part of the Financial 
Estimates. The 'Statement of Public Finance' shows the estimated General Government 
position as at the end of the current year and for the following year. This report was published 
for the first time in the Financial Estimates for 2010, showing the estimated ESA95 deficit for 
2009 and 2010. The format of the 'Statement of Public Finance' is as shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Format of the Statement of Public Finance 
 
 
  
The Budget Speech includes a similar report with more detailed capital expenditure. The GDP 
is shown and the General Government deficit as a percentage of the GDP is calculated. This 
financial position is given in actual figures for the previous year, approved and revised figures 
for the current year, and projected figures are given for the next three years. A similar five-
year analysis is given in the Statement of Public Debt, showing the General Government 
public debt as a percentage of the GDP. 
 
Given all this, parliamentary discussions during the presentation of the Financial Estimates 
are more concerned with departmental allocation of funds and political issues. The ESA95 
report is too technical for parliamentary discussion, according to the PS (Interview 9). The 
Budget Office (Interview 18) emphasised that "even if they (parliament members) don't ask, 
the bottom line is this - only the EDP movements count". The PS (Interview 9) himself 
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confirmed that the deficit calculated in the Consolidated Fund is not regarded at all by the 
Ministry. 
 
The Budget Office (Interview 18) pointed out that the ESA95 is accrual reporting and not 
accrual accounting. The methodology involved has improved accrual awareness. Previously, 
only the cash allocations were considered as having an impact on government finances.  
 
The Budget Office (Interview 18) drew attention to the fact that capital expenditure is 
included in the ESA95 calculation of the deficit. The Budget Office also drew attention to the 
time adjustment methodology of reporting tax flows in the ESA9571. The Budget Office 
considers this methodology as producing very realistic results, avoiding subjectivity, even 
though "you cannot say that in this way you have a figure of tax debtors at year end". 
 
3 NATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
 
The National Accounts of Malta are prepared by the NSO. According to the NSO's website, 
the National Accounts data are compiled and presented in accordance with ESA95 as 
recommended by the EU statistical agency, Eurostat.  
 
 
 
                                                 
71
 This is an option that is offered by the EU, and one that Malta has chosen. The tax collected in cash is changed 
into 'tax collectable' in the year by deducting the first month's tax collected and adding the cash collected in the 
first month of the following year (two months in the case of income tax and national insurance contributions). 
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3.1 National Accounts Preparation 
 
The National Accounts report on the GDP. Whereas a business prepares the accounts of a 
company, the National Accounts are an account of the whole economy. The economy is 
divided into five sectors: the general government; Non-Financial companies; financial 
companies; households and NPISH (non profit institutions serving households); and the rest 
of the world. The NSO follows two manuals in the preparation of the National Accounts, 
namely, ESA95, which covers all the National Accounts; and the Manual on Government 
Deficit and Debt72. The Manual on Government Deficit and Debt is extensive and is very 
important because it contains the actual regulations that a government needs to follow to 
account for its particular operations73. 
 
The Annexes to the ESA95 contain examples of the accounts for the General Government. 
The deficit according to the Maastricht rules is calculated in the Non-Financial Account, so 
this corresponds to the Income Statement. The Financial Account is like the Balance Sheet, 
but excluding the non-financial assets schedule. Tangible assets, referred to as 'Grossed fixed 
capital information', are included in the Non-Financial Account, because as already explained 
by the Budget Office, capital expenditure is included in the calculation of the deficit (refer to 
Figure 13). This is one of the fundamental differences between national and business 
accounting. 
                                                 
72
 The NSO (Interview 24) considers the Manual on Government Deficit and Debt as its "bible". The manual 
lays down a form of accounts which is different from business accounting. Instead of an Income Statement and 
Balance Sheet, a Non-Financial Account and a Financial Account, respectively, are prepared. Basically, the 
results are the same but the net worth of each sector of the economy is calculated instead of the net worth of a 
company.  
73
 The Manual is very important and provides you with the required mind set. It changes your terminology; it 
changes business accounts with these accounts, for example, the issue that provisions are not made. A business 
does not receive taxes and does not pay pensions; so there are issues that go beyond business. This manual 
contains the actual regulations for government to adhere to for these transactions. (NSO, Interview 24) 
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Another difference between national and business accounting is that provisions, for example 
provision for doubtful debts, are not done in the accounts of the ESA, neither in the Financial 
nor in the Non-Financial Account. Depreciation allowance is not provided for in National 
Accounts74, and when a non-financial asset is disposed, only the proceeds from disposal are 
accounted for in the Non-Financial Account. This is unlike the gain or loss on disposal of 
non-current assets that is calculated in business accounting using accounting conventions like 
the net book value. 
 
The proceeds from the sale of financial assets are recorded in the Financial Account, that is in 
the 'Balance Sheet'.  
 
The NSO (Interview 24) pointed out that the National Accounts are economic accounts, 
implying that accounting conventions do not apply. Different terminology is used, for 
example, 'intermediate consumption' instead of 'recurrent expenditure', and 'market output' 
instead of 'turnover'.  
 
The Financial Account is not simply a list of closing balances, as is the purpose of the balance 
sheet in business accounting. In the National Accounts, the Financial Account records the 
actual difference between opening and closing stock positions, which flows are analysed into 
three categories: the real transactions (flows) that have occurred during the year; the 
                                                 
74
 The conceptual definition of depreciation in ESA95 is similar to the IPSAS/IFRS framework but no 
estimations are done in National Accounting. A type of replacement method is used to calculate depreciation in 
National Accounts. 
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revaluations, if the price of an asset or liability changes during the year75; and other changes 
in volume76. 
 
Since the Financial Account only deals with financial assets, it is like an explanation of the 
movements in cash, cash equivalents, and long term financial assets and financial liabilities. 
The Financial Account shows the opening position, the changes including revaluations, other 
changes in volume, and the final position. The changes would be reflected in the Non-
Financial Account. The closing position would be at market value, but it only includes 
financial assets. The NSO (Interview 24) confirmed that Malta does not have a register for 
Non-Financial assets: 
We don't even send the data about the Non-Financial assets of the government, and 
neither of the whole economy.  
 
The Financial and Non-Financial Accounts have to move pari passu, using a sort of double 
entry77. When the balance on the Consolidated Fund is adjusted to arrive at the deficit, both 
accounts will be affected. 
 
The end result on both accounts is the calculation of  'Net borrowing/net lending', shown as 
the balance B9 in the Non-Financial Account and as B9F in the Financial Account. Since the 
two accounts move in tandem, in theory, these two balances should be equal. But this is 
                                                 
75
 For example, no government securities are bought or sold during the year, meaning that there were no real 
transactions; but the market price of the asset has changed, and this is recorded in the separate 'revaluation 
account'; a distinction is therefore done between movements in actual transactions and movements due to 
revaluations. 
76
 This category is rarely used. It is used to write off liabilities; in the case of a catastrophe; and when a new 
entity is re-classified as general government. When a new entity is re-classified as General Government, the 
EBU would not be included in opening stock and is, therefore, introduced into the system through this account. 
77
 For example, the government buys a Non-Financial asset with cash: the Non-Financial Account will record the 
expenditure, while the Financial Account will record the decrease in cash. If the Non-Financial asset is acquired 
on credit, the Non-Financial Account will record the expenditure, while the Financial Account will record the 
increase in liabilities. 
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difficult to achieve in practice due to different sources of information and timing issues. Any 
discrepancy would be shown as a payable/receivable in the Financial Account. 
 
The standards bind the NSO to ensure that the discrepancy between the Financial and the 
Non-Financial Accounts does not exceed 2% of GDP on a quarterly basis, and 0.2% of GDP 
on an annual basis. The discrepancy is a measure of quality of accounts preparation. The 
government deficit reported is always that calculated from revenue and expenditure in the 
Non-Financial Account, even though this should be the same as calculated from the assets and 
liabilities in the Financial Account78. By default, the EU literature states that any discrepancy 
is always taken to be in the Financial Account, but this is not always the case79. 
 
The NSO publishes the Financial Account and its adjustments on a quarterly basis. The 
Financial Account is not published annually, but the figures would be consolidated as the 
final quarterly in the April notification80.  
 
                                                 
78
 For example, in 2011, the government deficit in the Non-Financial Account was 2.7% of the GDP: what if the 
Financial Account showed 3.2%? The accounts preparer would need to identify where the discrepancy of 0.5% 
lies, which would be very difficult. If the discrepancy lies in the Non-Financial Account, this would mean that 
the deficit should be 3.2% and not 2.7%, thus exceeding the 3% limit. This is why it is important that the 
discrepancy should be as low as possible, otherwise it could throw some doubts on the computations. 
79
 Sometimes we had to revise our figures and the discrepancy would be in the Non-Financial Account. But no 
one goes into these types of adjustments - not the ministries and not even the media - because they are not aware 
of them. Our annual discrepancies are very low, but this is not always the case. And if the discrepancy exceeds 
0.2% of the GDP, we are asked to decrease it by the Commission. No one bothers in Malta - they just look at the 
Non-Financial Account deficit. No one looks at the Financial Account. (NSO, Interview 24) 
80
 Two releases are issued by the NSO in April: 
a) the EDP that reports the annual government deficit and debt, and would contain the table of adjustments 
of the transition from the consolidated fund to general government (refer to Figure 13);  
b) another quarterly with the data of the revenue and expenditure of the government by category, with the 
sum of the four quarters being equal to the annual; and 
c) Tables showing financial stocks and liabilities of the government, and the transactions of assets and 
liabilities, on a quarterly basis, with the sum of the quarters being equal to the annual transactions. The 
values at the end of the fourth quarter would be the closing stock (balances) as at the end of the year. 
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The calculation of the ESA95 deficit is done twice a year, in March and September. A 
provisional report is prepared at the end of March, which is then updated at the end of 
September. The reports always deal with annual figures and not quarterly81.  
 
The semi-annual data, with the adjustments, and the Financial Account (stocks of assets and 
liabilities, excluding the transactions) are also submitted to the PAC (NSO, Interview 24). The 
PAC, as the investigative arm of Parliament, is requiring that the information it receives is 
accrual-based so that it has a more clear picture of the situation. According to the Budget 
Office (Interview 18), this is very important because the PAC scrutinises the government 
audits and raises financial issues, but the submission of accrual data to the PAC is not a 
regular process. 
 
On the other hand, the EDP Package is prepared annually, therefore, the EDP is reported on 
an annual basis to the EU Commission. The EDP Package incorporates many questionnaires, 
including, for example, capital injections, dividends received and details about privatisations. 
A supplementary questionnaire covers the financial crisis, for example, should the 
government do an equity injection in a financial corporation due to a financial crisis. Another 
questionnaire covers 'Mean Loss Making Public Corporations', which will also include 
companies owned by the government. The data for these is extracted from the companies' 
business accounts and are not converted according to the ESA, "otherwise the figures would 
change completely" (NSO, Interview 24). These questionnaires are not published (NSO, 
Interview 24). 
 
                                                 
81
 For example, on 30th March 2012, the annual figures of the last four years, including 2011, were reported 
(refer to Figure 13). The September report would be basically the same as that of March because the revisions in 
the data would be minimal (NSO, Interview 24). 
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As already described in Chapter 6, when the ESA95 was being revised, the Eurostat was not 
successful in widening the definition of General Government due to objections from the 
member states. As a result, the NSO is now required to compile an annual questionnaire about 
the corporations that are not included in General Government. The data required includes 
information about employment, activities, turnover, liabilities, loans and guarantees. The 
Eurostat, therefore, still has access to the required information about the Corporations. 
 
Figure 14 shows a breakdown of the line item 'General Government adjustments' shown in 
Figure 13. It illustrates the series of adjustments required to change the cash-based deficit 
reported in the Consolidated Fund to the accrual-based deficit according to ESA95. The NSO 
(Interview 24) explained these adjustments and how government reporting has been amended 
to cater for this reporting and reduce the adjustments as much as possible (refer to Table 12). 
 
The NSO issues a monthly release for the Consolidated Fund. It has now become a policy that 
the release for the December Consolidated Fund is issued on 30th March, that is on the same 
day that the EDP notification is sent, because "basically, we start from the Consolidated Fund 
deficit" (NSO, Interview 24). 
 
The NSO (Interview 24) pointed out that if the original deficit is reported using accrual 
accounting according to IPSAS or some other standard, then it would still need to be 
converted to adhere to ESA9582.  
                                                 
82
 So even if the government maintains a record of debtors for tax, and is showing the tax as revenue, it would 
still need to make these adjustments. According to the NSO, Eurostat is more comfortable with the time-adjusted 
cash since, as the actual cash received will be recorded, there is less risk of abuse. During the height of the 
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, private companies were not paying their taxes and the government deficits 
increased. But countries that used the assessment option were not reflecting the effect of the crisis because they 
were not adjusting their assessments (NSO, Interview 24). 
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Figure 14: From the Consolidated Fund to the General Government Sector 
 
 
 
(Source: NSO News release dated 23 April 2012, General Government Debt and Deficit under the 
Maastricht Treaty: First Reporting for 2012) 
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Table 12: From the Consolidated Fund balance to the ESA95 deficit 
Adjustment Description 
Loan repayments Any loan repayments recorded in the Consolidated Fund as expenditure are reversed 
because these financial transactions would be accounted for as a movement in stock 
balance in the Financial Account. This adjustment is no longer required since the 
Treasury is now reporting loan transactions in a separate line item, and in this way, 
"the figures are clean from the outset ... (and) the cash is already clean from large 
financial transactions as much as possible" (NSO, Interview 24). 
 
Equity 
acquisitions 
The Government's Consolidated Fund may include an item to buy shares, or to invest 
in a public corporation, or as Malta's contribution to European Institutions like the 
European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Restructuring and Development 
and the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF). Like loan repayments, these 
expenditures are added back and recorded in the Financial Account. 
 
Other financial 
Transactions 
Three types of adjustments are done here being, the Central Bank's non trading profit, 
transfers from reserves of the Central Bank to the Government, and the dividends 
received from Corporations. 
 
a) The Central Bank belongs to the Government, and the profit reported in the 
accounts of the bank is transferred to the government. The Manual on 
Government Deficit and Debt contains a chapter that specifically deals with the 
Central Bank, and it limits a lot the operations of the government. According to 
these regulations, the Central Bank cannot just transfer any sum of its income or 
reserves to the government, which the government then shows as revenue. The 
manual provides a formula that has to be adhered to by all the central banks in the 
whole European system. Then another formula is provided to see what the 
government can take from the bank's profit, for example, 'writing down of coins' 
is net income of the Central Bank, which income cannot be recognised by the 
government. The amount by which the Central Bank's contribution exceeds the 
amount allowed by the regulations is called 'super profit', and this would need to 
be reversed. 
 
b) Transfers from reserves of the Central Bank to the Government, that is dividends, 
are also not allowed by the regulations and would need to be reversed. 
 
c) Dividends paid by the Corporations to the Government are also limited according 
to these regulations. The government has an investment in these corporations, but 
the amount of dividend that they can pay to the government cannot exceed the 
operating profit that they make in that year. For example, a corporation cannot 
make an operating profit of 5 million and pay the government a dividend of 10 
million. This would be possible in business accounting due to accumulated 
reserves, but is not acceptable for these regulations. 
 
Corporations like the Malta Financial Services Authority, the Malta Stock 
Exchange and the Malta Industrial Parks, sometimes pay a dividend to the 
Government and these are checked on an annual basis (not quarterly). Dividends 
received in 2012 would be based on the results of 2011. Similar to IAS 10, 
dividends are due when the accounts are issued, that is in 2012, and are therefore 
shown as income for that year. However, the profits for 2011 would need to be 
checked to ensure that the dividend does not exceed them. If an adjustment is 
required, a counter transaction is done in the Financial Account by adjusting the 
shareholding of the government. 
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Stock Premium 
Proceeds 
When the Government issues stock at a premium, namely the Malta Government 
Bonds, the premium received is revenue for the government. This revenue is reversed, 
and the premium is apportioned over the lifetime of the bond up to maturity, according 
to the bond issues done as from 2005 onwards. This adjustment could be either 
negative or positive, depending on whether the premium being reversed is more or less 
than the premium allocated for that year. 
The difference 
between interest 
paid and accrued 
This adjustment is required because the interest paid recorded in the Consolidated 
Fund is on a cash basis. If the interest payable is more than that paid, the difference 
would have a negative impact on the deficit. 
Other accounts 
payable/receivable 
This adjustment refers to Government accounts payable and receivable for 
Government Ministries and departments. This adjustment is possible through the 
accrual data collected from the ministries and departments on the quarterly templates. 
The Consolidated Fund is on a cash basis using the DAS. The Treasury then surveys 
the Ministries and departments on a quarterly basis using the system of templates, 
which was described in Chapter 4. The data collected concerns accrued and prepaid 
expenses, accrued and deferred income, inventories (non-current assets) and stocks. 
Accruals for capital expenditure would also be reflected in this adjustment, since 
capital expenditure is taken into consideration in the Non-Financial Account. Any 
creditors for capital expenditure would also be included as liabilities in the Financial 
Account. 
 
This line item may also include adjustments to reconcile subventions paid to EBUs 
and corporations, which the government records on a cash basis and the EBU or 
corporation would be declaring as a receivable. After confirming with the MFEI that 
the difference is simply due to timing, the NSO records the full expenditure and the 
difference is recorded as a payable in the Financial Account. When the difference is 
paid, the payable is cancelled. This adjustment is done on a quarterly basis. In Malta, 
the quarterly accounts are a copy of the annual EDP, but not all countries are in a 
position to meet this requirement; this depends on the quantity of the data available. 
 
The NSO maintains a detailed breakdown of this line item, and sometimes adjustments 
are done to better reflect consumption on a quarterly basis, but which would not affect 
the annual figures, for example, adjustments concerning street lighting prepayments 
and the one week difference in salaries paid by ministries and government 
departments. The NSO stated that the Treasury is constantly trying to improve the data 
it collects through the templates in order to reduce the number of adjustments required 
by the NSO (NSO, Interview 24). 
 
The Manual on Government Deficit and Debt outlines a specific treatment for EU 
funds received by the government. The basic rule is that EU funds should not have an 
impact on the government's deficit. There cannot be a revenue without a 
corresponding expenditure; the impact should be neutral on the government's 
account83. 
                                                 
83
 The NSO referred to the new package 0713 that deals with the large government funds which amount to nearly 
90% of all the funds received by the government, that is the Structural Funds, Cohesion Funds, External Border, 
and the Agricultural Funds. All projects are co-financed and the Maltese element would amount to around 15% 
or 25% of the whole cost. The EU Funds are received by the government and recorded in the Consolidated Fund 
on a cash basis, and then they are paid to the relevant recipient. Every quarter, the NSO checks the expenditure 
incurred on the project, compares it with the revenue received on these Funds, and adjusts accordingly so that 
these two amounts are equal. In this way, the EU Funds will not affect the deficit, most importantly, that the 
revenue does not exceed the expenditure. For example, if expenditure is 10 while revenue is only 3, further 
revenue of 7 is imputed, which will be shown in the Financial Account. A reverse adjustment would be done if 
revenue exceeds expenditure.  
According to the NSO, this adjustment used to have a positive impact on the government's deficit but, since the 
funds are open until 2016, most of the projects will be peaking, resulting in a negative impact (NSO, Interview 
24).   
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Time-adjusted 
cash 
Taxes on an accrual basis are a separate adjustment according to regulation 
2516/2000, which offers two options: 
a) Time-adjusted cash requires the identification of a pattern of how private 
companies pay their taxes and an adjustment is done accordingly; or 
b) The assessment or the coefficient method, which requires an estimate to be made 
of the amount of taxes that should have been received, and then the amount that 
has not been received is recorded as an expenditure. 
 
Malta has chosen the option of time-adjusted cash and is applying it for the main taxes 
being income tax, value added tax and national insurance contributions. A study had 
identified the most suitable pattern of one month for VAT and two months for income 
tax and national insurance contributions. The time-adjusted method is described in the 
Manual for Government Deficit and Debt, but the intervals are chosen by the member 
state, with the approval of Eurostat84. 
 
Deficit/surplus 
incurred by 
government 
entities 
This adjustment refers to EBUs. There are around 50 EBUs classified in this sector 
according to the delimitation exercise that is carried out by the GFS Committee on an 
annual basis. The delimitation exercise is laid down in the ESA95. These EBUs 
prepare their accounts on an accrual basis according to the IFRS, and the NSO would 
take their profits/losses as reported in their financial statements and convert them 
according to the ESA95 requirements, "in the same way that I convert the 
Consolidated Fund" (NSO, Interview 24). Consolidation adjustments are also required 
to cancel corresponding payables and receivables between the government and the 
entities. 
 
The Local 
Councils Sector 
This sector is very limited in Malta when compared to other countries. Like the EBUs, 
the 68 Local Councils prepare financial statements according to the IFRS, and the 
NSO converts these according to the ESA95. 
 
Treasury 
Clearance Fund 
Non-Financial 
Transactions 
The Treasury Clearance Fund used to be called the 'below-the-line account of the 
government'. It is used to record tax refunds, or transfers to cancel old advances, or 
small amounts of revenue received by the departments. These transactions are not 
recorded in the Consolidated Fund and, previously, did not affect the deficit. Since 
Malta became an EU member state, all these accounts are being included in the deficit. 
 
Interest earned This adjustment refers to interest earned on deposits or sinking funds that have not 
been included in the Consolidated Fund. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
The NSO referred to a report concerning Greece, which revealed that only the revenue from EU funds was being 
reported in the Non-Financial Account, while the expenditure was recorded in the Financial Accounts. He 
described this as "rampant abuse" (NSO, Interview 24). 
84
 The time-adjustment affected the deficit negatively with about 32 million in 2010. Companies were not 
paying, and this had an impact on both the Non-Financial and the Financial Account. The actual tax received 
during the 12-month period is recorded in the Consolidated Fund. Then the difference between, say, January 
2010 and January 2011 (in the case of VAT) is adjusted in the Non-Financial and the Financial Account, 
resulting in the Non-Financial Account showing receipts from VAT from February 2010 to end of January 2011. 
In 2009, the Government had offered a tax scheme and collected a lot of money in 2010, which revenue was not 
repeated in 2011: "if you have an exceptional occurrence during January and February, which is not repeated in 
the following year, you will have a negative impact" (NSO, Interview 24). 
The cash received in January 2011 has been recorded as revenue of 2010. The cash received in January 2011 will 
be shown as a receivable in the Financial Account as at 31 December 2010, in order to maintain the Financial 
Account consistent with the Non-Financial Account.  
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EFSF re-routing The EFSF has been created by the EU Commission for the Eurozone in order to assist 
member states in dire straits. The Government of Malta has guaranteed 700 million 
euro to the EFSF, so that this institution can borrow in order to lend to countries like 
Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
 
The EFSF is a company with its own Board of Directors, but Eurostat has decided not 
to consider the EFSF as an institutional unit because at the end of the day, the 
Eurozone countries decide what the EFSF does, according to the guarantees they have 
provided. The shareholding of the countries in the EFSF is minimal, but Eurostat 
decided that whatever happens in this Fund is re-routed to all the countries in the euro 
area. For example, if the EFSF lends money to Greece, this loan is apportioned 
between the Eurozone countries, and will be reflected in each country's accounts. 
During the first quarter of 2012, Malta's debt increased by around 88 million because 
of the EFSF. 
 
All transactions are re-routed, including the interest received, interest paid and the 
expenditure for administering the fund. For example, when Ireland pays interest to the 
EFSF and for administration, Malta would record its share of the revenue; and vice 
versa for interest paid on bonds issued by the fund.  
 
The net effect of the EFSF re-routing was to reduce Malta's deficit in the Non-
Financial Account for 2011 by Euro 292,000. Basically, the EFSF is charging more 
for its loans than it is paying to its sources. 
 
The Financial Account will show the contra entry for the effect on the deficit, and will 
also show the loans made to the countries as an asset, and the monies borrowed by the 
EFSF as a liability. In Malta, the Financial Account shows an asset and a liability of 
Euro 86 million. Since the country only reports its debts, the debts have increased 
because of the EFSF. To date, Malta has not paid one cent, but the re-routing has 
affected its deficit. 
 
 
 
(Source: NSO, Interview 24) 
 
4 NATIONAL VS GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING 
 
It is generally accepted by the interviewees that National and Government Accounting refer to 
"two different realities", with the former used for economic planning and decision-making, 
while the latter is used for financial decisions. The importance given to one or the other varies 
with the level of the decision-maker, and there appears to be disagreement as to whether the 
same accounting system could cater for both types of reporting. 
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The PAC Chairman (Interview 5) sees a link between the two methodologies, and believes 
that a reliable accounting system could be used for both types of reporting. 
 
A PAC member (Interview 6) emphasised the importance of the government accounting 
system that gives "the vision" for financial decisions. The current government accounting 
system lacks the preparation of a three-year rolling forecast, delineating the recurrent and 
current expenditure, which, according to this politician, is essential for correct decisions to be 
taken even at macro-economic level. 
 
In spite of claiming that the Consolidated Fund balance "is not the imbalance in our public 
finances", the PS (Interview 9) stated that one cannot say that National Accounting is more 
important than Government accounting, or vice versa. The two methodologies have different 
functions, but are complementary to each other and not substitutes. He described Government 
accounting as "obviously important", and management accounts are required to run a large 
entity, but National accounting is "crucial because it gives you a snapshot of the economy and 
economic trends". While claiming that he gives them both equal attention, the PS stated that 
"Government accounting on its own does not get you anywhere", because at the end of the 
day, both expenditure and revenue are functions of the economy, and if the economy is not 
working, the government will not collect any taxes. 
 
As a statistician, the PS (Interview 9) is convinced that National and Government accounting 
cannot be produced from the same accounting system. Government accounting produces a 
substantial input to the National accounts, but the methodology, compilation and scope are 
totally different. National accounts is 'economic accounting', which is substantially different 
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from commercial or government accounting: "In National accounts you have many things that 
are not observed, for example, consumption" (PS, Interview 9). 
 
On the other hand, the AG (Interview 13) thinks that the same accounting system can be 
used. While not losing sight of the objective of the accounting system to produce financial 
reports in compliance with IPSAS, he is willing to facilitate the NSO's work through a 
suitable coding structure. 
 
The AG (Interview 13), who is not an accountant, believes that National accounts are more 
important for the government because of international reporting obligations. He understands 
that National accounting is different from Government accounting, in that the former deals 
with all sectors of the economy and has its own sets of standards, and that the data provided 
by the Treasury is just a part of the National accounts. However,  he perceives aspects of 
national accounting that are very relevant for the work of the Treasury, for example, "the 
deficits and movements in balance sheets, from the financial and non-financial accounts": 
What they (the NSO) do is very relevant for us, but you have to look at them through 
different lenses. If you want to see proper accounting, you have to refer to our trial 
financial statements. If you want to see ESA-based reporting, look at the statistics.  
 
According to the NAO2 (Interview 4), as the current situation stands, National Accounting is 
more important than Government Accounting because it is presenting a more comprehensive 
picture by including local government, public entities, payables and receivables. He thinks 
that should government accounting be developed in a proper way, meaning an accrual 
accounting system adhering to IPSAS, the data produced can be used for national accounting: 
As it stands today, it cannot. In fact, the government accounting data is adjusted by 
the NSO in order to use it for Eurostat. If government accounting data is prepared 
according to IPSAS, its quality would warrant it to be useable for national 
accounting. So the same data can be used.  
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This is contrary to what the NSO had stated in that regardless of the accounting system used, 
the data would still need to be amended to comply with ESA95. 
 
According to the ex-Director General Special Projects (Interview 8), a study to harmonise 
IPSAS with ESA95 is not possible because one is referring to the internal environment while 
the other is referring to the external economic environment. Even though the data used can 
overlap, it is important that the two reporting regimes are not mixed up since the purpose of 
internal reporting is different than for 'economic accounting'. The ESA95 rules relate to a 
different reporting regime, and even the chart of accounts is different, but both systems are 
important because they build on each other.  
 
While admitting to never bothering with the detail in National Accounting, as an accountant, 
the DGA (Interview 2) perceives it as very different from financial reporting, and results in 
different interpretations of the data. However, she considers both as important: government 
accounting provides accountability and national accounting is important for economic 
decision-making. According to this Director, national and government accounting definitely 
cannot use the same accounting system. 
 
Even the IAID (Interview 21) admitted that for her, the term 'economic accounting' was 
something new, which she had heard from the PS. For her, its either 'accounting' or 
'economics', and still needs to be told what the mix of these two entails. As an accountant, she 
understands that the ESA95 is an economics-based reporting structure, and the point of 
departure would be the data from the accountancy exercise: "the financial deficit is important 
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because it is the first step". She thus believes that if accounting is improved "to reflect reality 
in a clear way", then the ESA95 report will also "be completely correct". But the Director is 
rather sceptic about the economic measures, like GDP, that are being used for the Maastricht 
criteria. Economic measures are not used by the private sector. She thinks that real money 
terms for any ratio would be more useful. 
 
The Director General Strategy and Operations (Interview 19), another accountant, regards 
both national and government accounting as important, and "one does not exclude the other". 
He sees them as complementary. Even though the ESA95 is used to be in line with EU 
requirements, proper accrual-based government accounting is still required so that it can be 
used for decision-making as well: 
I say that these two measures can be drawn up in conjunction, and one can indicate 
the differences between the two and the adjustments that are required. If the deficit 
is calculated on an accrual basis it would be more streamlined to what is reported 
by the NSO, so one can use it as a base for decision-making as well.  
 
One DCS (Interview 7), who is an accountant, described National Accounts as "nice 
statistical exercises", with ex-post data, used by government for long-term economic 
decisions, but which are totally useless for the decision-making that is required at 
departmental and ministerial level: 
Statistics give a picture at a certain point in time ... What we need is up-to-date 
correct information now so that we take decisions now. I need to be instantly aware, 
for example, that receipts are not being collected and that this will result in a cash 
flow problem. This is done at departmental level and even at higher government 
levels.  
 
4.1 ESA vs IPSAS and accrual accounting 
 
The partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 14) referred to a study his firm had carried 
out comparing the ESA and accrual accounting, which study had concluded that the two 
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methodologies have completely different objectives and frameworks. He emphasised that the 
ESA is not an accrual accounting system.  
 
According to the partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 14), the scope of the ESA for 
the EU is very clear, and is merely for governments to know their position in terms of deficit 
or surplus. The ESA rules limit the extent of the reporting entity to general government; 
excluding entities that do not rely on government funds because they are capable of 
generating at least 50% of their own revenue from the market, or because the government 
subsidy does not exceed 50% of its cost of sales. On the other hand, consolidation using 
IPSAS or IFRS would include all entities, irrespective of dependence on central funds. But 
this does not mean that ESA and IPSAS are in conflict, but the reason is because the two 
frameworks intend to provide different perspectives: "IPSAS has the focus on ownership, 
whereas ESA has the focus on dependency on government" (GT, Interview 14). 
 
The ESA and government accounting are, therefore, two separate systems serving two 
different objectives, stated the partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 14), and it 
would be a mistake to consider them together.  
 
The AG (Interview 13) pointed out that it would be wrong to assume that an accrual 
accounting system would be compliant with ESA95 because the rules are different. With an 
accrual accounting system, the current exercise of compiling accrual data with the templates 
would be avoided; all the data would be extracted from the system and the data would be 
according to standards, that is IPSAS. The PS (Interview 9) agrees that there are differences 
between the requirements of ESA95 and IPSAS, but he thinks that the former will be 
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strengthened with the adoption of IPSAS. This line of reasoning is based on the fact that 
Eurostat looks at the methodology and not at the actual data, and therefore an accrual 
accounting system would make the data more reliable (AG, Interview 13; NSO, Interview 
24). 
 
The AG (Interview 13) is aware that "every entity has its own standards" and in fact the ESA-
compliant reports prepared by the NSO are different from the trial accrual-based financial 
statements prepared by the Treasury. As one example, he referred to the tax receivables used 
by the Treasury, which would not be correct for the NSO since the NSO uses the time-
adjusted cash method.  
 
The AG (Interview 13) is also aware that ESA95 is not an accounting standard, and that it 
uses "economic accounting" to lay down rules of how to report so that reporting of all 
member states is homogeneous. The ESA includes many elements of accruals, but it also 
includes many things that are beyond accounting (AG, Interview 13). The AG (Interview 13) 
is aware that even if the government had an accrual accounting system and IPSAS are 
adopted, "you would still need to report to Eurostat using the ESA rules". 
 
However, the AG (Interview 13) still tends to mix the two methodologies, and when 
confronted with various standards, he tends to see them conflicting: 
There is also the push towards converging the rules in ESA95 and IPSAS. There are 
various rules: ESA, GFS - but you abide by the major rules, like the time-adjusted 
rules. (AG, Interview 13) 
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As already described in Chapter 5, the AG is for sure considering the ESA definition of the 
reporting entity as a "major rule" and is only considering consolidation up to General 
Government in order to be in line with ESA95 reporting. 
 
The AG (Interview 13) accepts that the Treasury is bound to refer to accounting standards and 
understands that the ESA95 is not the Treasury's first point of reference. He confirmed, 
however, that the Treasury maintains continuous interaction with the NSO, and in the absence 
of a clear accounting rule, or in the absence of an accounting standard, the Treasury adopts 
the ESA95 which provides "more strict rules and guidelines". 
 
4.2 Mixing up the two 
 
On 3rd December 2011, a member of the Opposition submitted a parliamentary question85 to 
the Minister of Finance, asking him to state when the full implementation of an 'accruals 
system' will be done, since this has been 'a long-standing promise'. The Minister answered 
that the government is already reporting its data according to the ESA95 regulations, which 
regulations incorporate the principles of accrual accounting according to the parameters of 
Eurostat. 
 
"The Minister's answer was correct", according to the Director General Strategy and 
Operations (Interview 19), because reporting to the EU is "accrual-based according to 
ESA95". According to the IAID (Interview 21), the PS has made Parliamentarians believe that 
the country is using accruals since it is reporting to the EU under ESA95, and as a result, the 
                                                 
85
 PQ 30897 
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work on implementing an accrual accounting system has slowed down. The PS (Interview 9) 
himself admitted to convincing even the "older employees" in accepting the ESA95 deficit, 
and it appears that one of these employees is the ex-Budget Office Director: 
Accrual accounting is important to give a holistic picture. How far have we arrived 
to date? I would say that we are there with the adjustments being done by the NSO. 
(XBO, Interview 25) 
 
Even the current employees in the Budget Office appear convinced: 
The annual deficit is accrual-based. The monthly and quarterly data collected is 
accrual-based. The entities use an accrual accounting system. And still there are 
people who think that the government is operating a cash-based system ... 
Government accounting is currently cash-based but reporting is not. ... All our 
reporting is accrual-based, even to the EU .... Even the National Accounts issued by 
the NSO are accrual-based. (BO, Interview 18) 
 
The partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 14) referred to confusion re-ESA95 within 
the Accrual Accounting Task Force. A member of the Task Force had argued that the Task 
Force need not bother with accrual accounting since the ESA will be adhered to. At another 
meeting, another member had expressed genuine concern that "we have to be careful that we 
don't do anything contrary to ESA" thinking that the two systems were convergent (GT, 
Interview 14). The Task Force member had requested a reconciliation between the ESA and 
accrual accounting. The partner of the consulting audit firm (Interview 14) had recommended 
that a reconciliation could be done "if  it gives you a certain comfort ... But that's all - they are 
not a replacement to each other".  
 
The Treasury is being required to report to the PAC on the differences between the data in the 
trial accrual-based financial statements and the data that is reported to Eurostat by the NSO 
(DGA, Interview 2). The Treasury requests the NSO to clarify, and these refer, for example, 
to the fact that the tax revenue is being recorded using the time-adjusted cash method in line 
with Council Regulation 2516 of 2000 (DGA, Interview 2). 
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The current discourse on the adoption of  IPSAS by the EU member states and the importance 
that is being shown by the Eurostat towards this issue appears to be adding more fuel to the 
confusion.  
 
4.3 EU Reporting - importance 
 
The PS  (Interview 9) described the ESA95 deficit reported to the EU as "the deficit that 
matters"; it is the bottom line that matters to him. The IAID (Interview 21) understands this 
point of view, stating that the ESA95 has become very important because it is seen as a means 
to an end: "you have a pipeline of euro pouring in".  
 
The AG (Interview 13) admits to being biased towards reporting from a macro point of view 
rather than at a departmental level because he is more involved in the GFS Committee 
(GFSC) rather than the management of the departments. He appreciates that an accrual 
accounting system would enhance the quality of the fiscal figures of deficit and debt being 
reported. 
 
Earlier findings (Chapter 5) have already identified the priority given to the definition of the 
reporting entity in the ESA95 as to the level of consolidation. For example, the NAO2 
(Interview 4) insisted on the importance of taking into account the Eurostat definition in order 
to have consistency: 
In practice you use the Eurostat as a benchmark, so that even for comparative 
purposes, the figures in the financial report would correspond with those of 
Eurostat.  
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Even the DGA (Interview 2) and her accountant (Interview 3) identified EU reporting 
requirements "using an accrual basis" as the primary role of the accrual data being collected 
on the templates. According to the AG (Interview 13), the Treasury started requiring quarterly 
templates from the departments "to suit the ESA reporting requirements", and once these 
requirements were being satisfied "it's like we reached a plateau, and stopped". 
 
According to the PS (Interview 9), "the deficit that matters" is used both for external and 
internal reporting. External reporting meaning reporting to Eurostat, and internal reporting 
meaning that it is used by the MFEI for its own decision-making. The accrual-based reports 
are prepared quarterly: "so quarterly, we have a clear picture of what is happening in 
accruals" (AG, Interview 13).  
 
For the Budget Office (Interview 18), the ESA95 deficit is the most important target, and all 
decisions are taken after considering the impact on the reported figure, and always according 
to ESA95 standards86:  
ESA95 is the framework that is discussed and is the framework that we have to work 
with.  
 
Even the financing of new projects is engineered in a way to reduce the impact on this 
reported figure, and always according to ESA95 standards (BO, Interview 18; NSO, Interview 
24). 
 
                                                 
86
 For example, the ESA95 calculation includes debt cancellations: if the government is issuing shares for a loss-
making project, according to the ESA95, this is not considered as an investment, but is written off immediately. 
The reasoning being that if it were a normal business transaction, the transaction would be considered as an 
expense and not as an investment (BO, Interview 18). 
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The Director General Strategy and  Operations (Interview 19) appreciates the importance of 
statistical reporting because even the EU bases its decisions on these statistics, "even if 
actually, the reality is different"87. Both a PAC member (Interview 6) and the IAID (Interview 
21) expressed their cynicism regarding the percentage economical targets as set by the DG 
ECFIN and which are used by the EU member states to manage their economies88.  
 
According to the IAID (Interview 21), "there are a thousand things based on Eurostat 
reporting". This provides an incentive to member states to engage in activities to obfuscate 
their reporting and cloud the true state of their finances (IMF, 2012). 
 
The IAID (Interview 21) thinks that the ESA95 is being given more importance than it duly 
deserves in Malta. She described this as a recent development resulting from two things: EU 
membership, and the fact that the current PS of the MFEI came from the NSO "and the 
ESA95 is what he knows". According to the IAID (Interview 21), it is short-sighted to regard 
EU reporting as the bottom line for government: 
You can report to Eurostat that our economy is heaven on earth, but wouldn't you be 
interested to see whether this is true or not?  
 
 
 
                                                 
87
 An issue has arisen concerning Malta and EU funds as from 2014, because when Bulgaria and Romania 
became member states, statistically these decreased the average of the EU. And the GDP of Malta appeared that 
it had substantially improved and that it is in line with the 75% target, and therefore, it is not entitled to the full 
complement of funds. The Government of Malta argued that there was no substantial improvement in its GDP in 
reality. Since these two countries are not fully developed, they impinged on the statistical figures (DGSOS, 
Interview 19). 
88
 For example, the 75% per capita GDP target that distinguishes a country from classifying for Objective 1 or 
Objective 2 status, and its entitlement for EU funds. "On the eve of our membership, Malta scored 74.5%. Either 
god loved us, or we loved ourselves, because had we scored 75%, we would have been Objective 2, meaning 
large millions less than what we took" (IAID, Interview 21). 
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4.4 NSO as decision-maker and "accounts" preparer 
 
As already described in Chapter 6, the NSO thinks that 'statistics' is a misnomer. The NSO 
reports are used by the EU Commission and the government when taking decisions: "then 
these are the accounts of the government" (NSO, Interview 24).  
 
The Manual for Government Deficit and Debt, referred to by the NSO as their "bible", is not 
just a statistics book. It lays down the framework for government's operations and actually 
limits the actions of the government: 
Our work is like 'auditing' the accounts of the government and of all the EBUs, to 
check for compliance with this Manual. (NSO, Interview 24) 
 
The NSO (Interview 24) described how his office is involved in all MFEI decisions and the 
NSO provides advice on methodology89. The NSO (Interview 24) is also involved in the 
preparation of the three-year forecast as published in the Budget Speech and submitted to the 
EU: "the MFEI gives me the figures, and I translate these according to ESA". 
 
5 EU REPORTING AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING REFORMS 
 
The findings in Chapter 5 show that EU membership was not amongst the original stimuli that 
started the accounting reform because various changes were effected in the Public Service in 
the 1990s that would still have been carried out irrespective of EU membership, for example, 
                                                 
89
 For example, the method of funding a new project "has to pass the test of this Manual, otherwise nothing can 
be done" (NSO, Interview 24). In order to assist a government-owned company, the government wanted to 
increase its shareholding in order not to affect the deficit. But the EU rules stopped it from doing so, because 
according to the Manual, a government cannot increase the shareholding of a company in order to cover its 
losses. If a company has a history of losses, a private investor would probably not invest in it, "so we had to stop 
the government from doing this" (NSO, Interview 24).  
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the autonomy of the NAO (NAO2, Interview 4). Eventually, targeting the Maastricht criteria 
and the adoption of the euro may have actually acted as a retarding factor on the accounting 
reform as resources were diverted to concentrate on these issues. 
 
Being part of the eurozone may be considered as a stimulus for the accounting reform due to 
the reporting requirements, but according to the NAO1 (Interview 15), these should not be 
considered the primary objectives of the government. He believes that the accounting reform 
is not being done just to please the EU, and in fact, it would be pointless without changing the 
underlying fiscal discipline. In the opinion of the NAO1, the reporting requirements to the EU 
are secondary, as the obligations of the government lie first with its citizens as the 
shareholders. 
 
But it is still a generally held opinion by the research participants that priorities and 
developments in the country are now EU-driven, and unless a requirement becomes 
compulsory by the EU, it will not be done. While the recent developments in the EU may 
prompt action on the accounting reform, the fact remains that accrual accounting is not a 
requirement by the EU. Perhaps only Eurostat exerts indirect pressure because it requires its 
data to be accrual-based, but to date, it does not require the accounting system itself to be 
accrual-based and offers the option to have a cash-based accounting system plus time 
adjustments, as adopted by Malta. 
 
Both PAC members (Interviews 5, 6) expressed their dissatisfaction about the present state of 
the accounting system, claiming lack of confidence in the methodology used to submit data to 
the EU, when the most important objective is to have an accounting system that can be used 
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as a management tool. The PAC Chairman (Interview 5) doubts the extent that reports 
submitted to the EU reflect the reality of the financial situation of the country. While he 
cannot understand how the model to convert cash-based data to accrual data can actually 
work, he accepts that the model used is justified because it adheres to EU regulations. But 
then the PAC Chairman questions whether these rules are good in themselves: 
OK we are following the rules. But is this rule good for us? At the end of the day, is 
the outcome going to be beneficial for financial sustainability? Can we then better 
administrate our finances?  
 
The PAC Chairman (Interview 5) agrees with the NAO1 in that EU reporting and targets 
should not be an end in themselves, because the EU can only penalise and impose sanctions, 
when the government has to manage the country: "what I need is more detailed information to 
help me take better decisions and make better planning".  
 
A PAC member (Interview 6) criticised the accounting reforms and the system used for EU 
reporting, stating that "it is not accrual accounting at all" but "bits and pieces". According to 
this politician, the reports prepared for the EU are simply something being done so that the 
EU can integrate the data into its own accrual accounting system.  He described Eurostat as 
very complacent for "allowing members states to do certain procedures pretending to be 
accruals", as it is not encouraging accrual accounting but to the contrary. The current 
patched-up system is being used by the government because it has found a loophole that 
satisfies the EU Commission: "if we are getting along, and Eurostat is happy, why bend over 
backwards?" (PAC2, Interview 6). For this PAC member (Interview 6), these allowances by 
Eurostat have had serious consequences: 
 ... when you allow certain tactics to simplify and make acceptable certain things, 
the result is that countries like Greece, confounded their reports and no one picked 
up what was happening. Now they are going to put more pressure on government 
accounting systems - but they have been saying this for a long time.  
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And the ex-Budget Office Director (Interview 25) had no qualms to state that it would be a 
waste of resources to implement an accrual accounting system when the EU and all other 
international interested parties are satisfied with the cash-based patched-up accounting 
system. 
 
5.1 ESA95 as a reform driver 
 
The PS (Interview 9) stated that the accounting reform is still important but perceives it less 
so due to National Accounting reforms. "Our deficit, the deficit that matters, is compiled on 
an accrual basis", according to the PS and, therefore, an accounting reform makes sense to 
him "because we are already doing it". According to the AG (Interview 13), MFEI top 
officials are using the fact that the EDP notification is being satisfied to say that "we have 
accruals data", but he does not agree and is still waiting for a comprehensive accrual 
accounting system.  
 
In Chapter 5, the incomplete fixed asset register was identified as the biggest problem in the 
accounting reform, but the AG (Interview 13) said that it is not being given a lot of 
importance at the moment and their main concern are the "profit and loss items" that affect 
the deficit for external reporting . The AG said that the Treasury is in constant contact with 
the Budget Office and the NSO "regarding these statistics that we collect". 
 
The Budget Office (Interview 18) thinks that the main trigger for government accounting 
reforms were "the EU requirements due to National Accounting". The DGA (Interview 2) 
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doubts whether the trial accrual-based financial statements would still be being prepared in 
the absence of this requirement: 
Now I can say that I do not need a system to issue an accrual-based report for its 
present objective. The EU requirements are being met ... the ultimate objective, that 
is EU reporting, is being achieved.  
 
According to the DGA, even the interest shown by the PAC is due to the fact that the data 
prepared by the Treasury is used for international EDP reporting. 
 
It appears that the accountants involved in the reform have not managed to "sell" their concept 
of a full accrual accounting system to the top MFEI officials, but interest in the accounting 
reform is only shown due to EU's interest in the quality of the government accounting data 
(DGA, Interview 2; IAID, Interview 21). The Treasury Officials (Interviews 2, 13) and the 
NAO (Interviews 4, 15) believe that the developments in the EU regarding the IPSAS will re-
ignite the accounting reform, given that "the EU is the driving force for everything." 
 
According to the Director General Strategy and Operations (Interview 19), it may be argued 
that the financial crisis should provide the impetus to concentrate on accrual accounting and 
improved financial legislation. But according to the IMF (2012), in times of crisis, the EDP 
reporting requirement may actually create more incentive for the government to "cloud" its 
actual financial position rather than to be more transparent. 
 
The continuous harping about the importance of ESA95 worries the IAID (Interview 21), and 
she fears that the obsession in Malta with ESA95 is detrimental to any improvements to the 
government accounting system. The IAID expressed scepticism about EU reporting 
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requirements because governments appear to be moving slowly on accrual accounting since 
they are being accommodated by the ESA95: 
Something is very wrong with ESA95 ... Countries are using manipulated cash basis 
and are avoiding to apply accrual.... They don't want to implement accrual 
accounting ... My gut feeling is that accrual accounting will affect the base of ESA95 
in a bad way. (IAID, Interview 21) 
 
The calculation of the deficit according to ESA95 methodology, as described earlier in this 
chapter, should not be affected by the accounting method that is used because the ESA95 
makes adjustments to suit. However, the picture presented by the ESA95 has been questioned, 
and the fear of implementing accrual accounting may be because this may reveal a very 
different picture from what the ESA95 shows, resulting in even more doubts and questions. 
 
The ESA95 is a reform driver in the sense that it has raised more awareness about the use of 
the accrual concept for some (not all) measures, but it appears to be actually acting as a 
deterrent for the implementation of an accrual accounting system. 
 
5.2 EU Crisis 
 
Chapter 6 described the steps being taken by Eurostat and the EU Commission following the 
lessons learnt from the crisis. Besides increased surveillance, the budgetary framework of the 
member states will be strengthened from 'its roots' with Eurostat looking into the quality of 
government accounting data, suggesting some form of harmonised public sector accounting 
standards, while pushing for accrual-based public sector accounting systems. 
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The type of accounting system has nothing to do with the crisis. According to the IAID 
(Interview 21), window dressing distorts any report from any type of accounting system - 
cash or accrual-based. Eurostat reporting and ESA95 did not serve their purpose when faced 
with troubled waters, and this is why there is this discourse towards change (IAID, Interview 
21). According to the IAID, Eurostat statistical reports would be pointless without proper 
surveillance; there are too many objectives related to Eurostat reporting that tempt 
manipulation: "it imploded". 
 
However, things are not solved by complicating matters. The IAID (Interview 21) does not 
think that the current system needs to be scrapped or replaced by a system that is complicated 
in itself. Perhaps the current system could be fine-tuned, introducing compulsory standards 
and increase monitoring.  
 
According to the AG (Interview 13), the NSO practically represents the Eurostat in the 
member state, and to date (January 2012) the NSO was trusted: 
To date, we used to collate and analyse the data and give it to the NSO. The NSO 
prepares the data and submits it to Eurostat, and that's that! (AG, Interview 13) 
 
But following the EU crisis, Eurostat has been given more powers (as described in Chapter 6), 
and will not remain taking the figures submitted at face value, but will start making 
"missions" for the purpose of analysing and auditing the "upstream data", that is the raw data 
gathered by the departments. The Eurostat will involve the NAO in this work. Because of this, 
the AG (Interview 13) described the process as "taking another thrust" due to the increased 
scrutiny: 
We now have to be really careful as to how we are reporting, and ensure that the 
departments are in sync with what we are doing.  
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And in late June 2012, a one day seminar was organised by the Treasury to inform the DCS 
about the new surveillance procedure (DGA, Interview 2). 
 
5.3 Co-operation between SAIs and NSIs 
 
To date, the NAO has been reluctant to involve itself in the collating of accrual data since it is 
not part of its legal remit (AG, Interview 13).  In spite of the PS's statement that "everything is 
being audited" (PS, Interview 9), the fact remains that the accrual data collected on the 
templates have never been subject to a full audit by the NAO (NAO2, Interview 4). The 
Eurostat missions would require the NAO to start auditing the returns submitted by the 
departments to the Treasury, adding "teeth" to the whole process.  
 
The EDP exercise is carried out by the GFSC, with representatives from the NSO, the 
Treasury and the Central Bank. Eurostat wants the NAO to be included: a requirement for all 
member states (NSO, Interview 24). The NAO will be required to audit the data and not the 
methodology. The methodology will be checked by Eurostat itself (NSO, Interview 24). The 
upstream data missions will concern the data providers, that is the Treasury, the Departments, 
the EBUs and the FDRS used to collect the accrual data: 
In the upstream, they will check how the departments enter the data in the DAS; how 
they collect the accruals; and then, how I extract the information from these systems 
and enter it into my system (I use an Excel programme, and don't have some fancy 
system) … They are not going to identify some figure and audit it intensively - this is 
not the intention. I will show him the systems, and he is not going to query the origin 
of some amount. This is not the intention, unless there is some consensus about it. 
(NSO, Interview 24) 
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Eurostat carries out Standard dialogue visits in each member state every two years. For the 
May 2012 visit held in Malta, the NSO had invited the NAO "so that they are aware of how 
things stand" (NSO, Interview 24).  
 
The Upstream data missions will start being carried out in high-risk countries like Greece and 
Spain. According to the NSO (Interview 24), Malta is not considered a high-risk country by 
the EU, partly due to its small size, and is expecting the first of such missions to occur 
towards the end of 2013 or beginning of 2014, that is before the next Standard dialogue visit. 
 
The IAID (Interview 21) welcomes these audit missions, stating that audit was missing in the 
monitoring done to date. However, she expressed doubts concerning the NAO's involvement 
because, as a national institution, its reporting obligations lie with the national Parliament and 
not to the EU. Furthermore, she pointed out that not all Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) of 
the EU member states enjoy a good reputation. She is sure that any audits carried out by the 
NAO will be supervised by Eurostat (IAID, Interview 21). 
 
However, according to the NAO1 (Interview 15), whether the SAIs of the EU member states 
will participate in these EU upstream data missions is still under discussion90. He had the 
impression that the SAIs will be required to audit the methodology used by the NSIs, but 
stressed that "the issue is still under discussion" as there would be a continuum of ideas and 
"a compromise needs to be reached". 
 
                                                 
90
 This comment was recorded before the annual meeting of the Contact Committee of the heads of the EU SAIs 
and of the European Court of Auditors (ECA), which was hosted in Portugal on 18 and 19 October 2012. 
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According to the NAO1 (Interview 15), the fact that a SAI audits the work of a NSI may be 
unthinkable in certain jurisdictions. However, it would not be a problem in Malta since, due to 
the country's small size, the officials of the NAO and the NSO are on a first-name basis 
(NAO1, Interview 15).  
 
Cooperation between the SAIs of the EU takes place within the framework of the EU Contact 
Committee structure91. In October 2011, a task force was set up to explore the possibilities for 
cooperation with Eurostat and NSIs. The overall goal of the Task Force was to identify areas 
where SAIs, Eurostat and NSIs can cooperate, and to advise on concrete actions. In October 
2012, a resolution (CC-R-2012-02) concerning SAIs' co-operation with Eurostat and NSIs, 
emphasised the importance of good communication between SAIs and NSIs to improve and 
ensure the quality of government statistics in the framework of their own competences and 
mandates. It acknowledged that SAIs may play an important role in ensuring the quality of 
government statistics. Through their audit of the public sector accounts, SAIs already 
contribute to the verification of data flowing to NSIs. The Contact Committee also 
acknowledged that SAIs may play a role (together with NSIs) in identifying risks and 
breaches in the system in their Member State that ensures good quality in government 
statistics (ECA, 2012). 
 
The Contact Committee stressed that SAIs are independent institutions that cannot be 
instructed by Eurostat or any EU body to carry out specific audits or tasks, however, although 
there are differences between the involved institutions in terms of mandates, responsibilities 
and powers, there is a common goal for good public governance (ECA, 2012). 
                                                 
91
 The Contact Committee is composed of the heads of the SAIs, including the President of the ECA. The EU 
Contact Committee structure is made up of the Contact Committee itself, the Committee of Liaison Officers, its 
task force and working groups on specific audit topics (eca.europa.eu). 
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The Contact Committee thus encouraged the individual SAIs to consider how they can 
contribute to improving the quality of upstream data used by Eurostat and the NSI92. It also 
encouraged them to establish and maintain good communication with the NSI93. Through this 
resolution, the Contact Committee decided to suggest that the SAIs establish contact with 
their NSI if they have not done so already; and to ask SAIs to consider their role in national 
follow up on six-pack legislation and EDP regulation where relevant (ECA, 2012). 
 
6 SUMMARY 
 
Besides the different terminology used, fundamental differences between national and 
business accounting are identified (refer to Table 13 - these differences are not extensive). 
Other differences that emanate from the requirements of ESA95 and the Manual on 
Government Deficit and Debt include the calculation of the dividends receivable as revenue; 
accounting for EU funding; and the time-adjustment method that is allowed, and preferred, to 
calculate the tax revenue and the tax receivable. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
92
 For example, by considering auditing the quality of upstream data sources, including quality management; 
identifying any audit gaps that may prevent full audit coverage of general government data by internal control 
and external audit; considering – if relevant in the national context – to assist or advise the administration on 
implementation of accounting standards or other similar guidance (ECA, 2012). 
93
 For example, by considering making the NSI a privileged partner, meaning that the SAI and the NSI, where 
beneficial for both, could for instance exchange information on risk analysis, possible infringements, information 
on standards, methodology, etc.; considering how to make SAI and NSI reports more useful to each other in 
timing and scope and, if suitable in the national context, share information that may require immediate attention 
by the other party; establishing and maintaining regular or ad hoc contact with the NSI, depending on the NSI’s 
willingness, for instance by yearly meetings, ongoing informal contact, etc.; participating in Eurostat’s upstream 
dialogue visits, where Eurostat visits the NSI and the upstream data providers, when invited (ECA, 2012). 
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Table 13: Some fundamental differences between business and national accounting 
Business Accounting National Accounting 
 
Non-current non-financial assets are capitalised in the 
balance sheet. 
Non-current non-financial assets are included as 
expenditure in the deficit calculation. 
 
Non-current non-financial assets are depreciated. Non-current non-financial assets are not depreciated 
over their estimated useful economic lives. 
 
On disposal of a non-current non-financial asset, the 
net book value of the asset is deducted from proceeds, 
and the resulting gain/loss on disposal is shown in the 
income statement. 
 
On disposal of a non-current non-financial asset, the 
proceeds are taken as revenue in the deficit calculation. 
Provisions are created in certain circumstances. The creation of provisions is not allowed. 
 
The calculation and accounting treatment of a gain or 
loss on sale of a financial asset depends on the asset's 
classification according to IFRS. 
 
Proceeds from sale of financial assets are recorded in 
the 'balance sheet', that is, the Financial Account. 
 
The balance sheet, also called the Statement of 
Financial Position, lists all the assets, liabilities and 
equity of an entity, as at a certain point in time. 
The 'balance sheet', that is the Financial Account, 
records the stock positions and flows in financial 
assets only. 
 
 
 
The findings in Chapter 6 reveal the difference in the reporting entity according to ESA95, 
that is, General Government, and IPSAS 6, that is, Whole of Government. It also reveals the 
importance given to the definition of the reporting entity, which the NSO was adamant would 
not be changed due to opposition from the member states themselves (NSO, Interview 24). 
 
Certain methodology used in national accounting would not make sense to an accountant, for 
example, the treatment of non-current assets. It appears that what makes 'economic sense' is 
recording the transactions from one stock position to another94.  
                                                 
94
 The effect of spending for the deficit in the Non-Financial Account is reflected in the movement of financial 
assets/liabilities in the Financial Account. The two accounts seem like a broken down version of the Statement of 
Cash Flows (IAS 7) or, perhaps, the Statement of Sources and Application of Funds (SSAP 10). The Non-
Financial Account shows cash flow movements in everything but financial assets/liabilities, which are then 
shown in the Financial Account. Since stock positions of payables and receivables are also taken, this would 
therefore mix up the cash flows and movements in these would need to be recorded in both the Non-Financial 
Account and the Financial Account. 
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The Financial and Non-Financial Accounts should not be compared with the Balance Sheet 
and the Income Statement. The objective of financial reports produced from business 
accounting is to provide information that is useful for decision-making, and if IPSAS are 
applied, to enhance the accountability of the reporting entity. The objectives of reports 
prepared under ESA95 are to calculate the extent of dependence of government operations on 
central budget funds; and to analyse and evaluate the structure of a total economy or parts of 
it. Both objectives are important and both types of reporting are required by a government for 
proper administration. 
 
There appears to be no sense in attempting to converge the two methodologies. Accountants 
may be disappointed for not having succeeded in 'selling' their methodology to the 
administrator, while the administrator is perhaps placing more importance on ESA95 and 
national accounting due to the targets and outcomes that are related to it. Or could it be that 
National Accounting satisfies the needs of the administrator for better decision-making? After 
all, National Accounting prepares an account for the whole economy. 
 
This chapter presents the findings concerning the perceptions on national and government 
accounting, and how such perceptions are affecting the accounting reform. Overall it appears 
that the importance attached to National Accounting is promoting its own types of changes 
while it is actually stalling the reform to a full accrual accounting system. 
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CHAPTER 8:  DISCUSSING THE FINDINGS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study is about the how and why of government accounting reforms at central level in 
Malta. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the findings in the light of the literature 
review of Chapter 3, using the analytical framework described in Chapter 2.  
 
Section 2 discusses the possible impacts of the historical and legislative background on 
governmental accounting reforms.  
 
Section 3 applies Lüder’s FMR Model (2002) in the Maltese context; identifying the factors 
or variables underlying the change process and the main actors effecting and/or affecting it. 
What is the combined effect of these factors on the environment surrounding the reforms? 
 
The decision taken by the government of Malta to adopt IPSAS and the importance of 
National Accounting are analysed in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. 
 
Section 6 re-visits Lüder's Model in the Maltese context, including the effect of IPSAS and 
National Accounting. Reference is made to Institutional Theory with respect to the gap 
identified in the literature by Jorge et al. (2011) in that the Lüder's Model does not explain 
'why' accrual accounting is deemed to be the reform concept. Jorge et al. (2011) also refer to 
'black boxes' in the model that need further explanation. These are discussed through the lens 
of Organisation theory, on which Lüder's Model is based.  
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2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
According to Fielding (2005), it is important to be aware of what has happened in the past in 
order to be in a position to understand the present. The historical background surfaces three 
issues that affect the current situation of government accounting in Malta and the trend of the 
reforms that are taking place, namely: the system of paternal government that the country got 
used to after centuries of different foreign rulers; British Colonial influence; and the aftermath 
of the attempts to implement NPM ideology during the last thirty years. 
 
2.1 Paternal government 
 
In Political Science, paternal government is defined as: 
the assumption by the governing power of a quasi-fatherly relation to the people, 
involving strict and intimate supervision of their business and social concerns, upon 
the theory that they are incapable of managing their own affairs. (Farlex, nd) 
 
The Island's strategic position in the Mediterranean may have attracted various powers over 
the years, either to settle on the island or to use it for their bigger plans. Lacking in natural 
resources, the country's economy became dependent on the activities of the foreign rulers. 
The country was aptly referred to as a 'fortress' and was used as such by all the different 
rulers. The economy of the country and the well-being of its people flourished in times of war 
and suffered in the interludes. British rule endured turbulent times, and it was only during 
times of peace that the local leaders spoke in favour of independence. 
 
The dependence on foreign government for financing and problem-solving may have fostered 
an excessively submissive attitude in the Maltese and a sort of inferiority complex since 
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anything foreign is perceived as better than local produce. And the general tendency is to 
regard any person who suggests otherwise as radical and/or strange. Years of paternal 
government thinking that the people is not capable of managing its own affairs would rub off. 
When the last vestiges of the British military forces were removed from the Island in 1979, 
half the population 'mourned' the end of days. 
 
The tendency to look at the government as 'the father and provider' persisted even with self-
government and independence. This is manifested by the central role that the government 
played during the development period between 1959 and 1989. Pirotta (1996) claims that 
historical paternalism reached its peak during this period. Due to the paternalistic system of 
government in the 1980s, even the NAO drew attention to the need to curb employment levels 
in the public sector and to ensure efficient utilisation of manpower. 
 
As an EU member state, with the strict requirements of the Maastricht criteria, and the current 
blurry prospects of the economy in general, political leaders appear to find it difficult to 
balance the requirement to curb public expenditure and the appetite of the citizens for 
paternalistic favours, especially during periods preceding general elections.  
 
A paternal government may also find some difficulty to implement and maintain NPM 
ideology. This is referred to in section 2.3. 
 
The sense of insecurity that may have been fostered by years of paternal government could be 
the underlying reason why the Maltese Government regards credibility of the country as of 
utmost importance. The need to establish ' … the standing of a country on the international 
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stage' (Godfrey et al., 1996:199) has been identified as the underlying reason why the Maltese 
Government embraces the full adoption of IPSAS. The findings regarding the IPSAS decision 
is further discussed in section 4. 
 
2.2 British Colonial influence 
 
British influence is imprinted all over the Island's way of life, but perhaps the wisest 
inheritance from Colonial times is the language. The English language is Malta's official 
language, together with Maltese, the native tongue. The English language was a necessary 
tool to communicate with the British officials during the occupation, and then was perceived 
by Maltese leaders as a useful means of communication with other nationalities. Given that 
Maltese is a language only spoken by around half a million people, the English language 
established its importance. 
 
The English language provided the tool for the Maltese to venture outside the Island's shores 
and to import systems from abroad. The Education system in Malta is based on the British 
system. Accounting is taught, practiced and written, in English - even government accounting.  
 
While the legal structure of Malta is based on the civil law pattern of Continental Europe, 
administrative and fiscal legislation is based on British laws. The centralised administration 
established by the Knights was adopted by the British who designed its departmental structure 
and set up the civil service as a salaried work force. The NAO boasts of its Anglo-Saxon 
origin. 
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Accounting systems in Malta can be classified as Anglo-Saxon. The accounting system in the 
private sector is principles-based and accountability-driven. IFRS are also used by local 
councils and other public sector entities that have their own accrual-based accounting 
systems, while the accounting system of the central government is based on UK’s old cash 
basis of pre-2000. The reason is basically because the underlying Financial legislation has 
been inherited from the British. The existing laws were designed on British Colonial 
Regulations with emphasis on budget preparation, budgetary accounting and control. 
 
The findings reveal that in spite of having been re-enacted three times, the Financial 
Legislation for government accounting did not change much over the years. The Colonial 
Regulations remained in force up to 1966, and then even the Financial Regulations 
promulgated in 1966 were based on the Colonial Regulations. The Colonial Regulations were 
used as a guide even though not applicable to colonies with a responsible government.  
 
The major change to the Financial Legislation of the 1960s occurred in 1997, when the 
independence of the office of the Auditor General was constitutionally recognised. Otherwise, 
there appears to be an overall reluctance to change the inherited financial legislation, in spite 
of various deficiencies that have been identified, for example, the annuality principle in the 
budget95 and the provision for supplementary estimates96. The existing legislation does not 
define the reporting entity, which may prove confusing should the accounting reforms at 
central level proceed as planned. 
 
                                                 
95
 Articles 22 and 27(4), Financial Administration and Audit Act, 1962. 
96
 Article 24, Financial Administration and Audit Act, 1962. 
 
262 
 
Nobes (1998) recognises that strong external cultural influences can affect some countries 
because of their small size, underdeveloped state or former colonial status. The accounting 
systems used by such culturally-dominated countries are likely to be based on that of the 
influential country. British products and systems are highly regarded by the Maltese. Due to 
British influence, the Maltese still tend to look up to Britain as a model. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the first computerised government accounting system used a British 
application. This software is also very popular in the private sector, but it needed to be 
amended beyond recognition in order to be suitable for the government's cash-based budget-
oriented accounting system. It is surprising, however, that the Maltese Government did not 
decide to emulate British government accounting and move to accrual accounting earlier. But 
perhaps other factors started influencing the Maltese outlook, for example, EU membership. 
 
2.3 NPM ideology 
 
According to Pirotta and Warrington (2001), the centralised administration devised by the 
Knights and the British to govern their fortress provided a ready foundation for the ambitions 
of Malta's sovereign governments. Central control was retained while government operations 
became more heterogeneous and complex. Different forms of government entities cropped up 
during the development decades as an attempt towards better administration through 
decentralisation, but these were not founded on consistent arrangements and thus provided 
more confusion. 
 
As a result, the PSRC carried out a study in 1989 and it put forward its ideas to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness of the public service, including decentralisation and delegation of 
263 
 
power (PSRC, 1989). Through its suggestions, the Commission appears to have been 
promoting NPM ideology. But the findings suggest that some of the reforms appear to have 
been done half-heartedly and may not have been implemented as planned. For example, the 
underlying financial legislation was not amended to enforce more responsibility, 
accountability and monitoring. And employment practices reeking of patronage appear 
rampant still, perhaps partly due to the paternal system of government.  
 
Operating under a tight EU financial regime, the PS felt the need to rein back control to a 
central level, at the cost of being called a 'small dictator'. Some literature97 describes such a 
policy of strengthening co-ordination through more centralised or collaborative capacity, as 
post-NPM, implying that NPM ideology may have failed. But according to Lodge and Gill 
(2011), the defect is not in the NPM ideology but in incorrect or incomplete application of it, 
as these findings appear to uphold. 
 
3 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING REFORM PROCESS IN MALTA 
 
Lüder's FMR Model (2002) presented and discussed in the literature review, is a framework 
that explains the relationship between contextual, behavioural and instrumental variables and 
the conduciveness to innovations in a country's governmental accounting system, in order for 
this to become more informative. The reasons why this model has been chosen have already 
been described in the literature review in Chapter 3. The main purposes of this section are: to 
describe which contextual, behavioural and instrumental variables have affected the Maltese 
                                                 
97
 For example, Christensen and Lægreid, 2008. 
 governmental accounting reform; to explain how they have i
and to predict how and which of these variables will affect the future course of the reform.
 
As described in section 2, the governmental accounting system in Malta i
tradition. Due to the paternal system of government, 'citizen
government appears to be high, but 'openness' is a more recent concept that needs to be 
developed. In the meantime, the restructuring of the exte
does not appear to be the top priority for Maltese government authorities.
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Characteristics that create an unfavourable environment for the development of a 
governmental accounting system, as identified by Lüder (1992:124) (refer to figure 15), are 
all present in the Maltese context. 
 
The findings indicate that the long-winding reforms at the central government level of Malta 
may only be illusory because once the statistical reporting requirements for Eurostat were 
satisfied, the accounting reforms actually died, and the original raison d'être was lost. While 
the original stimulus was managerial-driven, the changes in the actors that occurred over time, 
together with the financial stress that naturally accompanies EU membership, appear to have 
blurred the reform concept. Contrary to expectations, the evidence indicates that the small size 
of the country may have actually acted as a negative factor on the government accounting 
reform process. The findings indicate that the reform process can be divided into two phases, 
namely pre- and post-2004. While the environment in the first phase may appear to have been 
conducive for accounting reforms, the second phase perhaps is not so conducive.  
 
Some of the discussion arising in this section have been elicited by Jones and Caruana 
(2013b). 
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3.1 Contextual Variables 
 
3.1.1 Stimuli 
 
After 164 years as a British colony, Malta gained its independence in 1964. The Maltese 
government was accustomed to the accounting system used by its rulers, and simply adopted 
it, together with the underlying financial legislation. Except for some political issues, overall 
it was a peaceful transition, in the wake of a fast rate of development. The government 
became involved in all aspects of the economy; the public sector grew and its investment 
stimulated economic growth. The standard of living increased dramatically and the citizens 
enjoyed a wide range of social benefits. There was no financial or economic crisis, but a 
political crisis arose due to a malfunction of a constitutional requirement98. This led to a 
change in administration in 1987, and the new administration advocated a modern 
government with the ultimate aim of the country becoming an EU member state. 
 
The requirement of Public Sector Reform has been identified by the literature as a possible 
stimulus for government accounting reform. Government accounting reforms in Malta appear 
to have been instigated as part of an overall reform of public services undertaken in the early 
1990s. The financial aspect of the modernisation included the computerisation of the central 
government's accounting system which started in 1992 and was completed by 2000. While 
enhancing financial internal controls, the accounting system remained cash-based with 
emphasis on budgeting and budgetary control. 
 
                                                 
98
 Refer to Chapter 4 (section 2.2) 
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In the meantime, NPM ideology appears to have triggered various changes in the public 
sector, including privatisation and decentralisation. Various forms of government entities 
cropped up as a result of delegation of powers and responsibilities. The underlying aim was to 
improve public sector economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and private management models 
and practices were adopted. The traditional cash-based governmental accounting system 
proved rather problematic, and these entities were encouraged to use an accounting model that 
was similar to that used in the business sector. 
 
Then in 1999, the official decision was taken by the Minister of Finance that the accounting 
system of the central government will be changed to an accrual accounting system. The 
findings indicate that the original intention was to improve the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of the government at central level. It was thought that this could be achieved 
through the business accounting model, and thus the dominating doctrine of superiority of 
business accounting was acting as a stimulus. The proposed reforms were managerial-driven, 
and the ultimate aim was that accounting will be used as a management tool across the board. 
 
Perhaps due to defects in the institutional arrangements that will be described shortly, the 
accounting reforms took longer than expected. But it could also be that there was no stimulus 
at all, and changing to accrual accounting "was just a good idea at the back of everyone's 
mind" (IAID, Interview 21) because nothing transpired. 
 
In 2004, a new Minister of Finance was confronted with the challenges of EU membership. 
The government started facing financial pressures in order to meet and maintain the 
Maastricht criteria tied to EU membership and the decision to adopt the euro by 2008. These 
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financial pressures took precedence. But since EU regulations and standards do not require a 
member state to have an accrual accounting system, and only require a form of accrual 
reporting, the Maltese government endeavoured to adhere to these requirements. Once these 
requirements were being met, the wind that was blowing in the sails of the accrual accounting 
reform at central government level stopped. 
 
Therefore, financial pressures acted as a deterrent in the case of Malta, rather than a stimulus. 
And it appears that it still is. The accrual accounting reform has not been abandoned because 
the apparent motions are still there: the committees and the preparatory work by the Treasury 
are ongoing. But the process appears to have stalled, while the administration is now waiting 
for the EU to prescribe what needs to be done. As will be explained in section 4, this may 
prove to be a very convenient position, especially for the politicians. 
 
Perhaps the most 'tangible' stimulus now is the fact that the current computerised accounting 
system used by the government is outdated, and if steps are not taken to replace it, the system 
could suffer due to lack of technological support. The government could thus see it as 
opportune to change to an accrual accounting system, given that the expense of acquiring a 
new accounting system still needs to be incurred. The requirement to replace the IT system 
is another stimulus identified by Lüder and Jones (2003). 
 
It appears, therefore, that the accounting reform process can be divided into two phases, 
namely, 1999 to 2004 (before EU accession); and 2004 to date (after EU accession). 
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It can be argued that the prospect of EU accession was present from the start because the 
government was striving for EU membership since 1987. Two things happened in 2004: EU 
membership and a new Finance Minister. EU membership is now part of the institutional 
arrangement (a contextual variable), while the new Finance Minister represents a change in a 
behavioural variable - a change in the political reform promoter. It appears that a change in 
the combination of these two variables has reduced the conduciveness of the environment 
towards accounting reform. It also appears to have affected and changed the reform concept 
itself. 
 
3.1.2 Institutional arrangements 
 
The legal system may affect the flexibility of the governmental accounting system. Less 
flexible legal systems tend to be less conducive to reforms, or at least tend to slow down the 
reform process. 
 
The legal structure in Malta is Continental European (civil law), and the fiscal legislation of 
the central government has been inherited from colonial times. The legislation and the 
supporting regulations are very important in guiding administrative actions.  
 
There is no Government external body that issues guidelines on government accounting in 
Malta. All the financial rules and laws are issued by Parliament, the MFEI, and the Treasury. 
And they are all mandatory, even if they are called 'guidelines and instructions'. The financial 
regulations require all accounting officers to abide by circulars and notices issued by the 
MFEI or the Treasury. 
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The FAA Act and the GFR lay down strict rules and procedures that are required to be 
followed by all government officials. The legislation refers to cash-based accounting, with 
emphasis on budgeting and budgetary control. It specifies the content of the annual Financial 
Report prepared by the AG, and the format of the annual Budget (known as 'Financial 
Estimates') that is presented for approval to the Parliament by the Minister of Finance. The 
regulations also specify the procedure required for the preparation of the Financial Estimates. 
 
Nevertheless, the legal system cannot be considered as unfavourable to changes in the 
accounting system because the FAA Act itself allows the issuance of further instructions and 
new rules in the form of circulars and notices by the Ministry and the Treasury. In fact, the 
compilation of accrual data by the departments, and its collection by the Treasury, are not 
procedures which are laid down in the legislation, but are simply the result of a number of 
Treasury circulars. The majority of these circulars were issued at the beginning of the 
accounting reforms, but then trickled to nothing after 2004, as the terms of reference of the 
Accrual Accounting Task Force that was preparing these circulars became doubtful. 
 
The powers and flexibility of the Minister of Finance were enhanced by the 2004 amendment 
to the FAA Act. With this amendment, the Minister can determine government accounting 
standards and give them legal backing by means of a simple legal notice, thus bypassing 
Cabinet approval. The other possibility that was suggested by the AG is to issue a directive 
through the OPM, as this has the power of the law, according to the Public Administration 
Act. 
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The existing financial legislation was enacted in 1962, on the doorstep of the country's 
independence. The administration, economy and legal status of the country has changed since 
then, and the financial legislation may not cater for the present circumstances. But there is no 
consensus as to whether the 1962 legislation should be scrapped and totally replaced, or 
slowly tinkered with so that amendments and changes are done gradually. A new Public 
Financial Management Act was drafted in 2002, but it was set aside when the administration 
changed in 2004. The PS claims that the new Act was not complete, and he would prefer to 
introduce gradual changes to the rules in order to avoid confusion. But perhaps the proposed 
Act had contained certain provisions that were not acceptable for certain stakeholders, for 
example, the carry forward of unused allocation of funds, and the requirement for each 
department to have its accounts audited by a private audit firm. 
 
The Maltese legal system tends to be favourable to governmental accounting reforms, but 
may cause delays in implementation if it is decided to replace the existing law. Also, since 
Malta became an EU member state in 2004, EU directives need to be transposed into law. As 
to accounting reforms, the Maltese Government is now waiting for instructions from the EU 
Commission in order to proceed, especially with regards to government accounting standards. 
The legal system may thus now effectively be a negative factor. 
 
Malta is a unitary state with a one-chamber parliament. There is an unbalanced division of 
power favouring the Executive because the government and parliamentary majority are 
closely identified with one party. A low degree of political competition between Parliament 
and the Executive branch makes the state structure conducive to government-induced 
reforms, because whatever laws the Executive proposes are very rarely contested by the 
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Parliament. But if the government does not propose such reforms, nothing is done, and the 
Parliament has no power to induce them. This is why Lüder (1992:124) states that lack of 
political competition creates an unfavourable environment for the development of the 
governmental accounting system. 
 
Perhaps the state structure is irrelevant in the case of Malta for the purpose of government 
accounting reforms, because there appears to be a general consensus from both political 
parties in supporting the introduction of an accrual accounting system at central government 
level.  
 
When discussing the influence of the size of a jurisdiction as an implementation barrier for 
innovations in the governmental accounting system, Lüder (1992:118) explains that: 
… as the size of the jurisdiction increases, technical and administrative problems of 
implementing a new accounting and financial reporting system multiply and cost of 
implementation rises. 
 
While it may be true that governmental accounting innovations might be easier and cheaper 
(and thus more likely) to implement in smaller countries, other problems arise that counteract 
this argument. For example, Local Councils in Malta were required to use an accrual-based 
financial reporting system soon after they were set up. All Local Councils adhere to this 
regulation with no apparent difficulty, even though the extent of the use of accrual-based 
financial reports for decision-making is doubtful as it appears that none of them actually 
prepare an accrual-based budget nor apply a cost accounting system. The size of the Local 
Councils is very small, and perhaps could be compared to the size of parishes on an 
international scale. 
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But when it comes to applying accounting reforms at central government level, which would 
be a more complicated process, the findings show that the small size of the country actually 
acts as a negative factor on the reform process. 
 
Due to limited resources, the administration cannot afford to have employees specialising on 
one issue, but these need to be involved in a variety of tasks. The advantage of administering 
a small country is that you can get the top people together around one table. But the same 
small cluster of people are required to take on the responsibility of many things. While a large 
country can afford to have more staff who are specialised.  
 
The actual level of human resources then acts as a constraint because it would need to be 
concentrated on issues that are top priority, with other processes being placed temporarily on 
a 'waiting list'. For example, the importance given to euro adoption is described in Chapter 5 
as a factor that may have negatively affected the accounting reform, because limited resources 
were being absorbed by this issue. 
 
The size of the jurisdiction is important when considering the administrative structure as a 
contextual variable. The administration at central level is divided into 12 ministries99, with 
each ministry being divided into a number of government departments. There are around 50 
government departments overall, but the actual number varies each year. Each ministry then 
has a number of independent government entities within its portfolio, but these entities have 
their own accounting system which is accrual-based100.  
                                                 
99
 The number of ministries increased to 15 under the new administration as from 9th March 2013. 
100
 These are the entities that evolved from the decentralisation process because it was perceived that a private 
management approach would overcome the inefficiencies of the government departments that were providing 
certain services.  
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The accounting reform under study concerns the ministries and the government departments. 
While there is an accounting function within some departments, there is definitely an 
accounting function within each ministry that is responsible for the accounting system of the 
ministry and its departments. These are known as DCS. Overall control of the accounting and 
budgetary systems is then centralised at the MFEI: with the Treasury responsible for 
accounting; and the Budget Office responsible for the budgetary system. The administrative 
structure of the central government is therefore highly centralised, even though there is 
potential for more delegation of responsibilities and authority at least at ministry level.   
 
While this centralised system may be desirable to ensure consistency and uniformity of 
accounting reform across all the departments and ministries, it concentrates a lot of 
responsibilities and pressures on small groups of people, namely, the AAWG within the 
Treasury and the Accrual Accounting Task Force (or whatever the committee may be called - 
it still consists of basically the same individuals). This may appear not conducive to 
accounting reforms. However, when some of the responsibilities of the Task Force were 
delegated to other directorates within the MFEI, for example, when the new legislation was 
given to the Director General Strategy and Operations, and the accounting standards to the 
Director Financial Policy, the work on these aspects of the accounting reform stopped. But 
this may have been the result of the change in a behavioural variable, namely the change in 
the political reform promoter. The political reform promoter affects the institutional 
arrangements. 
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It appears important that the institutional arrangements are not used to scatter the 
responsibilities of the committee that is ultimately responsible for the accounting reforms. In 
other words, all the aspects of the accounting reform should be the responsibility of one 
committee in order for the reforms to have the possibility of success. 
 
The institutional arrangements, in particular the administrative structure, appear to be creating 
a conflict within the MFEI itself. Especially with regards to the actual functions of the 
Treasury and its role, or expected role, in the accounting reform. It appears that more 
communication is required in this respect so that there is a clear definition of roles. 
Responsibilities of the actors involved in the accounting reform should be clearly defined and 
not assumed, otherwise it may result that nothing is actually done. 
 
Accrual accounting is not a salient topic in the public service, and "if the government can 
forget this topic and leave it cooking slowly, it will" (PAC2, Interview 6). Lack of accounting 
skills and lack of familiarity with certain accounting practices, in particular those closer to 
business accounting, is pervasive in the civil service. Many civil servants responsible for the 
accounting services, do not have a financial background. Besides a handful of accountants, 
the major educational background is economics, statistics, law, public administration or 
public finance. This serves well, given that their main responsibility concerns budget (legal) 
execution, but otherwise, the attitude towards the accounting reforms appears rather 
misinformed and, therefore, not fully appreciated.  
 
A civil servant can find him/herself working in the accounting function without having any 
accounting knowledge, let alone an accounting qualification. Besides a short course on how to 
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operate the DAS, no particular training in accounting is provided. All that one can expect is 
some "hand holding" by a colleague.  
 
All the DCS interviewed expressed their concern about lack of suitably qualified support 
staff. While working in the accounting function would involve more responsibilities, there is 
no financial compensation for this, which makes it difficult to attract appropriately qualified 
personnel. It appears that accounting positions within the public service are not adequately 
promoted by the government, which thus fails to attract suitable professionals as these would 
prefer to work in the private sector. Perhaps this is also partly a failure of the education 
system because accountancy courses are primarily oriented towards business accounting 
practices, focusing solely on private sector opportunities. There is also a deficit in the legal 
framework since there is no professional set up for public sector accountants, that is, there is 
no particular professional training or requirements for accountants to practice in the public 
sector. 
 
This situation appears to be changing only in recent years. The OPM had set up a Centre of 
Development and Research Training, which organises various courses for public service 
employees, including one on financial management. The MFEI had also requested the 
University of Malta to design a particular course on Public Accounting and Finance, which 
started being provided as from October 2010 to a selected group of public service employees 
working in the accounting function. On its part, as from October 2012, the University has also 
included an elective on Public Sector Accounting in its Masters in Accountancy which leads 
to eligibility for the warrant to practice as an accountant in Malta. The intention is to promote 
more awareness about accountancy practices and opportunities in the public sector. 
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The restructuring of the Treasury led to the set up of the Government Accounts Directorate in 
2006, and this division is headed by an accountant. As at March 2013, there are only two 
other accountants working in this division, but the Director is endeavouring to increase this 
number.  
 
In July 2012, training on IPSAS in particular was provided for a group of top officials in the 
civil service, including non-accountants. As pointed out by the partner of the consulting audit 
firm (Interview 14), in a large organisation like the government, accounting knowledge is 
required at all levels of the structure and not solely at the top. Perhaps if the trend that has 
started is maintained, this objective will be eventually achieved.  
 
The findings indicate that the features of the Maltese civil service, in particular as to 
accounting knowledge and exposure, the tendency is moving towards characteristics more 
favourable to governmental accounting innovations. While the ex-Chairman of the Task Force 
(Interview 8) described the resistance that he had encountered from civil service employees at 
various levels of administration, it now appears that there is a general expectancy and 
eagerness for accounting reforms from the ministries. And even the partner of the consulting 
audit firm (Interview 14) believes that the government is presently better equipped with 
suitably qualified personnel to implement accounting reforms. 
 
As to the culture variable, which incorporates social, political and administrative tendencies, 
Lüder (2002) expects a most favourable climate to include a combination of risk-taking, 
individualistic, openness and responsiveness to the general public's needs. This variable is 
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somewhat complicated and difficult to describe in the Maltese context, because although the 
country appears advanced in certain respects, it is still in the process of modernisation. 
 
The traditional paternal system of government, as described in section 2.1, has a large role to 
play in the culture variable. The democratic structure of the government demonstrates a 
tendency of a high level of responsiveness to the needs and demands of the general public, 
together with an increasing level of transparency in political and administrative processes. 
Parliamentary discussions are publicised in the media and meetings of the PAC are open to 
the general public. The government's website is extensive, providing access to information 
about the various ministries' activities and public services. The Auditor's report, the annual 
Financial Statements, the Financial Estimates and a pre-Budget publication, are all available 
on the MFEI's website. Pre-budget discussions are also held with the various stakeholder 
groups.  
 
On the other hand, there is a certain degree of risk-aversion considering, for example, that the 
same political party remained in government for 25 years101. Abrupt changes do not appear to 
be desirable, and the inclination is towards introducing gradual reforms. The findings show 
how the PS does not wish to change the financial legislation, but prefers to work on the 
mentality of the employees and slowly introduce new measures. The findings also highlight 
risk aversion in the cautiousness shown towards reforms in government accounting because of 
the uncertainty about their impact on financial reporting, especially on the results being 
reported to the EU. This aversion to risk may be one of the underlying reasons why 
government accounting reforms have been long-winded, multi-step and with no apparent 
                                                 
101
 The Nationalist Party held the government seat from 1987 to 2013, except for a short interlude in 1997 and 
1998, when the Labour Party was in government. The latter was elected in power in the last General Elections 
held on 9th March 2013. 
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actual target. The accounting reforms appear to have stalled now, with the government 
authorities waiting expectantly for directions from the EU. 
 
The characteristic of individualism vs collectivism is rather a generalisation because the 
administrative structure could either promote or hinder these traits. The small size of the 
island does promote individualistic competition, but participation on various committees and 
group work are also popular, and many prefer not to voice an opinion perhaps out of fear of 
labelling, which is very easily carried out in a small size population. 
 
When the government accounting reforms started, the two main actors were rather 
individualist, and the reforms were managerial-driven. The ex-Chairman of the Task Force 
(Interview 8) promotes individualism when stating that the demand for accounting 
information should come from bottom up and not vice versa. He also holds the opinion that 
the Treasury Officials should take a more firm and active role in the accounting reforms. 
When the actors in the accounting reforms changed, collectivism became more pronounced, 
with actions depending a lot more on committee decisions. There is a certain hesitation by 
individuals to take decisions. And the accounting reforms became more accountability-driven. 
 
The culture variable appears to depend on the type of actors involved in the process, that is, it 
overlaps on the behavioural variable. 
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3.2 Behavioural variables 
 
Lüder's FMR Model gives distinctive roles to reform drivers, political reform promoters and 
stakeholders (Lüder, 2002), but the findings show that these roles may overlap in practice, 
especially the roles of reform drivers and stakeholders. As described in chapter 2, sometimes 
it proved difficult to classify an actor in a specific role, for example, the NSO. 
 
3.2.1 Reform drivers 
 
The Accrual Accounting Task Force is the government committee specifically set up to 
design and implement the required accounting reforms at central government level in Malta. 
Basically, the same group of people constitute the three committees that evolved to deal with 
the legislation, the accounting standards and the system specifications. At first, the output of 
these committees appeared satisfactory to the political reform promoter, but when the latter 
changed, the influence of these government committees decreased dramatically: the proposed 
legislation was shelved; the IT system specifications were sent back to the drawing board; 
while the MGAS were overridden with the decision to adopt the IPSAS. The findings lead to 
suggest that this reform driver now only exists on paper: it has lost its effectiveness; and 
meetings are rarely held. 
 
The first chairman of the Task Force was a government financial officer, an accountant, a 
strong character who believed in the reforms and promoted them. It appears that he had a 
good relationship with the Minister of Finance at the time, and thus the reform driver and the 
political reform promoter held the same vision about the accounting reforms. As a result, the 
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reforms progressed. The chairman 'owned' the accounting reform, but he did not have the 
power to enforce it - this power was held by the Minister of Finance. 
 
When the Minister of Finance changed, this affected the influence of this reform driver, and it 
appears that the views of the reform driver and the new political reform promoter were not on 
the same wavelength. The tempo of the reforms suffered, as for a time, the terms of reference 
of the Task Force were being questioned. The allocation of funds for the reform, which were 
always a problem, dwindled further. 
 
Eventually, the chairman of the Task Force retired and his responsibilities were scattered on 
other government officials, resulting in loss of ownership of the project. The successor, that is 
the Director General Strategy and Operations, became responsible for the accounting reforms 
overall and for the development of the financial legislation. This government official is an 
accountant as well, but the accounting reform is not his sole responsibility. It is one task 
amongst many others, and since he has not received instructions to give priority to the project 
from his superior, it has been 'placed on the back burner' in the meantime.  
 
The responsibility for the accounting standards was given to another government official, 
namely, the Director Financial Policy. This Director is not an accountant. While he 
acknowledges the importance of this aspect of the accounting reforms, once again, it is just 
one task amongst many others that claim his immediate attention. This Director is a member 
of the committee responsible for the accounting standards, that is the IPSAS Committee, but 
this committee is being chaired by the PS of the MFEI, who has the power to enforce the 
reforms, and thus is the new political reform promoter. 
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These two new reform drivers are not exercising any influence on the political reform 
promoter, but are awaiting instructions from him in order to act. They do not demonstrate 
individualistic characteristics like their predecessor. 
 
The ex-Chairman of the Task Force (Interview 8) stated that one way to hold back the 
accounting reforms is to place the project in the hands of officials who are not really 
interested in the accounting reforms. The way that the accounting reform has slowed down to 
a near standstill perhaps affirms this view. The possibility that these changes were intentional 
in order to have this braking effect, cannot be excluded. 
 
Professional interest in public sector accounting appears to be weak in Malta. This is typical 
of countries in Continental Europe as identified by Lüder's (1992:114) comparative study. It 
appears from the findings that there is relatively little business potential for accounting firms 
in public sector audit engagements. When the accounting reform started, however, the Task 
Force had appointed private audit firms to carry out studies on certain aspects of the 
accounting reform. These studies are referred to, but the influence appears to stop there. A 
professional association particular for accountants in the public sector does not exist. The 
MIA, which is the Maltese professional body for Accountants, is more concerned with the 
private sector.  
 
When the government accounting reforms started, there was some enthusiasm even at the 
MIA, which set up a public sector committee with the involvement of an accountant in 
government employment. But the interest eventually waned mainly due to the passage of time 
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and lack of initiative and interest from the government side. The professional body does not 
attempt to make governmental accounting reform a political issue or to somehow try to 
influence political decision-makers. 
 
There are no accounting standard setting bodies in Malta. The private sector has been 
adhering to IFRS since 1995102. When the government accounting reforms started, the Task 
Force, with the assistance of a private audit firm, designed a set of MGAS, but these standards 
were never effectively used, and have now been replaced with the IPSAS. The PS (Interview 
9) considers the IASB (and the similar IFAC and IPSASB) as more suitable to issue 
accounting standards since it is an internationally recognised body. While government 
officials do not take a direct interest in the pronouncements made by international bodies, 
such as IFAC and IPSASB, regarding public sector accounting reforms, these international 
standard setting bodies have still managed to influence the Maltese Government but only 
through the auspices of the EU. 
 
Through their advice, talks and publications, the IFAC and the IPSASB have managed to 
make governmental accounting reform a political issue and have succeeded in influencing 
political decision-makers at EU level. The IFAC and the IPSASB can, therefore, be 
considered as reform drivers at EU level. It is then the EU, and Malta's membership in the 
EU, that acts as a reform driver for governmental accounting reform in Malta. 
 
                                                 
102
 The Companies Act of 1995 made this a legal requirement. The GAPSE were designed for small and micro 
businesses in Malta, and these are based on IFRS.  Prior to 1995, the IASB's international accounting standards 
and the UK's Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) were considered as best practice by the 
Accountancy profession in Malta.  
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Malta's EU membership status also requires due attention to be paid to the statistical reports 
that are submitted to the EU, which reports are the product of national accounting. These 
reports are so highly regarded and given utmost importance, that the standards on which they 
are based, namely the ESA95, are highly influential on the development of the governmental 
accounting reforms and are even affecting the reform concept itself. One can conclude that 
national accounting and the ESA95 are reform drivers that are proving to be very influential 
on the political decision-makers. This concurs with Heald and Georgiou (2011) who describe 
national accounting as an epistemic community. This issue is discussed further in sections 4 
and 5. 
 
This argument leads to assessing the NSO as a reform driver due to the role that this office 
plays in the accounting reforms. The advice of this office is sought for all financial decision-
making, and it is involved in the accrual accounting reform to guide the political decision-
makers as to the impact of any changes on national accounting and statistical reporting. The 
NSO is also a stakeholder because the government accounting reform will affect its work 
procedure. But it is also a reform driver due to the prominence it is given in decision-making. 
For example, comparing the NSO with the NAO, one can note a significant difference in the 
level of influence that these two offices can exert. In fact, the NAO cannot be considered as a 
reform driver in the Maltese governmental accounting reforms, and is only influential on 
matters that concern the office itself, for example, changes in the legislation concerning audit 
procedures. A similar conclusion can be drawn about the PAC. While the PAC can enquire 
about the accounting reform and encourage implementation, it has no actual power to enforce 
action. 
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Besides National Accounting, epistemic communities relevant to this study do not appear to 
exist in Malta. There may be scholarly networks or professional associations who share 
common views on the main features of the reform, but they are not effective, and they do not 
try to influence the governmental accounting reform process. 
 
The analysis of the findings leads to the conclusion that, with the exception of the EU, overall 
the reform drivers either have no effect on the political reform promoters or may actually 
promote change but not in the originally intended direction. While the EU is a powerful 
reform driver, its views on the main features of government accounting reform are still under 
discussion, and thus its effect on the reform concept is still unknown. Having said this, 
however, it can be assumed that the EU would promote innovations. 
 
3.2.2 Political reform promoters 
 
Except for a short intermittent period when the Prime Minister himself was responsible for 
finance, ever since the accounting reforms at central government were launched, the 
Ministers of Finance were accountants by profession. This did not make any difference on 
the outcome, that is, the accounting reforms were not successfully implemented. 
 
As members of the Executive, both held the power to begin and complete the reforms. The 
findings reveal that the two ministers perhaps did not share the same vision about the 
accounting reforms. 
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The Minister of Finance who initiated the reforms in 1999 believed in the importance of 
implementing accrual accounting at central government level, and upheld its importance as a 
management tool. His enthusiasm for the project infected the other actors and wholly 
supported the main reform driver, being the first Chairman of the Task Force. The Minister of 
Finance and the main reform driver shared the same views about the accounting reform and 
they are both described as 'champions'  for the accounting reform. As at 2004, all the 
groundwork was ready to begin implementation, but then the Minister resigned from office 
due to internal political matters103.  
 
When the Minister of Finance changed in 2004, the thrust of the accounting reforms slowly 
waned. Various factors could have contributed towards this as suggested by the other actors in 
the reform. For example, the new Minister could have found himself overcome by a series of 
events including the demanding requirements of EU membership and euro adoption. Due to 
efforts in controlling debt and deficit to be in line with the Maastricht criteria, it was never 
opportune to expend funds on perhaps not so necessary back-end procedures like the 
implementation of a new accounting system. It could also have been a matter of different 
personal characteristics in that the new Minister, as an auditor, was perhaps disillusioned 
about the utility of accrual accounting at governmental level. One participant referred to the 
possibility of political jealousy, in that a new minister in office would wish to start with a new 
slate and thus dismantle the work done by his predecessor. Perhaps the new Minister of 
Finance was affected by a combination of all these factors. 
 
                                                 
103
 The Minister of Finance had contested for party leadership in 2004 but lost. This created some internal 
political friction within the party, and the Prime Minister took over the Ministry of Finance, appointing another 
accountant as Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry. Subsequently, the Parliamentary Secretary became the 
new Minister of Finance. 
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The PS of the MFEI is the chief financial adviser of the Government. The position of PS is 
not political, but it is the highest grade in the civil service (after that of Principal PS), and the 
person filling this post is personally chosen by the Minister on the basis of mutual trust. The 
PS would thus reflect the policy of the Minister, and vice versa, that is the Minister acts on the 
advice of his/her PS. The new PS chosen by the new Minister of Finance assumed full and 
direct responsibility for the accounting reform project. His power is such that he can be 
considered as a political reform promoter, because all the other actors in the reform follow his 
decisions and directions. 
 
Although the PS is very supportive of training, in particular in the accountancy field, the 
reform project is not his sole or main item on the agenda. Therefore, he cannot be described as 
a 'champion'. Perhaps this is why the project is now described as 'an orphan' (GT, Interview 
14). While the PS is professional in the execution of his responsibilities, his background is 
statistics and economics, and thus his view on the accounting reforms tends to emphasise the 
importance of national accounting rather than government accounting. And the resulting 
direct influence he exercises on the reform concept is in that direction. He has managed to 
change the process of implementation to suit his views on the reform concept.  
 
National Accounting and the NSO are thus the main reform drivers now affecting the political 
reform promoter. While the behaviour of the political reform promoter is directly influencing 
the reform concept, the implementation strategy, the institutional arrangements, the 
stakeholders, including parliamentary members, and even the reform drivers, for example, the 
members of the Government committees in charge of the accounting reform and the PAC. 
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The members of parliament in Malta are not political reform promoters, because the 
parliament is not strong enough to enforce reforms against the resistance of the executive 
(Lüder, 2002). The members of the opposition support the accounting reforms but they have 
no power to enforce it. They could influence the stakeholders and even perhaps the reform 
drivers, but they are not powerful to enforce any changes because the majority in parliament 
is the same as the executive branch. The actual level of support can only be tested should 
there be a change in government104.  
 
The analysis of the findings thus may lead to the conclusion that governmental accounting 
reform in Malta enjoys a lot of lip service but political will and support is lacking, as the 
process appears to be only apparent and half-hearted. 
 
3.2.3 Stakeholders 
 
Stakeholders are institutions or positions that are affected by the reform, either in a positive or 
a negative way. 
 
Due to its involvement in the decision-making process including the annual budget 
preparation, the NSO has been included with the reform drivers, but it is as well a stakeholder 
since it does have an interest in a more informative accounting system that is more in line 
with the accrual system used in the National Accounts. Since the government uses a cash-
based system for its accounting, the NSO is responsible for converting this data in accordance 
with the requirements of the ESA95.  At present, the NSO places a lot of reliance on the work 
                                                 
104
 This hypothesis can be tested now by a future study, since the General Election held on 9th March 2013 
resulted in a change in government.  
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of the Treasury in collecting accrual data from the government departments. As already 
described, the overall influence of the NSO may not be in line with the original reform 
concept and may have contributed to the redefining of the reform objectives, with more 
emphasis on the requirements of the ESA95.  
 
On the other hand, the NAO and the PAC are stakeholders who are not so influential on the 
political reform promoters. Their views appear to be more in line with accounting reforms that 
are managerial-driven rather than accountability-driven. The same applies for the IAID, even 
though the latter appears to be more informed about how the reform concept has changed and 
appears willing to be flexible and open to any kind of change that results in an improvement 
in the accounting system. 
 
The Maltese members of parliament are the representatives of the general public. 
Parliamentary members are stakeholders who, as already described, give the appearance of 
upholding an accounting system that would improve transparency and accountability but 
perhaps are not so well-informed of what changes are required in order to achieve this. The 
majority of parliamentary members do not have a financial background and includes mostly 
medical doctors and lawyers. Subsequently, they are easily persuaded by the opinions of the 
political reform promoters. One result of this is that the PS of the MFEI has convinced the 
majority of parliamentary members that an accrual accounting system is in use because 
reporting to the EU is on an accrual basis. 
 
The general public as such does not appear to care for the accounting system used by the 
government. The main concern is the impact of the budget measures on the standard of living. 
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As already explained in the section about culture in institutional arrangements, there is no 
education being provided about public sector accounting that could perhaps trigger a 
particular interest by this stakeholder group. Perhaps the recent changes could initiate some 
form of interest in the future, but it is still too early to consider at this stage. 
 
The Treasury is a very important stakeholder that has persisted in its work in the accounting 
reforms. Due to its reluctance to initiate reforms itself, however, it cannot be described as a 
reform driver. Even its potential influence as a stakeholder is dampened due to the position 
that it is taking with regards to decision-making, and in its persistence to regard itself as 'the 
executive arm' of the MFEI rather than the decision taker. 
 
The line departments appear to be supporting the accrual basis because they are expecting 
that this will mean the end of the annuality principle, which would enable them to better plan 
and manage the resources that they are allocated and reduce the reliance that they feel they 
have at present on "the mercy of the MFEI" (DCS4, Interview 17). They appear to expect that 
they will have more autonomy with an accrual accounting system. Have they been given this 
impression in order to increase their support and co-operation to the reform? Or was this truly 
the original intention, which has now changed with the political reform promoters? It appears 
that the line departments are misinformed about what the implementation of accrual 
accounting would mean for them. Is this being done purposely to maintain their support and 
reduce resistance to change? 
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Perhaps the line departments would be satisfied with a new IT system, which is more user 
friendly, together with some freehand to carry forward unused funds. This appears to be their 
actual expectation as to how an accrual accounting system would affect them positively.  
 
The analysis may therefore lead to the conclusion that the stakeholders are not offering any 
kind of resistance as the political reform promoter, namely the PS, has led the key 
stakeholders to at least a neutral position. According to Lüder (2002), such a situation should 
have a positive impact on the reform process, but in the case of Malta, the result is that the 
reform is proceeding in the direction chosen by the PS according to the 'revised' reform 
concept (as described in the following section). 
 
3.3 Instrumental variables 
 
3.3.1 Reform concept 
 
The reform concept is the target that is being planned: innovations that allow the 
governmental accounting system to provide information useful for ensuring financial 
accountability and sound financial management. The literature suggests that it is a normative 
assumption that accrual accounting is superior to cash accounting. Comments like: "Public 
sector accounting is tragically cash-driven" (MIA, Interview 1); "Reporting using accrual 
basis would be as it should" (DCS5, Interview 20),  appear to confirm this assumption. 
 
The actors involved in the reform process hold various opinions about the requirements of the 
public sector, in particular the type of government accounting system. These varied opinions 
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create an aura of uncertainty, detracting from the effectiveness of the requirements of the 
public sector reform as a stimulus. The behavioural variable is very important in this respect, 
because this uncertainty appears to also be affecting the development of the reform concept 
itself, according to the beliefs of the particular actors. 
 
The cash-based system is criticised because it does not produce a comprehensive picture of 
the government's activities. On the other hand, the cash-based system is simple, 
understandable and does provide a "good form of control" (GT, Interview 14) and curbs over-
spending. These arguments appear to support the view that cash-based accounting and 
reporting are still important for government, albeit not enough, and it would be ideal if the 
cash-based accounting system is complemented with some other form of accounting that 
would measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the government's operations.  
 
The cash-based accounting system is also criticised because reports can be easily window 
dressed to suit political objectives, allowing "more leeway for certain creative accounting" 
(NAO1, Interview 15). But is this not true for any type of accounting system? From the 
experiences in the private sector, can the accountancy profession vouch that an accrual 
accounting system, producing reports according to IFRS, cannot be played around with to 
cater for the reporting entity's requirements? What about the level of subjectivity and the 
element of judgement required in IFRS accrual accounting reports? Anthony (1985:168) 
claims that "all accounting reports are approximations". However, Anthony (1985) overlooks 
the possibility that even the private sector may not have the intention "to arrive at the best 
approximation possible", but rather "to come to a predetermined bottom line." Such 
manoeuvres are not particular to government accounting. 
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The risk of manoeuvres can only be reduced with fiscal discipline supported by a solid system 
of internal control, irrespective of the type of accounting system.  It is the system of 
governance that counts. Inefficiencies need to be dealt with at micro level, improving the 
quality of the input, so that benefits flow upwards, resulting in an accounting system that can 
be used as a management tool and support decision-making. 
 
Will an accrual accounting system induce better discipline in the departments? Some of the 
stakeholders believe that it will, or rather expect it from an accrual accounting system, 
because on the other hand they do recognise that "a good foundation" is required in order to 
get a meaningful and useful result. The more technical stakeholders go a step further and 
recognise that accrual accounting would facilitate a management accounting system that is 
essential for decision-making like output measurement and investment appraisal. 
 
When the accounting reforms at central level started, the idea was to implement a full accrual 
accounting system that will be used as a financial management tool, in addition to the cash-
based system. The findings described in Chapter 5 reveal that uncertainty surrounds the utility 
of accrual-based budget. And the PS (Interview 9), who is a political reform promoter, is 
rather sceptic about the innovativeness of the accounting reform. While the DGA (Interview 
2) confirmed that the actual output from the accounting reforms is a concept that is still work 
in progress.  
 
The reform concept is under the direct influence of the political reform promoter, that is the 
PS, acting on the advice and opinions of reform drivers. The main reform drivers in the case 
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of Malta appear to be the EU and National Accounting. The reform concept appears to have 
reacted to this feedback, and is now tantamount to providing more reliable data for national 
accounts and statistical reports. If this is now the reform concept, then one can argue that the 
reform concept has not only changed but is even being achieved, and, therefore, the 
government accounting reforms have been successfully completed and no further changes are 
required. 
 
3.3.2 Implementation strategy 
 
 
The main problem relating to staff qualifications has been identified and staff training is being 
provided. Until recently, the staff training provided cannot be described as systematic. 
 
The process has always been authoritarian and centrally guided, which should be more 
conducive to a successful reform. However, central guidance appears to be lacking at present: 
the intention is there, but the change in the administrative structure and the behavioural 
variable have reduced the actual quality of this guidance. 
 
A multi-step approach has been chosen, with the preparation of the trial accrual-based 
financial statements considered as the required pilot testing. But a new accounting system is 
required in order to initiate the implementation of the accounting reforms and this decision is 
still pending. So even though the planned implementation strategy appears to be adequate and 
ideal for a quick and successful implementation, the actual decision to proceed is still being 
withheld. 
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The reform concept has changed due to the extended length of the implementation period and 
the change in contextual and behavioural variables during this period of over 13 years. But 
perhaps it was never intended for innovations to be rapidly implemented. 
 
The set up for the accounting reform is all there, but it may be that this is all for appearances 
sake as the political will to change is missing. For Brunsson (1989), Christensen and Lægreid 
(1998) and Pollitt (2000), there are differences between ‘reform talk’, ‘reform decisions’, 
‘actual implementation of reforms’, and ‘results’ (Torres and Pina, 2004:450). 
 
3.4 Lüder's FMR Model for the Maltese central government 
 
The accounting reform of the Maltese central government has been a long winding process 
that is still unfinished business. The findings reveal that the process has experienced two 
phases. The reforms started out, in 1999, mainly managerial-driven, with the aim being a 
more efficient, effective and economic public management. The accounting reforms were part 
of a comprehensive administrative reform, and there was no apparent fiscal stress. Changes in 
the political reform promoters in 2004, resulted in the reforms becoming more accountability-
driven, with major emphasis on external reporting. Some fiscal stress may be apparent here 
due to EU accession. 
 
This change was not planned and did not happen intentionally, so the two periods cannot be 
described as particular phases of the accounting reform. The phased approach to the 
accounting reform was suggested by Bailey (1998) for transitional countries and was used by 
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Jorge (2005) and Haldma (2006). It does not appear to apply in this case, but as Haldma 
(2006) had concluded in the case of Estonian municipalities, the findings show that the 
materiality of various factors differ between the two periods resulting in different effects on 
the outcome of the accounting reform process. 
 
As summarised in Table 14, a positive environment that was conducive to innovations at 
central government in Malta was present during the period 1999 to 2004. The overall positive 
effects of the behavioural and instrumental variables, together with the stimuli, could 
overcome the negative impact of the institutional arrangements. The environment appears to 
have changed to a negative one in the period 2004 to 2013. The only positive stimulus is the 
need to change the outdated IT system used for financial management, but even this could be 
replaced with a new version of an identical system. The institutional arrangements remain 
negative. The negative impact of the reform drivers and the political reform promoters have 
neutralised the position of the stakeholders and the reform concept itself. The length and 
quality of the implementation strategy are also having a negative effect on conduciveness to 
innovations. The long-winding process can be inflicting 'reform fatigue' on the project. 
 
Since it appears that the political reform promoters and the reform drivers have taken the 
stance to await EU direction before proceeding with the accounting reforms, it is now 
essential for the EU to provide the appropriate stimulus in order for accounting innovations to 
proceed. While nothing can be done about the size of the jurisdiction, which has increased in 
its negative impact due to increased administrative burden, the political reform promoters 
have the power to affect the administrative structure, the civil service and even the culture, in 
order to make them more conducive.  
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Table 14: FMR Model in Malta - Interference of Environmental Conditions to Governmental Accounting 
Innovations  
 1999 - 2004 2004 - 2013 
Criteria Conduciveness to Innovation 
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES 
STIMULI: 
 Requirements of overall reform of whole Public Administration 
 Dominating doctrine of superiority of business accounting  
 Financial Pressures (from EU membership) 
 Economic crisis 
 New IT System requirement 
 
+ 
+ 
=/+ 
= 
=/+ 
 
= 
+/= 
+/- 
= 
+ 
 + = 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: 
 Legal system 
 State structure 
 Size of Jurisdiction 
 Administrative structure 
 Civil service 
 Culture 
 
-/+ 
= 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
-/+ 
 
+/- 
= 
- 
+/- 
-/+ 
+/- 
 
- - 
BEHAVIOURAL VARIABLES 
REFORM DRIVERS: 
 Government Commissions 
 Professional Associations 
 International Standard Setting Bodies 
 EU 
 National Accounting and statistical office 
 
-/+ 
+/= 
= 
-/+ 
= 
 
+/= 
= 
=/+ 
+/- 
+/- 
 + - 
POLITICAL REFORM PROMOTERS: 
 Members of Parliament 
 Members of Government 
 
= 
+ 
 
= 
+/- 
 + - 
STAKEHOLDERS: 
 Statistical Office 
 Audit Institutions 
 Parliament 
 General Public 
 Treasury 
 Line departments 
 
= 
+/= 
= 
= 
+ 
+/- 
 
+/- 
= 
= 
= 
+/= 
-/+ 
 
+ = 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
REFORM CONCEPT + +/= 
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY: 
 Training 
 Central guidance 
 Authoritarian 
 Multi-step 
 Implementation period 
 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
 
-/+ 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
- 
 + - 
OVERALL ASSESSMENT Favourable + Negative - 
KEY: + Favourable;  - Unfavourable; +/ - Sometimes unfavourable; -/+ Moving towards favourable; +/= Moving 
towards not important; =/+ Moving towards important; = Not important/no effect. 
 
(adapted from Jorge, 2003; and Haldma, 2006) 
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4 THE IPSAS DECISION 
 
According to Chan (2006), accounting software is mindless without accounting standards. 
The importance of appropriate government accounting standards to guide the accounting 
reforms at central level in Malta was recognised right from the start. One of the sub-
committees of the Accrual Accounting Task Force set up in 1999 was entrusted with this task. 
The MGAS Technical Advisory Committee, did not simply adopt the accounting standards 
available at the time but deemed it necessary to adapt them to suit the requirements of the 
Maltese Government.  
 
The purpose of this section is to analyse how this process evolved over time with the 
changing circumstances, which affected the contextual, behavioural and instrumental 
variables, leading to the decision taken in February 2011 to adopt IPSAS in full. The EU's 
consideration of IPSAS for its member states and what may be the possible outcome of this 
interest are also analysed. 
 
Some of the arguments arising in this section have been elicited by Jones and Caruana 
(2013a). 
 
4.1 Which accounting standards? 
 
Accounting reform at central government in Malta was initiated as part of wider reforms 
undertaken in public administration, in an effort to make the operations of the government 
more economic, efficient and effective. The underlying notion was to be more like the private 
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sector, with a management information system that provides timely, accurate and reliable 
information on the financial and economic position and performance of the government. 
Business accounting practices and the underlying accounting standards were referred to for 
guidance as their superiority is taken for granted. 
 
Accounting standards are required as a guide to achieve the desired output being a set of 
financial statements that provide a true and fair view of the financial performance and 
position of the government. Local Councils and government entities that applied accrual 
accounting from the outset were expected to comply with IFRS with no questions asked. 
Adherence with IFRS is taken for granted and no other alternatives are considered in spite of 
the difficulties in their application for public sector. This situation persisted even when 
eventually the MGAS were formulated. None of the Local Councils or government entities 
considered to change from IFRS. The application of IFRS may make sense for government 
entities with business-like operations, but may provide some difficulties in practice for Local 
Councils and entities that provide purely public services. The underlying reason for the choice 
of IFRS at this level may be the normative pressure exerted by the accountancy profession 
since Local Councils and government entities are audited by private audit firms. But the 
consulting audit firm is a private firm as well, and its advice to the contrary was not heeded. 
 
The situation is completely different for the central government. It was never considered 
appropriate to adopt IFRS at this level. Perhaps here, the difference between government 
operations and the private sector is more pronounced and many difficulties were foreseen in 
their application. An attempt was made to devise a set of accounting standards that were more 
specific to government accounting requirements and the MGAS were formulated. Reference 
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was made to IPSAS, but these were still being developed, and, in their absence on certain 
topics, IFRS were referred to. Perhaps this does not make much difference because IPSAS are 
based on IFRS, therefore, the emerging MGAS were still based on business accounting 
standards.  
 
The difference lay in the attempt to simplify the international standards and make them more 
applicable and understandable for the local scenario. In particular, the MGAS Committee was 
expected to eliminate the choices offered by certain standards in order to streamline the 
financial reporting of the government departments and the ministries. According to two 
research participants (GT, Interview 14; IAID, Interview 21), the Committee never got around 
to finalising this task, therefore, the MGAS project was never really accomplished. Some of 
the MGAS were used by the Treasury in the preparation of the trial accrual-based financial 
statements for central government, and work had started on translating the accounting 
concepts in the MGAS to more understandable communication to government departments 
and ministries in the form of circulars that clarify the required procedures. 
 
The application of MGAS may have proven to be a simpler solution, but the decision to 
abandon the project and adopt IPSAS in full was supported by a general consensus of the 
officials concerned and external bodies interviewed for this study. The decision to abandon 
the MGAS project was taken by the PS who effectively took over the Task Force in 2009. The 
decision for IPSAS adoption was, therefore, partly due to a change in the behavioural variable 
who was being subjected to a set of contextual and instrumental variables that were somewhat 
different from those experienced by his predecessor due to the time difference. 
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On the basis of their title, it is assumed that IPSAS are applicable for the public sector and 
should, therefore, provide a point of reference for government accounting. The fact that 
IPSAS are based on IFRS, that is, IPSAS are based on business accounting practice, is not 
only not seen as a problem but is considered as a good thing. The predominance of business 
accounting practice appears to be still present, therefore, in spite of officials saying that 
guidance is sought from sources specific for the public sector. 
 
No studies have been carried out on the suitability of IPSAS for Maltese government 
accounting. The decision is not backed by some well devised plan as to their 
implementation105. The decision is to adopt IPSAS in full and then any problems that may 
require, for example, a policy of exclusion, will be tackled as they crop up. The decision to 
adopt IPSAS cannot be described as an informed decision and was based on other factors that 
will be described shortly. The study on the suitability of IPSAS was carried out by the EU 
Commission during 2012, which concluded that the IPSAS were not all directly applicable for 
government accounting and they do not all effectively address public sector specific needs. 
Some of the IPSAS require substantial revisions due to conceptual problems 
(COM(2013)114). 
 
In a way then, the procrastination of the Maltese Government has proved advantageous since 
the EU Commission will now be carrying out the major work required on IPSAS to make 
them more suitable, and perhaps it will also eliminate the alternative accounting treatments 
available in these standards in order to promote harmonisation in practice (COM(2013)114). 
                                                 
105
 The decision was taken in February 2011. In 2013, the new administration commissioned the CIPFA to carry 
out a study in Malta, and an implementation plan was presented to the Ministry of Finance in October 2013. The 
Minister of Finance declared that the implementation of IPSAS will be a long-term project and he reiterated the 
importance of IPSAS for providing more reliable data for statistical reporting. 
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Hopefully, even the language used in the standards would be somewhat simplified to make 
them understandable by non-accountants. But the emerging EPSAS would still need to be 
adapted for the local context, meaning that the work that was done on the MGAS would need 
to be repeated in the future. 
 
4.2 Credibility 
 
Besides material resources and technical information, organisations also need social 
acceptability and credibility in order to survive (Scott et al, 2000:237). According to Lüder 
(2002), endeavours to improve international reputation may be a relevant stimulus for 
accounting reform, especially by developing countries. From the findings concerning what led 
the Maltese authorities to go for IPSAS, it appears that credibility and international reputation 
was the main factor, in spite of the country being classified as an advanced economy by the 
IMF. 
 
The literature refers to developing countries attempting to mould their accounting systems in 
order to meet donor requirements (Godfrey et al., 1995). Malta does not have loans with the 
IMF or the World Bank. But as an EU member state, it tries its best to balance the costs of EU 
membership with the EU funds that it may be eligible to. In this sense, then, it is 
understandable that the country would try its best to accommodate EU's reporting 
requirements in order to achieve its end. Hence its propensity to adopt IPSAS in full. 
 
All the EU member states are subject to financial stress in order to meet the EU's strict 
financial requirements. In the case of Malta, one cannot exclude the possibility that this 
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financial stress may be compounded by some sense of insecurity fostered over years of 
colonialism and paternal government. Thus making credibility a bigger issue. 
 
On the other hand, international reputation and credibility did not act as a stimulus for accrual 
accounting reform. While the Maltese Government gives the impression that it is all for 
IPSAS adoption, reluctance to actually implement accrual accounting is still apparent, even 
because of the fear of how this will affect the current system used to prepare EU reports, 
which to date has proven satisfactory to serve its purpose. The result is, therefore, a hybrid 
sort of cash and accrual accounting system: an illusory sort of financial reporting system 
because the output is not being used as a management tool across the board for better 
decision-making to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector. Perhaps it is 
being used to improve economy because the underlying aim is to satisfy EU financial targets 
and not to exceed the Maastricht criteria. For example, the balanced budget concept that is 
being considered for inclusion in the Constitution of Malta. 
 
According to the PS (Interview 9), Malta needs to be recognised by international 
organisations, and by respectable and developed countries 'and recognition is gained by using 
international standards'. The PS emphasised the importance of credibility, stating that 'the 
economic survival of the country is partly dependent on its credibility'. In the AG's view 
(Interview 13), transparency, accountability, comparability are all very nice reasons for 
adopting IPSAS, but the most important factor is being credible with international 
organisations. Even though the MGAS were based on IPSAS, they lacked the 'brand name' 
(NAO2, Interview 4). The MGAS are not recognisable and thus would not provide the 
required credibility. 
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The IPSAS are recognisable and credible because they are issued by international accounting 
standard setters who are considered as experts in the field of accountancy. There is an element 
of ambiguity here because while some sceptism as to the suitability of business accounting 
practices is expressed, the government officials are susceptible to normative pressures exerted 
by the accountancy profession. It is assumed that IPSAS are tried, tested and are correct 
because they are international standards issued by an international body, and "after all, they 
are based on IFRS" (AG, Interview 13).  
 
Mimetic isomorphism is also manifest in the IPSAS decision. Mimetic isomorphism emerges 
in an environment of uncertainty as a powerful force that encourages imitation. The generic 
lack of accounting knowledge in the public service, the lack of knowledge on IPSAS and the 
lack of planning as to their implementation, creates an environment of uncertainty and 
ambiguous goals. According to institutional theorists (March and Olsen, 1976; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983), such an environment leads organisations to model themselves on similar 
organisations whose practices are considered to be legitimate or successful. The majority of 
the research participants have the impression that IPSAS have already been adopted by many 
countries, or at least, they will soon be, due to the interest being shown in them by the EU 
Commission. 
 
4.3 The size of the jurisdiction, standards and decoupling 
 
The small size of the country has already been described in section 3.1.2 as an institutional 
variable that may be acting as an implementation barrier for accounting reforms at central 
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government level. In the Maltese context, due to limited resources of the administration, 
which are constantly being restrained in order not to exacerbate the financial situation, the 
actual number of government officials is limited and specialisation is barely possible. On the 
other hand, like any other member state, the country is required to adhere to the same level of 
regulation emanating from EU membership. The result is a handful of the same practitioners 
being responsible for the various features and implications of the accounting reform, 
including different sets of standards. 
 
Besides adhering to the requirements of national legislation for government accounting, the 
same group of people need to deal with: MGAS, as these are still referred to in the collation of 
accrual data for the compilation of trial accrual-based financial statements; IFRS, as these are 
used by local councils and government entities; and with standards relating to reporting to 
international bodies and to national accounting, in particular, the ESA95. The IPSAS decision 
has added another ingredient to the process. The majority of these practitioners are not even 
accountants by profession, and it is therefore not surprising how all these standards are 
observed as external pressures that do not remain distinguishable. The effort by these 
practitioners to find some short-cuts to try and satisfy all these demands is also 
understandable. Limited resources will be concentrated on satisfying the standards and the 
reporting that are considered as more important due to related or expected benefits, which in 
the Maltese case appears to be the ESA95. For example, on the question of consolidation, the 
limitation of the reporting entity to the boundary of the general government definition 
according to the ESA95, appears indisputable. But the end result may be rather confusing, for 
example, if the objective to implement IPSAS is perceived as a way how to better meet the 
ESA95 requirements for external national reporting, then the original objective of IPSAS to 
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enhance decision-making, transparency and accountability by producing information that can 
be used as a management tool across all levels of government may be lost. 
 
The institutional arrangements necessary to deal with IPSAS implementation do exist in the 
form of the MGAS Committee, or what is now being called the IPSAS Committee. But the 
same group of people are involved as in the main Task Force and in the other sub-committees 
that are supposedly dealing with changes in legislation and the IT specification requirements. 
Some of these officials are also involved in the GFSC that is responsible for national 
accounting and EU statistical reporting. Other officials that are involved in the accounting 
reform, including those particularly responsible for IPSAS adoption, have many other 
responsibilities that are prioritised. The result is that the institutional structure that exists is 
not functioning. Moreover, since EU reporting requirements in the form of statistical reports 
based on accrual data are being met, the impression is given that accrual accounting has been 
implemented, and that accrual reporting will now be enhanced with the implementation of 
IPSAS. 
 
Institutional theorists refer to this gap between formal structure and the work activities as 
decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, [1977] 1991). Decoupling refers to the situation in which an 
actual organizational practice is different from the formal organizational structure or practice, 
meaning that the adopted practice is not integrated into the organization's managerial and 
operational processes (Dillard et al, 2004:509). The advantage of decoupling is that possible 
inconsistencies and anomalies of technical activities are effectively hidden from public view 
and it is assumed that the formal structure is really working as set or predetermined. 
Decoupling may also happen when there are high symbolic gains from the adoption of the 
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practice but equally high costs associated with its full implementation (Scott, 2001:173), as in 
the case of IPSAS. Previous studies106 have found that public sector accounting systems 
implemented to satisfy government mandates are rarely used for internal decision-making and 
control, and the primary use of elaborate, mandated management accounting systems is to 
legitimise the organization's activities to external parties by creating the impression that the 
organisation is well-controlled and demonstrating that resources are being used rationally 
(Geiger and Ittner, 1996:550). 
 
4.4 Effect of the IPSAS decision on the accounting reform 
 
According to the NAO1 (Interview 15), the IPSAS decision will improve the quality of the 
accounting reform. Such opinion is based on statements issued by the accounting standard 
setter itself and are, therefore, the result of normative pressure exerted by the accountancy 
profession. The opinion is, therefore, a presumption as it is neither based on in-depth 
knowledge about IPSAS requirements nor on evidence from other countries. Institutional 
theorists would refer to such statements as being based on a 'myth' (Meyer & Rowan, [1977] 
1991). 
 
It is not expected that the IPSAS decision will make the rate of the accounting reform at 
central government level in Malta any faster. It is recognised that a lot of work is required in 
order to go through each IPSAS and to assess its suitability for the local context. But, as 
already explained in section 3.1.2, the institutional arrangements are lacking and as a result 
the IPSAS Committee is not functioning. In fact, work on IPSAS has been stalled as there 
                                                 
106
 For example, Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1991; Geiger & Ittner, 1996; Bogt ter & van Helden, 2000; Harun and 
Robinson, 2010. 
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appears to be a consensus amongst the higher officials that since such work is being 
undertaken by the EU Commission, then it would be best to await the EU's decisions and 
directions. This is very convenient because it is the way for the authorities to overcome their 
uncertainties and appear to be doing the right thing - by succumbing to coercive pressure, 
embarrassing questions in the future will be avoided (Meyer & Rowan, [1977] 1991). But it 
appears to be a way of further stalling the accounting reform. 
 
4.5 The EU involvement 
 
The PS (Interview 9) claimed that EU pressure had nothing to do with his decision to adopt 
IPSAS. While this may not be deniable, the fact that IPSAS were being heavily discussed at 
EU level is confirmed by the Treasury Officials (Interviews 13, 2). The decision of the PS 
was communicated to the government officials involved in the reform in February 2011, 
while the proposed directive of the EU Commission was issued in May 2011. The PS was, 
therefore, very aware of the importance being given to IPSAS at EU level. 
 
The emergence of IPSAS is described as the most significant development among the many 
government accounting changes that are happening (Sutcliffe, 2003; Jones & Pendlebury, 
2010). The adoption of IPSAS in local and central governments is completely voluntary 
because the IPSASB does not have the power to force any jurisdiction to endorse IPSAS 
(IFAC, 2010). It appears that IPSASB's normative pressure was not strong enough to 
convince governments to adopt IPSAS. Various governments are still reluctant to adopt 
accrual accounting, let alone IPSAS. While those countries that have adopted some form of 
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accrual accounting did not adopt IPSAS in full, but preferred to pick and choose from the 
accounting standards available: national accounting standards and GAAP; IFRS; and IPSAS. 
 
Chan (2003) suggests that IPSAS would be more enforceable if international organisations set 
an example by adopting IPSAS themselves, which the UN, NATO, OECD and the EU 
Commission, have done (Ball, 2011a). In this way, normative and cognitive-cultural pressures 
may have swayed governments to do the same. But such pressures did not prove to be strong 
enough. It should be pointed out that even the EU Commission itself did not fully adopt 
IPSAS (Grossi and Soverchia, 2011). 
 
Chan (2003) also suggests that international organisations should link IPSAS adoption to 
membership obligations. IPSAS adoption can be made a condition for receiving international 
grants and loans, or it can be called upon in international agreements specifying convergence 
criteria for fiscal policy (for example, in the Maastricht Treaty). Jones and Pendlebury 
(2000:153) found surprising the EU's absence in accounting policy-making at supranational 
level, especially in view of comparable data that would be required in a single market with a 
single currency. Increased interest in IPSAS by the EU was envisaged by Lüder and Jones 
(2003:5): 
The European Union has not so far shown any interest in harmonising governmental 
accounting in the member states but this may change under the influence of IPSAS 
in Europe. 
 
This interest materialised in November 2011:  
The Commission shall assess the suitability of the International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards for the Member States by 31 December 2012. (Council 
Directive 2011/85/EU) 
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The interest of the EU in IPSAS for its member states became evident, therefore, with the 
advent of the economic crisis as the Council Directive 2011/85/EU is part of the Six-Pack 
legislation put forward by the EU in order to strengthen the budgetary frameworks of the 
member states. Perhaps IPSASB's normative pressure was successful at this level and at that 
point in time as it had targeted the EU Commission during a vulnerable period: at a time when 
the EU Commission and Eurostat were trying to re-establish their own reputation and 
legitimacy on an international scale as it appears that they had not been successful in 
monitoring the state of the economies of the member states through the reporting that was 
being required. 
 
Perhaps the first step should have been for Eurostat to assess the format and content of the 
statistical reports that it was requiring from the member states and the adequacy of the ESA95 
as the standard on which the statistics are based. But instead of assessing the effectiveness of 
statistical reports in meeting their objectives, Eurostat deemed it necessary to go to the roots 
of these reports and investigate the possibility of an overhaul of the systems from which the 
underlying data for these reports are extracted. The implementation of accrual accounting 
systems by the governments of the member states is deemed the necessary first step, and with 
it the adoption of IPSAS. The proposed directive issued in May 2011 had suggested the 
adoption of IPSAS by member states within three years. The opposition and political lobbying 
that such a proposal instigated can be expected, resulting in the Commission to take a softer 
approach and first consider the suitability of IPSAS for adoption by the member states by 
carrying out a study. 
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The study was carried during 2012 as described in the findings. The study concluded that the 
IPSAS as they stand cannot be fully implemented as they are not totally suitable for public 
sector accounting requirements. But this was not the end of the story as the EU Commission 
persists on its mission, and it has presented a plan of action to consider and revise each IPSAS 
as necessary, resulting in the EPSAS. The EPSAS will be issued by a purposely set up 
institutional structure to provide them with the required legitimacy that will make them 
acceptable by the member states. This will circumvent one of the main objections by member 
states regarding the suitability of the governance structure and authority of the IPSASB to 
issue accounting standards for governments. 
 
If the report that the EU Commission has presented to the Council and the European 
Parliament on 6th March 2013 (COM(2013)114) is convincing, the recipients can then exert 
coercive pressure on members states and thus overcome the resistance shown so far by some 
governments to adopt accrual accounting for their public sectors. One may argue that the type 
of accounting practiced by governments should be at the discretion of each individual 
government, and that coercive pressures should not be the basis of legitimacy of government 
accounting practices. Such measures appear invasive in democratic institutions. 
 
According to the EU Commission's report (COM(2013)114), the governments of the member 
states are not contrary to the implementation of some form of accrual accounting in their 
public sectors. The objection is mainly directed towards the adoption of IPSAS, or at least 
some of the standards. The EU Commission considers that a single set of accrual-based 
accounting standards at all levels of government throughout the EU would generate 'distinct 
benefits' for public sector management and governance, even at micro level, by improving 
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'transparency, accountability and comparability of financial reporting in the public sector, 
and may serve to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public audit' (COM(2013)114:4). 
But the Commission's main concern is that 'the system of fiscal statistics has not sufficiently 
mitigated the risk of substandard quality data being notified to Eurostat' (COM(2013)114:4). 
The EU Commission considers that harmonised accounting standards would considerably 
improve the requisite statistical data at macro level, because: 
this would allow for the use of common bridge tables to compile the entity accounts 
into ESA accounts, thus greatly facilitating the statistical verification process. 
(COM(2013)114:5) 
 
This assumption, however, cannot be completely validated by the findings of this research. 
The findings in Chapter 7 reveal that the base line for the compilation of the deficit reported 
to the EU is the deficit calculated on a cash basis. 'Accrual adjustments' are then carried out 
according to the ESA95 standard requirements (which standard is common for all EU member 
states). Data extracted from accrual-based accounting systems of local councils and 
government entities is also revised in order to make it ESA-compliant. Harmonisation of 
statistical data at macro level is, therefore, already present through the ESA95. While the cash 
flow data is used as a basis for macro reporting.  
 
The necessity for all member states to implement accrual accounting at micro level in order to 
improve statistical data at macro level is, therefore, questionable. And even the attending 
requirement for IPSAS in order to harmonise the proposed accrual accounting systems. The 
increased level of subjectivity required in accrual-based reporting, and its implications, is 
perhaps not being given due consideration. Any accounting system can be undermined by the 
manipulation of underlying transactions, and financial integrity can only be enhanced by 
better monitoring, audit and internal control. As Chan (2006) had commented, the IPSAS' 
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claims on the quality of financial reporting appear to assume the existence of a strong system 
of internal control in a government's financial management and accounting system. 
 
The reliability of statistical data used for macro reporting is questioned when statistically 
significant differences arise between the deficits calculated in the Financial Account and Non-
Financial Account in national accounting. According to the NSO (Interview 24), these 
differences arise because the data used in the two accounts emanate from different sources 
and at different times. This appears to be a drawback of the national accounting system, and 
the solution to such a statistical problem need not require the involvement of the government 
accounting systems at micro level. After all, government accounting systems at micro level 
only provide the data that will be used for national accounting and, otherwise, it does not 
interfere with the system of national accounting. 
 
Respondents to Eurostat's public consultation identified the fact that IPSAS are not in 
harmony with ESA95 as a reason for not adopting them. A rather surprising reason since the 
two sets of standards are targeted for two totally different types of reporting with totally 
different objectives. Having said this, however, more than one of the participants in this study 
expect that the adoption of IPSAS would bring government accounting data more in line with 
ESA95, in the sense that less adjustments would be required to be made to the government 
accounting data when it is used for statistical reporting. This expectation concurs with the 
conclusion reached by Jorge De Jesus and Jorge (2011) in their comparative study of five EU 
countries, but it is somehow doubtful when one considers the adjustments that the NSO is 
required to carry out on data extracted from accrual-based accounting systems in order to 
make it ESA-compliant. The advantage of an accrual accounting system would be that accrual 
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data, like payables and receivables, would be generated from the accounting system. But even 
these two items would need to be reviewed in order to make them ESA-compliant, especially 
receivables.  
 
Respondents to Eurostat's public consultation expressed their concern that the requirement for 
government financial reporting at micro level to be accrual-based and IPSAS-compliant 
would involve a duplicated effort. This concern appears to be justified since the deficit 
reported according to IPSAS would still need to be revised to make it ESA-compliant. The 
solution that is being considered by the EU Commission is to revise IPSAS in a way that there 
would be minimal differences with the ESA95 requirements. But, as described in the findings 
of chapter 7, the objectives of these two sets of standards are different. In order for 
convergence of these two standards to be even considered, the underlying objectives of 
government financial reporting need to be re-defined. Alternatively, as mentioned earlier, the 
suitability and effectiveness of the statistical reports need to be assessed.  
 
In order for the EU Commission's interference with member states' government accounting 
systems to be justified, the output from such systems should be useful and meaningful for all 
parties concerned. It should be possible for the debt and deficit data, that are the main EDP 
indicators, to be directly derived from the government accounting systems. Such a possibility 
should be examined beforehand in order to entice governments to even consider changing 
their current reporting systems, and not simply be considered as a possible long-term 
objective (COM(2013)114:5-6). A long-term objective that could be considered is to perhaps 
change the main EDP indicators of deficit and debt to reflect targets that can be determined 
from financial reporting figures and exclude the GDP denominator. After all, such figures like 
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the GDP are not used by any other economic entity except governments, when the argument 
for the need of governments to be as accountable and transparent as private sector entities is 
so often emphasised. But perhaps such a suggestion may not be acceptable for economists. 
 
4.6 Superiority of the ESA95 
 
In the Maltese context, section 4.3 has already hinted on the dominance of the ESA95 over 
other standards. The ESA95 statistical reports are given paramount importance by Maltese 
officials, with the NSO (Interview 24) describing them as 'the accounts of the government' 
because they are used for decision-making at national level and even at EU level.  
 
The NSO appears convinced that Eurostat will not change the ESA95 rules, and is rather 
expecting IPSAS to be more flexible and in line with ESA95. It appears that the NSO is 
expecting a totally different IPSAS objective and/or a totally different type of accrual 
accounting for government. The fact that one of the objectives of IPSASB is to build IPSAS 
on IFRS so that government's accounting is more in line with business accounting appears to 
be irrelevant for the NSO. 
 
Accounting standards setting bodies are referred to as epistemic communities in the literature. 
Epistemic communities stem primarily from normative isomorphism usually as a result of 
professionalisation where individuals of a similar calling assemble and become organised in 
order to establish, promote and practise a cognitive base and to legitimise their activities 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:152-153). Acting as a group, their influence on the reform 
process is strengthened (Laughlin and Pallot, 1998). Lüder (2002:8) recognises epistemic 
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communities as reform drivers who aim at making 'governmental accounting reform a 
political issue and influence political decision-makers in a specific way'. Heald and Georgiou 
(2011:467) describe the ESA95, the standard used for national accounts by EU member states, 
as an epistemic community.  
 
The superiority of ESA95 over IPSAS, both at national (Maltese) level and even at EU level, 
is evident from the analysis of the findings emanating from the interviews and even from the 
findings of the EU Commission's study and the subsequent report. The ESA95 appears to be 
the dominating doctrine for government reporting intra-EU member states. The pressure that 
it exerts on governments is coercive rather than normative. According to Scott (2001:53), 
'force, fear and expedience are central ingredients of the regulatory pillar', and thus the 
ESA95 can exert coercive pressure on government accounting including any proposed 
reforms. After all, unlike IPSAS, the basis of legitimacy of ESA95 is legally sanctioned by 
the directives issued by the EU Council and Parliament. The ESA95 is more than a reform 
driver. It forms part of the legal system, and is therefore, a contextual variable - a law that is 
affecting the accounting reform. In Malta, this contextual variable appears to be very powerful 
- directly influencing the political reform promoters and the reform concept.  
 
5 NATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
 
As observed in the UK by Jones (2000a), the distinction between Government Financial 
Reporting, Government Budgeting and National Accounting appears to be becoming less 
clear in the eyes of the Maltese Government authorities. While it is recognised that they entail 
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different techniques, it appears that there is very little understanding between national 
accounting, government budgeting and the accounting discipline.  
 
Up till only recently, the relationship between the financial report and the budget was very 
clear, since both were being prepared on a cash basis. But now statistical adjustments as 
calculated in national accounting are encroaching on the budget, to show the General 
Government deficit together with the percentage to GDP ratio. These are stated as targets and 
measures, but given that there is hardly any parliamentary discussion concerning how these 
figures are calculated, it is not clear whether the link between any decisions taken on 
budgetary allocations and their effect on the national accounts is understood at all. 
 
Since the 'deficit that matters' is calculated according to ESA95, which standard uses a form 
of accruals, it is assumed that the national accounting deficit and the government financial 
reporting deficit will be brought closer together if the latter is produced from an accrual 
accounting system at micro level. But the underlying conceptual differences are being 
ignored. The gap may even become wider since one of the fundamental concepts in accrual 
accounting - the distinction between capital and revenue expenditure - does not apply in the 
calculation of the ESA95 deficit. Given that the two deficits are measuring different things, 
any attempt to reconcile them is pointless because it would be meaningless. It would appear a 
meaningless exercise for an accountant, and perhaps even from an economist's point of view. 
But such a reconciliation may provide some sort of comfort for the practitioner, especially if 
s/he is asked to explain the two different figures. Would a politician be interested in such a 
reconciliation? Or would s/he choose the deficit that is more politically convenient?   
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This analysis is not trying to establish which type of reporting should be used for 
government's decision-making. For sure, any accounting system that provides financial 
information on an entity's activities, resources and performance, should suit the requirements 
of the stakeholder users - it should be 'a useful Financial Management Information and 
Reporting System' (Barton, 2011). Due to external macro pressures described in the previous 
section, the Maltese Government appears to be finding National Accounting as the most 
meaningful system. But if National Accounting is to be used for decision-making, due care 
needs to be given to the reliability of the reports from this system, as also pointed out by 
Jones (2000a), since not all the figures used in National Accounting are subject to an audit. As 
described in Chapter 7,  this is an issue that is recognised and being discussed by SAIs at EU 
level. 
 
It is also very important to bear in mind that satisfying standard requirements is not the 
solution nor is it a guarantee that the information provided is sufficient. As the research 
participants pointed out (PAC, Interview 5; IAID, Interview 21), the picture that is reported 
should be both reliable and wholesome. 
 
5.1 The reporting entity 
 
The findings reveal the importance given to the general government definition of the ESA95. 
The level of consolidation up to general government level is deemed to be of utmost 
importance, regardless of IPSAS requirements. Is this a question of expedience? 
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The national accounts are an account for the whole economy, incorporating the activities of 
both the public and the private sector. The definition of what is public and what is private are 
described as 'empty' by Jones (2000b) because the underlying standards, both the ESA95 and 
the SNA, do not identify the public interest activities, resulting in a definition of 'general 
government' that does not incorporate all the activities of the government. This does not really 
matter for the preparation of the national accounts themselves since they purport to account 
for the whole economy, but which activities and government entities are classified as part of 
general government then become extremely important in the view of the purposes of these 
accounts. In particular for the EU, the criteria of convergence for the EMU are defined in 
terms of general government debt and deficit in the national accounts figures, and even the 
granting of EU funds to support the regions are partly based on these figures. 
 
Given that the definitions of 'control', 'ownership' and 'prices that are economically significant' 
are rather hazy, reliance is placed on that part of the ESA95 definition of general government 
that states that an entity is excluded from 'general government' if it is capable of generating 
revenue that exceeds 50% of its cost of sales - an arbitrary measure decided by the experts. 
This results in the general government figures to include the activities of the ministries and 
government departments at central level, plus local government, plus the activities of the so-
defined EBUs107, and to exclude all the rest. The general government definition includes 
social security funds operated by the government or in which the government has an interest 
(such funds are absent in Malta). 
 
                                                 
107
 An EBU is a government entity, however it may be called - a board; unit; foundation; authority; corporation; 
limited liability company - that has a governance structure apparently independent of the government, has its 
own accounting system, which entity, however, is still financially dependent on central budget funds because it 
is not able to generate revenue that at least covers 50% of its cost of sales. 
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Governments are thus not only tempted but in fact endeavour, by applying all their available 
financial skills, to keep the size of their general government sector as small as possible. 
Various schemes are devised, including the use of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), using the 
loophole provided by the ESA95 definition, in order to divest the government from its 
commitments and liabilities. Lüder (2000) describes various examples of such schemes, 
which he calls 'creative accounting'. The ESA95 definition also provides an incentive for 
governments to shift spending from their budget onto entities that fall outside the general 
government sector. According to the IMF (2012), such cost shifting not only undermines the 
financial performance of these entities, but also undermines the quality of fiscal statistics and 
reduces the effectiveness of fiscal rules. When NSIs detect such problems and reclassify the 
entities into general government, the resulting effect on the fiscal data is unrealistic108 and 
causes havoc in financial management due to lack of comparability. The IMF (2012:11) 
identified such revisions as one of the sources of fiscal shocks during the crisis. 
 
Business accounting consolidation rules according to IFRS and IPSAS follow a control 
approach, while the ESA95 appears to follow a risk and rewards approach. The IPSAS, 
therefore, require a wider definition of the general government sector and this is one of the 
major objections of the member states for their application. Will the EPSAS extend the 
general government boundary, or will the proposed EU standard setting body succumb to 
political pressure and retain the status quo? 
  
  
                                                 
108
 The final adjusted data would present a more wholesome picture, but the resulting changes in the data would 
not reflect the real events due to the inclusion of previously unreported fiscal activity. 
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6 LÜDER'S FMR MODEL RE-VISITED 
 
Despite all the revisions, Lüder's FMR Model (2002) still does not address the 'why' of 
government accounting systems themselves (Jorge et al., 2011). Even its predictability is 
limited because the extent to which the modules interact is not known (Christensen and 
Yoshimi, 2001). This section draws on the findings from the research and the literature to 
analyse the criticism of the model. 
 
6.1 Why accrual accounting? 
 
The FMR Model was derived from Lüder’s (1989, cited in Jorge et al., 2011) initial 
hypothesis which stated that specific contextual variables determine the orientation of the 
primary user, and then this determines the design of governmental accounting and reporting 
(Figure 16). Lüder's initial hypothesis had expected an explanation for a relationship between 
the contextual variables and the contents of the governmental accounting systems (Lüder, 
1989). Lüder’s empirical research seemed to confirm this hypothesis because the observed 
cross-country governmental accounting differences were partly due to differences in national 
political-administrative settings. Research revealed, however, that the relationship is 
conducive and not causal.  
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Figure 16: Hypothesis initially stated underlying Lüder’s comparative study 
 
               
(Source: Jorge et al. (2011), Page xii) 
 
 
The FMR Model, therefore, only tackles the upper part of the hypothesis (Jorge et al., 2011). 
It emphasises the contextual approach of the reform process, that is, ‘why’ do governmental 
accounting systems experience changes towards a more informative system. The model does 
not provide explanations for the actual design and contents of a governmental accounting 
system. During Lüder’s project, some accounting and financial reporting theoretical issues 
were discussed and clarified, and national governmental accounting systems were classified 
according to those aspects (Lüder, 1989, cited in Jorge et al., 2011), but this approach was 
discontinued. The expected explanation for a relationship between the contextual variables 
and the contents of the governmental accounting system was neglected. 
 
The adoption and application of accrual accounting methodology by governments appears to 
be taken for granted as the reform concept in Lüder's FMR Model (2002). Accounting 
Specific contextual variables
The primary user 
orientation of governmental 
accounting and reporting
The design of the 
governmental accounting 
and reporting system
determine 
determine 
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research literature is rich with studies that have applied Institutional theory to explain a range 
of accounting phenomena, both contemporary and historical (Gomes, 2007).  According to 
Gomes (2007:74), these studies109 have used the institutional perspective to collectively 
demonstrate 'that accounting practices represent means through which organizations can 
accomplish external legitimacy and document institutional compliance with external 
requirements'. Accounting researchers have used the concepts of legitimacy, institutional 
isomorphism, decoupling, and the notions of power and self-interest involved in the process 
of institutionalisation of accounting practices, to highlight the institutional pressures that are 
exerted through the actions of different actors in such process.110  
 
The key concepts of institutional theory are presented in Chapter 3. Institutional theory 
focuses on the taken-for-granted nature of organisational forms and practices, and provides 
explanations of phenomena that do not reflect the behaviour of rational actors driven by 
clearly perceived interests (DiMaggio, 1988:7).  
 
Institutional theorists are not convinced when only technical reasons are used to justify the 
adoption and maintenance of practices or procedures. It is considered that technical 
explanations are used to hide significant political and cultural factors (Meyer & Rowan, 
[1977] 1991). Accordingly, the explanation for the incorporation of different elements in the 
formal structure of an organisation, which elements are institutionalized in society, effectively 
increases the organisation's legitimacy and its survival prospects (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
                                                 
109
 Gomes (2007:74) refers to, for example, Ansari & Euske, 1987; Chalmers & Godfrey, 2004; Covaleski & 
Dirsmith, 1988; Fogarty, 1996; Geiger & Ittner, 1996; Gupta et al., 1994; Rahaman et al., 2004; Rollins & 
Bremser, 1997. 
110
 Gomes (2007:74) refers to, for example, Burns, 2000; Christensen, 2003a; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; 
Covaleski et al., 1993; Dirsmith et al., 1997; Granlund & Lukka, 1998; Hussain & Hoque, 2002; Lapsley & 
Pallot, 2000. 
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Meyer & Rowan, [1977] 1991:50; Scott, 1987, 2001). Accounting practices and technical 
procedures tend to become taken-for-granted means to accomplish organizational ends; and 
once they are institutionalized, they make the organization appear appropriate, rational, and 
modern. Their use displays responsibility and avoids claims of negligence (Meyer & Rowan, 
[1977] 1991:45).  
 
Institutional theorists have contributed significantly to a better understanding of the 
relationship between organisational structures and practices and the wider social environment 
in which organisations are located (Beckert, 1999:777). Underlying most research on 
institutional theory is an assumption that intra-organisational structures and procedures, 
including accounting, are largely shaped by external factors rather than cost-minimising 
objectives (Moll et al., 2006). Institutionalism defends a holistic and contextual analysis of 
specific practices and processes within the whole organisation, where even history plays an 
important role (Powell, 1988; Scott, 1987). Institutional theorists consider that no organisation 
is a technical system alone: organisations exist in an institutional environment that defines 
and delimits social reality, while there are multiple institutional environments which vary 
across time and space (Scott, 1987:508; Scott and Meyer, 1991:111). 
 
The empirical findings of this study appear to uphold Lande's (2006) view that the expected 
isomorphism is not perfect, in that the application of the business accounting principles and 
practices in the government accounting reforms have been distorted to accommodate the goals 
of the organisation as identified by the actors. While technical reasons are not clearly 
understood, the fact that the accounting system conforms to institutional norms and 
requirements, even if symbolically, presents a set of rewards.  
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Lande (2006) explains that this imperfect isomorphism has resulted in governments adopting 
different types of accrual accounting systems. The peculiarities of a governmental accounting 
system are linked with the political, social, legal and cultural features of a country, but are not 
bound by them. The effect of pressures at macro level on a given context and behavioural 
variable cannot be generalised and thus cannot be captured in a comprehensive model. 
Institutional theory implies that there is no exclusive relationship between the contextual 
variables and the contents of the governmental accounting system. Even though all countries 
may be subject to similar levels of coercion, normative forces and mimetic tendencies, the 
effects of these pressures on the individual country would depend on national political and 
economic factors. Perhaps government accounting systems cannot then be conveniently 
classified due to the various factors that affect the content. 
 
6.2 Lüder's FMR Model through the Institutional Theoretical lens 
 
Jorge et al. (2011) maintain that the empirical validity of Lüder's FMR Model is questionable 
due to speculative features of the complex multi-causal relationships between the variables in 
the framework. The authors refer as well to 'black-boxes' being certain variables in the model, 
for example, behavioural variables and reform concept, which affect and are affected by the 
reform process, but it is not known exactly how or to what extent they do this. Similar to 
Christensen and Yoshimi (2001), Jorge et al. (2011) are referring here to the lines of influence 
and the lines of impact connecting the various variables in the model.  
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Lüder's FMR Model started out as a contingency model based on contingency theory, placing 
more importance on the technical requirements, resource streams, information flows and 
influence relations. Lüder extends the original contingency theory approach to include 
variables of collective behaviour (Lüder, 1994). The development of the model introduced 
more internal and external variables, at both micro and macro level; and the analysis of the 
cultural and institutional variables at macro level would attribute importance to symbols, 
cognitive systems, normative beliefs, and the source of such elements. According to Scott 
(1987), contingency and institutional theories can be used together to better understand the 
instrumental and symbolic roles fulfilled by coordination and control practices that are used in 
contemporary organisations. Scott (1987:507-9) has observed that separate application of the 
two theories provides an incomplete understanding of the different roles played by various 
practices. 
 
The contingency theory perspective suggests that an organisation focuses on its technical 
activities and shapes its work processes to promote those activities while protecting them 
from disturbances in the external task environment (Gupta et al., 1994). The contrasting 
institutional perspective is that an organisation gains legitimacy by conforming to external 
expectations of acceptable practice, and thus may ceremonially adopt elements of formal 
organisational structure to demonstrate the rationality of its operations to external 
constituents, rather than to control organisational members (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Gupta et al. (1994) point out that despite the apparent 
inconsistency between these two perspectives, theorists working within each recognise its 
interrelation with the other.  Institutional and technical factors are dimensions along which 
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environments vary, and both place pressures on organisations to which they must be 
responsive in order to survive (Powell, 1991:186). 
 
It is being suggested that Luder's FMR Model should be three dimensional in order to capture 
the variables at macro level and the forces they exert through the lens of Institutional Theory, 
as in Figure 17; and the variables and lines of impact and lines of influence at organisational 
and micro level, as in Figure 18. The holistic features of Lüder's model are retained as the two 
planes are interconnected: the common connecting variables between the two levels are the 
political reform promoters, the reform concept and part of the institutional arrangements. The 
variables noted in each cluster are as identified in this empirical study in the Maltese context. 
 
Godfrey et al. (2001) combines Lüder's Model with theories of diffusion of innovations to 
provide a better insight into the social, political, economic and organisational factors affecting 
the innovation process. In this study, Lüder's Model is combined with Institutional theory 
resulting in a hybrid model that better explains what is happening in the Maltese context. 
Godfrey et al.'s (2001) hybrid model also takes into consideration internal and external 
organisational structural characteristics affecting organisational innovativeness. In the model 
being proposed by this study there is no separation between the initiation phase and 
implementation. The forces exerted at macro level are continuous and not limited to particular 
stages. 
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Figure 17: Governmental Accounting Reforms in Malta at macro level 
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Figure 18: Governmental Accounting Reforms in Malta at micro level 
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The rationale behind this suggestion is to attempt to differentiate between the extent of some 
forces (lines of impact and lines of influence) affecting the reform process. The political 
reform promoters are more exposed to pressures at the macro level, and they also tend to act 
as a buffer for lower level actors from the effects of these institutional forces.  
 
The Administrative Structure and the Civil Service are also included in the macro level plane 
because the political reform promoters appear to carry out changes in these two variables not 
only for instrumental purposes but also to appear to comply with general expectations. The 
appointment of certain government officials who are not appropriately qualified or not 
interested in the reforms is one example. Scott (1992:211-212) refers to staff training as 
another example: 
Training staff indicates both instrumental competence and also ceremonial 
conformity to societal expectations that call for such credentials.  
 
The culture variable defined in Lüder's Model (2002) needs to be expanded because it 
overlaps with the behaviourable variable. As explained in section 3.1.2, the cultural variable 
proved rather ambiguous and difficult to analyse in the Maltese context as the characteristics 
tend to vary according to the individual. 
 
In the case of Malta, when the outcome from the first stage (1999-2004) was fed back into the 
process, it encountered a situation (2004-2013) where the political reform promoters were 
being affected by a macro-environment that was exerting a stronger coercive influence due to 
financial pressures from EU membership. Legitimacy and survival as organisational goals 
were more prominent active stimuli at macro level. The dominating doctrine of business 
accounting was also in a position to exert stronger normative pressure. 
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7 SUMMARY 
 
The governmental accounting reform process in Malta, at central level, is described in two 
phases: pre- and post-2004. The feedback loops in Lüder's FMR Model (2002) provide for the 
analysis of long and multi-step reform process, as in the case of Malta.  
 
The accounting reforms started in 1999, and the original stimulus was managerial-driven. By 
applying Lüder's FMR Model (2002), the environment in the first phase is assessed as 
conducive to change. The certainty surrounding the reform concept and the strong 
individualistic character of the behaviourable variables, combined with the supportive 
relationship of the political reform promoter and the reform drivers, appear to be the main 
positive drivers for change. The normative forces were active at micro and organisational 
level. 
 
The environment changed in 2004: the actors changed, facing new challenges that accompany 
EU membership. The financial stress at macro level became the new stimulus, which, 
combined with the new political reform promoter, changed the reform concept in order to 
satisfy the demands exerted by macro forces. The driving force is thriving for legitimacy 
based on coercive forces. The reform process in the second phase is described as 'illusory' 
because the changes are not targeted towards improvements in financial management but 
towards satisfying the statistical reporting requirements of a supranational body. The 
environment in the second phase of the reform process is assessed as not so conducive to 
change. While the organisational structure to carry out the reform exists, it is not functioning, 
but awaiting the push from the EU (at macro level). Perhaps the project is suffering from 
'reform fatigue' due to the long time that it is taking. 
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Contrary to expectations, the evidence indicates that the small size of the country is actually 
acting as a negative factor on the government accounting reform process. And this has been 
exacerbated in the second phase due to increased administrative demands from the macro 
environment. The only tangible positive stimulus in the second phase is the requirement to 
change the outdated IT system currently in use. This situation has been created due to the 
length of the reform process. However, it does not necessarily mean that the new system 
would necessarily result in a change in the new reform concept.  
 
An environment of uncertainty is a powerful force that encourages imitation. The decision by 
the Government of Malta to adopt IPSAS does not appear to be well-informed, and is based 
mainly on the need for credibility and legitimacy. There is a gap between the formal structure 
and the actual implementation of these standards, but the most important factor appears to be 
to create the impression that the process is acceptable and is under control. Such decoupling 
indicates an element of mimetic isomorphism in the IPSAS decision.  
 
In the meantime, the study of IPSAS undertaken by the EU is very convenient for the Maltese 
authorities to overcome their uncertainty, as succumbing to coercive pressure would avoid 
embarrassing questions in the future. But this expectancy can only result in delaying further 
the governmental accounting reform in Malta. 
 
The superiority of ESA95 over IPSAS is due to the fact that the basis of legitimacy of ESA95 
is legally sanctioned, while that of IPSAS is not - at least, not yet. In the Maltese context, the 
ESA95 is more than a reform driver. It is a contextual variable because it forms part of the 
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legal system. The coercive influence of ESA95 on the reform process in Malta appears to be 
very powerful - directly influencing the political reform promoter and the reform concept. 
 
The application of  Lüder's Model (2002) in the Maltese context, as analysed in section 3.4, 
resulted in the accounting reform process at the central government level to be explained in 
two phases. The strongly positive behavioural variable and the defined reform concept in the 
first stage produced gradual and evolutionary changes. The driving force of the decision 
making process were norms, values and unique cultures, developed through a process of 
institutionalisation and adaptation. The changes were in line with the cultural institutional 
theories, focusing on the organisational level and task environment.  
 
When the outcome from the first stage was input into the second, where it encountered 
different behavioural and contextual variables and a different reform concept, the process of 
financial management reforms appears to have slowed down. The symbolical changes in this 
phase can be described as due to adjustment to the environment, stressing isomorphism and 
convergence; more focus on the organisation at the macro level, in line with myth theories. 
 
Change is the underlying theme of this study. Lüder's Model (2002) tries to explain the 
environment that induces change in governmental financial management reporting systems. 
The Model is based on organisation theory that is a theoretical framework dealing with 
change. 
 
Change is instigated by both time and space. Past events and situations effect and affect 
change. This study gives due importance to the historical aspect of the context, because the 
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colonial inheritance and the traditional paternal system of government appear to have affected 
and are affecting the governmental accounting reforms in Malta.  
 
Even though this is a one-country study, events happening outside the island's shores are 
important because they also effect and affect change. While it is important to consider forces 
and variables at both micro and macro level, it is being suggested that these are not assessed 
at the same level but parallel to each other: with the macro level acting like an overhanging 
cloud on the micro and organisational level, but still with a common actor and connecting 
institutional variables. The rationale is that forces at macro level mainly affect the political 
reform promoter, who then sieves these through to micro and organisational level. 
 
The magnitude of the effect of the macro level forces on the reform process at micro level 
cannot be generalised. This would depend on political and economic factors, and also on the 
behaviourable variable. In Malta, the effect of macro level forces on the behaviourable 
variable appears to be very strong, especially in the environment of the second phase of the 
accounting reform. 
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CHAPTER 9:  CONCLUSION 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The constitutional crisis of the 1980s, and the Maltese Government's determination to apply 
for EU membership, led to extensive reforms in the public service. One of the pillars is 
improvement in the financial management of the government, including the adoption of 
modern accounting methodologies. While government auditing evolved over time and now 
adheres to international standards, government accounting and reporting remains cash-based, 
focusing on budgeting and budgetary control. The applicable financial legislation is based on 
regulations inherited from colonial times. 
 
The Ministry of Finance set up the Accrual Accounting Task Force in 1999 with the remit to 
take all necessary measures to implement an accrual accounting system for the central 
government. It was decided from the outset that any accrual accounting reforms will be an 
add-on to the current cash-based accounting system, emphasisng the importance of the 
budget. 
 
Since 2002, in the absence of a new accounting system that can handle accrual accounting, the 
Treasury has been compiling trial accrual-based financial statements by integrating accrual 
data collected from the departments with the cash-based data generated from the accounting 
system. These financial statements are not audited and are not published because the data is 
incomplete. In the meantime, a decision was taken in 2011 to adopt IPSAS.  
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Malta became an EU member state in 2004 and joined the Eurozone in 2008. The accrual data 
collected from the government departments is also used for the preparation of statistical 
reporting according to national accounting standards. Since the country's reporting 
requirements to Eurostat are somehow being satisfied with a system of patched-up cash-based 
accounting data, the implementation of accrual accounting appears to have been put on the 
'back burner'. Given that the EU Commission is studying the introduction of accrual-based 
public sector accounting systems across all EU member states, and the possibility of 
promulgating the EPSAS, the Maltese administration is now awaiting further directions from 
this source.  
 
2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The basic research question is the 'how and why' of accounting reforms being carried out by 
the central government of Malta. The circumstances leading to the adoption of IPSAS are 
analysed, together with the perception of national accounting versus government accounting. 
 
An empirical study, supported by documentary research, where various actors (reform drivers, 
political reform promoters, and stakeholders) were interviewed to try to identify the 
contextual, instrumental and behavioural variables underlying the government accounting 
reform in Malta, and to explain why and how these variables are affecting the environment as 
to its conduciveness for the reforms. The format and contents of the questionnaire used during 
the interviews were based on Lüder and Jones' (2003) EuroCIGAR study, which clarifies 
what constitutes governmental accounting and how it is to be described, thus providing a 
framework for research. 
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Figure 19: The research questions, findings and discussion 
 
 
 
The research objectives of this study are threefold, as shown in Figure 19. Using Lüder’s 
Model (2002) focuses the research to answer the questions on government accounting reforms 
in Malta. The decision to adopt IPSAS and the increased interest in IPSAS being shown by 
the EU for government accounting of member states make these aspects current and relevant, 
and are thus included as objectives of this study. The importance given to statistical reports of 
national accounting by practitioners adds another dimension to the study.  
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This one-country study contributes towards the already existing wide repertoire of CIGAR 
studies that have used Lüder’s FMR Process Model (2002). Described as a paradigm for 
CIGAR, Lüder's Model is applied in a different context, that of the central government of 
Malta. 
 
Lüder’s Model (2002) has been criticised for not explaining the contents of government 
accounting, and for certain 'black boxes' in not considering the extent of certain variables and 
how the variables interact with each other (Christensen and Yoshimi, 2001; Jorge et al., 
2011). These criticisms are analysed through the lens of organisational theory that underlies 
the Model. 
 
3 LIMITATIONS 
 
The subjectivity involved in certain interpretations of the data cannot be excluded. The values 
of both the research participants and of the researcher are unavoidably reflected in this study. 
The study endeavours to present the findings in an acceptable way that presents convincing 
but debatable arguments. 
 
The classification of actors involved in the accounting reform into stakeholders, reform 
drivers and political reform promoters, is not as straightforward as it seems in theory. Perhaps 
the behavioural cluster of variables needs to be better explained, or perhaps it is difficult to 
capture these distinctive meanings in theory. 
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The research process, in particular, the period of the interviews, was slightly disrupted due to 
political developments that culminated in an early electoral campaign. This affected the 
availability of political actors that had agreed to participate in the study. As explained in 
section 4.3 of Chapter 2, these difficulties were overcome and compensatory measures taken. 
 
4 THE MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
The findings confirm the centrality of the budget in government accounting and parliamentary 
proceedings. The findings indicate that the long-winding reforms at the central government 
level in Malta may only be illusory because once the statistical reporting requirements for 
Eurostat were achieved, the accounting reforms stopped and the original raison d'être appears 
to be lost. While the original stimulus was managerial-driven, the changes in the actors that 
occurred over time, together with the financial stress that naturally accompanies EU 
membership, appear to have blurred the reform concept. Contrary to expectations, the 
evidence indicates that the small size of the country may actually act as a negative factor on 
the government accounting reform process. This appears to be compounded by the financial 
pressures that naturally accompany EU membership. It also appears that the availability of 
IPSAS, and their consideration by the EU Commission for member states, are acting as 
another deterrent. 
 
4.1 Accounting reform process 
 
The governmental accounting reform process in Malta, at central level, is described in two 
phases: pre- and post-2004. As suggested by Jaruga and Nowak (1996) and Chan et al. 
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(1996), the feedback loops in Lüder's Model (2002) proved particularly adequate for the 
analysis of a slow and multi-step reform process, as in the case of Malta. The environment of 
the first phase of the accounting reforms is assessed as conducive to change, mainly due to the 
strong forces exerted by the behavioural variable together with the certainty surrounding the 
reform concept. These conditions changed in the second phase, and were replaced by stronger 
forces at macro level, which resulted in an environment that is not so conducive to change. 
While the organisational structure to continue the reform exists, it is not functioning, but is 
waiting for directions from the EU. 
 
Contrary to Pallot's (1995) conclusion that smaller countries follow a managerial-driven 
approach to implement governmental accounting reform, it appears that in Malta, the second 
phase is more accountability-driven. The first phase appears to conform to Pallot's suggestion, 
but then the direction changed after 2004 due to the macro context becoming more powerful. 
The approach came to resemble more of that of larger countries. 
 
The reluctance of the PS to impose systems on current structures, and the NAO's concerns 
regarding the defects of the present legislation and procedures, appear to confirm 
Caperchione's (2000) assertion that an accounting reform can only result in a proper 
governance tool if considered in the context of wider public administration changes. 
Accounting reform is not a simple technical exercise (Caperchione, 2000). It is also 
recognised that accrual accounting is not "some panacea that will solve our problems" (IAID, 
Interview 21) because "problems are solved by taking decisions" (PS, Interview 9). 
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The behaviour of the politicians and high level administrative officials involved in the 
Maltese governmental accounting reform appears to confirm that public leaders stand to gain 
from 'double-talk'; this is described in the literature as when they talk as if they intend to act, 
even if they have no intention of doing so and have no idea of what to do if they run into 
problems of implementation (Goffman, 1974). The accounting reform often features in the 
Budget Speech delivered by the Minister of Finance to Parliament, but nothing transpires. The 
appearance that accounting reforms are an ongoing process is maintained; this may help the 
organisation to strengthen the legitimacy of its actions and ensure survival. But perhaps it was 
never intended for innovations to be rapidly implemented. 
 
Various debacles have taught politicians that being totally honest may have disastrous 
consequences. The reluctance to implement accrual accounting methodology at central 
government level may arise from the fear to be too transparent, and may not be a matter of 
losing control over the budget and government finances as suggested by Jones and Lüder 
(2011). However, uncertainty and fear of the unknown may then justify Jones and Lüder's 
(2011) conclusion. 
 
On the other hand, there is no similar hesitation in the case of Local Councils and government 
entities, and these are required to adopt accrual accounting methodology. According to Lüder 
and Jones (2003), this appears to be a normal trend in most countries. In the case of Malta, 
there is also no objection for the IFRS framework to be followed by these government 
entities. But the IFRS framework is not considered as applicable for Central Government. 
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4.2 Financial Reporting Standards for government 
 
The decision by the Government of Malta to adopt IPSAS does not appear to be well-
informed, and is based mainly on the quest for credibility and legitimacy. These factors are 
important for the survival of any organisation; and may be even more important for a small 
state which may be more vulnerable to external pressure. Just by stating that IPSAS will be 
adopted provides a "certain relaxation" (AG, Interview 13); actual implementation is a 
different story. The accounting reform will now proceed according to EU direction. This 
expectancy can only result in delaying further the governmental accounting reform in Malta, 
but this may be convenient due to uncertainty surrounding the reform concept and to avoid 
embarrassing questions in the future. 
 
The EU is examining the IPSAS to assess their suitability for adoption by the member states. 
The underlying idea is to require the member states to implement accrual-based public sector 
accounting systems. One may argue that the type of accounting practiced by governments 
should be at the discretion of each individual government, and that coercive pressures should 
not be the basis of legitimacy of government accounting practices. Such measures appear 
invasive in democratic institutions. 
 
The counter-argument being made by the proponents of this idea is that harmonised reporting 
is required by the member states in order to ensure better monitoring and thus strengthen the 
budgetary frameworks of the member states. This brings forth two issues. First, that the 
IPSAS are financial reporting standards and do not provide any guidance on budgeting, 
budgetary accounting and control. Secondly, reporting to Eurostat is already harmonised 
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because all member states adhere to ESA95, and cash flow data is used as the basis for this 
macro reporting.  
 
Reporting according to ESA95 appears to have not been sufficient for the EU Commission to 
properly monitor the financial and economic situation of the member states. However, the EU 
Commission appears to be overlooking the possibility that the problem lies with the ESA95, 
and instead prefers to 'normalise' the underlying government accounting systems that feed the 
data for statistical reporting and national accounting. The English would call this behaviour 
"beating around the bush" because no level of accrual accounting methodology can ensure the 
reliability of accounting data; only proper internal control and audit procedures can perhaps 
sustain fiscal propriety, together with enforceable legislation that supports political 
responsibility, accountability and transparency. 
 
4.3 The influence of national accounting 
 
Limited resources of a relatively small administration would concentrate on satisfying the 
standards and the reporting that are considered as more important due to related or expected 
benefits, which in the Maltese case appears to be the ESA95. 
 
 
This perspective is leading to situations where government accounting and national 
accounting are confused, or fused into one and the same thing. The AG confirmed that in the 
absence of a clear accounting rule, or in the absence of an accounting standard, the Treasury 
refers to the ESA95 which provides "more strict rules and guidelines" (AG, Interview 13). 
One important aspect identified in this research is the definition of the reporting entity, the 
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limitation of the ESA95 General Government definition, and the consequences of this 
restricted reporting boundary especially in times of crisis. 
 
The research participants expect that an accrual accounting system would bring government 
reporting and statistical data more in line and that fewer adjustments would be required to be 
made to the government accounting data when it is used for statistical reporting. This 
expectation concurs with the conclusion reached by Jorge De Jesus and Jorge (2011) in their 
comparative study of five EU countries, but it is somehow doubtful when one considers the 
adjustments that the NSO is required to carry out on data extracted from accrual-based 
accounting systems in order to make it ESA-compliant.  
 
The ESA95 statistical reports are used for decision-making, both at national level and even by 
the EU. But are these reports comprehensive and sufficient?  
 
The study carried out by the EU Commission confirms the importance of ESA95 for all 
member states. The ESA95 appears to be the dominating doctrine for government reporting 
intra-EU member states. Heald and Georgiou (2011) consider ESA95 as an epistemic 
community, because it exerts influence over government accounting. But in the Maltese 
context,  ESA95 is more than a reform driver. It is a contextual variable because it forms part 
of the legal system. The ESA95 is engrained in the institutional variable that affects 
government accounting, exerting strong coercive pressure. 
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5 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
 
The findings indicate that the reform concept in the Maltese government accounting reform 
has changed from the implementation of a full accrual accounting system to a hybrid cash and 
accrual accounting system: an illusory sort of financial reporting system because the output is 
not being used as a management tool across the board for better decision-making to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector. The reform concept in the second stage of 
the accounting reform in Malta is more aligned to satisfying reporting requirements at macro 
level. The change in the environment has shifted the emphasis of the accounting reform 
process from organisational level to a macro level. 
 
Using the institutional theoretical lens while applying Lüder's Model in the Maltese context 
suggests that the model can better explain what is happening by expanding the model three-
dimensionally. A distinction is made between forces and variables at macro and micro levels. 
The forces at macro level mainly affect the political reform promoter, who then sieves these 
through to micro and organisational level. The holistic features of Lüder's Model are retained 
because the two planes are connected by common variables being the political reform 
promoter, part of the institutional arrangements, and the reform concept itself. 
 
Lüder's Model (2002) strikes a balance between the demand of the technical and institutional 
environments, as emphasised by Brunsson (1989). The proposed amendment to two 
connecting planes is emphasising the balance between the technical and institutional 
environments; and it is also illustrating how myth theories often focus on phenomena at 
macro level and relate these to effects and implications on an organisational level, as 
described in the literature (Scott, 1987; Gupta et al., 1994; Christensen, 2003b). 
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This proposal aims at extending the discussion surrounding the criticism of Lüder's Model in 
not clarifying the extent and direction of the lines of influence and the lines of impact. It is 
important to point out that the proposed model cannot be generalised: the effect of pressures 
at macro level on a given context and behavioural variable cannot be generalised and thus 
cannot be captured in a comprehensive model. Even though countries may be subject to the 
same types and levels of pressures - coercive; normative; mimetic - the effects of these 
pressures on a particular country would depend on national political and economic factors.  
 
The same arguments can be used for the other criticism of Lüder's Model in that it does not 
explain the why of the content of governmental accounting systems. The peculiarities of a 
governmental accounting system are linked with the political, social, legal and cultural 
features of a country, but are not bound by them. Institutional theory implies that there is no 
exclusive relationship between the contextual variables and the contents of the governmental 
accounting system. Perhaps government accounting systems cannot then be conveniently 
classified due to the various factors that affect the content. 
 
6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The long-winding accounting reform at central government level in Malta may be suffering 
from reform fatigue. And perhaps it is convenient to wait for further directions from the EU. 
But once these instructions are received, it is important to learn from past mistakes. 
 
It appears important that the institutional arrangements are not used to scatter the 
responsibilities of the committee that is ultimately responsible for the accounting reforms. In 
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other words, all the aspects of the accounting reform should be the responsibility of one 
committee in order for the reforms to have the possibility of success. 
 
Staff training to enhance accounting skills should proceed; and such staff should be placed in 
challenging accounting positions with rewarding remuneration. Care should be taken about 
the importance given to National Accounting and statistical reporting in order not to confuse 
these with the ulterior objectives of government accounting innovations. While more attention 
should be given to the other stakeholders to increase their involvement and awareness of the 
accounting reforms, in particular the Treasury, in order to enhance its important participatory 
role in the project. 
 
The findings point to the importance of clearly defining the responsibilities of the actors 
involved in the accounting reform; these responsibilities should be spelled out and not 
assumed, otherwise it may result that nothing is actually done. Lack of communication 
between the different levels of management is another drawback that needs to be overcome. 
 
The quality of the implementation strategy is very important, and this can be effective if the 
project has a legitimate owner capable of co-ordinating and backed with suitable legislation. 
 
As to the proposed EPSAS and the link of government accounting reporting with EU 
statistical reporting, perhaps a more fruitful debate would surround the suitability of the latter 
should this be directly extractable from audited financial statements. The debate could extend 
to the reconsideration of the Maastricht criteria themselves, so that the fiscal targets are 
calculated from audited financial data.  
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7 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This research was carried out during the final term of an administration. The General 
Elections resulted in a change in government on 9th March 2013. This means a change in the 
behavioural variable in the form of a new political reform promoter, namely, the Minister of 
Finance. The new minister is an economist and not an accountant like his predecessors. 
Further changes are anticipated in the institutional variable as the EU proceeds with the 
IPSAS/EPSAS project and any future EU Directives concerning public sector accounting are 
transposed into Maltese legislation and implemented. Such a change in the variables would 
warrant a repetition of this study in the future, to analyse how they are affecting the 
conduciveness of the environment towards accounting reform. Changes in the content of 
government accounting would also be worthy to note. 
 
An interesting period of change is envisaged, as the EU Commission undertakes the EPSAS 
project. According to Makaronidis (2012), it is indisputable that IPSAS are used as a basis of 
reference for the promulgation of EPSAS. A future study may examine the process 
undertaken and determine how and why an IPSAS is directly adopted, slightly adapted, or 
overhauled. 
 
Another issue highlighted by the EU Commission's report on IPSAS is the requirement of any 
future EPSAS to converge as much as possible with the ESA95 (COM(2013)114). How this 
will be achieved and the resulting effects on both government and national accounting could 
be another aspect of the current changes that warrants further research. 
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8 CONCLUDING NOTE FOR FUTURE CIGAR 
 
This one-country study contributes towards CIGAR by introducing Malta in this field of 
research. As the smallest EU member state, it is an interesting case study, and the accessibility 
of the participants enriches the empirical research. The timing of this study is also opportune: 
in the wake of governmental accounting changes instigated at supranational level; and backed 
by 25 years of CIGAR. 
 
Change is the underlying theme of this study. Change presents challenging opportunities for 
researchers. In the case of CIGAR, the aim of future accounting research - looking at 
governments through the eyes of the accountant - should include a better understanding of 
political, legal, economic and social environment in which government accounting is 
immersed: an environment that is continuously changing. When studying governments, the 
unique panorama would be better understood should the eyes of the accountant not be 
"glazed" by private sector accounting practice. 
 
In other words, accountants should not just prop their accounting baggage on the table. They 
should look for useful and relevant tools inside. For example, from their experience in the 
private sector, accountants are very aware that any accounting system is susceptible to errors 
and intentional manipulation. Even an accrual accounting system could be undermined and is 
no guarantee for proper and complete reporting. It is the system of governance that counts, 
that is, ensuring that appropriate fiscal legislation and rules are in place that promote fiscal 
probity, accountability and transparency. And it would prove pointless to have a complicated 
accounting system that is not supported with adequate internal controls, external audit, and 
enforceable rules. These building blocks are a must before attempting to complicate matters. 
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An accrual accounting system has the potential to provide improvements in financial 
management, but it cannot be viewed as an end in itself. Accounting reforms, therefore, 
cannot be viewed as a simple technical exercise of changing from cash basis to accrual. The 
proposed accounting system, or rather, the proposed financial reporting system, should be 
useful, and provide relevant and reliable information. In order to be useful, there has to be the 
expertise to use the output from the system properly. In order to provide reliable information, 
the accounting system needs to be backed by a good governance structure. In order to provide 
relevant information, the particular needs of the users have to be considered. What drives 
users to seek particular information? What is their overarching goal? What are the benefits? Is 
the information used for decision making?  
 
Research shows that governments refer to national accounting for their decision making, 
especially governments of EU member states because of its added value and implications. 
And this brings forth the questions: "Which financial reporting standards should be used for 
the output from the government's accounting system? Shouldn't this decision be left for the 
government to decide in order to cater for the particular requirements and conditions of its 
jurisdiction?" At the end of the day, Parliamentary discussions still centre around the cash 
budget, with emphasis on resource allocations depending on the political agenda. 
 
Change for the sake of change is no change at all. Change should be undertaken to solve a 
problem. A problem is identified and something is done to solve it. For example, in Malta, the 
end users in the departments are dissatisfied with the strict application of the annuality 
principle in the budget. Will this problem be solved with the introduction of accrual 
351 
 
accounting? Or, in other words, need it be solved in such a drastic way? Or is it a question of 
government policy? 
 
Rather than to solve problems, research shows that in the case of government accounting, 
reforms are undertaken more as a signalling device to appear more legitimate. Perhaps this is 
just as well because in order to survive, organisations need more than just resources: they 
require credibility and legitimacy as well. So while accrual accounting practices do have the 
potential to help solve problems by providing data that can make organisations more efficient 
and effective; they also have a legitimising effect, which perhaps satisfies political objectives. 
 
The way that the IPSAS decision was taken by the Maltese Government appears like a signal 
so that the government appears more legitimate - "we're doing the right thing, even though we 
don't know exactly how we are going to go about it, and neither are we sure whether the end 
result will be of any value really". But the decision is politically attractive. 
 
Even the EU's interest in IPSAS and the proposed EPSAS indicates that this is being done so 
that it appears that it is doing the right thing. It does not appear to make sense to require 
member states to apply a set of financial reporting standards for government accounting, for 
the simple purpose to take some data, and turn it all around in order to suit another reporting 
system. Somehow it appears to be a waste of resources - time and money. The possibility that 
the problem may lie with the ESA95, statistical reporting requirements and national 
accounting is not considered. So is the problem being tackled holistically?  
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Adopting IPSAS or any other reporting standards is not a guarantee of sound financial 
management and accountability. The EU may be worrying the wrong end of the stick by 
taking this track of regarding the implementation of a standardised public sector accounting 
system in EU member states as a way of improving the budgetary control framework. It may 
result in giving the signal that government accounting is legitimate, but are problems going to 
be solved in this way? 
 
9 CONCLUDING PERSONAL COMMENT 
 
On a personal note, as an accountant myself, I did not expect to reach certain conclusions 
when I embarked on this project. I feel that the work that I have done has helped me to widen 
my perspective on certain issues in an effort to understand.  
 
Research has proven to be a very rewarding way how to learn. The available literature is 
awesome, and continuous reading is a must in the research process, in order to appreciate 
what has already been written and integrate, extend or simply debate the arguments put 
forward by others. 
 
Overall, this research process has been a humbling experience and this is only the beginning. 
The possibility of contributing further to the wide ocean of knowledge is challenging and 
exciting. I hope that in this way I can better understand and help others to do so as well.  
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APPENDIX A:  FORMAT AND CONTENT OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT                                        
 
Table 15: The research instrument 
 
Introduction 
 
The introduction is tailor-made to suit the interviewee, by providing some facts from the 
documentary research which involve the interviewee.  
Then I ask the interviewee to elaborate on his/her involvement in the accounting reform, 
and for an opinion about the process. For example, I ask: 'Does the accounting reform make 
sense to you?' 
 
 
Part A - 
Accounting 
 
This part is divided into four sections and concerns the financial reporting aspect of the 
reform concept: 
 An overview of the current accounting system and the proposed accrual accounting 
system; 
 Measurement focus, both current and as proposed; 
 Disclosure issues that may need to be tackled in the proposed system; 
 Consolidated financial statements, that is, the level of consolidation that is 
intended. 
And here is where I ask them about the distinction between national accounting and 
government accounting. 
 
 
Part B - 
Budgetary 
accounting and 
budgeting 
 
This part is divided into four sections and deals with another aspect of the reform concept, 
being the budget and performance measurement: 
 Budgetary accounting; 
 Accrual budgeting; 
 Budgeting principles; 
 Output measurement. 
 
 
Part C -  
Context of the 
reforms 
 
This part is divided into four sections: 
 The process of setting new accounting norms and rules and other institutional 
arrangements; 
 The main stimuli that triggered the reform, and factors that may be holding back 
the reform; 
 The identification of the key players in the reform process; 
 The planned implementation strategy. 
 
 
Part D -  
IPSAS 
 
This part concentrates on the IPSAS decision: who decided? Why? Why IPSAS and not 
some other standards? How will IPSAS be adopted and implemented?  
I refer the participant to Art 16(3) of  EU Council Directive 2011/85,  and then ask about 
their reaction and expectations. 
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thirty-six participants were identified (refer to figure 20). Eight did not participate (indicated 
in italics in figure 20), resulting in twenty-eight actual interviews. 
 
  
  
•the Permanent Secretary at the MFEI
•The Minister for Finance, the Economy and Investment
Political Reform Promoters (2): 
politicians and/or government officials who initiate a reform and have the power to enforce it
• Two Parliamentary members (members of the Public Accounts Committee)
•The Accountant General
•The Director for Government Accounting
•An Accountant at the Treasury
•The Director General for Internal Auditing and Investigations
•The Deputy Auditor General
•The Assistant Auditor General
•The Director for Financial Policy Development and Analysis
•The Budget Office
•The Director General for Strategy and Operations Support
•The Manager at MITA responsible for new IT system
•The Principal Permanent Secretary (Head of the Civil Service and Secretary to the 
Cabinet)
•Nine Directors  for Corporate Services
•Three Directors for Corporate Services
Stakeholders (25): 
depending on their discretionary powers, these actors may affect the reform process
•The Technical Officer of the Malta Institute of Accountants
•The MEP vice chair of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European 
Parliament
•A MITA official on the Departmental Accounting System
•The ex-head of the Accrual Accounting Task Force (retired)
•A partner at the private audit firm that was responsible  for writing accounting standards 
specifically for the Maltese government (prior to the decision to adopt IPSAS)
• A Member of the Government Finance Statistics Committee from the National Statistics 
Office
•The ex-Director of the Budget Office
•The Shadow Minister for Finance
•The preceding Minister for Finance (ex
Reform Drivers (9): 
these actors may influence the decisions of political actors
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Figure 20: The research participants 
 
-EU Commissioner for Health)
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Table 16: The Interview Schedule 
 
No. Interview date Notes Abbreviation 
 
1 8/10/11 Technical Officer, The Malta Institute of Accountants MIA 
2 27/10/11 and later Director Government Accounting, The Treasury DGA 
3 30/11/11 and later Accountant, The Treasury TA 
4 1/12/11 and later Assistant Auditor General NAO2 
5 2/12/11 Chairman, Public Accounts Committee PAC1 
6 6/12/11 Member, Public Accounts Committee PAC2 
7 6/12/11 Director General Finance, Office of the Prime Minister DCS1 
8 14/12/11 Ex-Director General Special Projects, MFEI XDGS 
9 9/1/12 and later Permanent Secretary, MFEI PS 
10 10/1/12 Director Corporate Services, Ministry for Infrastructure, 
Transport and Communication 
DCS2 
11 13/1/12 Manager, Malta Information Technology Authority 
(MITA) 
MITA2 
12 17/1/12 Director Financial Policy Development and Analysis, 
MFEI 
DFPDA 
13 27/1/12 and later Accountant General, The Treasury AG 
14 31/1/12 Partner, Grant Thornton Audit Firm GT 
15 5/3/12 Deputy Auditor General NAO1 
16 12/4/12 Director General Finance, Ministry for Health, the Elderly 
and Community Care 
DCS3 
17 19/4/12 Director General Finance, Ministry for Justice and Home 
Affairs 
DCS4 
18 20/4/12 and later The Budget Office, MFEI BO 
19 3/5/12 Director General Strategy and Operations Support, MFEI DGSOS 
20 3/5/12 Ministry for Resources and Rural Affairs DCS5 
21 1/6/12 Director General, Internal Audit and Investigations 
Directorate (IAID) 
IAID 
22 6/6/12 Manager Finance, Ministry for Education, Employment 
and Family 
DCS6 
23 6/6/12 Manager for Schools Finances, Ministry for Education, 
Employment and Family 
DCS7 
24 19/6/12 Manager, National Statistics Office NSO 
25 6/8/12 Ex-Director General Budget Office, MFEI XBO 
26 9/8/12 Ministry for Gozo DCS8 
27 11/9/12 General Manager, Malta Information Technology 
Authority (MITA) 
MITA1 
28 28/9/12 Director Corporate Services, Ministry for Justice, Dialogue 
and Family111 
DCS9 
 
  
                                                 
111
 Following a Parliamentary re-shuffle in June 2012, the Ministries were increased from nine to twelve. The 
Ministry for Justice, Dialogue and Family is one of the "new" ministries resulting from the changes in portfolio. 
 Figure 21: Hierarchical Structure i
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dentifying the Public Accounts Committee
: Hierarchical Structure for the National Audit Office
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 Figure 23: Hierarchical Structure i
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dentifying the Internal Audit Directorate and one DCS
 
 
dentifying the other DCS and the MITA
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 Figure 25: Hierarchical Structure for the Ministry of Finance identifying the Permanent Secretary, 
Financial Policy Directorate, the Budget Office, The Treasury, Strategy & Operations Directorate 
         
 
 
Figure 
   
 
   
 
Financial Policy 
Development and 
Analysis (DFPDA)
Budget Office (BO)
Ex-Director 
General Budget 
Office (XBO)
Malta Institute of Accountants, 
Technical Officer (MIA)
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National Statistics Office 
 
26: Other participants, external to the government
 
Minister of Finance
Permanent 
Secretary (PS)
The Treasury
Accountant 
General (AG)
Director 
Government 
Accounting (DGA)
Treasury 
Accountant (TA)
Director Debt 
Management
Strategy &  
Operations 
Support (DGSOS)
Ex-Director 
General Special 
Projects (XDGS)
(Other sections)
 
Grant Thornton (Audit Firm), 
Partner (GT) 
and the 
 
 
National Statistics 
Office (NSO)
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APPENDIX D: THEMATIC MAP 
 
Figure 27: Thematic Map 
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APPENDIX E: DEFINING AND NAMING THE THEMES 
 
1. THE DAS - Describe the Current System 
a) Implementation 
b) How it works; double entry; coding 
c) Pros & Cons 
2. CASH BASIS 
a) Importance of Cash basis 
b) Advantages 
c) Disadvantages 
d) Financial Reporting and audit: procedure and defects 
e) Abuses 
f) Perception of Cash Basis - negative 
g) Perception of Cash Basis - positive 
3. ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING 
a) Expectations - positive 
b) Advantages 
c) Disadvantages 
d) Perception of accrual accounting - negative 
e) Purposes of accrual accounting 
f) Public vs Private 
4. REFORM CONCEPT & EXPECTATIONS 
a) Importance of accounting system 
b) Which accounting system? 
c) Reform Concept 
d) Reform Expectations and reservations 
5. REFORMS 
a) Beginning of the reforms and the Accrual Accounting Task Force 
b) Reform work to date 
c) Trial Financial Statements 
d) Rate of reform 
e) Immediate Plans 
f) Planned Accrual Accounting System 
6. BUDGETING 
a) Importance of Budgeting 
b) Budgeting at present 
c) Accrual budgeting 
d) Budgetary control 
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7. IT SYSTEM 
a) MITA and new system 
b) Issue of tender factors 
c) New IT system - Committee, specifications and disagreements 
d) IT System and cost 
e) IT System and staff 
f) Implementation and anticipated problems 
8. LEGISLATION 
a) New legislation: gradual changes vs major overhaul 
b) Reinforce fiscal discipline 
c) Update the budgetary process 
d) The definition of the "reporting entity" 
e) Work done on new legislation (scrapped?) 
f) New legislation and the NAO (disagreement) 
g) Current legislation and defects 
h) Introducing modern financial management concepts 
i) Is a new legislation required to introduce accounting reforms? 
9. THE TREASURY AND THE REFORMS 
a) The work of the Treasury on the reforms 
b) A more active role of the Treasury 
c) The MFEI and conflicts with the Treasury 
10. CHAMPION 
a) Previous Minister of Finance 
b) Ex-Director General Special Projects 
c) MFEI vs Treasury 
d) Limited resources - MFEI 
e) Limited resources - Treasury 
f) "Orphan" project 
11. POLITICIANS 
a) Politicians vs Civil Servants 
b) Politicians and the reform 
c) Political decisions 
d) Politicians and training 
e) Reporting accrual to Parliament 
f) Effect of General Election on reform process 
12. HUMAN CAPACITIES 
a) Staff attitude towards reforms 
b) Change in culture required 
c) Human resources and training 
d) Civil servants with a vision 
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13. AUDIT 
a) NAO and the reform 
b) Importance of NAO involvement in the reform 
c) Problems for the NAO 
d) Qualified Audit Report and the reform 
14. DEPARTMENTS 
a) Departments and reforms 
b) Functions and responsibilities of DCS in the accrual accounting project 
c) Lack of feedback to DCS on project 
15. DECENTRALISATION AND CENTRALISATION  
a) Organisation structure and problems 
b) EBUs and the DAS 
c) Decentralisation and NPM 
d) Problems with entities 
e) Central Control and post-NPM(?) 
16. NEGATIVE FACTORS 
a) Small country and culture 
b) Change in Minister 
c) Crisis and priorities 
d) Mentality and resistance 
e) IT System specifications - disagreement 
f) Effect of new legislation on operations 
g) Staff training - lack of professional staff 
h) Government level of pay does not attract professionals 
i) Lack of funds for IT system 
j) Political aspects (no political will; forward planning not desirable; too transparent) 
k) Lethargy at all levels (even EU) and lack of vision (no champion) 
l) Meeting EU obligations (and ESA assumed as a replacement for accrual accounting) 
m) Waiting for EU decision 
n) MFEI is understaffed 
o) Time span taken 
17. POSITIVE FACTORS 
a) IT system needs to be replaced 
b) EU requirements (ESA helped change mentality) 
c) Previous Minister's vision 
d) Ex-Director General Special Projects as driver 
e) Government is more experienced 
f) Political pressures 
g) Local criticism and private audit firms 
h) To be like the private sector 
i) To appear more progressive (especially with the EU) 
j) Comparability with other countries' reporting 
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18. THE REPORTING ENTITY 
a) Not specified in current legislation (and rather hazy in proposed/scrapped) 
b) Assumed definition 
c) Importance of ESA definition - General Government 
d) IPSAS 6 not referred to 
e) Financial Engineering encouraged by ESA definition 
19. CONSOLIDATION 
a) Consolidation or aggregation? 
b) No problem envisaged due to use of different standards 
c) Level of consolidation 
d) Objective of consolidation 
e) Costs involved 
20. THE MALTA INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS (MIA) 
a) Interest of the private sector in the public sector 
b) Private sector/MIA involvement in the reforms 
c) MIA level of interest 
d) MIA and members' interests 
e) MIA and limited resources 
21. MGAS 
a) MGAS Development 
b) MGAS based on IFRS/IPSAS 
c) MGAS Committee and the "Financial Policy Development & Analysis Unit" 
22. IPSAS 
PART D of interviews plus 
a) Importance of Standards 
b) Importance of IPSAS 
c) IFAC & IPSAS and MIA obligations 
d) IPSAS & IFRS & MGAS       IPSAS decision* 
e) IPSAS adoption/adaption and the ESA effect 
f) IPSAS, the EU and ESA 
g) IPSAS Committee 
h) IPSAS training 
23. SOVEREIGNTY* 
a) IPSAS and sovereignty 
24. THE EU 
a) Before the EU - the IMF 
b) EU Policies & Outlook 
c) EU and reforms 
d) EU Reporting - importance 
e) EU Crisis 
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25. NATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
a) EDP & ESA 95 
b) National Accounts Preparation 
c) National Accounting vs Business Accounting 
d) ESA vs IPSAS and accrual accounting 
e) National vs Government accounting 
f) Mixing up the two 
g) Importance of EDP 
h) NSO as decision-maker and "accounts" preparer 
i) Eurostat power 
j) Eurostat Missions and the NAO  
k) NAO involvement in upstream data missions 
l) Eurostat reporting and the DAS Coding system 
m) EDP as reform driver 
26. SMALL COUNTRY AND CULTURE 
a) Relative size of civil service 
b) Public employees skills 
c) Learning from other countries 
d) Limited resources and practical implications 
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